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Myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME), also referred to as chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), is a 
symptomatically defined and debilitating condition that presents as a range of physiological 
and psychological effects. Post-exertional fatigue and ongoing low energy levels are cardinal 
features. Whilst ME-like conditions have been recognised for at least two hundred years, they 
have been characterised over recent decades by a fiercely contested debate as to whether 
aetiology is primarily psychological or physiological. ME sufferers experience profound 
changes to their self-perception, ability to maintain daily routines and activities and how they 
are perceived in terms of their capacity to carry out social roles, including illness-status. The 
contested aetiology results in-part from a climate of dualistic thought and the biomedical 
model upon which ME is treated and theorised.  
Whilst the effects of ME on self experience have been investigated from various qualitative 
and quantitative perspectives, the primary purpose of this thesis is to develop a psychosocial 
framework from which to explore previously neglected dimensions of the effect of ME on self 
experience. Developing a psychosocial understanding of ME is in keeping with a turn towards 
post-Cartesian and non-dualistic thinking. The second interconnected purpose of this thesis is 
to address the role played by the material environment and objects and to conceptualise their 
importance and relation to self and how it is affected by ME. This is currently absent in the 
literature on ME.  
Developing a psychosocial framework suitable for this purpose rested on a synthesis of Actor 
Network Theory (ANT) and a psychoanalytically influenced use of metaphor and metonymy. 
At the heart of this synthesis are the notions of relational ontology (Latour, 1997; DeLanda, 
2002) and assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; DeLanda, 2002; Hodder, 2012). A 
relational ontology focuses on the relations between disparate objects such as material 
artefacts, humans, other organisms and concepts and avoids prioritising any one ‘thing’ as 
more important than another. The notion of assemblage has emerged alongside ideas 
concerning complexity, chaos and indeterminacy and informs a vocabulary addressing the 
problem of causality, determination and the stability of social and psychological phenomena 
(Venn, 2006). As part of a psychoanalytically informed psychosocial framework these 
concepts enable an exploration of ME by bringing together disparate aspects such as everyday 
objects, experiences, symptoms and environments in a non-causal, non-dualistic and 
processual manner. The psychoanalytic element also enables an exploration of the 
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unconscious and irrational aspects of experience, which is most pertinent with regards to the 
effects of ME.  
Thus, the premise of this research was to establish a psychosocial methodology and 
theoretical basis from which to explore the effects of ME on self experience. Moreover, this 
methodology was designed to engage with the complex, coincident and entangled nature of 
the symptoms, discourses, objects, material artefacts, environments and non-human 
organisms that ME appears to be comprised of.  
Methods were developed which enabled the researcher to be with and explore the day-to-day 
life and routines of eight ME sufferers in their everyday environments over a six month 
period. This involved working with the ME sufferers taking part primarily in their own homes 
and spaces around their home which they frequented, such as shopping malls and even a 
cemetery; in itself novel in terms of qualitative research into ME. Of these eight sufferers, 
three were male [age range 49 – 65; earliest formal diagnosis of ME occurring in 2005] and 
five females [age range 25 – 63; earliest diagnosis 2002]. Two sufferers were in paid 
employment, one was retired and five were unable to work due to their ME. Due to the 
extensive nature of the data, only 3 case studies, two male and three female, were selected for 
in-depth analysis. Cases selected were those that most clearly illustrated central analytic 
themes. 
Data comprised talk, audio-visual material and the affective responses of the researcher. 
Analytic methods were devised which initially adopted a thematic approach before 
metaphoric and metonymic equivalences were drawn between what ME sufferers discussed 
and aspects of the routines, objects and environments they were engaged with. This informed 
descriptions of how these things became networked, in an ANT sense, and how self 
experience was implicated. A key finding which emerged is the notion of debilitating spaces.  
This term captures the manner in which, for certain sufferers, the experience and hence the 
maintenance of ME was intrinsically enmeshed with their immediate physical environment. 
Further findings discussed include the way in which seemingly everyday objects such as food 
blenders can be co-opted by sufferers as a means of enhancing their self-experience in light of 
ME. 
Overall, the findings of this PhD are discussed in terms of the success and applicability of that 
premise and its contribution to the field of psychosocial approaches. The key assertion is that 
the methodology enhances an understanding of ME and its effects, highlighting the variable 
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yet particular nature of ME and its effect on self experience and in incorporating the hitherto 






















































Introduction, overview and structure of the thesis 
 
1.1  Introduction and aims of this thesis 
This introductory chapter provides an overview and rationale of the research 
represented by this thesis. The research focus was developing a methodology suitable 
for exploring the relation between ME, the self and the material world and the things in 
it from a non-causal, non-reductive perspective. I begin the chapter by summarising 
the effects and history of ME and why it presents as a contested illness that continues 
to evade distinct characterisation. I then provide an overview of my relation to and 
interest in ME and how this evolved into the methodology and methods explicated. 
Finally, I present summaries of each chapter, drawing attention to their salient features 
and, where appropriate, existing work that I have drawn on. 
1.2  Overview of ME and its effects  
Confusion and ambiguity has long surrounded what is currently known in the UK as 
myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME) (Smith & Wessely, 2014); a distressing and 
debilitating chronic condition marked primarily by fatigue of an unknown origin. In its 
acute phase, sufferers are often bed ridden. The course of the illness is unpredictable, 
remitting and relapsing. Reviews of an eclectic range of papers which explore ME 
often reflect the ambiguity associated with the condition in their opening paragraphs; 
for instance a diffuse symptomology and a contested history dating back to at least the 
19
th
 century. The exact aetiology of ME remains unknown, although it is increasingly 
discussed in terms of an heterogenous, multi-system illness (Myhill, Booth and 
McLaren-Howard, 2009; Deary & Chalder, 2010). Different hypotheses have been 
proposed concerning the origin of the condition, from immunological disorders to 
post-traumatic oxidative stress and yet the confused and confusing nature of ME 
continues to challenge contemporary understandings of health and disease (Poeschla et 
al. 2013). 
Clinically, ME is characterised by disabling, unexplained fatigue that is not alleviated 
by rest and which persists for four months or more (Bayliss et al. 2014). Beyond 
fatigue, symptoms are wide-ranging and include headaches, cognitive impairment, 
pain, sore throat, unrefreshing sleep and post-exertional malaise. There are no positive 
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diagnostic criteria and instead diagnosis is by exclusion of other conditions. After what 
is often an acute onset many sufferers progress to a chronic trajectory and prognosis 
for recovery is variable.  
The mainstays of treatments for ME in the UK are cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT), graded exercise therapy (GET) and pacing. CBT and GET are aimed at 
rehabilitation whereas pacing aims at adaptation to the illness (White et al. 2011). The 
aim of CBT is altering negative cognitions that are hypothesised as playing a 
maintenance role in ME, whereas GET seeks to engage the patient in gradually and 
consistently increased exercise with the hypothesis that under-activity leads to 
deconditioning and exacerbates the condition (Wessely, S., Nimnuan, C., & Sharpe, 
M, 1999). Pacing is based on the idea that ME sufferers have a depleted amount of 
energy to spend on activities and that management should involve ensuring expended 
energy remains within the available ‘energy envelope’ (Jason, 2008; Brown, Evans 
and Jason, 2013; Goudsmit et al. 2012).  
The efficacy of these treatments is debated. PACE, the largest randomly controlled 
trial of CBT and GET to date in the UK, compared specialist medical care (SMC) to 
CBT and GET and pacing (White, Goldsmith, Johnson, et al. 2011). CBT and GET 
appeared similarly efficacious and both better than pacing or SMC. However, 
improvement rates for CBT and GET were 30% and 28% which means that the 
majority of sufferers showed little or no improvement. Moreover, Bleijenberg and 
Knoop (2011) claim that there is little empirical evidence for the proposed mechanisms 
underlying CBT and GET. Twisk and Maes (2009) state that CBT and GET are often 
counterproductive and have resulted in some sufferers experiencing worsening 
symptoms. Twisk and Arnoldus (2012) add that CBT and GET do not address 
objective measures such as oxygen uptake. Thus, the issues surrounding, and rationales 
for, CBT and GET appear to reflect an implicit psychologisation of treatment and 
hence an underlying pathology rooted in the mind.  
Indeed, the debate that surrounds ME reflects confusion over the relationship between 
mind and body per se. Establishing whether the aetiology of ME and its antecedents 
reflect a predominantly psychological or physiological process has been an area of 
conflict for specialists and sufferers alike for over a century. However, Van 
Houdenhove, Van Hoof, Becq et al. (2009) report that sufferers attending either a 
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psychologically or biomedically orientated treatment centre displayed no significantly 
different psychopathologies.  
Part of the issue with characterising ME appears to reflect not whether mind and body 
can be differentiated aetiologically but the belief that they can and should be 
differentiated in the first place. This reflects broader epistemological questions. Many 
of the aetiological issues and approaches to treatment revolve around the mind body 
dualism and especially the hegemonic status of the biomedical model; which implies 
that the mind and body can be treated separately and that, ultimately, mind can be 
reduced to biological processes (Nettleton, 2006).  
Because no consistent physiological aetiology could be found, clinicians began to look 
to psychological aspects as potentially causal and to represent it as psychologically 
rooted (e.g. McEvedy & Beard, 1970; Abbey and Garfinkel, 1991; Manu, Matthews 
and Lane, 1992). Whilst the conceptualisation of illness-as-deviance, from sociological 
perspectives (Gerson, 1976) has waned, its presence clearly lingers around ME. A 
further issue is that ME is often co-morbid with psychiatric conditions such as major 
depressive disorder (Arnold, 2008; Van Houdenhove, Kempke & Luyten, 2010) and 
this raises a question as to whether psychiatric disorder promotes ME or vice versa.  
These issues have led to the ongoing stigmatisation of the condition and 
delegitimisation in the eyes of sufferers and even some physicians and a contest 
between sufferer and physician to establish the true nature of the illness (Banks & 
Prior, 2001). The difficulties sufferers face because of this psychologisation, 
delegitimisation and uncertainty is that they struggle to access benefits and insurance 
and a socially warranted sick role (Dumit, 2006). The lack of a definitive diagnosis and 
the spectre of a psychological aetiology mean many sufferers come to experience 
rejection and delegitimisation from family and friends (Wendell, 1996). 
So the history of ME is complex. Indeed, even the term ‘ME’ is contested and often 
appears synonymously or alongside CFS as ME/CFS. CFS, or chronic fatigue 
syndrome, is a term most widely associated with the history of conditions similar if not 
identical to ME in the USA. ME is most often used in the UK and reflects a somewhat 
different trajectory of nosological development.  Lewis, Cooper & Bennett (1994) 
suggest that CFS is preferential to ME because it implies neither a specific 
neurological aetiology nor a homogenous phenomenon. CFS and ME are classified as 
distinct illnesses in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10). However, a 
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Joint Working Group Report (2001) indicates insufficient evidence for complete 
distinction between CFS and ME or delineation of subtypes.  
Biomedical research concerning ME focuses on aetiology but not on what it feels like 
to experience ME. In contrast, much social scientific qualitative research has explored 
how ME is experienced. Approaches in this area include discourse analysis, narrative 
analysis, interpretive phenomenological analysis and grounded theory. Whilst this 
work is useful in enabling sufferers to describe what ME feels like, a tendency is to 
aggregate the voices of sufferers and generalise how ME is experienced. What has 
emerged are a set of themes or discourses that characterise the condition, including 
warranting knowledge claims about ME, offsetting psychological stigmatisation and 
how illness narratives are constructed (Guise, Widdicombe and McKinlay, 2007). 
However, no single discourse about ME has attained dominance and hence each 
discourse challenges the explanatory power of each other discourse (Tucker, 2004). 
The picture becomes more complex and confused, given that sufferers are increasingly 
able to access information about ME. The distinction between expert and lay 
knowledge becomes blurred (Horton-Salway, 2004) and a ‘gulf’ between the 
understanding of sufferers and doctors exists (Hossenbaccus & White, 2013). 
However, the relationship between illness in general and society is equally complex. 
Illnesses do not simply unfold as objective entities affecting peoples’ health in a 
unitary manner. Instead, how illnesses are constructed reflects a complex relationship 
between various social, biopolitical and institutional discourses (Karfakis, 2013). 
Kleinman (1986) for instance describes how not only can symptoms originate in the 
social world but also how the body and society exist in a dialectic relationship such 
that the body becomes a site on which social anxiety is inscribed. The manner in which 
people seek professional help in light of illness and bodily-changes is also shaped by 
culturally distinctive illness beliefs (Ware & Kleinman, 1992). How illness is 
experienced is therefore a constantly shifting process that reflects the dialectic relation 
between the well-body and the ill-body (Paterson, 2001). Thus, an exploration of ME 
and its effects should ideally reflect the confused yet dynamic relationship between 
illness, the self and the body and the manner in which these are entangled with social 





1.3  Journey towards the research premise 
What struck me about ME prior to beginning my PhD studies, despite increasing 
recognition of its heterogenous profile, was its implicit representation as a discrete 
illness entity. From a discursive perspective, establishing ME as an unambiguous 
object enables various discursive positions to be constructed around it. Indeed the 
mind-body dichotomy enables similar contrasting discursive work to be achieved 
(Cohn, 1999). But at the same time I recognised a conflict in that ME did not appear to 
exist in any easily explained manner. I came to think about the term ME as a necessary 
label, yet one which hindered attempts to understand the condition as much as it 
helped.  
My experience of ME involved two consecutive long term relationships with sufferers, 
one of whom had almost recovered from the condition and one who developed it and 
was diagnosed during the course of the relationship. I had therefore engaged with 
much literature on the subject. My casual reading led me to observe that despite a lot 
of work being carried out on how ME affects self experience, there was nothing 
explicit on how ME sufferers negotiated their immediate material environment, given 
the debilitating nature of ME symptoms. This observation coincided with making 
alterations to my partner’s house in light of her worsening ME symptoms. A second 
observation was that despite discussing both partners’ life histories leading up to and 
including ME, there was no clear cause for their condition or its ongoing presence in 
the absence of any physiological pathology. This led me to question whether thinking 
about causes was the most useful way of addressing the problem.  
These were the issues which laid the foundations for my research and which 
intersected with my existing interests in psychoanalytic theory. My research aim 
crystallised into developing a way of exploring the effects of ME on self experience 
and how this experience was related to the material environment and objects in it. I 
wanted to develop a perspective that incorporated psychoanalytic ideas because of 
their value in exploring the confusing, contradictory aspects of how ME is 
experienced. Most significantly, psychoanalytic ideas struck me as providing a means 
of negotiating the mind-body dualism that ME was stuck upon.  
Given that it was impossible to identify a single cause for my partners’ ME, I wanted 
to find a way of holding on to the messiness and complexity of the condition. Finally, 
because I had insight into two particular experiences with ME and because of the 
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generalising tendency I had noted in ME literature, I wanted to highlight what I came 
to term the particularity of ME experience; that each case of ME was as different as it 
was similar.  
1.4  Ideas drawn on to establish the methodology 
Ideas about the autonomous and unitary nature of the self have for some time been 
challenged by postmodern and poststructuralist notions of a more fluid self, 
determined by powerful, politically infused discourses (Hollway, 2007). Benwell and 
Stokoe (2006) for instance explain how essentialist approaches to self, including 
psychoanalytically inclined thinking posit self and identity as an internal, knowable 
product of mind. Lewis (2012) claims that staying with a predominantly 
constructionist view of self and assuming that experience reduces to and can be 
understood through the way that broad social discourses position people, or how 
individuals call upon discursive repertoires, overlooks dimensions of experience that 
transcend inside/outside and are extra-discursive. In other words these are the elements 
of experience that are unconscious, felt, preverbal, connect self with other and that are 
not easily representable through discourse. Given these types of critique, I looked for 
ideas that could accommodate thinking about self as simultaneously fluid and yet 
retained a sense of interiority. A self where the divisions between inside and outside in 
terms of social and psychological processes were less clear. Most importantly, I looked 
for a means of exploring the ways that people are often not clear on what motivates 
their feelings or behaviour. My research led to an area of investigation gathered 
together as psychosocial approaches.  
Psychosocial approaches is an emerging yet distinct discipline representing an eclectic 
body of work engaging with non-dualistic means of theorising the relations between 
the social and the psychological. It draws on ideas from feminist studies, anthropology, 
post-structuralism, discursive and psychoanalytic bodies of theory and continental 
philosophy. Developing a psychosocial framework appeared apposite because it 
maintains the integrity of both the psychic and social aspects of a self and typically 
employ psychoanalytic principles to rethink existing models of human rationality and 
the notion of a unitary self. 
Given a psychosocial framework, I then looked to a means of establishing 
commonality between all the entities that ME might involve, including any model of 
self that I developed. I explored sociological theory to establish how self had been 
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thought of in relation to materiality. It was perhaps no coincidence that over recent 
years there had been a turn to materiality in the social sciences, with new ways of 
exploring and reassessing the fundamental relations with material things being 
developed (Domanska, 2006; Sayes, 2014). My work therefore reflects this material 
turn.  
I did not want to implicitly suggest ME was caused by any one antecedent. It was 
important to avoid assuming either a biological, social or psychological definition of 
ME as this would inevitably lead to an inherently causal model. This meant finding a 
way into the experience of ME with no prior conceptions as to what might be entailed. 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) appeared ideally suited (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1986; 
2005; 2007; Law, 1986a; Law, 1992). ANT originated in the study of science and 
provided a model of technological organisation that rejected social relations as 
independent of the material world (Latour, 2005). The basic premise of ANT is to 
describe how human and non-human entities, referred to in ANT as actants (Latour, 
1987; 2005), come together in networks where the interests of a focal actant or a 
problematic situation can be negotiated and resolved (Law, 1986b; 1992). ANT 
explores the translations that occur as actants effect and have effected their own and 
each other’s identities and actions and how relations emerge and are maintained by 
actants ensuring each other’s ongoing interests (Tatnall and Gilding, 1999). 
The premise that appealed to me concerning ANT was that it set out by establishing a 
relational ontology. The basic tenet of a relational ontology is that no entity is 
fundamentally more important than another (Latour, 1997) and is premised on the idea 
that there is no such thing as the social, but only actors in associations with each other 
(Munir & Jones, 2004). Therefore, the social or any other apparent ontological 
category cannot be looked upon to provide an explanation for how things behave.  
Apart from enabling me to give equal credence to, for example, the role that a virus 
and a specialist discourse may play in ME, a relational ontology implies that materially 
orientated events are always in a dynamic state of becoming and disintegration 
(Collinge, 2006). In other words, a dynamic complex system such as an actor network  
sometimes leads to areas of order and at other times disorder, depending on whether 
actants are associating or dissociating from each other. This notion appeared to reflect 
the dynamic, eclectic and complex relations between the things that ME was 
comprised of.  
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However, whilst ANT looks only to the surface of actants and brackets off recourse to 
the inner complexity of actants, be they human, pieces of rope or a PowerPoint 
presentation, I wanted to retain some interiority in terms of the way that the self was 
construed and experienced.  It was important to reflect not only the subjective feelings 
mobilised by ME but also that people usually experience self as an internal and 
consistent entity, even if at times confusing. To achieve this, I looked more closely at 
psychoanalytic ideas and particularly notions of metaphor and metonymy as a way of 
grounding the association between self, body and the material world.  
My reading had already explored the work of Freud, Klein, Winnicott, Lacan and 
many others. What I had taken away from this was an increasingly explicit move 
towards what Freud had implicitly theorised, namely that the processes of the 
unconscious appear to function in terms of metaphor and metonymy. For example, a 
major theme in psychoanalysis, that of transference, implies that the present is 
understood unconsciously in terms of the past. As Borbely (1998; p.923) notes, this 
use of metaphor extends its original linguistic conception to imply the metaphoric 
nature of mentation in general. Given that Freud (1900) had already rooted ego as a 
primarily somatic affair, I looked to contemporary work on metaphor that theorised the 
connections between body, mental development and the physical and material nature 
of the world. I encountered the seminal work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980a; 1980b; 
1999).  
Exploring the associations between the body, cognition, affect and the non-material 
and material entities that people encounter in the world using metaphor and metonymy 
opened up the possibility of considering how the different things that ME appeared to 
be comprised of were connected. Moreover, metaphor and metonymy appeared to 
provide a means of tracing how, from an ANT perspective, actants become displaced 
from place to place and across time and form. Metaphor and metonymy hence provide 
a language to describe the ongoing presence and effects of things that have been 
transformed and re-represented. 
Thus, the final set of ideas I drew on concerned the metaphorical relations between 
self, space and other from the psychoanalytic perspectives of Freud, Klein, Winnicott, 
Stolorow and Atwood. I also drew on the work of Lakoff and Johnson in terms of the 
relation between body, thought and metaphor and the work of Schmitt, Stern and 
Mueller in terms of linguistic metaphors and metaphor analysis.  
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Drawing these various influences together enabled me to develop a non-reductive 
methodology capable of exploring the individual experience of ME and its effects on 
self and how these reflect associations with specific material environments and the 
objects in them.  
The present research builds upon and extends ME research by: 
 Developing a psychosocial understanding of ME in keeping with a general turn 
towards a non-dualistic understanding where the experience of the sufferer moves 
centre stage (Baker, Kale and Menken, 2002; Bracken & Thomas, 2001).  
 Addressing the role played by the material environment and objects at the level of 
self.  
 Informing advances in psychosocial theory by seeking to develop a multi-method 
methodology and analytical approach. 
This rationale is formalised in the following research questions:  
 How can material actants be used to explore the relationship between self and others 
for people with ME?                  
 How can metaphor and metonymy be used to explore relations between actants?  
 Can ANT and metaphor be used to rethink how the body is theorised in ME? 
1.5  Methods developed 
To address the relationship between ME and self experience, the research visits with 
ME sufferers needed to employ experience-near methods. This entailed being in the 
home and everyday environments that were important to the sufferer or were 
implicated in their ongoing daily lives with ME. This approach is novel with regards to 
ME research. Ethnographic methods appeared to be suited to the task. As Owen (2014; 
p.13) notes:  
“The core premises of ethnography are to use multiple methods so that the 
researcher can analyze a phenomenon from multiple angles and make links 
between different research materials and experiences.” 
Beyond exploring the narratives of ME sufferers, my aim was to participate and 
observe in their everyday activities to shed light on how ME affected them and their 
ongoing, ordinary and everyday sense of self. The rationale for this was twofold. 
Firstly, from the ANT perspective, being in the everyday settings of ME sufferers 
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meant that I could observe actants and trace the associations between them. A 
longitudinal approach was adopted such that visiting the sufferer over an extended 
period would reflect the relapsing and remitting trajectory of ME. Visiting the sufferer 
five times over a six month period meant that I could follow actants by reflecting on 
my response to each encounter and use this response to inform questions that might 
arise and which could be followed up. This would not have been possible with stand-
alone interviews. The second aspect of the rationale was that adopting a position as an 
actant in relation to the sufferer’s experience of ME allowed me to develop a mode of 
reflexivity that could acknowledge my role in the research process, including the 
analysis.  
Several threads of data were accessed and woven together. For each visit, a digital 
video camera was used, which enabled me to record discussions and the activities that 
the sufferer and myself engaged in and the material objects and environments that 
were implicated. As I was interested in using the feelings that the research evoked in 
myself and feeding them back in to the research process, after the visit I also recorded 
my affective responses using a Dictaphone. It transpired that several ME sufferers I 
worked with wrote to me, unsolicited. The writings included reflections, questions and 
poetry and were included as part of the research procedure and analysis. Using 
multiple methods enabled me to gain experiential insights into the activities that ME 
sufferers carry out to help manage their condition as well as a visual record of how 
they interacted with the material world.  
My reading and reviewing of literature uncovered no ethnographically inclined studies 
of this nature, which points to the value of developing such approaches with regards to 
ME.  
1.6  A note on terminology 
Throughout this thesis I refer to the condition as ME apart from where primary studies 
which use the terms CFS or ME/CFS are cited. This is for two reasons. Firstly, it 
reflects the experience and history of the condition in the UK and secondly, and most 
significantly, all of the sufferers I worked with primarily referred to their condition as 
ME. My use of the term reflects an attempt to remain faithful to their accounts. But 
this decision in itself is contentious and highlights the challenges associated with 
making methodological choices concerning the study of ME and the challenge of 
writing about it (Robinson, 2003). In this vein, I also made an active choice to refer to 
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the people I carried out my research with and who experience ME not as ‘participants’ 
but as ‘ME sufferers’ or ‘people with ME’. This choice reflects textual consistency but 
primarily that I want the reader to hold in mind that ME sufferers are real people 
struggling under difficult circumstances and not objects of study that exist in an 
abstract, decontextualised life. 
1.7  Summary of chapters 
The final section of this introductory chapter provides a brief overview of all 
subsequent chapters. The developmental thread that runs through this thesis reflects a 
movement from existing theory to how this theory underpins methodological choices, 
how the methodological premise was translated into research methods and an 
analytical frame which is then exemplified through my analysis. I conclude with an 
evaluation of the methodological premises and how it contributes to an understanding 
of ME and as a psychosocial approach.  
Chapter two provides a review of the biomedical understanding of ME. I discuss the 
issues associated with diagnosing ME, epidemiology and outline the significant areas 
of physiology that have been explored through an aetiological lens. This is situated in a 
historical context that illustrates the long and contested nature of the condition. 
Because ME can only be diagnosed by the exclusion of other conditions it is important 
to understand how it overlaps and/or is co-morbid with other illnesses. To this end I 
discuss ME’s relation to psychological disorders and questions about its psychological 
aetiology and relation to personality and cognitive styles. This is especially important 
because of the manner in which ME has historically undergone delegitimisation as an 
organic illness, with the implication that it is ‘all in the head’. For this reason, the 
thread that runs through chapter two concerns the mind body dualism implicit in ME 
and how it manifests itself not only in terms of a psychologised aetiology but also in 
terms of the main treatment-approaches, research epistemologies and the general 
confusion that exists around the condition. Despite the present thesis representing 
qualitative social scientific research, it is important to provide the reader with enough 
detail to convey not only the confusion around ME but also the intense biomedical 
research that has been involved and how, despite many areas beginning to converge on 
the idea that ME is founded on definite physiological anomalies, much uncertainty 
remains; uncertainty that lays the foundation for the type of non-causal, non-reductive 
approach that the present thesis adopts.  
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Given that ME disrupts one’s sense of self and bodily unity, the self is at the heart of 
chapter three. I begin by situating ideas about self in relation to chronic illnesses from 
a general perspective, before focussing explicitly on how the self in ME has been 
explored in social scientific research. This complements the biomedical perspective of 
chapter two. Discussion of qualitative approaches to ME provides the reader with a 
sense of how ME is experienced but also some of the methodological and conceptual 
issues associated with existing research. A key assertion in this area is that illnesses do 
not affect the self in predictable ways but instead reflect complex arrangements of 
social, physiological and psychological factors. From this position I adopt a 
perspective on self that envisages it as a dynamic and contingent process that 
implicates the material world. I discuss the importance of psychoanalytically informed 
psychosocial approaches as a means of conceptualising and exploring the unconscious 
and confusing ways in which self can be experienced. The central theorists I draw on 
are Freud, Winnicott, Klein and Stolorow and Atwood. Overall, these bodies of 
psychoanalytic work enable the conceptualisation of an intermediate space that 
transcends the inner world of the psyche and the outer material world. Subsequent to 
psychoanalytic approaches to self I outline the central concepts of Actor Network 
Theory. ANT in conjunction with psychoanalytic ideas provides a means of exploring 
ME and self from an experience near and reflexive perspective. The final section of 
chapter three outlines existing work on spaces and places. Thinking about the 
relationship between ME sufferers and specific places such as their home is important 
because such places are already full of personal meanings, relationships and affects. 
Chapter three leads towards the notion of ME as contextualised in a dynamic, 
psychosocial space where various entities and experiences coalesce in non-causal 
ways.  
Chapter four discusses my methodological premise in terms of how the methods of 
ANT were drawn on to provide a general heuristic to explore the world of ME 
sufferers. Having outlined psychoanalytic ideas in chapter three, the present chapter 
develops a specific focus on how metaphor and metonymy can be used to investigate 
the associations between actants. Part of this discussion focuses on how contemporary 
work links metaphor to primary somatic experience. Thus is important as it provides 




In chapter five I describe how I developed my methodology into ethnographically 
informed methods. I begin by outlining the ethical requirement of the research before 
describing the steps undertaken to recruit ME sufferers and the demographic nature of 
the resulting sample of sufferers I worked with. In the second half of the chapter I 
detail the analytical procedure I developed, including the utilisation of ideas on 
metaphor analysis by Schmitt (2005) and Mueller (2005; 2010). Where necessary, I 
draw on existing methodology and theory to justify my choices. I also refer to my data 
to illustrate the more complex aspects of the analytical process. 
To retain the integrity of each sufferer’s experience of ME and to represent the 
particularity of how ME is experienced, each of my three analytical chapters are 
organised around a particular sufferer.  These are Bruce, Whimsy and Les; 
representing chapters six, seven and eight respectively.  Beyond retaining the integrity 
of each sufferer’s experience of ME, each chapter addresses one of each of my 
research questions as detailed previously. Thus, Bruce’s chapter exemplifies the 
relationship between ME, self experience and the material world and objects in it and 
how I used ANT as an heuristic device. I describe how Bruce utilises certain objects 
and practices to offset some of the consequences of ME and to provide a productive 
sense of self.  Whimsy’s chapter focuses more explicitly on how metaphor and 
metonymy were used to trace the associations between actants and how the 
antecedents to her ME can be thought about in terms of coincidence and coextensivity. 
I also suggest the notion of debilitating spaces to capture how an environment can 
become entangled with ME in detrimental ways. Les’s chapter discusses the relation 
between ME and the body and how metaphor provides a way of re-imaging the body 
in terms of its heterogeneity and its relation to places that Les visits. I discuss the 
unusual nature of Les’s ME-onset in relation to his heart as a particular part of the 
body and how the anxiety associated with events becomes entangled with ME and 
daily routines. Where necessary and throughout these chapters I draw on other ME 
sufferers I worked with to further exemplify or make contrasts in terms of my 
analytical claims. It is important to note some overlap of analytical inferences across 
these three chapters. This is inevitable given the aims of my methodological and 
analytical premises.  
Chapter nine entails three main aspects. Firstly, I present a summary of my main 
findings and how they contribute to an understanding of ME and psychosocial 
approaches. This is followed by a discussion and evaluation of central aspects of the 
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methodological premise, namely whether ANT and psychoanalytically inspired ideas 
on metaphor and metonymy were compatible and whether they were successfully 
synthesised and whether the relational ontology of ANT provided a useful way of 
symmetrising and exploring the many facets of ME. The final aspect of chapter nine 
involves outlining what I consider to be the potential limitations of the research and 
my personal reflections on the research journey. I finish by suggesting directions for 























Background to ME 
 
2.1  Chapter overview 
This chapter provides an account of the biomedical understanding of ME as well as a 
summary of its historical development and relation to psychiatric diagnosis.   
Biomedical literature was reviewed with a focus on the effects of ME and its 
hypothesised aetiology. An account of ME from this perspective provides a backdrop 
for ideas subsequently developed in this thesis. ME has a developmental history that 
conflates common-sense beliefs concerning what is a physiological or psychological 
symptom, such as fatigue, with specialist discourses, underpinning epistemologies and 
mismatched methodologies. Despite mounting claims that there is an organic basis to 
the condition, an implicit psychologisation exists which fuels the conflict between the 
subjective experience of ME and dominant discourses about it. The thread that runs 
through this chapter therefore concerns the centrality of the mind/body debate and the 
confusion that results from it. 
2.2  Presentation of ME 
ME symptomology is varied, including sore throat, fever, muscle pain, joint pain, 
headaches, malaise, painful lymph nodes, photophobia, irritability, cognitive 
impairment, forgetfulness, brain fog, sleep disturbances, muscle weakness, mood 
disturbances, orthostatic hypotension, nausea, digestive system dysfunction and 
recurrent flu like symptoms (Afari & Buchwald, 2003; Wyller, 2007; Courjaret et al. 
2009; Fernandez et al. 2009). The cardinal symptom of ME/CFS is debilitating, 
ongoing fatigue which severely limits the ability of the sufferer to maintain or achieve 
a normal every-day life style (Fukuda et al. 1994).  
2.3  Historical background to ME and nomenclature 
ME is often used interchangeably with CFS or together as ME/CFS.  Patients in the 
UK tend to prefer ME as a descriptor whereas physicians, especially in the USA, refer 
to it as CFS (Prins, van der Meer and Bleijenberg, 2006). These preferences reflect 
different biomedical research histories and experiences concerning ME over the last 
seventy years. However, conditions that resemble ME have been recorded for at least 
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two hundred years (Straus, 1991; Shorter 1993; Berrios, 1990; Wessely, 1990) but the 
terms ME and CFS have shorter, intrinsically linked histories.  
From the 1930s to the 1950s many polio-like epidemics occurred across the world; in 
locations such as Iceland, the UK, South Africa and the USA. These epidemics, 
eventually recognised as atypical of poliomyelitis, became grouped under the 
umbrella-term benign myalgic encephalomyelitis (Acheson, 1954; 1959). However, 
given that many incidents were neither benign nor myalgic, the prefix benign was 
eventually abandoned; hence the appearance of myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME) in the 
UK. In 1959, the term epidemic neuromyasthenia was suggested, based on the 
symptoms of muscle weakness; myasthenia and neurasthenia (Henderson and 
Shelekov, 1959).  
This terminology linked ME to a condition called neurasthenia; a fatiguing illness 
with symptoms of depression, headache and anxiety, identified by George Beard in 
1869. For several decades neurasthenia was a legitimate and ‘fashionable’ diagnosis 
(Berrios, 1995). However, given changes in psychiatric nosology, advances in 
neurology and changing social conceptions of illness the diagnosis fell out of favour. 
By the early 1940s, cases of neurasthenia were interpreted as depression (Berrios, 
1995; Wessely, 1990). Neurasthenia provides an often cited historical analogue to ME 
and highlights the difficulties reconciling illnesses with no definite organic basis as all 
in the mind.  
CFS first appeared in 1988 in the USA as a result of the focus on the Epstein-Barr 
(EB) virus and the proposal that the early polio-like epidemics were similar to chronic 
EB syndrome (Holmes et al. 1988). Thus, ME and CFS have developmental histories 
in the UK and the USA respectively. Wessely (1991) also notes that in the USA, 
attention was focussed on EB whereas in the UK enteroviruses were a focal point.  
Issues of nomenclature are intrinsically linked to the stigmatisation of ME as well as 
evolving biomedical understanding of the condition, given its association with 
neurasthenia and psychiatric diagnoses. The belief that ME may be psychosomatic or 
that psychological factors inform the onset or maintenance of the condition places it at 





2.4  Definitions and diagnostic criteria 
There is at present no positive diagnosis that can confirm or refute the presence of ME 
(Reeves et al. 2003; Harvey & Wessely, 2009). Because ME is neither a distinct 
nosological nor diagnostic entity and because the psychological symptoms overlap 
with neuropsychiatric syndromes such as somatoform and anxiety disorders and major 
depression, diagnosis is by exclusion (Fukuda et al. 1994; Prins, van der Meer and 
Bleijenberg, 2006).  
Diagnostic criteria retain many features associated with early epidemic outbreaks 
resembling ME more than fifty years ago. More recently there have been attempts to 
produce definitive criteria. In America, Holmes et al. (1988) under the Centre for 
Disease Control (CDC) set out the salient clinical features of CFS as the basis for 
future epidemiologic and clinical studies and indicate conditions producing similar 
symptoms that should be excluded from diagnosis. One limitation with their criteria is 
that the description of the primary characteristic of fatigue is abstract and doesn't 
distinguish CFS from unexplained fatigue in general. The first British attempt to 
describe criteria by which to assess for ME in terms of research studies was conducted 
by Sharpe et al. (1991).  
In comparison with the CDC criteria, the British [Oxford] criteria were specific for 
features of mood related symptoms, stipulating that mental functioning must be 
impaired whereas this effect may be a feature in the CDC criteria, but did not recognise 
any clinical sign or symptom as characteristic of ME. In 1994 updated CDC criteria 
appeared based on recognition of the ambiguity of neuropsychiatric symptoms and 
their potential to confound study results (Fukuda et al. 1994). As with the Oxford 
criteria, the emphasis was on a framework to foster a systematic research approach and 
to compare CFS with other populations such as those presenting no disorder and those 
with pre-existing conditions. These criteria also tried to take account of idiopathic 
cases of CFS. However, they did not specify which measures to use or provide 
empirically based scoring guidelines to diagnose CFS (Jason et al. 2009).  
In 2003, an expert consensus document for ME/CFS was developed in Canada 
(Carruthers et al. 2003). The report viewed ME/CFS as an acquired organic, 
pathophysiological, multisystemic illness that occurs in both sporadic and epidemic 
forms. The Canadian criteria select cases with less psychiatric co-morbidity, more 
physical functional impairment and more fatigue/weakness, neuropsychiatric and 
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neurological symptoms than the 1994 CDC criteria (NICE guidelines, 2007). The 
Canadian criteria and report were criticised by NICE for lack of methodological data.  
In 2011, Carruthers et al. published further criteria for ME, rather than ME/CFS. In 
comparison to the 2003 criteria, the six month waiting period needed before diagnosis 
was dropped. Fatigue was dropped from the label, given its ubiquitous and confusing 
nature and post-exertional malaise/fatigue (PEM) was relabelled as postexertional 
neuroimmune exhaustion. This development indicates an increasing belief in the 
physiological basis for the condition and increased knowledge of how various bodily 
systems are implicated.  
This is exemplified by Maes, Twisk and Johnson’s (2012) primary-care study which 
used CDC criteria and biomarkers to claim that ME, CFS and chronic fatigue (CF) are 
distinct categories and that ME/CFS should be divided into ME [with PEM] and CFS 
[without PEM]. However, Jason et al. (2012) asserts that when applied to a population 
meeting the 1994 CDC case definition, both ME/CFS and ME criteria appear to select 
a more severe subset of patients. Finally, a meta-analysis by Johnston, Brenu, Staines 
and Marshall-Gradisnik (2013) suggest that the heterogeneity of the condition may 
result from assessment methods, particularly that most heterogeneity reflects studies 
from self-reported symptoms in community-care study samples.  
Overall, diagnostic criteria have evolved to capture disparate symptomology via an 
increasingly expansive and prescriptive list of diagnostic inclusions and exclusions. A 
further problem has been the conflation of psychiatric symptoms and whether they are 
co-morbid with, or result from, ME.
1
 Whilst most non-psychotic disorders are not 
exclusionary for a diagnosis of ME, co-morbid psychiatric disorders must be 
accurately assessed if people with the condition are to receive effective care (Afari & 
Buchwald, 2003).  
In summary, what ME is and how to recognise it represents the difficulty in 
characterising it biomedically and adds to its historic and implicit psychiatric 
stigmatisation. The relation of ME to psychiatric categories remains a moot point and 
                                                 
1
 The Canadian Criteria select more symptomatic individuals because the criteria insist on it. The 
problem is that if the number of symptoms required increases, rather than excluding psychiatric 
disorders, to achieve a ‘pure’ case of ME, the opposite is achieved. In other words extending the 




furthers the stigmatisation of the condition and the respective roles played by mind and 
body. 
2.5   Epidemiology and demographics 
UK ME prevalence estimates range from 0.2 – 0.5% (Wessely et al. 1997; Kerr, 
Christian, Hodgetts, et al. 2007; Cho et al. 2009). The variation may depend on 
whether the study is community or primary-care based and the specific diagnostic 
criteria used for assessment (Jason et al. 1999; Ranjith, 2005; Johnston et al. 2013). 
Selection bias in reporting may also be a factor.  
Gallagher, Thomas, Hamilton & White (2004) suggest that since 1997 diagnosis of 
ME has increased but against a background of little change in symptom reporting. 
They attribute this to increasing legitimisation of the condition as well as trends in 
diagnostic labelling. This indicates that cultural discourses about the condition may 
mediate its effects. 
Most sufferers tend to be female, with prevalence estimates ranging from 2.5:1 ratio 
(Afari & Buchwald, 2003; Gallagher, Thomas, Hamilton and White, 2004) to 4.5:1 
Reyes et al. (2003).  The higher prevalence in females may reflect differences in 
referral patterns, illness behaviour and socio-cultural expectations of the female sick 
role (Richman, Jason, Taylor and Jahn, 2000). Pawlikowska et al. (1994) found that 
the relative risk of fatigue in women compared with men was 1.3; a figure similar to 
Sharpe et al. (1990). Jason et al. (2000) supports not only the higher prevalence of 
women with ME/CFS but also revealed they were more likely to report significantly 
more severe myalgia and poorer physical functioning.  
Historically, ME appeared over-represented in the middle and upper classes, especially 
white females, leading to its association with high-achieving groups and the epithet 
yuppie flu (Wessely et al. 1998). However, the condition is found across different 
ethnicities and countries in varying degrees (Cho et al. 2009). Variable prevalence 
might be explained by factors such as access to healthcare and cultural mediation of 
the condition (Dinos et al. 2009). Wessely, (1998) explain variation as reflecting 
symptom-attribution and selection and referral bias rather than aetiology. However, 
variable prevalence represents the types of claim and counter claim commonly found 
in cross-cultural ME/CFS research in that Western illness-constructs and theoretical 
frameworks may not easily translate to other cultures and may lack local validity 
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(Paralikar et al. 2009; Cho, 2009). In Brazil, unexplained fatigue is not certifiable for 
treatment, sick leave or benefits and may thus be viewed as everyday adversity not 
recognised as a medical disorder.  
Average age of onset is 20-40 years, although children as young as 5 can be affected 
(Jones et al. 2004; Farmer et al. 2004; Lorusso et al. 2009). The condition is less 
apparent in children than in comparable adult surveys (Chalder et al. 2003) and some 
studies exclude children under 12 (Rangel et al. 2000). The condition can prevail for 
25+ years (Fernandez et al. 2009). Estimates of recovery range from 0-66% but this 
depends on how recovery is defined (Adamowicz, Caikauskaite and Friedberg, 2014). 
Full recovery is unusual (van Geelen et al. 2007) with estimates for a full recovery 
ranging from 5 – 10% (Joyce, Hotopf and Wessely, 1997; Cairns & Hotopf, 2005). 
In summary, epidemiological patterns may result from the study setting (Ranjith, 
2005) with outcomes reflecting factors such as health care access, study context, 
diagnostic criteria, accuracy and completeness of medical records and cultural 
mediation which may or may not legitimate the condition. These factors add to the 
difficulty in characterising ME. 
2.6  Overlap with other conditions 
A key difficulty in establishing a diagnosis of ME is that its symptomalogical profile 
overlaps with many other conditions. Exclusionary medical conditions include 
hypothyroidism, sleep apnoea, narcolepsy, malignancies, unresolved hepatitis B/C, 
iatrogenic conditions, psychiatric disorder, alcohol or substance abuse and severe 
obesity (Mihrshahi & Beirman, 2005). 
Hickie et al. (2009) suggests that chronic fatigue states share a common set of 
symptom domains readily identifiable in the community and at all levels of health care. 
Consequently, it is likely that they share common risk factors, pathophysiology and 
may therefore respond to common treatment strategies. Hickie et al.’s study draws 
attention to the link between risk markers, be they genetic, biological or psychosocial 
and symptomology.  
Hamilton, Gallagher, Thomas and White (2009) make a case for linking risk markers 
to symptoms in prospective rather than retrospective studies in that different functional 
somatic syndromes (FSS) share a common pathophysiology and that ME can be 
considered as a discrete FSS, made up of different sub-phenotypes. Arnett and Clark 
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(2012) suggest that many conditions presenting fatigue as a primary symptom share a 
common inflammatory pathophysiology.  
Overall, how to effectively compare across different subject populations and how to 
operationalise subjective constructs of bodily sensations and reconcile these with 
specific biomarkers appears to influence how ME is conceptualised.  Consequently, 
there are difficulties reconciling the subjective experience of ME with the 
epistemological ground of biomedical science. Accordingly, there are issues in 
ensuring compatibility between the various specialist perspectives on ME and how it is 
experienced. 
2.7   Aetiology: the biomedical perspective 
Studies on ME/CFS propose several aetiological roots, which can be divided into 
predisposing, precipitating, and perpetuating factors (White et al. 2001), though no 
aetiological hypothesis has received consistent supporting evidence (Klimas & 
Koneru, 2007; Courjaret et al. 2009; Fernández et al. 2009). In the subsequent 
discussion I distinguish between the physiological and psychological aspects of 
aetiology to highlight the tension between these two areas.  
2.7.1   Infectious agents 
Because many ME patients report infections prior to onset, research has focussed on 
identifying a causal agent (Mihrshahi & Beirman, 2005; Lorusso et al. 2009). 
Evengard and Klimas (2002) conclude that various infections may trigger ME. For 
example, exposure to Coxiella B produced more fatigue and ME-like symptoms in 
exposed individuals, 10 years after exposure, than in non-exposed controls (Wildman 
et al. 2002). According to Chia et al. (2010) enteroviruses can persist in patients to 
produce ME like symptoms. Suspect infectious agents suggested over the decades 
include mononucleosis, cytomegalovirus, human herpes virus type 6 and 7, Borna 
Disease virus, various enteroviruses, Chlamydia and Mycoplasma species (Gold et al. 
1990; Kitani, et al. 1996; Nasralla et al. 1999; Evengard & Klimas, 2002; Nijs et al. 
2002; Chapenko et al. 2006; Beqaj, Lerner and Fitzgerald, 2007; Fernández et al. 
2009). However, in many cases contradictory evidence is apparent with inadequate 
methodology, such as lack of strict controls (Dalakas, 2003; Vernon, Shukla and 





2.7.2   Immune dysfunction 
There are many studies assessing the role of immune dysfunction in ME but often 
result in contradictory evidence (Afari & Buchwald, 2003; Mihrshahi & Beirman, 
2005; Wyller, 2007; Fernández et al. 2009). Although ME can occur after infection, no 
consistent evidence supports an immunologic process in disease maintenance 
(Natelson & Lange, 2002; Natelson, Haghighi and Ponzio, 2002).  A key issue is 
whether immunological changes result from an underlying aetiology producing the 
symptoms of ME or whether they occur because of psychophysiological changes 
caused by ME.  
Amongst the more consistent evidence appears changes in T-cell activation (Lyall, 
Peakman and Wessely, 2003; Robertson et al. 2005; Wyller, 2007), an alteration in 
cytokine activity (Cannon et al. 1999; Jason et al. 2005; Fletcher et al. 2009) and 
decreased function of killer cells (Caligiuri, Murray, Buchwald et al. 1987; Maes et al. 
2007; Whiteside, Theresa and Friberg, 1998). However, differences in diagnostic 
protocols and laboratory techniques may account for persisting claims that no 
consistent evidence exists for an aetiological role of immune dysfunction (Mihrshahi 
& Beirman, 2005). Morris and Maes (2013) suggest that phenomenological and 
neuroimmune similarities between MS and ME/CFS substantiate the view that 
ME/CFS is a neuroimmune illness. Despite this view, caution needs to be exercised. 
As noted by Natelson, Haghighi and Ponzio, (2002), because of the large number of 
potential immunological markers being investigated it is likely that some markers will 
appear statistically significant due to chance and not because of a genuine implication 
in CFS. This means that the choice of statistical analysis is critical in determining the 
salience of an immunological role in CFS.  
A picture is emerging where contrasting laboratory sites and hence contrasting 
methodologies are as much an issue as the heterogenous nature of ME itself 
(Demitrack, Faries, Herrera, DeBrota and Potter, 1998). Oddly enough, claims that a 
clearer understanding of the mechanisms of ME is needed to develop treatments that 
will cure most cases are not uncommon. This appears to be at odds with the evidence 
that ME is heterogenous, both in symptomology and pathophysiology, because it 
implies an implicit belief in a simple causal model of the disease process; an issue 




2.7.3   Endocrinology 
Often cited in relation to the neuroendocrinology of ME/CFS is the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal axis (HPA) (Cleare, 2003; Mihrshahi & Beirman, 2005; Fernández et 
al. 2009), which is implicated in an everyday sense in homeostasis (Tsigos, Chrousos, 
1994) and in relation to the stress response per se and other extrinsic and intrinsic 
stressors (Chrousos, Gold, 1992). Several studies report HPA hypofunction in a 
significant proportion of ME patients (Van Den Eede et al. 2007; Van Houdenhove, 
Van Den Eede and Luyten, 2009). The question concerning HPA involvement is its 
causal relation to ME. Some evidence suggests neuroendocrine dysregulation in ME is 
secondary. For instance, Candy et al. (2003) asserted that changes in cortisol level, a 
feature of HPA function, could not be detected in patients with post-infectious 
mononucleosis fatigue, a risk factor for ME. Gaab et al. (2004) found changes in the 
HPA axis were more distinct in long term sufferers, although the study also points out 
that sample selection bias may have resulted in a lower than expected psychiatric co-
morbidity.  
However, Cleare (2003) concludes that on balance, there are enough robust studies to 
suggest some level of HPA hypofunction. But many factors affect HPA activity, such 
as psychiatric co-morbidity and sleep dysregulation (Mihrshahi & Beirman, 2005). The 
role of HPA activity therefore remains uncertain. 
2.7.4   Neurology and neuroimaging 
ME patients often show symptoms such as cognitive impairment and headaches 
implying a role for central nervous system (CNS) neurological abnormalities (Bested, 
Saunders & Logan, 2001; Afari & Buchwald, 2003). Chaudhuri and Behan (2000) 
claim that the fatigue experienced in ME is distinct from fatigue associated with 
neuromuscular disorders but similar to that found with disorders of the CNS, such as 
Parkinson’s disease and multiple sclerosis. However, Schwartz et al. (1994) found no 
significant difference in magnetic resonance imaging (MRi) scans of CFS and normal 
controls but single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) scans revealed 
areas of lower level cerebral blood flow in CFS patients compared with the healthy 




Neuroimaging may be of limited use in the differential diagnosis of ME/CFS, given 
that other inflammatory vascular and encephalopathic conditions can appear clinically 
and radiologically similar. However, an example of the convergence of investigative 
methodologies is illustrated by Caseras et al. (2006). Functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) suggested differences in the activation of the working memory 
network in CFS patients compared to healthy controls; Caseras et al. (2008) also used 
fMRI to demonstrate that ME patients may experience difficulties suppressing 
emotional states associated with subjective fatigue. 
Ortega and Zorzanelli (2010) highlight how the visual presentation of imaging 
techniques provides ME/CFS some objectivity, despite the actual images representing 
a physiological process and not the process itself. Overall, a problem with imaging 
techniques is that they cannot establish causality but only represent a correlation 
between factors. 
2.7.5   Genetic studies 
In this area, the two main avenues of investigations are by clinical assessment of gene 
expression and the use of twin studies.  Vernon et al. (2002) demonstrated testing 
blood for gene expression in distinguishing ME from non-ME subjects, although it is 
not clear how either the experimental or control groups were characterised. The 
characterisation of ME in terms of overlap with other conditions has also been a focus 
of genetics studies.  
Fukuda et al. (2010) investigated the association between a specific gene and ME 
given that the gene had previously been suggested as implicated in schizophrenia, 
major depressive disorder (MDD) and bipolar disorder and that some of the symptoms 
typically observed in ME were also common in MDD. Results suggested a gene 
associated with ME may also play a role in the induction of various psychiatric 
diseases. This type of evidence represents an overlap between psychiatric nosology 
and an organic basis for ME. Morris et al. (2003) propose that the gene implicated 
above with MDD and schizophrenia is also associated with mitochondrial activity. ME 
involves depleted energy levels and because cellular mitochondria are involved in 
energy production there exists an intuitive link, with some substantiating evidence 
(Myhill et al. 2009).  
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However, Roy-Byrne et al. (2002) concluded that ME and depression do not appear to 
share a genetic co-variance and that the link between depression and fatigue in ME is 
more likely to be environmental in origin or due to overlapping case definitions. This 
supports studies that suggest a link between chronic fatigue and atypical depression; 
perhaps with a shared aetiology as in hypoactivation of the HPA axis. Overall, 
conclusions about the relationship between genetic antecedents to ME and an overlap 
with other conditions are uncertain. 
2.7.6   Autonomic dysfunction 
Several research approaches implicate abnormalities of the autonomic system (Suarez 
et al. 1999; Newton et al. 2007). Self-assessment of symptoms associated with 
autonomic dysfunction, such as autonomic diahorrhea can be correlated with objective 
measures such as baroreflex sensitivity, heart rate variability and orthostatic tolerance. 
ME/CFS sufferers show significantly more autonomic dysfunction than controls, 
although autonomic symptoms did occur in the control group and did not occur in all 
ME sufferers. There may thus exist some relation between dysautomnia and ME/CFS. 
Overall, the exact nature and degree of autonomic system involvement remains 
uncertain (Afari & Buchwald, 2003).  
2.7.7   Significance of biomedical aetiology 
The central issue in understanding ME is disentangling what is psychological from 
what is somatic, given that this is even possible. As Engel (1977; p.132) states:  
“...the same words may serve to express primary psychological as well as 
bodily disturbances, both of which may coexist and overlap in complex 
ways.”  
This complicates reconciling objective methods of body-function with subjective 
statements about how they are experienced, which are then applied to further subjects 
and which may result in a self-confirming tautology. It also assumes for instance that 
reports about autonomic function are only about autonomic function. This is not the 
case, given that body systems are fully integrated. 
Questions that run through biomedical aetiology are about how subjective experience 
can be objectified and measured and how what may represent normal physiological 
function for one individual is abnormal for another. Added to this is the difficulty of 
separating out the various strands of physiological function to ascertain the weight that 
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each lends to the overall condition. In other words, delineating between normal 
functioning and ME is difficult. Added to this, different researchers in different sites 
use different diagnostic criteria to select cases. Methods may be poorly controlled. 
Overall, there are many issues concerning how or whether a consensus concerning ME 
characterisation can be developed. It is clearly not the case that ME exists as a discrete 
entity that affects people in characteristically predictable ways and for distinguishable 
reasons.  
2.8  Aetiology: the psychological perspective 
In this section I discuss the psychological issues associated with ME. As with the 
biomedical perspective, the evidence is varied and contradictory and ME has to be 
understood within broader debates about psychiatric diagnosis, especially how 
diagnostic categories develop and the stigmatising effect of psychiatric diagnoses. 
The relation between psychiatric disorder, fatigue and physiology is complex. The 
main questions concern causality and co-morbidity and whether psychological 
conditions and specific psychological profiles lead to ME, arise from or are co-morbid 
with it. For instance, as HPA hyperactivity in major depressive disorder (MDD) is a 
consistent psychiatric finding and HPA function is implicated in ME, a common 
ground between biological and psychiatric disorder is implicated. However, according 
to Sharpe (2005; p.271): 
“The defining feature that makes a diagnosis ‘psychiatric’ rather than 
‘medical’ is simply that it is listed in the psychiatric diagnostic classifications 
of ICD-10 and DSM-IV.” 
Deale and Wessely (2000) note that patients often complain of being given the wrong 
psychiatric diagnosis and Johnson, DeLuca and Natelson (1996) found that the type of 
judgment made regarding whether a symptom was coded as physiological or 
psychiatric considerably affected rates of somatisation disorder  diagnosed in CFS 
patients. 
For instance, White et al. (2001) indicated the complexity of classificatory 
relationships in a study of 250 primary care patients with infectious mononucleosis or 
upper respiratory tract infection. Various predictors of fatigue and mood disorders 
were investigated. Three diagnostic schedules were used; 1994 CDC, empirically 
defined fatigue syndrome and Oxford criteria. Results indicated that predictors of 
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mood disorder and fatigue were different. Empirically defined ME was strongly 
associated with a positive serological test at onset and physical deconditioning.  Mood 
disorders were predicted by a premorbid psychiatric history, a high emotional 
personality score and social adversity. However, immunological, behavioural and 
personality factors changed over time. This study suggests that social adversity triggers 
mood disorders that may in turn cause fatigue, rather than ME itself. Biopsychosocial 
models of ME thus incorporate it’s maintenance due to the interplay of beliefs, 
inactivity and symptoms (Harvey & Wessely, 2009).  
2.8.1   Fatigue  
Fatigue is ubiquitous in that it occurs in many psychiatric and medical disorders 
(Arnold, 2008). Iversen & Wessely (2003), state that fatigue does not easily fall into 
the remit of either medicine or psychiatry and also note a dual direction of causality 
between depression and fatigue with the presence of each worsening the prognosis of 
the other. May and Kline (1988) note that fatigue as a symptom is both vague and 
subjective and that as historically distant as 1921 it was declared that no objective 
measure of fatigue could be determined.  Fatigue is one of the most common 
symptoms found in medical consultations and primary and community care studies 
(Harvey, Wessely, Kuh and Hotopf, 2009). Around 25% of people report fatigue as a 
symptom. Around 66% of people reporting fatigue lasting longer than 6 months will 
also be suffering from a comorbid psychiatric disorder. Taylor, Jason and Jahn (2003) 
and Harvey, Wadsworth, Wessely and Hotopf (2008a) suggest that psychiatric 
disorders increase the risk of later chronic fatigue. Thus, central to ME research has 
been its relation to psychiatric disorder and hence fatigue. Much research has 
addressed the relationship between fatigue, ME and psychiatric co-morbidity with one 
avenue of inquiry focussing on the relationship to antecedent factors.   
However, there remain difficulties in characterising ME. Firstly, there exists an 
implicit division between mental and physical fatigue that appears to be based on the 
biomedical model. Whilst the problem of mind/body dualism in characterising ME has 
been widely noted, the problem might in-part maintain itself given this implicit 
assumption. There is also a question of how fatigue is operationalised. In 
questionnaires fatigue is commonly discussed in terms of energy and therefore as 
quantifiable. Secondly, the general recourse of such research is the standardised 
questionnaire, which usually relies on self-assessment. The appeal of such methods is 
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the collection of lots of information that can be quantified and statistically analysed. 
But the problem is that the inherent subjectivity of such measures fails to account for 
individual ME experience and it is difficult to appreciate where the objectivity that 
these methods claim actually lies. In particular, fatigue scales recommended for use by 
research studies are inadequate because they result in inaccurate representation of the 
severe fatigue required to meet the ME research case definitions and hence distort the 
profile and number of ME cases in the first place (Stouten, 2005). 
Fatigue is central to ME experience and in diagnostic criteria but how to characterise it 
is far from clear. Some 100 years ago the notion of fatigue evolved from a distinct 
nosological category, synonymous with what may now be called depression, into a 
feature of other illnesses before eventually disappearing from psychiatric diagnostic 
manuals (Shorter, 2005). The role fatigue plays in ME, biomedicine and psychiatry 
opens a window onto the relationship between illness and diagnosis and suggests that 
exploring how an individual experiences and understands fatigue as part of their 
general milieu may be as beneficial as trying to establish it in categorical terms.  
2.8.2    Co-morbid depression 
Individuals with CFS often have high rates of lifetime and current depression (Afari & 
Buchwald, 2003). Thomson and Nimigon (2008) found in a community based study 
that 36% of individuals with CFS were depressed. However, despite CFS-sufferers 
often meeting diagnostic criteria for depressive disorder, their symptoms vary from 
classical depression (Johnson, Deluca and Natelson, 1999), manifesting without 
anhedonia, guilt, and lack of motivation (Wessely, Chalder, Hirsch, Wallace and 
Wright, 1996).  
Gagnon et al’s. (2002) community based study based on self-reports of chronic fatigue 
showed that having one or more medical condition was associated with an increased 
risk of depression, although it is noted that that the methodological issue was that these 
were self-reports of fatigue and not clinical diagnoses of ME. Thus, illness and 
depression may go hand in hand and major depressive disorder is itself a complex 
heterogenous syndrome that is diagnosed and categorised on symptomology (Arnold, 
2008). Griffith & Zarrouf (2008) state that there remains no conclusive test that can 
differentiate ME from MDD, although they assert that they are distinct entities.  
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Jason, Najar, Porter and Reh (2009) carried out a study of the ability of fatigue 
measures to distinguish between CFS patients assessed on the 1994 CDC criteria and 
separate patients assessed with MDD. The ability to distinguish between disorders is 
important, given the ramifications for intervention and treatment and given that some 
of the minor symptoms specified in the 1994 CDC can also manifest in MDD. Results 
indicated that all of the ME patients assessed previously on 1994 CDC were reassessed 
similarly on the same criteria. However, 38% [14 out of 37] of MDD patients were 
also assessed as having ME. There thus remains the question of heterogeneity and how 
diagnostic criteria are formulated.  
Jablensky (2004) notes that with changes to diagnostic classification between DSM-III 
and DSM-IV, the preponderance of psychiatric co-morbid conditions, which are in fact 
separate entities, appears disproportionately high and that either such illnesses occur in 
clusters or classification cannot discriminate between spurious co-morbidity.  
Questions about co-morbid depression and ME remain unresolved. Sharpe (2005) 
notes that the current lack of a precise and agreed pathophysiology for  the condition 
means that any hypotheses about co-morbid psychiatric conditions are actually 
assumptions and therefore have to be viewed as alternative diagnoses.   
2.8.3   Pre-morbid psychiatric disorder 
Harvey, Wadsworth, Wessely and Hotopf (2008b) state that differentiating between 
explanations for the temporal relations between psychiatric disorders and ME has not 
been possible because previous research has been retrospective or cross-sectional in 
nature. They followed 5362 participants with different measures of personality, 
psychiatric disorder and fatigue levels collected over the first 43 years of their life. ME 
was identified via self-report. Results suggested that individuals reporting a diagnosis 
of ME had increased levels of psychiatric disorder, particularly depression and anxiety, 
prior to onset of fatigue symptoms and were more than two and a half times more 
likely of reporting later ME. It is suggested then that psychiatric disorders may be an 
aetiological risk factor for ME or that they have common vulnerability factors. For 
example, Fischler et al. (1997) found a high prevalence of generalised anxiety disorder 





2.8.4   Personality and personality disorders 
The issues of personality and personality disorders in ME are important because of the 
manner in which personality intersects with common-sense assumptions about the 
condition and issues such as what constitutes being legitimately sick (van Geelen et al. 
2007). This in-part results from the indefinite nature of the condition, its correlation 
with neurasthenia and the manner in which neurasthenia and subsequent 
manifestations of the condition have been stigmatised along psychological lines. The 
difficulty for example of separating a genuine case of ME from a malingerer raises the 
issues of the type of personality involved. 
Traits such as perfectionism and neuroticism have been implicated in the condition 
(White & Schweitzer 2000; Masuda, Munemoto, Yamanaka, Takei and Tei, 2002; van 
Geelen et al. 2007; Fukuda, 2010).  It has also been observed that depressive 
symptoms are more associated with neurotic symptoms in ME patients with depressive 
symptoms than in those without them (Taillefer, Kirmayer, Robbins and Lasry, 2003).  
An increased level of neuroticism appears to be the aspect of personality that it most 
consistently found in ME patients (van Geelen et al. 2007).  
Metzger and Denney (2002) suggest that individuals with ME set themselves 
impossibly high levels of performance that may lead to the subjective experience of 
cognitive impairment. Åsbring & Närvänen (2003) suggest that patients appear to 
overstate the severity of their problems. But arriving at a consensus on what 
perfectionism represents is difficult.  
Whilst Hamacheck (1978) distinguishes between normal and neurotic perfectionism, 
other theorists posit it as a uni-dimensional negative trait (Burns, 1980; Hewitt  & 
Flett, 1991). In a study of 27 female CFS outpatients and 30 healthy controls Dearey 
and Chalder (2010) found a significant tendency for people with CFS to report more 
neurotic perfectionism. Valero et al. (2013) suggest that neuroticism is associated with 
CFS by the mediating effect of depression severity. However, their study may be 
biased by a clinical rather than community based sample population and findings differ 
from Kempke et al. (2011). The suggestion is that different measures of fatigue may 
have influenced findings. 
In terms of premorbidity, Kato et al. (2006) found that higher emotional instability and 
self-reported stress level were associated with later CFS. Although this study used self-
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diagnosed participants it is interesting because it connects stress, familial environment 
and personality via coping style with a genetic base. The connection between 
personality and psychiatric disorder is also interesting. CFS patients with psychiatric 
disorders scored higher on fatigue measures compared with CFS patients without 
psychiatric disorders (Fukuda et al. 2010). A finding that backs up previous studies 
(Cloninger, Svrakic and Przybeck, 2006).  
In terms of personality and lifestyle  Van Houdenhove, Onghena, Neerinckx and 
Hellin  (1995) and Van Houdenhove, et al. (2001) concluded that action proneness and 
an overactive lifestyle may be one factor that may not only initiate and predispose an 
individual to ME but also to maintain it, although Christodoulou et al. (1999) found no 
predisposing personality traits.  
Overall, it is difficult to draw conclusions between personality and ME and it is 
therefore important to connect personality as an abstract construct to behaviour and 
real-life environments. Van Geelen et al. (2007) for instance, claim that personality is 
an important factor to be studied but that factors such as the ever-changing life 
narrative that sufferers use to make sense of ME and give direction to their life could 
usefully be included as an aspect of personality. Nater et al. (2010), whilst suggesting 
that CFS is associated with an increased prevalence of maladaptive personality and 
personality disorders, note that it is important to think about how personality plays a 
role, for instance in interfering with treatment adherence or resulting in unhealthy 
behavioural strategies. Observations such as this point to the need to ground factors 
such as personality in the particular experience of the ME sufferer in question. 
2.8.5   Cognition, emotion and models of ME 
A key feature of ME is its variable effects on cognition, which include confusion, 
disorientation, cognitive-overload, short-term memory loss and decision-making 
impairment (Wyller, 2007; Cockshell & Mathias, 2010; Carruthers et al. 2011). In 
terms of attribution, Moss-Morris & Petrie (2001) note that CFS patients are more 
likely to make external attributions for the condition as well as cognitive distortions 
specific to their somatic symptoms. Chalder & Hill (2012) note that faulty cognitive 
processing of emotion may be a causal factor in vulnerable individuals. Rimes and 
Chalder (2010) suggest that people with CFS were more likely than healthy controls to 
perceive the experience and expression of negative feelings as a weakness. Oldershaw 
et al. (2011) found that CFS patients demonstrated poor emotion-state recognition and 
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poor attribution of emotion in self but not others, reprising previous findings that 
despite impaired social function, emotional recognition in others by ME patients is not 
impaired and that other factors are responsible for the impairment. 
There is a clear overlap between cognitive and emotional aspects in ME. In this vein, 
Surawy et al. (1995) suggest a cognitive aetiological model that involves a pre-morbid 
character featuring an achievement-orientation and a cognitive bias towards 
suppressing emotion or viewing it as a weakness. These factors are rooted in childhood 
experience. Given this pre-morbidity, ME is precipitated by various psycho-social 
stressors and perpetuated by cognitive, behavioural and emotional styles and social 
factors. Whilst this model sets up a specific type of ME sufferer and roots it in the 
early developmental context, it is useful in that it implicates socio-cultural processes 
and leads to recognition of the broader context. External attribution of the condition to 
specific physical antecedents, such as a virus, and the emphasis on the somatic 
symptomology offsets concerns about psychiatrisation of the condition and legitimates 
it by reducing loss of self-esteem and personal blame. Moss-Morris et al. (2011) take 
the cognitive behaviour model further by incorporating a specific biological antecedent 
to investigate whether psychological factors could predict the onset of CFS following 
acute mononucleosis. Results suggested support for the cognitive behavioural model in 
that factors such as premorbid perfectionism are useful predictors for later CFS.  
However, somatic attributions may increase symptom focusing or functional 
impairment Rimes and Chalder (2010). Poeschla et al. (2013) found that higher 
emotional instability and lower extraversion were related to chronic fatigue. The 
implicit psychologisation of CFS is present, given that they suggest:  
“...behavioral prevention and intervention strategies can be used to mitigate or 
reverse the development and maintenance of CFS and other fatiguing illness.” 
(p.296). 
Models of ME/CFS are useful in bringing together psychological and organic factors. 
However, the weight of each factor is still under debate. Harvey & Wessely (2009) 
suggest an aetiological biopsychosocial model such that a combination of pre-morbid 
risk, followed by an acute triggering event leads to fatigue and subsequent behavioural 
and biological responses and CFS. Maes and Twisk (2010) criticise Harvey and 
Wessely’s model in that the only biological component is the viral trigger whereas 
maintaining factors are ostensibly behavioural. The caveat is that recovery from ME 
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depends on addressing the behaviour and concomitant psychological factors. In 
contrast Maes and Twisk suggest a model where biochemical process and immune 
dysfunction is foundational at each stage. Treatment and recovery becomes a matter of 
addressing physiology as well as psychology. But the recurrent problem is that even 
with this model which acknowledges the complexity of ME/CFS and implies a 
complex biochemical foundation there is a wish to translate complexity into remedial 
and causal arrangements. 
2.8.6    Significance of psychological aetiology 
Models of ME and exploring aspects such as cognition and emotion are useful because 
these factors can be brought together with the physiological to provide a more holistic 
perspective. However, an issue is how to make compatible the various factors that ME 
is comprised of, such as physiology, pathogens, social discourse, psychological 
constructs. Given the disparate epistemological foundations from which ME research 
is approached it is easy to appreciate the apparent inconsistencies and confusion that 
characterise the condition. An approach to ME that can make compatible the various 
strands of knowledge about it would be useful and this appears to implicate broader 
discourses about biomedical science, psychology and culture. 
Underpinning this are methodological issues regarding how to objectify and measure 
subjective experience. The preceding discussions imply that the overlap and relation 
between for example depression, personality and the expression of ME presents as a 
confusing picture. Specialist discourses of ME, whilst informing common-sense 
understanding, cannot capture or reflect the particular experience of ME. 
2.9  Treatment and management: CBT, GET and pacing 
In this section I review how ME is treated and managed, with a focus on CBT, GET 
and pacing. Whilst clearly important, I do not address pharmacological and alternative 
therapies because I feel that the main treatments and their development adequately 
illustrate my contention that the conceptualisation of the mind/body dichotomy is a 
sticking point in understanding the condition. The central theme is the way in which 
treatments polarise, albeit implicitly, around mind and body, resulting in an inherent 
psychologisation of the condition. GET, pacing and CBT appear to prioritise 
addressing the physical symptoms of ME and yet their efficacy arises from changing 
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the beliefs that patients hold about their symptoms and not physiological changes per 
se.  
The uncertain aetiology of ME and the wide ranging symptomology means that no 
cure exists and the condition is instead managed; with cognitive behaviour therapy 
(CBT) and graded exercise therapy (GET) showing the best results (Rimes & Chalder, 
2005). These approaches correlate with mind and body respectively. CBT has the aim 
of adapting and altering negative cognitions, assumptions and emotions that may 
prevent or hinder desirable or functional behaviours and activities. GET seeks to 
engage the patient in gradually and consistently increased exercise (Moss-Morris, 
Sharon, Tobin and Baldi (2005). In this sense, the recurring mind/body dualism that 
characterises aetiological debates about ME is reprised.  
Both CBT and GET are based on behavioural interventions. With GET, the patient is 
encouraged to decrease the degree to which they monitor symptoms to determine 
activity levels (Fulcher & White, 1998). Moss-Morris, Sharon, Tobin and Baldi, 2005) 
showed that focussing less on symptoms and increasing beliefs in treatment control 
correlated with decreased fatigue and increased physical functioning. This ties in with 
Paterson’s (2001) assertion that the sense of control is vital to one’s sense of well-
being.  
Similarly with CBT, post-treatment improvement has often been attributed to increases 
in activity level (Deale et al. 1997; Bleijenberg et al. 2003). However, Wiborg et al. 
(2010) found from re-analysis of three previous randomised control trial (RCT) studies 
that CBT did not result in an increase in physical activity at the end of treatment or an 
increase in physical activity associated with fatigue reduction. This reflects the theory 
that the positively altered beliefs that the individual holds about their condition is key. 
It also supports findings from an RCT by Wearden & Emsley (2013) that whilst 
activity-behaviour may change it is perhaps the underlying beliefs that are important. 
This remains the main-line of thought from the perspective of cognitive behavioural 
interventions. Wiborg et al. (2012) analysed the effect of introducing perceived 
problems with activity and sense of control over fatigue as mediators in a CBT based 
treatment protocol. Results suggested these mediators interact to reduce 
symptomology. However, some variables may not have been controlled and mediating 
factors were not assessed whilst treatment proceeded.  A significant observation is the 
suggestion that CBT and GET therapists may want to de-emphasise the role of 
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physiological processes when they introduce the treatment rationale to patients. The 
implication which remains is the centralisation of the psychological aspects of ME. 
Given the primary symptoms of fatigue and post-exertional malaise, questions exist 
regards whether rest or exercise is most beneficial. Nijs et al. (2008) hypothesized that 
using exercise limits would prevent symptom increase and worsening health status 
after a walking exercise in ME patients. They concluded that limiting the intensity and 
duration of exercise attenuated health status changes after exercise but did not prevent 
short-term symptom increase. Wessely and Powell (1989) suggested that avoidance of 
exercise may lead to physical deconditioning. This is supported by White and Fulcher 
(2002) who found that physical deconditioning may play a role in maintaining physical 
debility in ME patients. It is partly on this basis that GET was developed.  
However, Bazelmans, Bleijenberg, van der Meer and Folgering (2001) conclude that 
physical deconditioning doesn’t appear to be a maintaining factor in ME. Sisto et al. 
(1998) found a marked decrease in activity levels in 20 females with ME but much 
later than their self reports suggested. The authors propose that this may result from 
the patients incorrectly interpreting how they feel after exertion. This type of evidence 
appears to justify the GET approach but many sufferers report adverse effects resulting 
from GET.  
Nijs, Paul and Wallman (2008) suggest that GET can be safely undertaken without 
damaging effects to the sufferer and that the issue was early GET approaches 
advocating continued exercise at the same level, with sufferers developing symptoms 
in response to the exercise. Maes and Twisk (2009) claim that exertion leads to 
malaise with decreased physical ability, cognitive impairment and increased 
musculoskeletal pain, suggesting that underlying pathophysiological mechanisms 
become amplified.  
Pacing is essentially a behavioural intervention where the patient acknowledges the 
typical fluctuations in symptom severity and delayed exercise by setting daily activity 
and rest goals to avoid exacerbations (Nijs, Meeus and De Meirleir, 2006; Nijs, Paul 
and Wallman, 2008; White et al. 2011). White et al’s.  RCT compared specialised 
medical care (SMC) with pacing, CBT, GET/SMC and SMC alone. SMC consisted of 
an explanation of CFS, generic advice and symptomatic pharmacotherapy. Results 
suggested that SMC with GET and CBT were more effective in reducing fatigue and 
improving physical functioning than SMC alone. The most interesting outcome was 
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that results were the same for participants meeting various CFS criteria and for those 
with depressive disorder. As such, any conclusions about treatment efficacy have to be 
qualified with a consideration of methodological issues (Whiting, Bagnal, Sowden, et 
al. 2001). 
It is also important to note that cognitive [and biomedical] approaches to 
understanding ME assume that sufferers’ illness attributions reveal the meanings 
sufferers attach to symptoms, disabilities and bodily signs (Horton-Salway, 2001). 
These attributions are then seen as influencing sufferers’ illness behaviours, coping 
responses and emotional reactions (Lipowski, 1969, 1974; Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 
2001; Vandenbergen et al. 2009; Rimes & Chalder, 2010). This premise forms the 
basis for cognitive behavioural therapy as a treatment for CFS sufferers (Wessely & 
Powell, 1989; Wessely, Butler, Chalder, & David, 1991; Abbey, 1993; Corstorphine, 
2006; Hambrook et al. 2011) and explanatory models of ME (Surawy, Hackman, 
Hawton & Sharpe, 1995). 
In terms of ‘management’ of the condition, Van Houdenhove and Luyten (2009) state 
that there is no consensus about the final treatment goal in ME and view coping versus 
recovery as a faulty dichotomy. But despite positing ME as a stress-system failure, the 
psychiatrisation of the patient is still apparent in statements such as:  
“Changing energy-consuming lifestyles and habits such as maladaptive 
perfectionism, and learning to prioritize life goals may maintain gains and 
prevent relapse.”  (ibid. p.153) 
In summary the preceding discussion emphasised the implicit psychologisation of ME 
and therefore the division between mind and body from the main treatment 
perspectives. The manner in which mind and body remain conflated in terms of what is 
driving treatment protocols and how they are conceptualised is entangled with a 
dominant psychologising discourse. Because ME is not a discrete entity and because it 
transcends social, psychological and physiological processes it cannot be characterised 
easily and hence cannot be cured. Rethinking the mind/body dichotomy in a way that 






2.10  Chapter summary 
The pivotal problem in the ME debate appears to be whether the condition reflects a 
primarily somatic or psychological aetiology. Because of the broad symptom profile 
and diagnosis by exclusion, disentangling what is psychological from what is somatic 
is difficult. This problem also reflects difficulties in establishing and reconciling 
objective methods of measuring impairment with subjective reports of symptoms such 
as fatigue. Despite criteria being developed to aid research and standardising 
diagnosis, the picture remains unclear. Added to this is the issue of assessing what 
represents normal physiological function in the first place and that different 
researchers using different methodologies and representing different epistemological 
perspectives produce often conflicting results. Whilst various cognitive and 
biopsychosocial models of ME have been developed there remains uncertainty about 
the roles played by antecedent factors and how the condition is maintained. However, 
such models are useful in bringing together the various threads that constitute ME. The 
inherent psychologisation of ME characterises the condition as well as treatment 
approaches such as CBT and GET and this is reprised in the stigmatisation that 
sufferers seek to avoid. The relation of ME to psychiatric conditions is also unclear, for 
example whether depression represents a primary symptom or secondary symptom.  
What needs to be held in mind is a sense of the confusing nature of ME and the 
intricate relations between mind, body, diagnostic classification and how these are 
influenced by the epistemological foundations of biomedical and psychiatric medicine. 
However, what biomedical explorations do not reveal is what it is like to suffer ME 
and how suffering affects one’s sense of self. With this in mind, chapter three outlines 
how the relations between chronic illnesses such as ME and the self have been 
approached, before laying the foundations for a psychosocial framework from which to 









ME and the self 
 
3.1  Chapter overview 
The present chapter situates ideas about self in relation to chronic illnesses such as 
ME. I emphasise that illnesses are not necessarily experienced, nor affect self, in 
predictable ways. Instead, illnesses reflect a complex arrangement of social, 
physiological and psychological factors that necessitate a reassessment of self as an 
ongoing dynamic and contingent process. I give consideration to the relationship 
between self and the material world of objects and places; an aspect that has been 
overlooked in existing ME research. Considering the relation between self and objects 
is important because it is through objects that the self can affect and be affected by the 
world.  
To frame the way that ME and self are mutually implicated I then outline the 
importance and use of psychosocial approaches. This is an emerging yet distinct 
discipline within the UK and elsewhere which now has learned society status. 
Psychosocial approaches represent an eclectic body of work that engages with non-
dualistic means of theorising the relations between the social and the psychological 
and encompassing a range of ideas from across the social sciences. A psychosocial 
framework is apposite because it maintains the integrity of both the psychic and social 
aspects of ME.  
Typically, psychosocial approaches use psychoanalytic principles to rethink existing 
models that emphasise or rest on human rationality and the notion of a unitary self 
(Clarke & Hogget, 2009). Psychosocial approaches challenge the preoccupation with 
language and cognition, instead paying attention to feelings and affects and enabling 
new conceptualisations of the boundaries between inner experience and outer reality 
and how self is experienced. This is pertinent, given the contested nature of ME and 
the relationship between mind and body. Because ME can be experienced in ways that 
involve a confusion of mind and body, I turn to psychoanalytic ideas in relation to 
notions of the self. These ideas enable thinking about how the unconscious aspects of 
ME might affect self experience. Psychoanalytic ideas are also discussed as a means of 
establishing a psychosocial space in which to consider the relationality of self, others, 
material objects and the everyday environments that ME sufferers negotiate. To 
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identify and trace the associations between self, places, objects and others I outline 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) and explore how it encourages relational thinking.  
Focussing on ontology and synthesising ANT with a psychosocial framework provides 
a way of bringing together the different entities that might be implicated in the 
experience of ME. These include symptoms, beliefs, viruses, environments and 
material objects. I describe how a ‘relational’ ontological stance is adopted and why 
this enables acknowledgement of the heterogenous, particular nature of ME. As ME 
affects sufferers ability to engage with objects and places, I review work that has 
focussed on the relationship between health and places such as the home. Bringing the 
relationship between ME sufferers and specific places such as their home to the notion 
of a psychosocial space is important because of the way that such places are already 
filled with meaning and affective intensity.  
3.2  Chronic illness and self experience 
In this section I consider the effects of chronic illness on the self from the perspective 
of social scientific health research and connect this to more general questions about 
how self is constituted.  Chronic illness does not unfold as a set of discrete illness 
symptoms that affect the self in an objective manner. Instead, illness symptoms 
interact with the socially constructed nature of illness, including personal and 
professional beliefs about illness, and disrupt the unity of mind and body. I argue that 
exploring a condition such as ME, which is marked by aetiological questions revolving 
around the mind-body dualism, requires a perspective on the self and its relation to ME 
that transcends characterisation as psychological, social or physiological. Such a 
perspective requires consideration of the role played by non-human objects, given that 
it is partly through the semiotic system afforded by objects that self is constituted 
Qualitative social scientific work that investigates health is important because it 
complements and enhances clinical and biomedical approaches by providing insights 
into sufferers’ perceptions of the aetiological processes underlying conditions such as 
ME (Smith, 1996; Turpin et al. 1997; Van Houdenhove, 2002). According to Jelbert, 
Stedmon and Stephens (2010) the aim of qualitative health research is to understand 
and represent the experiences of sufferers by interpreting the meanings that illness 
phenomena hold for them. Qualitative work seeking to understand the effect of ME on 
the self is especially important because the condition is marked by aetiological, 
terminological and diagnostic ambiguity and social misrepresentation (Clements et al. 
40 
 
1997). These already complex factors converge with sufferers beliefs about the 
condition to the extent that their whole life world, including how their relations with 
others and physical daily functioning, appears to be affected (Wessely, 1999; Prins, 
van der Meer, & Bleijenberg, 2006). This is especially true of ME, given that mind or 
body explanations raise delicate issues about sufferers’ identities and credibility 
(Horton-Salway, 2001; 2002). It is not the case that ME exists as a discrete disease 
entity that can be investigated objectively. Thus, the development of the self in 
general, and especially in light of ME, is fundamentally interpersonal in nature and 
bound up with the development of the person as a social being (Charmaz, 1983; 
Andersen & Chen, 2002; Wood, Littleton and Oates, 2002).  
Kleinman (1986) and Charmaz (1995) for instance explain that illness symptoms 
interact with social context to produce a mode of being that involves a dialectic 
relationship between mind and body. Thus, by examining the social construction of 
illness it is possible to think about how social forces shape the illness response and self 
experience (Eisenberg, 1977; Charmaz, 1995). However, ME presents a problem 
because it challenges the delineation between the roles of being healthy and being 
legitimately sick
2
; due to a lack of definitive biomedical evidence of organic 
pathology, sufferers cannot easily validate their right to be legitimately ill (Robinson, 
2003). This exacerbates the manner in which ME destabilises how self is experienced.  
Chronic illness presents a threat to the integrity of self and can only be managed, rather 
than cured (Cooke & Philpin, 2008). It disrupts assumptions about how one’s body 
functions and also the sense of wholeness of body and self that might otherwise be 
taken for granted (Charmaz, 1994; 1995). Because conditions such as ME run 
disruptive, unpredictable and variable courses (Lubkin & Larsen, 2002), ME sufferers 
are obliged to adopt, adapt and reassess trajectories of self-development as an ongoing 
dynamic process (Charmaz, 1995; Clarke & James, 2003; Whitehead, 2006; Larun & 
Malterud, 2007; Brocki, 2008; Vandenbergen et al. 2009).  
If chronic illness disrupts the wholeness of mind and body and if social processes and 
the nature of beliefs about illness are entangled in complex ways, the implication is 
that self and the experience of ME is contingent. In general terms, Hollway (2007) 
alludes to the shifting, situated nature of the self of the present era as non-unitary, non-
self-determining and not as an innate entity. Paradoxically, ME sufferers are often 
                                                 
2
 See for example Parsons (1951) on the ‘sick role’. 
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positioned as responsible for aspects of their condition if they cannot demonstrate a 
clear, organic aetiology (Tucker, 2004).  
An important field of thought that addresses the issues around the determination of self 
comes from poststructuralist and social constructionist thinking (Lewis, 2012). From 
these perspectives, self is constituted and shaped by broad discursive forces which are 
internalised to produce certain subjects (Foucault, 1982; 1997; Butler, 1993; Bunton, 
1997; Burkitt, 1998; Hall, 2000). These subjects come to experience, talk about, 
understand themselves and are ordered through powerful discourses organised around 
normative categories (Lewis, 2012). In the case of ME, this occurs via specific medical 
and lay discourses that are dependent on knowledge that is not objective, neutral or 
value free (Arksey, 1989; Clarke & James, 2003). Thus, the ‘ME sufferer’ can be 
envisaged as a subject brought into being as a particular type of person. 
ME is important because of the contested relationship between mind and body and its 
consequences for aetiology. Foucault (1977) placed the body at the heart of struggles 
between different discursive formations of power and knowledge. From this viewpoint, 
the body of the ME sufferer is a site on which the ME debate is inscribed and 
experienced. However, as Lewis (2012) notes, this poststructuralist conceptualisation 
of the discursively produced body and subject destabilises the modernist notion of a 
subject who can be scientifically scrutinised and categorised. This blurs the capacity 
for a bounded, bodily self and the manner in which the body and self can be known in 
any absolute sense (Bunton, 1997).  
The fluidity of self is also relevant in an immediate way. Paterson (2001) for instance 
emphasises the need for clinicians and practitioners to recognise the ever-shifting 
needs of sufferers of chronic illness and to avoid assuming that chronic illnesses run 
linear courses. As the symptoms of a condition ebb and flow, the foregrounding of 
illness or wellness will have specific functions and effects on self. Paterson explains 
that when wellness is in the foreground, the self, not the diseased body, is the source of 
identity and that the body is objectified. This alters the relationship between mind and 
body so that the body is experienced separately from mind. There is also an issue that 
concerns how the agency of the sufferer is viewed, which is about the apparently 




However, Cohn (1999) suggests that the issue of mind-body dualism in ME is less 
about aetiology and more about personal control and that the dualism remains a useful 
device for assigning boundaries, culpability and moral responsibility. For this reason it 
is possible that the issue of mind-body dualism in ME is an intractable ontological 
issue. The implication for this thesis is to consider how ME might transcend 
characterisation as psychological, social or physiological and where and how self can 
be thought about within this arrangement. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise 
that the variable course of illnesses affects how the relationship between self and body 
is understood.  
A further implication for this thesis is that the human body is predestined to interact 
with, manipulate and change objects in the external world. Hence a necessary 
relationship between self, body and external object is implied. Relations with external 
objects also provide a sense of boundedness and help constitute external reality (Mead, 
1934).  However, objects affect us in ways linked to their own specific nature and 
potential use (Bollas, 1987). In this sense they oblige themselves upon us and afford 
certain actions. The implication is that the self arises through dynamic interaction of 
the body and material objects (McCarthy, 1984). Thus, to make sense of the social and 
relational aspects of self involves making sense of the part played by non-human 
objects because these form part of the semiotic system through which self is 
constituted. 
In this section I have outlined the complex relationship between chronic illness and the 
self as a means of moving towards the model of self I intend to work with. My route 
into this discussion was to highlight the importance of qualitative social scientific 
health research and the manner in which it complements biomedical research by 
exploring and representing the experiences of ME sufferers. I described the ways in 
which illness symptoms are experienced reflect their interaction with social context, 
mind and body. Because illnesses such as ME run unpredictable courses and disrupt 
the unity of mind and body, ME sufferers are obliged to reassess self and self-
development as an ongoing dynamic process and this points to the contingency of self 
which I outlined in relation to poststructuralist notions of subjectivity and discourse. 
Finally, I briefly outlined the importance of situating the self and body in a material 
context, given that making sense of the social and relational aspects of self necessitates 
making sense of the part played by the non-human objects which act as ‘signs of the 
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self’ (Rochberg-Halton, 1984) and through which, in conjunction with the body, the 
self arises.  
3.3  Review of qualitative social scientific research on the relationship  
  between ME and self 
In the previous section I discussed ME in the context of general social scientific 
research into health to provide a backdrop to some of the issues involved in thinking 
about how an illness such as ME relates to the self. The present section represents a 
review of empirical work that has addressed the relationship between self and ME 
directly. My aim is to not only represent the broad range of approaches by which ME 
has been explored but also to provide a sense of the variability of ME experience and 
that the manner in which it is understood reflects underlying epistemologies.  
Many studies chart the trajectories of how illness affects the self in ME. For instance, 
Clarke and James (2003) describe two modes of identity construction following ME. 
These are immediate and total loss of identity marked by separation from existing 
activities and friends and then the development of a radical self that was better than 
the previous one and involved rejection of the values of the old self. They did not find 
a desire to return to the former self, nor the creation of a new improved or supernormal 
self. Whitehead (2006) found that across a two and a half year period different 
priorities were set and that identity became progressively more positive as ME 
progressed. The trajectory reflected Clarke & James’ work that identities were 
pendular and could move backwards to a past identity and forwards to a new identity 
with the time period dependent on illness severity and its impact. However, Whitehead 
did not support findings by Charmaz (1983) that identity became progressively worse 
and that sufferers of chronic illness adopted restricted lives. Nor did she support 
Asbring’s (2001) findings of a partial identity disruption. As noted by Clarke and 
James (2003), these varied findings may reflect differences in sample types, the degree 
of systematicity of analysis or research questions.  
Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) has been employed to explore the 
effects of ME on self. The aim of IPA is to investigate the processes through which 
participants make sense of experiences (Chapman & Smith, 2002; Dickson, 2004; 
Brocki & Wearden, 2006) by focussing on their understandings, perceptions and views 
as a whole (Moustakas, 1994; Reid, Flowers, & Larkin, 2005). This is a 
phenomenological perspective because the focus is on the conscious perception of 
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phenomena in an individual’s world as they engage with it and how their private 
conscious experience is implicated in their accounts (Dickson, 2004).  
IPA studies support findings that ME sufferers experience a delegitimisation of their 
conditions due to a lack of definite organic aetiology, often exacerbated by physicians’ 
scepticism and lack of knowledge about the condition (Dickson, Knussen and Flowers, 
2007). Delegitimisation exacerbates the identity crisis that sufferer’s experience 
(Dickson, Knussen & Flowers, 2008; Arroll & Howard, 2013). This identity crisis is 
described as not only a loss of self but in some cases also as a loss of embodiment, 
implying the impact ME has and how it fragments the unity of self and body.  
ME affects the self on an everyday basis as well as across the life trajectory. Arroll, 
Dancey and Attree (2010) used IPA and found that sufferers begin their days with 
numerous worries centred on their ability to carry out daily tasks, strategies for 
scheduling activities and comparisons of present health with pre-morbid health. The 
implication is that ME exacerbates the worries that people may normally have. Arroll 
& Howard (2013) found that ME sufferers were obliged to redefine their sense of self 
due to the physical limitations imposed by ME. The authors state that their findings 
support Charmaz’s (1983, 2000) that former self-images could diminish whilst more 
positive ones formed. However, and perhaps typical of IPA studies on ME, a specific 
conceptualisation of self is not explicit. Where this is discussed it is usually couched in 
terms that participants use, which is useful in attempting to stay with participant 
descriptions but less useful if the term ‘self’ is to be used in a more explanatory 
manner. However, IPA puts self firmly in a spatial and bodily relationship and this is 
important. 
Given the subjective experience of self and the ubiquity of the interview method and 
listening to peoples’ narratives, one specific means of thinking about illness and self is 
in terms of biographical disruption (Bury, 1982; Asbring, 2001). This is where the 
autobiographical narrative of one’s past, present and future is altered in light of the 
effects of illness. Corbin and Strauss (1987) claim that this narrative work focuses on 
the construction and maintenance of a self that is the same as before the illness or one 
that is better. Narrative analyses of ME patients' talk suggest that ME sufferers often 
struggle to make sense of the condition due to its remitting-relapsing, unpredictable 
course (Ware, 1999; Horton-Salway, 2001; Whitehead, 2006). As such, a biographical 
understanding implies the temporality of self experience. 
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Bury (1982) asserts that illness disrupts future-planning and marks a biographical shift 
from a perceived normal trajectory to one that is unpredictable and damaging. Bury’s 
work with  arthritis sufferers is useful in drawing attention to how illness-onset 
disrupts everyday material practices as well as the capacity to make meaningful sense 
of things and a new awareness of the contingency of body. Charmaz (1987) states that 
managing chronic illness involves making sense of the changes to expected life 
trajectories and re-establishing order in light of their disruption. This implies that 
chronic illness is invariably a negative experience and involves the loss of previous, 
better identities and sense of self.  
In contrast, Carricaburu and Pierret (1995) note that in some instances, such as with 
the elderly or those affected by illness from birth, chronic illness may be understood as 
part of an ongoing biographical arrangement rather than as a rupture from a previous 
self. Also, Asbring (2001) in her interview-based study of 25 Swedish women 
suffering ME or fibromyalgia concludes that identity transformations associated with 
biographical disruption may be partial and involve positive gains as well as losses, 
such as re-evaluation of habits and attitudes leading to positive behavioural changes.  
However, Williams (2000) points out that the notion of biographical disruption, whilst 
useful as a reference point in the sociology of chronic illness, needs to be situated 
against changing conceptualisations of pain, suffering and self in the postmodern era. 
This is most pertinent in terms of how contemporary neoliberal health discourses lead 
to the signification of pain and its relationship to the body in specific ways. As 
Karfakis (2013; p.5) notes:  
“The human body is a field of conflict between different discourses such as 
the law, biomedicine, and economics, and each one of them promotes a 
different subject.”  
Implied is the need to acknowledge the contingent nature of any claims that can be 
made about how ME affects the self and how self is conceptualised in relation to the 
body.  
Discourse analysis (DA) has been especially influential in exploring the experience of 
ME and represents a range of approaches focussing on the way that people construct 
meaning through language (Willig, 2001). Language is understood as functional in that 
people use descriptions to perform actions (Langridge & Ahern 2003). DA assumes 
that language is neither a direct correlate of inner experience nor a neutral account of 
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the world and cannot be assessed for truth. In this sense, DA challenges the 
assumptions of cognitivism that attributions about illness correlate with beliefs and 
behavioural changes (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).
3
 Instead, descriptions are constructed 
to anticipate and mitigate against scepticism (Horton-Salway, 1998, 2001). DA 
therefore contrasts with other qualitative approaches in that its focus is how meaning is 
constructed through language, rather than to understand the meanings that phenomena 
hold for people (Dickson, 2004).  
DA has shed light on several aspects of the ME debate. For instance, it is commonly 
reported that ME is over represented by white females. However, feminist critiques of 
the Western construction of illness highlight the gendered nature of ME and its overlap 
with cultural expectations of female social roles; where ME was constructed as an 
escape from the burden of conflicted identities and responsibilities (Richman, Jason, 
Taylor and Jahn, 2000).  
Against this backdrop, Hart and Grace (2000) used DA to investigate women’s 
narratives on fatigue. A discursive field emerged in terms of energy as a mechanical 
flow and blockages. The implication is that if fatigue and energy are understood in 
metaphorical terms then they are not biomedically representable. This means that, 
biomedically, fatigue is studied piecemeal and the complexity of this symptom is 
missed. Moreover, fatigue challenges the notion of body as object and the self as 
subject because the sufferer moves between adopting a position where the body is 
opposed to the self and a subjectifying stance where the body is the self. This 
complicates unravelling the objectivity of ME symptoms such as fatigue from their 
subjective experience. 
An important focus of DA has been the delegitimisation of ME. ME sufferers are often 
stigmatised by the condition due to lack of positive diagnosis and aetiology (Asbring 
& Narvanen, 2002; Looper & Kirmayer, 2004). Obtaining a diagnosis is a struggle 
(Arroll & Senior, 2008). Tucker (2004) states sufferers manage this effect of ME on 
self-identity by adopting certain discursive positions in relation to debates around the 
illness. Because no single discourse can satisfactorily represent ME, competing 
discourses exist, resulting in scepticism concerning how sufferers are perceived; as is 
the case when the condition is attributed a psychological aetiology. Tucker 
demonstrates how sufferers attempt to mitigate this effect by establishing a discourse 
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 See chapter 2; 2.9. 
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of ME as an organically based and consequently legitimate illness. This work supports 
findings by Clement, Sharpe, Simkin, Borrill and Hawton (1997), Horton-Salway 
(2002, 2004, 2007), Asbring & Narvanen, (2002, 2003), Clarke & James, 2003, Raine 
et al. (2004) and Soderlund & Malterud (2005).  However, Asbring and Narvanen 
(2004) demonstrated that by gathering knowledge of the condition, sufferers can make 
demands of health providers to avoid or gain access to certain health options by using 
strategies such as non-compliance, distancing and persuasion. This connotes the active 
processes involved in identity management and that sufferers are not merely in a 
passive, powerless position.  
Overall, from the discursive perspective, identity and how ME affects self experience 
involves the management of alternative or competing attributions. These alternative 
attributions involve the specific interactional situation, the specific nature of the illness 
and what is at stake. If sufferers accounts of ME are taken at face value, attributions of 
personality type might be made that are taken up by biomedical discourse as 
justification for treatment approaches (Guise, Widdicombe and McKinlay, 2007). If 
ME sufferers attribute their condition as very serious, irrespective of definite clinical 
signs, this is easily psychologised as a cognitive bias that justifies the use of CBT.
4
 
Illness identities are thus constructed in situ. This is in contrast to perspectives that 
adopt an essentialist model of identity (Horton-Salway, 2001). However, whilst DA 
has been useful for shedding light on the construction and management of ME 
‘identities’ in relation to cultural discourses, an issue with discursive approaches is 
where to draw ontological distinctions between material and discursive practices 
(Wetherell, 2001). If a Foucauldian framework is adopted, where ‘discourse’ refers to 
a group of historically and culturally specific statements that provide a language 
through which specific knowledge can be represented, then no distinction can be made 
between material practices, including the nature of the body, and a discursive 
understanding of them (Hall, 1997). This arguably diminishes the capacity for an 
autonomous self and particularly the subjective experience of ME from the sufferer’s 
perspective. It is thus apposite to reconsider the relation between self and materiality.  
What can be taken forward? Whilst qualitative work suggests that ME results in 
various trajectories of identity reconstruction, an approach that focuses on each 
particular experience of ME would reveal how that variability is related to specific life 
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experience, antecedents and specific material environments. To date, qualitative work 
on ME has relied largely on the interview method and this has been useful for enabling 
sufferers to narrate their history as they understand it. However, to capture a broader 
slice of the trajectory of ME and how it affects self it would be beneficial to develop 
ethnographic, longitudinal methods that enable the researcher to enter into the 
everyday experiences of the sufferer. This is important given qualitative work 
revealing that the everyday management of ME necessitates that sufferers develop 
coping methods and causes them daily concerns.  
How self and body are related to ME results in various trajectories of effect on identity 
and self experience. These appear to reflect not only research methodologies but also 
the specific balance between illness and wellness. The body becomes a site on which 
the ME debate is inscribed and contested and which has repercussions for how the 
body is experienced. However, from poststructuralist perspectives, the discursively 
produced body does not easily lend itself to scientific scrutiny and this destabilises 
biomedical science’s ability to categorise the body in an absolute sense. From this 
perspective, the sufferer struggles to know their body with certainty, suggesting that 
how self and ME are experienced is mediated by social context and its relation to the 
body.  
The focus of phenomenological experience shifts between the body and self depending 
on whether the body is functioning normally or not. When the body is functioning 
abnormally, it is experienced in a more objective way and this implies that the 
relationship between self and body can be viewed along a continuum with 
differentiation of the two at one end and their unification at the other. This alludes to a 
dynamic relation between body as object and body as subject and hence the self. To 
take this forward, the body in my thesis is conceptualised as a site reciprocally 
engaged with subjective experience. The body is coincident with social and cultural 
discourses and these in turn reflect specific material contexts. One focus is 
consequently on the associations or the relationality of the body. Beyond the mind-
body problem, ME is often experienced by sufferers as confusing and inexplicable 
(Robinson, 2003; Dickson, Knussen and Flowers, 2008) and this provides a further 
avenue of exploration. 
The model of self I intend to develop in this thesis is therefore non-essentialist and 
reflects a fluid contingency of self that accommodates shifting social cultural 
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discourses and the ever-changing material contexts of the world. But given the 
subjective experience of self as stable and continuous (James, 1890) I also seek to 
maintain some interiority of self that reflects a sense of stability and autonomy. 
However, I am not positing a dualistic split between self as fluid and self as stable, nor 
between an absolute interiority of self. Instead, the emphasis is on relationality, such 
that at any given time how self is experienced depends on the way in which the body, 
materiality, discourse and the extra-discursive coalesce.  
To this end, the subsequent section presents an overview of ‘psychosocial approaches’. 
This is an area infused with ideas from disparate fields of thought and which represents 
a flexible, eclectic mix of methods and theories that provide a suitable framework from 
which to consider the effect of ME on self experience. A psychosocial approach 
frames this thesis because it enables a reconceptualisation of the boundaries between 
inner and outer, mind and body and acknowledges the particular yet social nature of 
ME.  
3.4  Psychosocial approaches: framing ME 
The term ‘psychosocial’ covers a varied range of research approaches and indicates a 
shift of emphasis away from dualistic thinking to questions of subjectivity and the 
forces that shape it (Clarke & Hoggett, 2009). Lucey, Melody and Walkerdine (2005) 
argue that to get beyond conscious and rational explanations of people’s behaviour 
requires a greater understanding of how the psychic and social processes that influence 
behaviour come about. A psychosocial approach represents a critical stance that 
challenges the notion of the ‘rational and autonomous human’ that has characterised 
social understanding and policy since the Enlightenment (Frost & Hoggett, 2008). 
Bracketing off rational epistemology and methods is crucial so that the confused and 
contested aspects of ME can be explored.  
This heterogenous psychosocial field draws on feminist, anthropological, post-
structuralist, discursive and psychoanalytic bodies of theory and research as well as 
continental philosophy (Clarke & Hoggett, 2009). It enables interdisciplinary non-
rationalist, non-reductionist means of conceptualising the connections between body, 
psyche and society and advocates methodological and theoretical pluralism (Frosh, 
2003). In this vein, psychosocial approaches are highly concerned with the 
philosophical underpinnings to the theories they call upon. For instance, the work of 
the French philosophers Deleuze and Guattari and their re-envisioning of bodies, 
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desire, spaces and relationships has been influential across disparate areas of 
psychosocial study from education to social justice (Zembylas, 2007; Manley, 2010; 
Henriques, 2010; Walkerdine, 2013). Influences such as this enable the psychosocial 
field to stand outside of positivist psychology and adopt a critical stance.  
The psychosocial field is fundamentally concerned with subjects and subjectivity and 
provides critical analyses of the tensions between external social and internal psychic 
formations (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). Most importantly, psychosocial approaches 
recognise that the dichotomies of individual-social and psychology-sociology are 
unhelpful to studies in these areas (Clarke & Hoggett, 2009) and enable a reflexive 
account of the research process. 
The application of psychosocial approaches and thinking is extremely broad and this 
eclecticism lends it to the study of ME. Studies include the exploration of young 
masculinities (Frosh, Phoenix and Pattman, 2003), film analysis (Froggett & Hollway, 
2010), the effect of macro political and organisational influences on cross-
organisational relations in a local authority (Watts, 2009), social policy and gender 
(Chamberlayne, Rustin & Wengraf, 2002; Hunter, 2009; Crowhurst et al. 2011), the 
experiences of ethnic groups in education (Clarke, 2002), a reconsideration of sibling 
relationships and their effects across different contexts (Edwards, Hadfield, Lucey and 
Mauthner, 2006; Gillies & Lucey, 2006; Young & Frosh, 2010; Lucey, 2011), 
understanding embodiment and gendered relationships (Frost, 2005; Featherstone, 
2010), the relationships between education, class and gender (Frosh, Phoenix and 
Pattman, 2003; Walkerdine, Lucey, Melody, 2001; Walkerdine, 2013) and the 
exploration of experiences involving shame, suffering, embarrassment, loss and hurt 
(Frosh & Hoggett, 2008; Jimenez & Walkerdine, 2011). 
Its flexible and innovative nature renders a psychosocial approach appropriate for the 
present thesis. The emphasis on thinking about how how the ‘‘out-there’’ gets ‘in-
here’’ and vice versa (Frosh and Baraitser, 2008) is key. Put another way, psychosocial 
thinking attempts to collapse binaries such as social-individual, inner-outer and mind-
body and instead thinks about the processes, relationships and experiences that mark 
them in non-dualistic ways. Sociological work that has considered the relationship 
between the individual and society has been limited by an unwillingness or inability to 
work with notions of unconscious processes (Lucey, Melody and Walkerdine, 2003). 
In this vein, the work of Lucey et al was amongst the first to challenge the notion that 
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social class was only a structural, social category. By exploring the interrelationship 
between class and the psyche, Lucey et al demonstrated that what might otherwise be 
taken as outcomes such as the educational success or failure of girls education ascribed 
to class, were in fact the result of a [psychosocial] relationship between class and 
unconscious processes.  Thus, a psychoanalytically informed psychosocial approach 
posits subjectivity founded on the unconscious ways that the social becomes imbued 
with the psychic and vice versa. The psychosocial is consequently a meeting point of 
inner and outer forces and is constructed as well as constructing (Frosh, 2003). 
Moreover,  
Approaching ME from a psychosocial perspective encourages the conceptualisation of 
imaginative ways of bringing together the disparate elements of ME experience. For 
instance, a discursive approach might explore the constructed legitimacy of the 
condition but is perhaps less focussed on how the condition feels. Moreover, a 
psychosocial approach suggests that the discursive sense that is made of ME is easily 
undermined and hence experienced in conflicted ways, given the role played by the 
unconscious wishes and obstacles that are always already an implicit part of the 
experience of ME as expressed through language. Also, phenomenological approaches 
may bracket off the reality of entities such as viruses and focus on the subjective 
reality of the experience but not the material reality of the entities involved. Thinking 
psychosocially provides a way of enhancing sociological explanations of ME that at 
the same time acknowledges the importance of material entities such as viruses and 
environments.  
As the focus of this research is the experience of ME and its effect on self, a 
psychosocial framework is fitting because its non-reductive stance encourages the 
exploration of the relationship between the self and body and their construction in 
reference to ongoing relations and experiences in a material world.  This relationship is 
important because the embodied self resides in a world where it has to respond to the 
mediating effects of material and social demands and restrictions (Millward & Kelly, 
2003). Given the relationship between the self and body and their construction in 
reference to ongoing experiences in a material world, emerging psychosocial 
approaches are ideally suited to reconsider the complex entanglement of self with 
culture. For example, at the heart of Jones’ (2013) analysis of the looting and riots in 
the UK in 2011 are the relations between materiality, consumer culture, masculinity 
and criminality.  
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Jones interrogates the cultural turn in criminology and draws on different strands of 
psychoanalytic theory to argue that culture must be understood as partly constructed 
‘by and within’ the internal worlds of the individuals that culture is already comprised 
of. And yet this already complex arrangement also implies more fundamental 
differences between the genders that help explain why men are more disposed to the 
pitfalls of [consumer] culture in the first place.  
Given the great potential for feelings such as shame and guilt with regards to criminal 
acts and the the losses and gains of being part of a social world, maintaining the self 
inevitably involves an enormous amount of reparative psychological work (Lucey, 
Melody and Walkerdine, 2003).  As Frosh (1991) notes, the self involves an ongoing 
struggle of construction and maintenance and the expenditure of considerable 
psychological energy. This implies the contingent nature of the self, which can be 
understood as the meeting place where the social and physiological effects of ME are 
experienced. A psychosocial stance is useful because self can be thought about in 
terms of the dynamic relationships, or process, involving various social, physiological 
and psychological entities.  
A psychosocial approach can be developed which extends the conceptualisation of self 
to incorporate the materiality of the environment and objects because, as Frosh (2003; 
p.1547) puts it, the psychosocial is a space where elements such as:  
“...‘individual’ and ‘society’ are instead thought of together, as intimately 
connected or possibly even the same thing.” 
 A psychosocial view of self can utilise and enhance a discursive understanding [of 
ME] (Frosh, Phoenix and Pattman, 2003). Parallels can be drawn for example between 
ME and Foucauldian inspired discursive understandings of how feminine identity and 
the feminine body is policed and constructed through technologies demonstrative of 
gendered power regimes (Davis, 1995; Frost, 2005). Just as these involve the 
reconciliation of the body and identity with gendered social discourses that view the 
female body as requiring transformative ‘improvements’, ME involves discourses 
structured through power that delegitimize ME and a body that is felt and viewed as 
inadequate (Horton-Salway, 2001; 2004; Tucker, 2004). Both the ME sufferer and 
women “are caught up with processes of normalisation and homogenisation” (Lovell, 
2000; p.341).  
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Considering the self as psychosocial provides a means of developing a ‘thick’ 
description [of ME] (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Psychoanalysis is central to the strand of 
psychosocial thinking drawn on because it provides a way of thickening interpretation 
of personal narrative by calling upon sophisticated ideas about emotional investment, 
phantasy and unconscious processes (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). From this perspective, 
understanding people’s practices and social realities involves exploring their fantasies 
about relations and subjective ideas (Froggett & Hollway, 2010).  This stance enables 
consideration of the temporal aspects of subjectivity and self experience because, from 
the psychoanalytic perspective, interactions in the present contain symbolised 
interactions from the past. These interactions are comprised of cultural, idiosyncratic 
and personal patterns of relating and how these are embodied materially. Interaction 
therefore transcends the inner and the outer worlds (Froggett & Hollway, 2010). 
In terms of understanding the anxiety that ME causes, a psychoanalytically informed 
psychosocial stance is also useful. Anxiety necessitates the mobilisation of defences 
which are both psychically and physiologically experienced. But they are also socio-
culturally mediated and produced and experienced individually. This is why they need 
to be understood as ‘psychosocial’ (Lucey, Melody and Walkerdine, 2003; Froggett & 
Hollway, 2010).
5
 However, a difficulty for psychoanalytically informed psychosocial 
approaches has been to develop a version of the unconscious that is not reduced to an 
individual, internal process (Froggett & Hollway, 2010). This reflects an ontological 
concern that psychoanalysis posits an unconscious ‘reality’ that stands behind the 
individual in a determinant manner and which can be excavated using specific 
psychoanalytic concepts and tools. However, this is a misunderstanding of 
psychosocial approaches.  
The appeal of a psychosocially framed recourse to psychoanalytic ideas is that there 
exists a productive tension between what appear to be opposed versions of 
psychoanalysis. This tension encourages the development of imaginative thinking and 
methodologies, such as a more materialist treatment of society and culture (Froggett & 
Hollway, 2010). Thus, rather than trying to find some underlying reality that directly 
correlates with what is assumed as the ‘truth’, the task of the psychosocial researcher is 
to understand the dynamic interplay between elements, such as ME symptoms, 
                                                 
5
 Some researchers in the psychosocial field are wary of psychoanalysis because of its individualising 
tendency, its appearance as expert “top-down” knowledge and its apparent claims to know more about 
the truth of an individual than the individual themselves (Hook, 2008). 
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discourse, viruses, self-understanding and material environments, all of which 
comprise the experience of ME. My focus is consequently on relations and process and 
how the effect of ME on self can be understood in relational terms. Adopting this 
relational perspective provides a place from which to understand how disparate 
elements come together and how self experience implicates the material world.  
In summary, thinking about ME psychosocially encourages developing an 
understanding that challenges notions of the self as rational and autonomous. 
Acknowledging the confusing character of ME and the unconscious ways that its 
social aspects become imbued with the psychic and vice versa enables a thicker 
description of how the condition is experienced. A psychosocial approach encourages 
thinking about how disparate elements, including materiality, come together in ways 
that do not reduce self to either a social nor individual matter. From this perspective, 
thinking about self and how it is affected by ME enables an appreciation of how 
different sufferers can have similar yet different experiences of the condition. I refer to 
this as the particularity of ME experience; drawing attention to how each sufferer 
exists in different material environments, engages in different activities and is exposed 
to different life events and people. 
As discussed, a significant influence behind psychosocial approaches has been 
psychoanalytic perspectives. Such perspectives are useful when thinking about self 
because they enable an exploration of the relationship between mind and body as well 
as seeking ways of understanding the contradictory, confused and less than transparent 
aspects of individual and societal phenomena (Clarke, 2002). In the subsequent section 
I discuss how inspiration can be gleaned from specific psychoanalytic theories to 
inform a non-dualistic, non-reductive understanding of ME and its effect on self 
experience. I outline key ideas from Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott 
and Robert Stolorow and George Atwood and describe their relevance to this thesis.  
3.5  Psychoanalytic perspectives and developing a ‘psychoanalytic  
  sensibility’ 
Psychoanalytic ideas enable the conceptualisation of the unconscious and confusing 
aspects of behaviour and experience as well as providing a means of re-articulating the 
mind-body dualism which characterises ME. Specifically, psychoanalytic theory 
addresses what happens at the interface between body and mind and self and object 
(Elisha, 2011) and represents a move away from the notion of a coherent and 
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continuous inner self, positing instead a self split between conscious and unconscious 
aspects (Frosh, 2002). The appeal of psychoanalytic ideas is that they retain tension 
between a dynamic self divided by unconscious conflict and innate anxiety and a self 
that has a core ego that is largely constructed through identification and the 
internalisation of objects from birth and likely before; an ego more resistant to change 
and defies fluidity. It is this epistemological perspective on self, one where the self is 
comprised of internalised others in dynamic, relational ways that reflect change and 
stasis, which is appealing.  
3.5.1   The work of Melanie Klein 
The relationality of self is reflected in the work of Melanie Klein  (1930; 1944; 1945; 
1948; 1953; 1957; 1975; Klein & Riviere, 1967; Mitchell, 1986) and is important 
because it enables thinking about peoples’ relations to others, material objects and 
their relevance to development of the self  in terms of how objects become internally 
represented in the mind.  
Klein understands self as inherently relational in that the first point of contact with the 
world is the body of the infant, who experiences first one body-part then another as 
libidinous, instinctual drives are directed to various places such as the mouth and anus 
(Klein, 1986). Klein explored how psyche and soma develop in conjunction with the 
external world and shares common ground with Freud in asserting that the ego is 
primarily a ‘bodily ego’ (Freud, 1923)6. This is an important notion because it 
necessitates that the body is brought into the analysis of, and is inseparable from self, 
reflecting the non-dualistic approach to self advocated in this thesis.  
For Freud, the body informed psychic development via instincts whereas Klein’s pre-
existent ego represents a metapsychological entity that apparently precedes and 
ultimately prioritises the psyche over the body (Elisha, 2011). This represents a move 
from a causal explanation of psychic development to a teleological one because the 
unfolding of a pre-existent ego implies that psychic and hence bodily developments are 
                                                 
6
 This represented Freud’s attempts to conceptualise a framework free of the mind-body dichotomy 
(Pollak, 2009). The ego and its developmental path represent the fundamental difference between Freud 
and Klein. For Freud, ego appears within the first year of existence, whereas the Kleinian ego, 
responsible for integrating aspects of the unconscious and conscious self, appears in elementary form 
from birth (Klein, 1959). This puts the relationship between mind and body in a different ontological 




shaped in a pre-determined way (Chessick, 1980). However, whilst Klein’s relational 
model of the psyche is not biologically reductionist like Freud’s it does not address the 
mind-body dualism in a way where the external world is maintained as an ongoing 
significant relation (Elisha, 2011). This appears to diminish the importance of the 
external, material world and it is partly this that I address through this thesis. 
Despite Klein agreeing that the ego is primarily a body-ego there appears to be an 
ontological incompatibility, or at least a lack of explanatory clarity. The problem is 
that a pre-existent metapsychological construct [ego] is being called upon to explain 
the appearance of further mental constructs without actually explaining the connection 
to somatic processes. This reflects an explanatory gap between mind and body and 
which in itself points to the need to be creative and non-dogmatic with theory. 
Ultimately, Klein’s prioritisation is of the mental over the somatic, which reprises the 
mind-body dualism.  Pollak (2009) states that the body cannot and should not be 
subordinate to its representation via mental constructs which focus on transforming 
somatic states to symbolic representations.
7
 It is here that a psychosocial stance is 
useful because it emphasises how the self is constructed through processes of 
identification with the external world, given the: 
“...flow and interchange between inside and outside; the ways in which we 
dynamically take on aspects of the outside world, and also how parts of 
ourselves are experienced as existing out there, in other people and objects.” 
(Lucey, Osvold and Aarseth, 2013; p.7) 
My objective is to therefore to think about the self in terms of a material world that has 
an ongoing effect on how self is experienced and understood without reducing self to 
body or body to materiality. This is important because ME clearly affects sufferers’ 
ability to engage with a material world as they might have done prior to ME. However, 
psychoanalytic ideas provide a means of creatively exploring the ways that self, body 
and material objects are interrelated as well as lending themselves to extension and 
enlargement. This is part of the psychoanalytic sensibility I seek to develop.  
For example, at the interface between the psychological world of the individual and the 
outer world is Klein’s notion of phantasy (Isaacs, 1948; Mitchell, 1986).8 Phantasy, 
spelt ‘ph’ to distinguish it from conscious fantasy, represents primary and innate 
                                                 
7
 See Freud (1923; 1933); Isaacs (1948); Hinshelwood (1991). 
8
 See Klein (1946; 1957) and Isaacs (1948) for a discussion of object relations and how the infant 
begins to build up symbolic, internalised phantasised versions of the external world and others initially 
via it’s relation to part-objects such as the mothers breast. 
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unconscious representations of instincts, which link objects to feelings, (Freud, 1915; 
Isaacs, 1943; Money-Kyrle, 1957). Kleinian psychoanalysts view the unconscious as 
comprised of phantasised relations with objects.  Phantasy is a bodily-framed language 
in which body parts stand in for weapons or presents, such that a baby feels suckling 
milk as love (Segal, 1957). When the capacity for symbolisation has developed, 
feelings can be expressed in words. Phantasy implies that neither the body nor the 
external world can be perceived directly. When the capacity for symbolisation has 
developed, feelings can be expressed in words. Indeed a psychoanalytic interpretation 
of ME might view ME as the failure to integrate or deintegrate experience and the 
manner in which it leads to undifferentiated internal states. Driver (2005) describes the 
experience of ME as unprocessed unconscious material that becomes conflated with 
anxiety and psychological defences. Part of this is the difficulty in separating out 
reality from phantasy. For example in how the patient in Driver’s clinical analysis of 
ME reprised the anxiety associated with her lack of a maternal figure that was able to 
process her experiences as an infant. This ME sufferer obsessively defended against 
anxiety and bodily experience as an adult, through over-functioning and obsessively 
attacking her body with over or under activity; features of ME. This patient’s 
psychological experience of ME became one which:  
“...embodied and symbolized the internal hurt child with the internalized 
helpless mother who could not engage with the child’s experience or process 
and understand it.” (ibid. p.158) 
This is already a useful interpretation of ME because of the way in which it highlights 
how unconscious processes of phantasy mediate the manner in which body and self is 
experienced [in destructive ways]. On the other hand, such an interpretation appears to 
pay too much attention to the internal world of the sufferer and its roots in childhood. 
In contrast, it is equally important to account for ongoing dynamic relations to the 
external world, as I aim to demonstrate.  
Nonetheless, phantasy implies that neither the body nor the external world can be 
perceived directly. This is not only important in exploring the reality created by 
sufferers of ME, but also as part of the process of exploration on the part of the 
researcher. For example, Froggett and Hollway (2010) claim that whilst it is relatively 
easy for social scientists to account for their understanding of social processes, it is 
more difficult to account for the quality of this understanding because it draws on on 
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the researcher’s unconscious awareness and the manner in which this awareness is 
‘impelled’ by phantasy.  
The value of ideas such as phantasy is that they provide a means of describing how 
experience is often mediated in ways that occur beyond conscious reflection and may 
appear contradictory or at best confused, as well as providing a language to explore the 
connections between mind and body. Such a perspective entails that searching for 
simplistic causal relations between things and rational explanations of experience and 
behaviour might be better addressed by exploring the relationality of mind, body and 
the world in terms of coextensive, non-causal associations. In other words a view 
where self and body and the material world and others are coincidental rather than 
related in a simplistic causal sense.  
The issue is how to conceptualise mind and body in a non-dualistic manner without 
prioritising one over the other and hence in ontologically different registers. Despite  
concerns with Kleinian ideas, for instance the way that the real external object appears 
to be less important than its internalised mental representation, they open up a space 
from which to begin thinking about how the psyche and hence the self meets the 
external world, others and objects (Young, 2011). It is also important with regards to 
ME because of the contested relationship between mind and body, the conflated nature 
of symptoms and the largely unexplored relationship between ME and the external 
material world of objects and places. These ideas provide a template of the dynamic 
nature of the self and the interplay between the many aspects and entities that comprise 
ME. For instance in how the materiality of a virus and its physiological effects are also 
symbolically mediated through unconscious processes, resulting in elements of 
experience that are not immediately available for conscious interpretation. 
3.5.2   The work of Donald Winnicott 
The relationship between the inner world of the psyche and the external world was 
carried forward and developed by subsequent psychoanalytic theorists such as Donald 
Winnicott. Winnicott is important because he informs thinking about how self forms 
not as a teleological unfolding of a pre-existent ego, but as an emerging in the space 
between the inner and outer worlds and their ongoing reciprocal relations. He provides 
a starting point from which to focus on the materiality of external objects. 
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Like Klein, Winnicott was influential in the Object Relations school of psychoanalysis, 
theory and clinical practice; a field that focuses on how the psyche develops in relation 
to others and how these others are internalised as objects. From the outset, Winnicott 
emphasises the ongoing environment and its effects (Gomez, 1997). Whilst Klein was 
more concerned with the subjective experience of the life and death instincts, 
Winnicott was more concerned with the infants’ adaptation to reality in relation to the 
quality of maternal care. This implies the social nature of the psyche by demonstrating 
that a baby never exists in isolation but is immediately in the care of an adult 
(Winnicott, 1952). He understood that the infant’s self could not develop unless it 
managed to differentiate itself from the mother whilst somehow remaining in touch 
with this objective source (Davar, 2001; Winnicott, 1965).  
Winnicott thought of the immediate environment of the infant as a transitional space, 
inscribed by the subjective experience of the mother/infant dyad and the real breast. 
This notion describes metaphorically how social and psychological modes of 
experience intersect and where meaning is created and re-created to produce a sense of 
self and cultural experience (Winnicott, 1965; 1971). The significance of what happens 
in this space depends on the mother’s behaviour and how the self emerges from an 
unintegrated complex of somatic feelings (Winnicott, 1954). It is through this space 
that the developing self learns the capacity to symbolise and in doing so distinguishes 
what is ‘me’ from ‘not me’ and becomes differentiated. The concept is important for 
this thesis because the implication is that the self is a developmental achievement, 
reflecting fundamental relations with others and an external world reconciled as part of 
the self in ways that are particular to the individual. This also implies the dynamic, 
ongoing developmental nature of self.  
Development of what is ‘me’ and ‘not me’ may occur via a transitional object (TO). 
This is the first ‘not-me’ object and is often something the infant adopts, such as a soft 
corner of blanket, a piece of wool or a cuddly toy (Winnicott, 1971). The TO 
symbolises real part-objects such as the breast but its own materiality is as important as 
its symbolic value. This concept provides a way of talking about how the inner and 
outer world is bridged by incorporating materiality itself. It implies not the unfolding 
of the psyche in the teleological sense of Klein and the negation of the real external 
object, but development comprising of the ongoing presence and behaviour of real 
objects and the maternal environment in an imaginative way. Winnicott (1953) viewed 
the earliest transitional phenomena and objects as rooted in bodily experiences, for 
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example between the infants’ thumb and the TO, which collapses the mind/body 
dualism into an intermediate transitional space. Moreover, the TO functions as a means 
to overcome unconscious anxiety and in the normal course of development the infant 
learns to exteriorise symbolically and differentiate itself from the outer world.  
The notions of transitional spaces and objects lend themselves to creative exploration 
of the relationship between self, body and places and objects as part of our ongoing 
project of self. Chittenden (2013), for instance, provides an illuminating discussion of 
the relationships between the transitional space provided by an arts degree course and 
transitional objects such as the paintings produced by a female student who struggled 
to reconcile her own body shape and female body image with the norm of 
contemporary culture or historical artwork. In Chittenden’s analysis, an arts degree 
course provided a frame for the student to play with different roles and practices as 
well as the possible enactment of different desires and identities. Through this space, 
the student developed creative strategies with which she could explore her sexual 
desirability and aesthetic self. The paintings themselves represent objects through 
which her identity was shaped and could eventually emerge as part of the process of 
negotiation which also involved critical reflection and verbal discussion of the work. 
What is important about this study is that it demonstrates how self development 
implies sociocultural and individual processes intersecting with material objects and 
practices.  
Thus, thinking about the space between inner and outer worlds and between self and 
other and how these relate symbolically to the wider cultural field leads to a 
consideration of the relational nature of objects and self. This is a focus on the 
relations between things rather than the things themselves; a perspective that eschews 
causal arrangements where one thing is causally related to another in favour of 
envisioning a space where various developmental threads coalesce and associate with 
each other in coincident, productive and imaginative ways. Conceptualising this 
metaphorical space provides a rudimentary model of thinking about how seemingly 
disparate and ontologically incompatible things come together. However, as implied 
by the work of Klein and Winnicott, the real other is in one way or another present as 
part of the self and for this reason it is important to reconcile the aspects of self-
development discussed thus far with ways of thinking about what occurs when the real 
other is engaged. This involves thinking about relations with others as neither internal 
nor external but in terms of an intersubjective space between and around people. 
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3.5.3   The work of Robert Stolorow and George Atwood 
A relatively recent development of psychoanalysis that addresses the relations between 
people is Stolorow and Atwood’s (1992) concept of intersubjectivity, which reflects a 
move away from the notion of the individual isolated mind of early psychoanalytic 
models towards the contextualised, mutually influencing interaction of subjectivities 
(Stolorow, Brandchaft, & Atwood, 1987; Mitchell & Black, 1995). Intersubjectivity 
theory also represents a move away from either/or questions about the dual or monistic 
nature of psyche and soma and places the body at the junction between subjective 
experience and its relationship with the outside world (Elisha, 2011).   
As Benjamin (2005) notes, the importance of intersubjectivity theory is  not only in 
addressing the subject-object problem but also to shed light on the process of the 
mutual engagement and recognition occurring between people. Mills (2005) observes 
that from the intersubjective perspective, affective attunement, social construction, and 
mutual recognition takes precedence over the role of interpretation. This stance 
resonates with my aims because what this thesis attempts is to comment on the 
experience of ME and self but not to provide an explanation of them.  
Stolorow and Atwood’s notion of intersubjectivity takes as its departure-point two 
interacting subjectivities that form an intermediate relational space (Thompson, 2005). 
In other words, how self is experienced and how the other is internalised occurs in 
between people, rather than in terms of two separate selves as might be implied by the 
notion of the isolated mind inferred by classical psychoanalysis. Stolorow and Atwood 
suggest that establishing mind as distinct from the body produces the illusion of a self 
free from the constraints of biological bodily rhythms, the wider physical environment, 
others and mortality. This serves as a defence against physical vulnerability but 
necessitates the reification of spatial, temporal and substantial aspects of subjectivity. 
Stolorow and Atwood contend that this reifying process involves constructing the 
world as ‘real’ and separate from the self. In terms of self, this points back to the over-
valuation of the autonomy necessary for a model of self that rests on the isolated-mind 
myth (Elisha, 2011).  
Conceptually, it is important to retain the tension between the subjectively experienced 
body and intersubjectivity. Elisha (2011) notes that even though the intersubjective 
model rests on a psychological experience of the body and an experiential divide 
between psyche and soma, the physical body and its interaction with other bodies is 
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where this is grounded. However, Stolorow and Atwood are at lengths to establish that 
mind and body are not to be seen as dualistic absolutes but instead as elements of self 
experience and that the boundary between the subjectively experienced mind and body 
is the product of specific and formative intersubjective contexts. Affective, emotional 
states become experienced as feelings in the mind and/or as a somatic awareness. This 
brings to mind the ‘confusion’ of psyche and soma apparent in ME (Driver, 2005). 
Overall, Stolorow and Atwood’s position suggests that ME and the effect on self can 
be explored not as an independent, objective truth but via the various contours of the 
relationality of the self that incorporates the biology of the body, other people and the 
materiality of the world. 
The psychoanalytic ideas discussed in this section provide a psychoanalytic sensibility 
and way of framing the fundamental relationships between body, self, others and the 
material world. Psychoanalytic ideas, as part of a broader psychosocial framework, can 
enable the exploration of these relationships by providing not only a descriptive, 
conceptual language that can be developed and enlarged but also an epistemological 
perspective on the way that self, body, phantasy, anxiety and materiality are mutually 
implicated in confusing and contradictory ways. This is very important with regards to 
ME because it provide a means of resisting the notion that inner life can be explored 
and clearly understood (Lewis, 2009) whilst at the same time striving to conceptualise 
and understand what occurs at the boundary between the inner and outer worlds of the 
individual. Bringing together the ideas of Klein, Winnicott, Stolorow and Atwood 
enables the conceptualisation of a [psychosocial] space which transcends dualisms 
such as inner and outer and mind and body. It is within this space, which is 
simultaneously personal and social and inscribed by real material places, objects, 
bodies and others that self arises and is experienced in particular ways. It is by 
establishing ME and its effects on self in terms of this psychosocial space that is at the 
heart of this thesis.  
In carrying forward the notion of a psychosocial space from within which to explore 
ME and its effect on self, the issue is how to maintain the relational integrity of the 
various strands of body, others, materiality, discourse and places without prioritising 
one over the other. I seek to explore ME experience and the aspects I have outlined in 
terms of ongoing relationality and process. To this end, the subsequent section outlines 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) as a means of tracing the associations between the 
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elements of experience in a way that is commensurate with my general psychosocial 
framework.  
3.6  Actor Network Theory: a means of exploring the relationality of self 
Actor Network Theory originates in the study of science and provides a model of 
organisation that rejects the idea that social relations are independent of the material 
world (Latour, 2005). ANT challenges sociologists’ tendency to mobilise the ‘social’ 
as a motivating force that pre-exists the material world, which instead becomes a site 
on which social phenomena are enacted (Pels, Hetherington and Vandenberghe, 2002). 
An example pertinent to ME is the tendency for medical sociologists and ME 
advocates to call on 'biomedical power' or related concepts such as ‘dominant 
discourse’ to explain why ME sufferers experience delegitimation (Prout, 1996). 
Approaching ME from this perspective ignores the processes and material things by 
which biomedicine has established itself and maintains its hegemony. ANT explores 
such processes and how they involve dynamic relationships between disparate human 
and non-human, material and non-material entities or as Latour (1987; 2005) refers to 
them, ‘actants’.  
An actant is initially a non-specific entity that has a number of potential identities or 
‘potentialities’ (Latour, 2005). When it becomes associated with other actants, distinct 
potentialities manifest such that the actant can carry out or aid certain actions. It is then 
deemed an ‘actor’ with a set of attributes or identities (Latour, 1992; 1997). An 
example might be a ten pence piece. As an unspecified actant, it is a piece of metal. In 
conjunction with other actants such as an economic exchange system and a human, the 
metal affords certain actions. It can be exchanged for things. The metal in this setting 
is an actor and can be described as having become networked with other actors with 
which its meaning and action is established; hence the term ‘actor network’ (Fioravanti 
& Velho, 2010). It is only in relation with other actors and as part of a network that a 
thing manifests specific identities and performs particular actions.  
The concept of actor-network overcomes the dichotomy of agency and structure by 
implying irreducibility and this resonates with a psychosocial approach. It implies an 
anti-essentialist stance because any one actor, be it human or non-material, is 
characterised as part of a network. Unlike other sociological approaches, such as 
symbolic interactionism, which to one degree or another prioritise human action as 
determinant in society, ANT views society as networks of heterogeneous actants, some 
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human and some non-human, constituted through the dynamic associations and 
dissociations between them (Prout, 1996). The social is irreducible to either human 
activity or technological artefacts.  
A central concern of ANT theorists is to avoid establishing a hierarchy of actors, for 
instance with humans seen as more important in establishing a network than material 
objects (Hartt, 2013). The reason for this is that if a type of actor is prioritised, it could 
be viewed as deterministically shaping the identities and behaviours of other actors, 
implying an essentialist position and suggesting that there is something unique to 
human agency that precedes the material world. This leads to the question of ontology. 
From sociological perspectives such as anthropology and social archaeology, objects 
have been granted some agency but underpinning this was the belief that the 
motivating force always originates in humankind (Webmoor & Witmore, 2008). 
Objects were not privileged ontologically. However, Rochberg-Halton (1984) notes 
that valued material objects act as signs for and of the ongoing cultivation of the self. 
Objects are therefore important in their own right and across the life-span.
9
  
González-Ruibal, Hernando and Politis (2011; p.2) note that the ontological relation 
between human and material object is important, stating that: 
“...the conscious projection or communication of the self through artefacts 
can only be a surface symptom of a deeper, pre-existing and mostly 
unconscious ontological relation, in which person and thing are one.”  
Considering the ontological relation between humans and material objects requires a 
shift from the conscious to the unconscious because:  
“Ontology implies a relation between humans and things that is prior to 
symbolization and therefore deeper and less obvious for the human actor.” 
(ibid. p.4).  
Reflecting on the relation between the self and the material world will provide new 
insights into the connection between self and ME and represents a point of synthesis 
between an ANT and psychoanalytically informed psychosocial approach. If, from the 
                                                 
9
 An in-depth discussion of the ‘sociology of objects’ and their relations to humans is beyond the scope 
of my thesis. How an object is distinguished from its use, how objects are perceived in consciousness, 
how the representation of an object is distinguished from its materiality and the degree to which surface 
representation as opposed to the internal complexity of an object should be considered are questions that 




ANT viewpoint, objects are no less privileged than humans and are ontologically 
fundamental to human self-understanding and expression, then the implication is that 
the way humans interact with objects reveals relationships beyond rational 
contemplation. Psychosocially, this means that whilst objects may be perceived as 
exterior to us, they should be explored as transcending a simplistic inner/outer dualism 
and from an imaginative, non-rationalist perspective.  
The ontological stance of ANT also offsets claims that may be levelled for instance at 
an intersubjective psychoanalytic stance. For example, a dualistic view is that there are 
either two separate subjectivities interacting or one intersubjective state. Intuitively, as 
discussed, people often do feel separate but equally often they do not. The issue is a 
false dichotomy is constructed between the individual self and an intersubjective self. 
From the ANT perspective this dichotomy dissolves because the various ways in 
which self can be experienced is an achievement that depends on the specific nature of 
actants, including people, which are in association at any given moment.  
However, a critique commonly levelled at ANT is that it sets out a flat ontology which 
eradicates the hierarchical distinction between human and object and neglects the 
regulating role of social structures in shaping the relations between actors and giving 
them consistency and continuity (Reed, 1997). ANT assumes that there is no such 
thing as the social, but only actors in associations with each other (Munir & Jones, 
2004). Schatzki (2002) criticises ANT by suggesting that this perspective neglects the 
existence of a social context that acts as a backdrop to and influences how actors 
associate. But, Latour (1991; 1997) argues that the issue is one of scale and that the 
macrostructure of society is ultimately made of the same things as the microstructures. 
Latour argues that ANT can accommodate different levels of analysis and can thus 
describe macro or micro structures and Akrich (1992) argues that the process of ANT 
exposes the mundane aspects of the social as being composed of complicated webs of 
relationships of actors. 
Latour (1997) refers to a flat ontology as relationist ontology, where no entity is 
fundamentally more important than another.  However, a criticism of relationist 
ontologies is that they diminish the sense of human agency and the nature of persons, 
denying the embodied, emotional nature of human existence (Mutch, 2002). But 
adopting a hierarchical ontology means having to categorise according to á priori 
structures, such as the ‘social’ or the ‘biological’, which ultimately involves a focus on 
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one level of the hierarchy or another.  On the other hand, a relational ontology involves 
looking at how elements interact and how ‘wholes’ emerge from the relationships 
between “unique [...] individuals differing only in spatio-temporal context...” 
(DeLanda, 2002; p.58).  
According to (Marston et al. 2005; p.422), who apply a flat ontology to rethink 
geographical space, the implication is that:  
“...the dynamic properties of matter produce a multiplicity of complex 
relations and singularities that sometimes lead to the creation of new, unique 
events and entities, but more often to relatively redundant orders and 
practices.” 
Collinge (2006; p.247) suggests that a flat ontology implies dynamic events of 
“material composition and decomposition”. In other words, a complex system such as 
an actor network can be seen as an ongoing dynamic event which sometimes leads to 
areas of order and at other times disorder, depending on whether actants are 
associating or dissociating from each other. Part of this will inevitably be the 
experiencing of emotion and the body.  
Thus, a further point of synthesis between ANT and psychoanalytic approaches are 
that parallels can be drawn between the dynamic relations that constitute unconscious 
processes that remain hidden from view and similarly dynamic processes that associate 
material relations and space. From that position, it becomes a matter of adopting a 
relational ontology to bracket off the boundary between inner and outer worlds and 
again this is in keeping with a psychosocial framework. Approaching ME in this way 
provides a conceptual basis for exploring how the disparate actants that might be 
implicated in self experience come together, such that the experience of ME can be 
viewed as an ongoing dynamic event. From this perspective, self is not an innate entity 
that is affected by ME in an objective sense. Instead, self, ME experience, how these 
are conceptualised, talked about and contextualised in a material world form and 
transform in situ. Adopting this perspective is crucial to enabling a specific 
understanding of why each sufferer’s experience of ME is particular to them: each 
sufferer’s world of ‘things’ is different.  
To frame this particularity of ME experience within an ANT perspective, I borrow the 
term assemblage. (Delanda, 2002; Latour, 2004; Hodder, 2012). This term reflects 
notions of complexity, chaos, indeterminacy, multiplicity and emergence. It indicates a 
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growing concern, reflected in new theoretical vocabulary, with addressing the problem 
of determination in social processes and their inherent stability or instability (Venn, 
2006). Deleuze & Guattari (1988), describe an assemblage in terms of a mix of places, 
bodies, voices, skills, technological artefacts, concepts, schemes and work that 
together make up knowledge and practice.  
The term assemblage provides a metaphor that can describe the multiplicities of 
relations between things and is opposed to the structuring, hierarchical tendencies 
implicit in Western philosophy, science, psychology and history (Navaro-Yashin, 
2009). Thus, the notion of the assemblage, its theorisation by Deleuze and Guattari and 
its subsequent development couples ANT to a psychosocial perspective. The notion of 
assemblage meshes with my previous discussion of psychoanalytic and psychosocial 
approaches to self because the relations and processes that assemblage implies 
transcend the mind-body dualism and the movement of actants such as viruses in and 
out of the material human body. From this perspective ME, ‘self’ and how ME affects 
‘self’ are relational and exist as an ongoing process.  
How to think about relationality in research practice connects to a broader set of 
theoretical debates and issues around relational ontology and requires a similarly broad 
outlook. For example, ANT presents a relational ontology that somewhat reflects the 
relational thinking implicit in psychoanalytic approaches. The manner in which actants 
are encouraged to describe themselves and the associations followed might be 
compared to the psychoanalytic notion of free association; where it serves as a 
projective device to explore for example the unconscious in a therapeutic setting. 
However, a key difference is the manner in which ANT tends towards an explicit 
recognition of the possibility for a multiplicitous relationality whereas classical 
psychoanalysis does not; which tends instead towards a more dyadic arrangement. This 
points towards the need to acknowledge that the idea of relationality can be ‘pushed’ 
further than perhaps I seek to do in this thesis, for example by developing concepts 
such as ‘affect’ and how it intersects with relationality (Hunter, 2012) and via authors 
working with feminist and poststructuralist ideas.  
The notion of affect for instance explicitly addresses the relation between the social, 
the individual and objects from the ontological perspective. Blackman and Venn 
(2010) indicate a recent interest in the non-verbal, non-conscious aspects of experience 
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that suggests a different “type of engagement with sensation, perception, memory and 
listening” and ask  
“...how [ ] can we model the psychic and sensory apparatuses that afford 
specific kinds of embodied knowing? If bodies are characterized by their 
intercorporeality and trans-subjectivity then how can we decouple such 
experiences from a singular, bounded and distinctly human body and what 
kinds of theoretical and methodological innovation will make this possible?” 
(p.8).  
Affect is not inherent in an object but is produced as an effect of the circulation 
between objects and signs and objects and the body (Hunter, 2012). Affect thus 
outlines a pre-reflective, pre-conscious and pre-linguistic dimension that is an inherent 
dynamic of the body, requiring us to reconsider ‘embodiment’ (Blackman & Venn, 
2010).  
In terms of ME/CFS, affect is pertinent in thinking about the body not as a reified 
object but as an entangled process (Latour, 2004), implicating an affective dimension. 
This speaks of the way that the body can act as mediator both subjectively and 
intersubjectively and also of how this mediating function reflects time, space and 
culture. The body can be envisaged not just as a site where cultural or social processes 
are merely enacted, nor with reified cognitive, or rationalist elements. Instead, through 
affect, the body is envisioned as part of a process that ultimately avoids deconstruction 
because affect is beyond signification; something that cannot be read but can only be 
experienced (O’Sullivan, 2001).  
However, Caselli (2010; p.250) states that “if affect is a way of theorizing what 
apparently defies narration then it is beyond critical analysis”. In other words it is 
difficult to stop and reflect on an affective process without reifying affect. On the other 
hand, affect does provide ways of thinking about and interrogating social and political 
processes in a different way from ones that rely on dualisms of repression/subversion 
(Hemmings, 2005). Hardt (1999) for example talks about ‘affective labor’ as one 
aspect of immaterial labour [that which produces no material goods; a service, 
knowledge or information about human interaction] in the context of the health 
services, where affective labour and care produces necessary yet somewhat intangible 
effects such as “a feeling of ease, well being…” (p.96). Whilst Hardt concludes that 
the production of affects is what gives qualitative value to the labor process it also 
presents the means of liberation from capitalist accumulation.  
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Affect is thus one example of the type of thinking that characterizes psychosocial 
approaches and in itself points to the way that the psychosocial field is itself 
heterogenous and provides a means of exploring and working with an eclectic range of 
material.  
In this section I have described ANT from a theoretical perspective. To reiterate, the 
appeal of ANT is it allows me to think about humans, material objects and non-
humans as coincident with each other, with a focus on the associations between these 
entities rather than on the entities themselves. This can lead to an understanding of the 
dynamic, heterogenous and particular ways in which ME is understood in terms of self 
experience.  The psychosocial framework to this thesis represents a synthesis of ANT 
and psychoanalytically informed ideas which converge in the relationality of a 
psychosocial space where ME and self can be explored. As this psychosocial space 
comprises physical places and environments, it is important to explore how these have 
been explored in relation to health and chronic illnesses such as ME. This is the theme 
of the subsequent section. 
3.7  The significance of spaces and places 
In this section I discuss the significance of the material environment in terms of ‘space 
and place’ and review ideas in this area. A significant body of literature address the 
relations between space, place and health. Thinking about space and place is important 
because, as discussed previously, the perspective that I seek to develop envisages self 
as intimately bound up with internal, external, psychological and material places and 
consequently as occupying ‘space’ in a psychosocial sense.  
The places where people live their lives are important and deeply implicated in self 
experience. Duff (2011; p.149) notes:  
“Place is a fundamental feature of human experience, deeply implicated in the 
development of identity and belonging and central to the conduct of everyday 
life.”  
Thrift (1999) points out the active role of place in shaping habits and situating 
experience whilst Proshansky, Fabian, and Kaminoff (1983) link identity to place by 
explaining how an aspect of self-identity is based on cognitions about the physical 
world which represent memories, feelings, attitudes and values. They also link place to 
a temporal framework by stating that at the core of such cognitions is an environmental 
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past which has served biological, social, psychological and cultural needs and is 
composed of “spaces, places and their properties” (ibid. p.59).  
An example of a specific place that is likely to be of significance for most people is the 
house as home. Gulwadi (2009) explains that a stress-inducing event such as illness 
disrupts the familiar and meaningful in terms of everyday functional activities and also 
in terms of how home is experienced emotionally. Hochschild (1989) points out that 
the home connects to the social world, for instance in the way that it instantiates 
expectations of women’s gendered caregiving roles. The home is therefore a site of 
social, psychological and emotional significance that is comprised of different types of 
human, non-human, material and non-material actants.  
ME has an extreme affect on people’s ability to engage physically with the world 
around them; most often marked during onset of the condition (Afari & Buchwald, 
2003; Goudsmit, Stouten and Howes, 2009). If ME is debilitating to the degree that 
sufferers spend more time in their home than they did before ME onset, it is useful to 
think about how the home relates to their experience of ME and sense of self.  It 
provides a physical place from which to think about the experience of ME. This 
meshes with an an ANT-informed psychosocial perspective because place can be 
thought about in the same way as material actants. 
It is important to consider how daily routines relate to ME sufferers’ ability to 
negotiate everyday environments in a functional sense; for instance whether they can 
climb stairs. Places can therefore be considered in terms of the activities they enable 
and constrain. Anfield (2011) for example describes how an ME sufferer was limited 
to living and sleeping downstairs because lack of mobility made climbing the stairs too 
difficult. Houlton (2012) notes how ME may make pushing a vacuum cleaner difficult. 
ME presents as functionally impairing in terms of daily routines and engaging 
physically in the home. However, one’s relationship to the home-as-enabling-place 
reflects not only demographic variables such as class, ethnicity and family size but also 
an increasing politicisation of that relationship and its restorative function 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Williams, 2002; Thrift, 2004). This 
suggests that people’s relationship to the home is a site of social organisation, which 
fits with an ANT perspective and how it can be used for instance to think about the 
social relations between the material environments, people and their sense of self in 
light of discourses around ME.  
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Whilst the home is important in terms of daily life and well-being, there are also many 
environments beyond the home that ME sufferers may engage in. These also need to 
be considered in terms of daily routines. For instance, a wealth of literature focuses on 
enabling places in terms of health-promotion (Smyth, 2005; Duff, 2011). Enabling can 
be understood in terms of restorative therapeutic functions and restoring diminished 
functional capabilities and resources (Hartig and Staats, 2003). Enabling places and 
environments have the ability to mitigate stress, anxiety and aid mood regulation 
(Hartig & Saats, 2003; Milligan & Bingley; 2007; Williams, 2007). Laumann, Gärling 
& Stormark, (2001) for example found that natural environments enhanced well-being 
more than urban environments. Korpela et al. (2008) suggest that the restorative 
capacity of favourite places reflects complex associations between renewal of directed 
attention capacity, physiological changes from tension and stress toward relaxation and 
positive mood change. Such places are also connected to personal background of 
nature experiences, such as nature orientedness and childhood experiences and 
duration and frequency of being in the favourite place. This implies the need to focus 
on the particularity of relationships with given places.  
Interestingly, Casey (1996) suggests that space can be reframed as an ‘event’. This is 
the idea that at the centre of place is an experiencing body that dynamically engages 
through the senses with the environment and the things in it. This relationship between 
the two is never static. Similarly, Pink (2008; p.246) claims that:  
“...paths and routes are not simply functional routes that connect one place to 
another, but are meaningful sensory and imaginative places...”  
This urges a rethink of places not as distinct, static areas but as a process which 
implies the moving, sensing body, others and objects. It is interesting to note how Pink 
intimates the metaphorical status of paths and routes as well as their literal status. The 
implication is that the path/route somehow connects things and at the same time is 
transformative beyond immediate sensory experience. This resonates with the 
relational premise of ANT in that the identities and actions that result as actants come 
into association reflect how actants associate, rather than the actants themselves. 
Moreover, re-imaging material places in terms of transformative psychosocial spaces 
necessitates an appreciation of the way that metaphor can be used as a means of 
generating fresh insights and understandings (Aita, McIlvain, Susman and Crabtree, 
2003). The relevance of a psychoanalytically informed psychosocial framework is that 
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it already holds open the door to thinking about the relationships between self, place, 
objects and others in imaginative, metaphorical ways.  
In summary, there are important connections between spaces, places, health and the 
experience of self. These connections appear to be complex and incorporate social, 
temporal, emotional, cognitive and physiological factors. Given the premise of ANT 
and the close relations between people and their home, an understanding of ME can 
focus on the actantial arrangements between sufferers, their everyday environments 
including the home and the things in it as a site where emotions and experiences are 
mobilised. This brings my methodology into the lived world of the ME sufferer and 
provides an experience-near perspective (Schneider, 1999; Hollway, 2009; Lewis, 
2009). The home can be envisaged as a dynamic, psychosocial space where ME and 
self are coincident and reflect way that specific actants move into and out of 
association with each other.  
3.8  Summary of research rationale 
In this section I summarise my theoretical perspective by outlining and drawing 
together the various conceptual strands discussed in this chapter. 
In terms of self, I draw on postmodern and poststructuralist notions to envisage the 
relational, situated, shifting and non-unitary nature of self as coincident with the 
activities and contexts that people are engaged in.  This view challenges a rational and 
essentialist model of self but adopts a critical perspective of the disparate aspects of 
micro and macro discourse such as social policy and power as well as more 
psychological aspects of emotion and cognition. It enables an understanding of the 
meaning of situations and processes through which ME and self are experienced by the 
sufferer. To make sense of the social and relational aspects of self necessitates 
exploring the part played by non-human objects and the material environment as these 
form part of the semiotic system through which self is constituted.  
ME transcends characterisation as psychological, social or physiological and involves 
contested relations between mind and body. Many aspects of ME are confusing and 
contradictory and there is an entangled relationship between the beliefs of clinicians, 
researchers and sufferers and the nature of aetiological models and treatment options. 
From this perspective, ME will be approached as a complex, dynamic arrangement in 
which the researcher becomes implicated. A methodology that is inherently reflexive is 
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necessary. Because of the potentially irrational aspects of how ME is experienced and 
to avoid implying that ME can be explained by social processes I will draw on 
psychoanalytic ideas as a means of thinking about and exploring the felt, unconscious 
and confusing aspects of ME and self experience that are not representable through 
discourse. In this way, an understanding can be developed that retains some interiority 
of self. 
Psychoanalytic theory is drawn on as it provides a means of thinking about and re-
articulating the mind-body schism. Body and mind need to be thought about in the 
same ontological register so that a non-dualistic understanding of the effect of ME on 
self can be developed.  The works of Klein, Winnicott and Stolorow and Atwood have 
been drawn on as a means of conceptualising a space that sits across the boundary of 
the inner and outer world. This enables me to think about the relationality of body, 
mind, others and external material objects as a dynamic arrangement and brackets-off 
questions of aetiological causality. Thinking about a psychosocial space which 
transcends mind and body and through which self is effected enables a consideration 
of the broader cultural and discursive field and provides a means of articulating 
metaphorically how seemingly disparate and ontologically incompatible things such as 
viruses and lay-beliefs come together.  
Psychosocial thinking provides the framework through which ME and its effects on 
self will be explored. A psychosocial stance envisages self as a meeting-place where 
social, psychological and physiological aspects of ME are experienced. This enables 
an equal-handed treatment of the social and psychological aspects of ME. Psychosocial 
thinking is drawn on as it promotes creative ideas about the relationships between 
psychological and sociological processes, and their mutual infusion, in a non-reductive 
manner. This relates to an ANT purview where all entities that ME might be 
compromised of can be given equal consideration, overcoming the dichotomy of 
agency and structure that ME implies.  
ANT provides an anti-essentialist stance where any one type of actor is no less 
important than another. Adopting a relational ontology and reflecting on the relation 
between self and the material world will provide new insights into the connection 
between self and ME. As ANT promotes a descriptive language in keeping with the 
voices of the actors it represents, I seek to develop descriptions of ME that reflect the 
experiences of ME sufferers in a way that is particular to each sufferer. This is a way 
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of staying with the similarities and differences in the ways that ME is experienced and 
articulated.  
Finally, I draw on research that considers the importance of spaces and places. The 
places and environments in which people live and frequent are important and 
implicated in how self is experienced and the identities that are involved. The home is 
a place of social, psychological and emotional significance that contains many human, 
non-human, material and non-material actants and provides a physical place in which 






















Actor Network Theory and metaphor: the 
methodological premise 
 
4.1  Chapter overview 
In chapter three I discussed ideas about self and self’s relation to ME, which lead to an 
outline of ANT along theoretical lines and why it lends itself to a psychosocial 
framework. My aim was to describe ANT’s main constructs and its premise of seeking 
to understand the relationships between materiality and social life. Anti-essentialism 
informs ANT’s conceptual frame for interpretation as well as guiding the methods 
used to trace networks (Ritzer, 2004). However, ANT is often cited as being a method 
as well as a theory (Latour, 1999; 2005; Dicken et al. 2001; Ritzer, 2004). To a certain 
extent this is due to ANT having no unified body of literature and being somewhat 
eclectic in its application and interpretation (Pollack, Costello and Sankaran, 2013). 
ANT does not seek to explain why an actor-network takes the form it does. Instead, it 
offers a method of exploring and describing the relations between actors rather than an 
explanation. Thus, whilst ANT rests on certain theoretical constructs and provides a 
general heuristic which leads to its theoretical status, its value for me is as a method to 
explore ME. However, ANT might be critiqued because of its apparent apolitical 
stance and because of the manner in which it suspends recourse to a priori social 
categories’ such as gender and class. According to Gad (2010) ANT has been 
challenged by feminists for focusing on privileged actors and for overlooking other 
ways in which networks may develop. Thus, a significant portion of the first part of 
this chapter addresses such critiques and how alternative perspectives on categories, 
such as psychosocial feminist approaches, require acknowledgment because of the way 
that they bring to attention and frame such issues. 
In this chapter I outline my methodological premise, describing how to notice and 
think about the relations between actors in the ANT spirit. Developing a methodology 
that could accommodate the potentially confusing nature of ME (Robinson, 2003; 
Dickson, Knussen and Flowers, 2008) involved synthesising ANT with 
psychoanalytically inspired ideas. With this in mind, the second section of this chapter 
discusses the nature of metaphoric and metonymic processes and how they relate to 
Freudian ideas. I then discuss how contemporary work links metaphor to primary 
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somatic experience before outlining how I use metaphor to trace associations between 
actants. My assertion is that the grounds for action  and experience, for example those 
which an ME sufferer are involved in, cannot be reduced to a conscious choice 
occurring in an isolated mind but can instead be thought about in terms of the 
associations between actants (Latour, 2005; Pollack, Costello and Sankaran, 2013). I 
conclude the chapter by drawing attention to the subtle and complex aspects of 
metaphor and metonymy and how oversimplification must be avoided when using 
them to explore the narratives of ME sufferers.  
4.2   Actor Network Theory as method 
Given that actants become relationally involved with each other in an actor-network, 
central questions are how to discern if something is an actant and how to find out what 
it associates with. In this section I address these issues and explain how they form the 
basis for my methods. 
Latour’s empirical slant is always to follow what objects are doing in their particular 
context of associations and to describe what is noticed (Harman, 2009); reprised in 
Latour’s directive to follow the actor (Law 1992; Latour, 2005; Fioravanti & Velho, 
2010). Following the actor is the process of focussing on an actant as it associates into 
a network, noticing the actions it is involved in, how its identity emerges in association 
with other actants and by paying attention to the language with which actants describe 
themselves. 
With this in mind, Latour (2005; p.147) states that:  
 ‘... actors themselves make everything, including their own frames their own 
theories, their own contexts, their own metaphysics and even their own 
ontologies.’   
Because actors build their own worlds, researchers cannot identify actor-networks 
unless they enter them, which involves approaching actors as far as possible on their 
own terms (Law, 2003). This promotes a reflexive stance to the research because the 
researcher has to consider the part they play in interpreting what they notice. 
Concerning ME, prioritising what is of importance to the sufferer and not questioning 
the veracity of their accounts by looking for inner psychological explanations is vital. 
By allowing the sufferer to delineate what is important to them the researcher may 
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encounter a previously unconsidered range of material and non-material aspects 
implicated in that sufferer’s particular experience of ME. 
ANT is flexible because it considers all actants, material and non-material, as equally 
important in understanding social relations and specific experiences, such as ME. 
Latour (2005) refers to this as symmetrisation. Symmetrisation implies that ANT 
theorists should apply a single explanatory framework when describing and 
interpreting what actants are doing and that no human actant is any more important to 
the network than a non-human actant (Ritzer, 2004). Symmetrisation provides a useful 
heuristic in approaching ME because it enables consideration of all and any entity as 
potentially important be they viruses, sofas or symptoms.  
The principle of symmetry connotes that neither humans nor non-humans are able to 
act with agency alone. I characterize agency as the:     
“...collective capacity of heterogeneous networks, in which the activities of 
the non-human may count for as much, or more, as the activities of humans” 
(Ruming, 2009; P.456).  
In other words, there are always many entities implicated in a specific action and no 
single entity, human or otherwise, is capable of action or effecting a specific outcome 
on its own. This perspective on agency avoids establishing a specific actant, such as a 
virus or a pre-existent personality type, in an aetiological role in ME. 
The principle of symmetry is extremely important in ANT studies for the reasons 
outlined previously, but it also needs to be thought about in terms of its broader 
ramifications and work that comes ‘after’ ANT (Law, 2004). For example, 
symmetrisation enables the making of material and non-material actants equivalent to 
the effect that all and any entity has to be approached in terms of its associations and 
resultant effects at the network level and not in terms of preconceived notions about its 
nature, capacities or likely effects. However, there are implications for assuming such 
equivalence and attempting to avoid engaging with existing categories that might be 
seen as determining the identity of an actant. Haraway (1988) is useful in drawing 
attention to how, if equivalences are drawn for example between the categories of 
gender and science, common language or heteroglossia or by extension material object 
and non-material object, each term obscures a structuring, binary opposition that rests 
on difference and the illusion of mutual exclusivity; the terms exist in a dialectical 
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relationship. To take an example which might apply to this thesis, my recourse is to 
bracket off categories such as gender to avoid being seduced by existing ‘genderised’ 
ME discourse.  Existing discourse might include that of sufferers being predominantly 
female with the implication that female sufferers are simply tired from working too 
hard, as has actually been implied by epithets such as ‘tired woman syndrome’ (Maran, 
Lawson and Hill, 1962). The question is whether bracketing off categories such as 
gender and by adopting symmetrisation as an heuristic results in other problems?  
One observation on symmetry is that it “is not to substitute the great divisions for a 
transcendent unity, but to recognize the little differences that the great divisions over 
codify…” (De Castro & Goldman, 2012; p.430). This brings the focus back to the 
particular and local in a way where the effects of broader categories such as gender are 
instantiated. However, it is undeniably the case that gender does play a role in how ME 
is experienced. What is at stake is how best to understand this tension. Law (2004) is 
useful here. He uses the term method assemblage to connote the messy, fluid and 
entangled relations of reality and the devices and understandings that it produces. 
Applying this approach to ME, it is not the case that ME exists as an homogenous 
object. It is instead crafted and assembled as part of a hinterland; as part of the broad 
background of investigations, practices, statements, beliefs and methods through which 
ME is established and understood. Through this enactment or crafting [which creates 
ME as a presence] is also the creation of manifest absence and Otherness (Law, 2004). 
The presence of ME is fatigue, post exertional malaise and so forth. Its absence, which 
its presence depends on, includes its genderised history. In this sense, gender, even if it 
is not salient as a research focus, remains present as an absence and this segues into 
what Law describes as absence that is not manifest; Otherness. This Otherness 
disappears because it perhaps becomes ‘routine’ (ibid. p.85) or because what is 
brought into presence can only be maintained because it is Othered and, as Law notes, 
this suggests Otherness taking the form of a repression. In this sense, gender remains 
as a necessary category because it delimits that which it is not; albeit one in this thesis 
that I have purposely bracketed off for reasons explained previously.  
A further benefit of ANT concerning ME is that it can:  
“...sensitise researchers to complex and multiple realities which might have 
otherwise remained obscure” (Nimmo, 2011, p. 109).  
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This sentiment urges ME researchers to avoid foreclosure of ideas and to be open to 
the possibility of multiple interpretations of each case. The equivalence I draw 
between this statement and how I think about self is that I view self as an outcome or 
effect of many actants networking in specific ways. From this position, self has 
multiple contours that reflect its inherent relationality. How self is experienced reflects 
specific actor-networks that the human actor is part of. Thus, depending on how stable 
these networks are and what they comprise, self will be experienced at times as 
constant whilst at other times as more fluid.  
However, there remain some questions concerning the apolitical and anti-essentialist 
accounts that ANT might be seen as producing. These questions are pertinent given the 
historically gendered nature of the ME debate. They concern different approaches that, 
whilst acknowledging the ways that ANT has managed to push such agendas forwards, 
posit alternative points of consideration. For instance, despite the attempt to avoid 
establishing the salience á priori of objects or categories, such as gender, class or 
ethnicity, bracketing off such categories means that where these categories have effects 
for people forecloses an important avenue of analysis. According to Singleton (1996) 
the non dualistic and descriptive vocabulary of ANT and the symmetrisation of human 
and non-human does not promote change nor the uncovering of the oppression and 
inequality experienced by various groups. Also, ANT eschews the use of categories 
and dualisms, the caveat of which is that power is represented as a consequence of 
action, not a cause. 
So approaches which come ‘after’ ANT (Law, 1999; 2004) share a commitment to 
uncovering and redressing the oppression and inequalities that can characterise the 
experiences of certain groups. Later, or post-ANT approaches also seek to denaturalize 
existing relations and interfere “in dominatory practices by articulating alternative 
politically hopeful or liberatory tropes” (Law and Singleton, 2014; p.380).. As noted 
by Star (1991), networks may be heterogenous and involve heterogenous actors, but 
heterogeneity is different for the privileged compared to the non-privileged.  More 
recent studies which challenge and develop ANT also acknowledge the affective, 
complex and messy nature of what might otherwise be seen as relatively harmonious 
networks. This is important because, as implied by Hunter (2012), without paying 
attention to such complexity and the affective dimension, analyses themselves can 
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produce sanitised versions of experience that fail to reveal the effects of power on 
certain groups.  
Drawing on feminist material semiotic and critical race theory, Hunter’s (2005) 
feminist psychosocial approach makes a space for a human dynamic founded on 
emotion and the relationality of a space in between the social and the individual. By 
focussing on [self] governance, Hunter indicates how categorisation relies on the 
entanglement of things like biographies, cultural orderings and personal histories. This 
involves the irrational, affective and emotional and provides for a personal relation to 
governance; one that is a product of very particular socio cultural and affective 
contexts and histories and is entangled with conflicted, emotional processes. From this 
perspective, categories that might be pertinent to ME, such as ‘female’ are not 
homogenous in the sense that they delimit specific aspects of ME experience. Instead, 
they point to the multiplicity of experience and identity and the manner in which 
categories constitute and are constituted by affective, relational processes in the first 
place.  
Hunter (2005) also distinguishes between what she sees as the multiple ontologies that 
arise through recognition of an enacted and particular set of experiences and the 
categorical dimensions through which an individual recognises themselves. In other 
words, subjectivity spans both ontology and category. This notion of relationality, 
premised on unconscious processes and a psychoanalytic influence that is 
commensurate with this thesis brings the biographical, social and situational into the 
same analytical frame. It shifts the analytic focus away from the recognition of 
sameness and difference considered in categorical and ontological formations to 
connection and differentiation as the principles of social relationships. The implication 
for multiple ontologies is that they arise with multiple realities. But that is not to 
contrast what I have discussed previously in terms of the relational ontology of ANT. 
My recourse to a relational ontology aims to provide an heuristic starting point from 
which to ‘follow the actor’. That is not to claim that for each different sufferer there is 
the same experience of ME. In this sense, the reality of ME is multiple; with each actor 
involved in their own specific ontology. 
So the idea of multiplicity draws on a different set of metaphors inclined to 
intervention and performance and suggests a reality that is enacted and done, rather 
than observed (Mol, 1999). There is thus a politics of the ontology of ME in that the 
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organisation of the detection of ME is not just a practical matter. The way that this 
occurs affects the reality that the ME sufferer experiences and even how ME is talked 
about. For different sufferers of ME, the subjective experience of the condition rests 
with entities and tests which provide the ‘facts’ of their ME and yet these facts are 
founded upon an already politicised deployment of the material actants, such as tests 
and questionnaires, that these facts have enrolled. Singleton (1996) suggests that to 
enable the different voices and the conflicting and contrasted identities that are implied 
by the previous discussion and enable a view of the multiplicitous nature of the 
network, the focus needs to be shifted towards multiple actors. 
Psychosocial feminist approaches highlight the dangers associated with adopting an 
apolitical stance. The problem is that by assuming the political neutrality of categories 
and objects shifts their potentially deterministic character to one where they are 
impotent or appear to have no effect at all. This undermines the effect that they might 
actually have on how experience is organised for certain groups of people. Gill (1996) 
claims that an apolitical stance misses a ‘middle ground’ that could be productive and 
goes on to note that if from a post-essentialist perspective there are no epistemological 
grounds for arbitrating between truth claims, then how are any claims to be evaluated? 
What the preceding discussion flags up is that despite my deployment of ANT and 
how I attempt to bracket off existing categories such as class or gender, there are 
different ways of doing this which adopt a much more critical approach. The key issue 
is that what is presented as structure/agency in ANT is framed through other debates as 
one of power/resistance and which can provide for a different analytical approach. But 
it is also worth echoing Gad’s (2010) observation that ANT does not represent an 
heterogenous body of work. Its nature means that it should always be in state a 
transformation and reflexive self-questioning. This means that whilst there may indeed 
exist inequalities, oppression and an inherent political dimension in many of the arenas 
which it had been applied, this may not always be the case. Gad claims that the 
question of ANT’s apoliticality cannot be solved by enforcing a viewpoint upon it and 
that opens up an ethical debate which I believe is beyond the remit of this thesis. 
However, according to Law and Singleton (2014), ANT demonstrates an analytical 
and political sensibility that enables it to reconsider taken for granted assumptions 
about, the social, the political and the natural. In this sense any ANT project is 
necessarily engaged in political work. 
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In terms of methods, the first issue is to identify a point of entry into the network. ANT 
studies often concern the success or failure of specific technological innovations or 
organisational structure or a problematic state (Bleakley, 2012). The starting point of 
an ANT study is often the problematisation of a state of affairs, with the research 
aimed at describing the problematic state and what transpired. Retaining this broad 
premise, my entry point is that ME represents a problematic state that can be described 
as a particular arrangement of actants and resultant experience. ME is already 
problematised because it remains a highly contested condition. The best point of entry 
is to follow the principle actant from its perspective. This is the sufferer and where 
they spend most time: their home and other significant places in their daily lives.  
Once the researcher has met the ME sufferer the task is to notice, observe, listen to and 
make sense of what suffering ME entails. The concepts, objects, experiences and 
places that become known can then be thought of in terms of actants. For instance, 
asking the sufferers I worked with to narrate their experiences with ME resulted in talk 
about symptoms, viruses, activities, specific places, family members and a range of 
material objects. Each of these can be thought of as an actant that required following 
because the task was to find out how they associated with each other and coalesced 
into an actor-network.  
However, an important aspect of following the actor is that some actants appear as if 
they have transported or displaced themselves in form, time or space (Callon, 1986; 
Latour, 1992). Displacement is a central idea in ANT studies. To illustrate this 
concept, Latour explains how an automatic door closer replaces a human actor by 
performing the same function. The door closer has had displaced into it the human 
capacity to close a door and under the right conditions, as part of a door and with other 
actants such as a wall, it can close a door accordingly.  
Displacement speaks of how a function, behaviour or competency has been 
reconstituted into another place or thing. A further example given by Callon (1986) is 
how scientists displace their ideas and theories into charts and graphs, which they use 
to convince others that their ideas are worth adopting. But this reconstitution also 
implies that a transformation has occurred. In the previous example, the door closer 
acts as a spokesperson on behalf of the organisation of actants, including humans, 
which led to its physical form and mode of action. It represents the aims of these other 
actants and acts on their behalf but it does this through its own material capacities. 
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Thus, the door closer has translated the language and behaviour of what human actants 
say or want (Latour, 1988; Pollack, Costello and Sankaran, 2013). Given the 
psychoanalytically inspired aspect of my psychosocial framework, I find parallels in 
the ANT notion of displacement with Freud’s psychoanalytic concept of the same 
name.
10
 Displacement therefore represents a point of synthesis between ANT and 
psychoanalytic ideas.  
How does ANT address the notion of displacement between actants? Displacement 
represents a physical, social or psychological transformation and movement from one 
site to another, occurring as a dynamic process of various actants coming together and 
jostling into position as a network. This process as a whole is referred to as translation, 
where the identity of actors and the possibility of interaction and salient identities are 
fought over, negotiated and delimited (Callon, 1986; Ruming, 2009). Translation 
invariably involves actants altering a state of affairs. According to Latour (1999, 
2002), any actant that mediates between actors will modify the relations between them. 
If the focus is on associations and resultant action it follows that the intervening actant 
is also altered in terms of what identities it can manifest, dependent on what it 
associated with. This perspective facilitates the exploration of a condition such as ME 
because it shifts the focus from a structural attribution of the roles played by discrete 
entities to one where the identity of given entities are mutually constitutive and 
dynamic. 
Translation consists of four moments; problematisation, interessemnent, enrolment 
and mobilization. These moments describe elements of a process that are inseparable 
from each other and detail how actants come together as an actor-network. As an 
overarching metaphor they frame the methods I develop for noticing things in the 
experience of the ME sufferers in this research.  
                                                 
10
 See for example Freud (1900); Robbins (2004). Displacement in a Freudian sense describes an 
unconscious process and defence mechanism whereby an intolerable affect is redirected towards an 
object or person, instead of the object that the affect is actually associated with, because it is less 
threatening to the ego to do so. Importantly, the process of unconscious displacement transforms the 
affect and its object and presents them to consciousness in an altered form that may not appear 
meaningful. The process of displacement is essentially metonymic. The significance is that chains of 
displaced signifiers can be linked together such that what is manifested is apparently removed by 




Firstly, problematisation is the defining of a problem in terms of a specific actant 
(Tatnall and Burgess, 2002; Sarker and Sidorova, 2006). The specific actant becomes 
defined as a means by which the problem can be solved and as such becomes 
indispensible to the network and the solution. It also defines other key actants with the 
problematic in question (Linde et al. 2003) and attempts to makes itself indispensible; 
becoming an obligatory passage point (Callon, 1986; González, 2013) and imposing 
its view on others. Beyond establishing ME as a problematic state, I also use the term 
problematisation to think about an event, actant, or question that arises from the data 
and that appears to be pivotal in the state of affairs regards ongoing experience and 
ME.  
The second moment, interessement, describes the way that an actant attempts to 
impose and stabilise the identity of other actants or aspects of the network by 
attempting to get other actants to accept its proposal (Callon, 1986; González, 2013), 
or in other words it “attempts to impose and stabilise the identity of the other actors it 
defines” (Callon, 1986; p.8). Through this process, actants that support the network 
begin to fix other actants into place (Tatnall and Burgess, 2002). They also weaken the 
influence of actants that conflict with the interest of the central actor (Linde et al. 
2003). The resultant network is precarious because actants can always act in 
unpredictable ways. A network is therefore dynamic and actant identities are 
simultaneously transient and intransient, which avoids establishing an actant or a 
network as stable and reified. When applied to ME, this perspective enables the 
researcher to reflexively refine and negotiate their ideas about what they notice and 
what the sufferer tells them as new actants are added to the network and existing ones 
altered.  
Enrolment describes the degree of success of the interessement in that various actants 
have been co-opted into the network in certain relationships and accept the identity 
that emerges from their relation to each other (Callon, 1986). Characteristic of ANT 
studies, it is here that there exists talk of power relations, of the means of maintaining 
the interessement and the identities of the actants involved. Callon (1986; p.211) 
describes this as: 
“...negotiations, trials of strength and tricks that accompany the interessement 
and enable them to succeed”.  
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Enrolment involves the ongoing moves to ensure that aspects of desired identities are 
highlighted whilst undesirable aspects are diminished (Law, 1986b). Enrolment 
represents the network settling into a stable state as long as negotiations between the 
actants are successful and their identities are accepted (González, 2013). 
Finally, mobilisation speaks of the way that the previous moments of translation are 
substantiated into the overall effect or solution because the controlling actor has 
accumulated enough allies to modify the behaviours or beliefs of all others (Latour, 
1990).The identities of actants might undergo a series of displacements of form, place 
and space via a series of other actants. As Donovan (2000) notes, when a researcher 
presents a paper at a conference, the paper stands in for all the research and other 
researchers and actants that it rests on. For all these other entities to remain mobilised, 
forming a stable network, the researcher has to carry out ongoing translations to ensure 
their continuing enrolment and silence that which is not desired.  
In summary, ANT provides a method of noticing and explore the ways in which 
different actants in the world of the ME sufferer come together and how these become 
displaced across time and place. Translation provides a metaphor to frame the research 
process and how actants might co-opt or suppress other actants such that the 
heterogenous field of things that make up the experience of ME come together as 
specific actor-networks. Translation frames the overall description of my findings. In 
this sense, translation speaks of the research process and the report arising from it 
(Ruming, 2009). As I move through the research with a particular ME sufferer I use 
the concept of translation to notice specific actantial associations to the point where 
interpretations can be made. Translation frames how actants associate and stabilise into 
an actor-network and how the end of the research process involves describing the 
actor-networks that emerged and hence the sufferer’s particular experience of ME.   
In the subsequent section I discuss displacement in light of ideas about metaphor and 
metonymy. The psychoanalytic concept of displacement can be synthesised with ANT 
and developed as a means of thinking about the apparently contradictory or opaque 
ways that one actant may associate with another. 
4.3  Metaphor as a means of following the displacements between actants 
As an example of Freud’s notion of displacement, a child may feel unconscious 
aggression towards its father but acknowledging this hostility induces too much 
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anxiety. The hostility is redirected towards the family cat, which the child kicks. What 
the child takes away is that the cat was kicked; perhaps not fully aware of why they 
kicked it. In terms of observable behaviour it is likely that an onlooker has no 
awareness that the original affective relationship that motivated the kick was between 
child and father.  
Displacement in the psychoanalytic sense provides a way of thinking about how things 
might associate in unconscious ways that are beyond conscious understanding and 
hence beyond rational explanation. ME lends itself to exploration in this manner 
because of its variable and confusing character, given that it is not clear how someone 
can suffer no apparent physiological insult and yet proceed to manifest a range of 
somatic and psychological symptoms. The commonality that allows synthesis of ANT 
and psychoanalytic perspectives is that they connote processes whereby something is 
translated into a different form. This brings to mind the notions of metaphor and 
metonymy. 
Metaphor is a figure of speech which describes a subject by conferring on it the 
properties of an unrelated object that are not literally applicable. For instance, ‘the 
wheels of justice turn slowly’. Justice does not literally have wheels. In literary terms 
the use of metaphor is creative, opening up new ways of description that create new 
understandings and visualisations. The character of the metaphor itself is important in 
that the greater the difference between the subject and the object of its comparison, the 
more powerful it is because work has to be carried out to make sense of it in linking 
objects or concepts that do not immediately appear compatible (Stern, 2001). One way 
of thinking about the differential aspects of such concepts is that they inhere in 
different domains (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Glucksberg & McGlone, 1999; Stern, 
2001). For instance, in the previous example, ‘justice’ is an abstract concept in one 
domain but ‘turning wheel’s’ exists as a mechanical device in the domain of material 
objects. Metaphor establishes relations between concepts or objects in different 
domains. Significantly, this implies that human relations to material objects are often 
metaphorical.  
During Freud’s development of psychoanalysis, metaphor was a linguistic device; a 
literary trope. But in the psychoanalysis of the 1930s and 1940s, metaphor use was part 
of the symbolic process of clinical description and treatment of the unconscious 
(Aragno, 2009). The act of psychoanalytic interpretation also involved translating 
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between different domains. A relevant example of the psychoanalytic interpretative 
process involving a metaphoric translation between two domains, soma and psyche, is 
given by Driver (2005). Driver describes the analysis of a young woman with ME who 
manifested severe headaches. Eventually, Driver began to experience bad headaches 
during analytical sessions. Driver interpreted her own headaches as the analysand 
[patient] wanting Driver to know what they felt like so that she could ‘unravel’ them. 
However, this interpretation when offered to the analysand caused anxiety. Driver felt 
this revealed a lack of a ‘maternal object’ or internalised mother-figure, on the part of 
the analysand.  
What this example illustrates is not only a metaphoric translation from a headache 
[somatic] to a psychic experience [understood as ‘unravelling’], but also that the 
unconscious metaphoric process acts as a means of communication and relating. If 
relations between people and objects are inherently metaphorical and objects and 
experiences are themselves understood metaphorically, then it is reasonable to explore 
ME in terms of the relations between the body, material objects and material places.   
It is the transfer between different domains that constitutes the metaphoric and in 
doing so establishes relations of similarity and, by negation, relations of difference. 
The polysemous qualities of any object that the subject of metaphor references and the 
potential for more than one meaning or understanding to arise from it provides a sense 
of the fluid, dynamic qualities of metaphor and their idiosyncratic deployment and 
uptake. Freud (1900) was fully aware that the ambiguity of words allowed them to act 
as a point on which numerous thoughts might converge. Hence, the scope for multiple 
relations and interpretations of these relations. 
Ricoeur (2003) suggests metaphor invites a new organisation and understanding of the 
subject and object of a metaphor, but with the ever-present carry-over or residue of the 
original organisation. In other words, something of the original metaphor persists. This 
implicates memory and the temporal dimension of metaphor. In other words, via 
metaphor, an affect or object that existed in the past can be said to metaphorically 
displace itself to exist in the present. This is important because it provides a way of 
thinking about the relations between objects and concepts that a sufferer of ME holds 
as important today but which may have their origin in a previous time. However, that 
is not to say these relations are necessarily causal. My concern is to think about how 
actants displace themselves and exert an effect as an overall part of an actor-network, 
88 
 
not as an isolated and agential entity. Applying a metaphoric frame provides a way of 
thinking about how things as actants come together and what might be effected for that 
particular ME sufferer.  
A literature review of metaphor in terms of its functionality, what it allows people to 
do and how it is deployed, revealed an extensive body of writing. The conclusion I 
came to from this review was that the field of metaphor studies is vast and to focus on 
the finer detail of metaphor function was beyond the remit of this thesis. However, the 
review enabled me to think about I how might use metaphor to trace the displacement 
between actants and also how ME sufferers may deploy specific metaphors and even 
how metaphor reflecting specific cultural viewpoints may be reflected in specific 
language.  
Studies concerning the link between metaphorisation and language include Schachtner 
(1999; 2002) who investigated diagnostic and therapeutic strategies among general 
practitioners concerning how linguistic images guided interaction with patients. 
Beneke, (1982) investigated how convicted sexual abusers’ use of metaphor reflected a 
specific understanding of and stance towards sexual violence, such as terms which 
refer to women as things to control or to hunt, for instance “what a piece of meat”. 
Thus, metaphor use goes beyond mapping between domains such as the material to the 
psychological. It informs many aspects of culture, how people understand themselves, 
inter-relations and even research strategies (Schmitt, 2005). From the perspective of a 
case study, metaphor analysis is commensurate with biographical research 
(Kronberger, 1999) and hence the particular perspective on ME experience which I 
seek to develop. 
 Metaphor, in contrast to metonymy
11
, refers to relationships consisting of a source 
being equated figuratively with a target located in a different domain such that the 
literal equation is meaningless, whereas the figurative equation is meaningful.  
Metonymy on the other hand refers to a source being equated with a target located in 
                                                 
11
 According to Catalano and Waugh (2013), the study of metonymy has been overshadowed by 
metaphor and some theorists view it as a sub-category of metaphor and not a category on itself (Searl, 
1993). Benczes et al. (2011) asserts that metaphor and metonymy are difficult to distinguish from each 
other and that they often interact in linguistic settings. This makes some instances difficult to analyse. 
The reason I consider metonymy and metaphor in different lights is that they enable me to think about 
displacement from an ANT perceptive in different ways and also because of their pivotal role in 
psychoanalytic theory.  
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the same domain. Hence, in a metonymic sense, ‘The White House’ stands for or 
literally represents the U.S government and policy.  
For Freud, metaphor and metonymy were the basis of the unconscious, although Freud 
referred to them as condensation and displacement (Freud, 1900). For Freud, in terms 
of a dream, condensation was the process of metaphorisation, with the properties of 
objects or persons in one domain, conveyed as a single subject in a different domain 
that was not literally equivalent. Hence the manner in which the dreamer describes one 
single figure in their dream as comprising several characteristics or features of several 
others known to them.  Displacement on the other hand was akin to metonymy, where 
one object literally stands in for another and is felt as such. It is identical. In a practical 
sense, Freud (1905; p.5) refers to switch words to refer to a word or phrase which 
appears perhaps often in a given person’s talk and serves as a nodal point on which 
various unconscious and conscious thoughts converge. A switch-word thus ‘reveals 
and conceals’ the true meaning of a dream or symptom (Litowitz, 2013; p.2). Paying 
attention to how an individual uses words [repetitively] and thinking in terms of 
switch-words provides a method of tuning into how things may be metaphorically and 
metonymically related.    
So psychoanalysis proceeds on the basis that the analysand signals much about their 
unconscious states via what they say, what they do not say and their bodily, non-verbal 
communication (Wachtel, 1967). For example, an analysand may report ‘feeling 
down’ and shift their body to reflect this. There is thus a metaphoric/metonymic 
relation between talk and body that can be discerned by paying attention to both. From 
a Kleinian perspective, talk often reveals a defended subject in that the speaker 
employs unconscious defences to guard against anxiety that otherwise undermines 
certain aspects of identity or self (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000; Lillrank, 2002; Frosh, 
Phoenix and Pattman, 2003). Whilst I do not adopt the notion of the defended subject 
per se, I note its ubiquity in psychoanalytically informed psychosocial approaches and 
its use in drawing attention to how anxiety may delimit talk. 
Contemporary work in psychoanalysis has moved metaphor and metonymy centre 
stage to establish a common basis for various psychoanalytic schools by rethinking 
psychopathology in metaphoric and metonymic terms (Borbeley, 2004; 2009; Modell, 
2003; 2009; Montana Katz, 2011). For example, Borbely describes normal mental 
functioning, with access between the same situationally or praxis-defined domains, as 
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positive metonymy. He describes negative metonymy as central to psychopathology, 
such that mental content in one temporal domain [present] is denied access to content 
in another temporal domain [past].  
For instance, if an individual suffered an abusive relationship with their father [an 
authority figure] as a child, this may come to metonymically stand for their 
relationships with authority figures in the present. The individual experiences present 
relationships in the same way as they experienced the father. The premise of 
psychoanalysis is for the psychoanalyst to tune into unconscious processes with the 
analysand and to bring to light unconscious material that enables the analysand an 
insight resulting in a new, healthier affective and cognitive self-understanding (Frosh, 
2002). Listening to what ME sufferers say, in this light, is one way of tuning-in to how 
disparate actants and past and present are associated with each other.  
As the body is thoroughly implicated in ME it is important to think about the 
connections between it and metaphor and how these have been explored. To this end, 
one area of contemporary work on metaphor has looked to primary somatic experience 
as the ground for the development of thinking and later experience, which are both 
inherently metaphorical (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).  
Over recent decades much work has been carried out to conceptualize the relationship 
between linguistic metaphors and how they might develop from or in parallel with 
physiological development and experience in the material world. This developmental 
movement involves primary somatic experience that becomes metaphorised and 
symbolized through linguistic means. Research which originates in the cognitive and 
linguistic disciplines suggests that language is inherently metaphorical and that its 
development originates in the basic somatic experience of the neonate (Feldman & 
Narayanan, 2004; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Grady, 2005). Freud (1911) had 
already proposed that thinking was a psychic elaboration of motor action and so it is 




Freud’s early work established symbolism as a largely unconscious transmission 
process involving the defensive substitution of one thing for another, namely 
displacement (Petocz, 1999). For Freud, the basic language of the mind was the 
                                                 
12
 See for example Freud (1923; 1937). 
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unconscious and this was rooted in sensory and somatic processes (Robbins, 2004). 
The capacity to think and for consciousness and language use was the result of a 
developmental process whereby the underlying unconscious processes  rooted in 
bodily experience make themselves known to consciousness in a symbolic form. These 
symbolic processes manifest for example through dreams, hallucinations and wishes. 
In this vein, Grünbaum (1986) points out that symptoms, such as those an ME sufferer 
might experience, have traditionally been viewed as non-semantic symbols in that they 
represent a substitute outlet for repressed unconscious material. That is not the 
perspective of this thesis but the importance of Freudian ideas is that they connect the 
body via symbolic processes to thinking and the experiencing of something from one 
domain in another. Such ideas are foundational to later work on the connections 
between body, thinking and metaphor from other perspectives, such as Lakoff et al. 
(1980, 1997). 
From the cognitive perspective an explanatory hypothesis is that subjective (non-
sensorimotor and non-proprioceptive) experience and sensorimotor and proprioceptive 
experience are initially undifferentiated. Sensorimotor refers to motor activity caused 
by sensory stimuli and proprioception refers to awareness of one’s body position. In a 
baby, the way in which it experiences its body, how its body orientates in space and 
how that body feels are inherently conflated (Grady, 2005). In a crude sense the 
somatic or bodily domain is initially identical to the experiential domain. During this 
period of conflation, associations are automatically formed between these two 
domains.  
Conflation gives rise to primary metaphor; the fundamental type of association that 
arises unconsciously and automatically through everyday experience in a world of 
material things (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). These associations are embodied in the 
neural aspects of the developing brain which can be understood as distinct conceptual 
domains that pair subjective experience with sensorimotor experience (Grady, 2005). 
For example, the infant’s developing sense of spatial orientation represents one 
domain. Another domain might represent temperature fluctuation. Both of these are 
inherently somatic. A conceptual domain, that which is not directly experienced, 
involves temporality. But as the infant develops the capacity to symbolise via language 
and play, these domains via metaphoric processes come to stand in for one another in 
terms of how the world is experienced and conceptualised. For instance, a pile of coins 
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can literally be seen but ‘time’ cannot. Metaphorisation enables translation between 
domains albeit in a symbolic manner. This is why in phrases such as ‘you are wasting 
my time’, time is understood and experienced in terms of a physical commodity that 
can be diminished (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). 
Lakoff et al’s ideas provide a way of grounding the body and its relation to a physical, 
material world. Lakoff and Johnson (1980; p.454) suggest that our conceptual system 
in terms of thought and action is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. If this is the 
case then metaphor acts as the operating-system through which people understand 
themselves and their ongoing relation to the material world.  
According to Litowitz (2013), metaphors confer iconicity. This is to say that a 
metaphor illustrates something abstract by means of a tie to a concrete image or thing. 
In this way, the concept acquires the same sensory immediacy of the thing in itself. In 
other words, a metaphor unites two conceptual domains, one being abstract and the 
other being concrete. I therefore envisage the out there getting in here in terms of not 
inner and outer but as a continuum with the concrete external object at one end and the 
abstract concept of it at the other. The division between the two is transcended by their 
metaphorical union. I therefore bracket-off questions about in here and out there 
because from this perspective they become a matter of convention and a categorising 
device. Stern (2009; p.81) appears to share this sentiment, albeit from a classical 
psychoanalytic perceptive, noting that: 
 “... it does not make sense to refer to the world outside our minds, because 
mind and world are a unity.” 
I also note that in psychoanalytic theory, psychic reality is in itself ungraspable 
(Enckell, 2002). Instead, psychic reality is manifested through representational means, 
the investigation of which is analogous to understanding metaphors. Enkell also notes 
that representation is the means of meaning. If that representation is metaphorical then 
it is within the metaphors themselves that meaning and self-understanding reside. 
However, Enckell also observes that if thinking is ultimately metaphorical and rooted 
in somatic processes, these processes have become so naturalised and conventionalised 
they are not always available for conscious reflection.  What this suggests is the need 
for a sensitive method that can explore ME sufferers’ narratives for subtle metaphoric 
and metonymic processes because this will enable tracing associations between actants 
that might otherwise be overlooked.  
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Beyond this, noticing how ME sufferers use metaphor and metonymy and how actants 
become displaced is commensurate with a focus on the descriptive surface of actants 
and how ME is experienced.  This is where the psychoanalytic sensibility comes in. 
Using metaphor and metonymy to trace associations and to suggest associations means 
that recourse to looking for inner complexity or essential qualities is not necessary and 
this is in keeping with the ANT premise.  
However, as Montana Katz (2011) notes, conceptualisation of an object will often 
involve segments of several metaphoric processes. Moreover, active metaphoric 
processes will not be mutually consistent.  In simple terms, trying to map how an 
actant displaces itself across place or time as a simple linear relationship will miss the 
complexity of how one actant may reflect and be involved in many overlapping 
metaphoric processes. This needs to be held in mind to avoid oversimplifying the 
complexity of the relations between people and things, albeit through the lens of 
metaphor or otherwise. 
In summary, this section has outlined how Freud and subsequent theorists have 
thought about the relationships between body, thought and metaphor and metonymy. I 
described in basic terms what metaphor and metonymy mean and how they relate to 
the ANT notion of displacement and how displacement is a point of synthesis between 
ANT and psychoanalytic ideas that is crucial to my psychosocial framework. Metaphor 
provides a means of establishing the associations between actants. This is critical to 
understanding how an actant might be displaced materially, temporally or from place 
to place. Whilst metaphor can be used to trace actantial associations without the need 
to look for inner or causal complexity, I concluded this section by alluding to the 
subtle and complex aspects of metaphor and how oversimplification must be avoided.  
4.4  Chapter summary 
In this chapter I have discussed central ideas that characterise ANT as a method. I have 
also considered how critiques of ANT as adopting an apolitical stance have been 
explored from psychosocial feminist perspectives.  This discussion was important 
because it brings to attention not only that there are alternative approaches to how 
ANT eschews recourse to á priori categorisation and how categorisation can be 
resisted, but also as a reminder that ME has a history which has at various times and 
places resulted in the creation of gendered subjectivities and the suppression of the 
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female voice. It is important that this history in itself is neither sanitised nor 
reinvented. 
 Following the actor describes how the researcher notices an actant, observes what 
actions it is involved in and follows it to discern what other actants it associates with. 
Symmetrisation describes how the researcher does not prioritise the human actor but 
grants non-human actants equal status in how a network comes together and its overall 
effect or action; in the case of the ME sufferer this amounts to how they experience the 
condition and how they perceive its effect on self. Displacement describes how an 
actant moves itself from place to place and in doing so may change its form and how it 
speaks on behalf of other actants. Translation acts as a metaphor to describe the 
overall process of the researcher engaging with the various actants that become known. 
As the research process proceeds this involves making associations between actants, 
describing how they effect each other’s capacities and identities such that overall 
descriptions about a particular experience of ME can be made.  
At the core of my methodology is a synthesis between ANT and psychoanalytic ideas. 
I outlined the Freudian idea of displacement and its resonance with ANT. Because of 
the contested, confusing and potentially unconscious aspects of ME and how it is 
experienced, I explained why I look to metaphor and metonymy as a means of noticing 
and tracing the displacements and associations between disparate actants. 
Psychoanalytic inspired ideas are important because they ground the relations between 
body, somatic experience and thinking.  
Metaphor translates between different types of thing and between different domains 
and this is why I use it to trace the relations between actants. This is pertinent for ME, 
given the indefinite relation between its somatic and psychological aspects which 
represent two different domains. I differentiate and add to these domains the domains 
of material objects [sofas, cupboard, people etc.], cognition [thoughts], affects 
[feelings, emotions], non-human organisms [viruses, bacteria], concepts [ideas, 
ideologies, beliefs] and environments [places, spaces]. Whilst I acknowledge the 
potential for overlap between these categories, my suggestion is that by adopting a 
relational ontology, these different domains attain equal status in terms of their role in 
how a sufferer experiences ME. They are all therefore implicated in how an ME 
sufferer constitutes their reality. 
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The methodological underpinning allows me to encounter and explore the entire aspect 
of an ME sufferer’s world of things and is not restricted to talking about 
symptomology, antecedent events or the social effects of ME. All these things can be 
encountered but in a contextualised manner that connects them to each other and 
focuses on their relations and ME as a dynamic process. I deem this a psychosocial 
method because of the way in which, by following metaphor, the social, the 
psychological and the bodily seep into one another and the material world of objects.  
The purpose of grounding my research with an ANT-informed methodology was to 
establish a means of addressing the heterogenous nature of ME and its hitherto 
neglected relation to self and the material world, the particular appeal being how ANT 
adopts a relational ontology between all actants, be they human or otherwise (Latour, 
1997). This core premise is crucial to the current investigation of ME. Assuming that 
each potential actant has equal standing means there is less likelihood of being seduced 
by existing discourses of ME or interpreting particular things in particular ways that 
would otherwise lead to reproduction of existing ideas. Considering the entire 
experience of the sufferer and not just their ME experience provides a better position 
from which to trace where ME infuses into and out of experience as a whole.  
In line with Moser (2006), I view ME is not a category that pre-exists activity but as 
continually constituted and reconstituted as different elements co-exist and co-
interfere. In other words ME inheres:  
“...in the particular socio-material arrangement of relations and ordering of 
practices that simultaneously produce the social, the technological, the 
embodied, the subjective and the human.” (ibid. p.376).  
Having outlined out the basis for my methodological premise, chapter five describes 












5.1  Chapter overview 
In the previous chapter I established the methodological basis for my research. The 
broad thrust of which is to consider how ME affects self experience by synthesising 
ANT with ideas about metaphor and metonymy. The resulting actor-networks that can 
be described can provide a descriptive statement about how ME is experienced by a 
particular sufferer and how that experience is comprised of heterogenous actants in 
dynamic association with each other. The focus is on the associations between actants, 
which include the body, home everyday environments, everyday routines and 
practices, specific material objects and what the sufferer discusses with me. It also 
includes my affective response to the data and research process. To notice and think 
about how actants associate with each other and to explore the conscious and 
unconscious aspects of each sufferer’s experience of ME I will employ methods that 
frame associations metaphorically or metonymically. The present chapter describes 
these methods. Where appropriate, I refer to my data or other studies to illustrate my 
methodological choices. I conclude by describing the heterogenous, indeterminate and 
dynamic characteristics of each sufferer’s particular experience of ME in terms of an 
assemblage. 
5.2.1   Research design overview 
My research aims were to extend existing qualitative work on ME by developing a 
psychosocial understanding of its effect on self experience.  
Longitudinal naturalistic participant observation and partially structured interview 
methods were used. Data included sufferers’ narrative accounts of how ME affects 
their self experience, consideration of material objects in the home environment that 
sufferers designated as significant in their day to day lived experience of ME, the daily 
routines that sufferers engaged in, the environments beyond the home that the sufferer 
interacted with and my affective response to these strands of data. In terms of daily 





The research schedule was five visits across six months; enabling snapshots of how 
self was experienced over time and allowing for ME sufferers to miss and reschedule a 
research visit if necessary. ME involves a remitting/relapsing course. Previous studies 
suggest this process results in shifts in how the self is experienced and envisioned 
across time (Corbin & Strauss, 1987). My assertion was that understanding how self 
might change in relation to ME could not be achieved with a single research visit.  
5.2.2   Sampling and inclusion criteria 
This research included people aged 18 or over with an existing clinical diagnosis of 
ME. Self-diagnosis was not sufficient. The implication of not having a clinical 
diagnosis was that the sufferer may have failed to have had a different medical or 
psychological condition diagnosed that would ultimately lead to a different outcome. 
The course of the ME illness trajectory is variable (Fernández et al. 2009). Sufferers 
with ME at any stage of the trajectory were included, which allowed for a broader 
understanding of the condition. However, they had to be generally healthy of mind and 
body to the degree that they were able to take part in the research with no adverse 
effects. Data collection required ME sufferers to engage in discussion and in their 
everyday physical activities. This meant that only individuals in the chronic rather than 
the initial acute stage of the condition came forward or were included. ME 
symptomology overlaps with other conditions entailing fatigue as primary feature 
(Mihrshahi & Beirman, 2005).  Prospective sufferers taking part therefore required no 
existing diagnosis of a co-morbid fatigue disorder. Participating ME sufferers had to 
be able to provide written informed consent before the research proceeded, as an 
ethical prerequisite. 
As ME can affect anyone I aimed for a sample of sufferers that reflected different 
geographical sites and the entire prospective age range. However, because ME is over-
represented by females (Dowsett et al. 1990) I selected a sample balanced for gender. 
This provided greater potential to think about any particular gendered aspects of the 
condition that emerged.  
As my methodology involved thinking about the particular experience of ME, I did not 
seek to develop a nomothetic model of the condition. However, the projected sample 
size of eight sufferers provided a range of experiences. Given the number of 
encounters with each sufferer and the disparate material being collected, more than 
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sufficient data was generated. Because the methods involved intense work and the data 
set was large, working with more ME sufferers would have resulted in an 
unmanageable amount of material.  
5.2.3   Recruitment  
I initially thought that specialist ME clinics would provide access to sufferers. 
However, in line with Richman Flaherty and Rospenda (1994), drawing ME sufferers 
from this setting might reflect only those with access to health care. I opted instead for 
recruiting from across the community to obtain a broader demographic. I approached 
MEassociation.org.uk who directed me to local self-help groups. I visited four groups 
from towns within a forty mile radius of each other in the South West of England and 
spoke to as many individuals as possible at each group, leaving a summary sheet about 
my research including ethical considerations and contact details. I was subsequently 
approached by fourteen individuals and followed these up by phone. I note that 
recruiting in this manner effectively comprises self-selection, which may result in 
sample bias. This is not an issue given the nature of the research but requires 
consideration none the less. 
5.2.4   ME sufferers taking part and demographics 
As data collection proceeded, I wrote short pen portraits summarising the life 
experiences, experiences of ME and general background history for each sufferer and 
referred to these throughout the analytic process; see appendix 11; note that Carol is 
not included as she withdrew from the study. These portraits aided holding in mind 
each person and their context. Each sufferer chose their own pseudonym to ensure 






Year of ME diagnosis
13
: 
Bruce Male 57 2007 
Carol  Female 63 2003 [withdrew from study] 
Hannah Female 25 2004 
John Male 49 2005 
Freya Female 43 2010 
                                                 
13
 Date of diagnosis does not reflect illness duration; all sufferers described ME antecedents predating 
diagnosis. Data collection began in July 2011 and was completed in February 2012.  
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Les Male 65 2005 
Patsy Female 54 2008 
Whimsy Female 59 2002 
 
Whilst all sufferers had received a formal diagnosis from a specialist clinic, it was not 
possible to establish the specific diagnostic criteria used. 
5.2.5   Ethical considerations 
Prior to recruitment, ethical approval was obtained from the University of Bath 
Psychology ethics committee. I also consulted and adhered to the British 
Psychological Society’s guidelines for ethical research (BPS, 2009).   My primary 
concern was that the methods might induce difficult feelings or knowledge that the 
sufferers had not previously experienced. From the outset, sufferers were made aware 
of this potential via clear discussion of the research protocol, answering their questions 
and a printed information sheet which they retained [appendix 1]. The research 
commenced when sufferers had been read the briefing sheet [appendix 2] and signed a 
written consent form [appendix 3].  
I acknowledged two specific ethical issues that may have arisen, in light of BPS ethical 
guidelines 3.1: 
3.1(i) The study involved being alone in the home of/with potentially vulnerable 
individuals. I was therefore mindful of potential risks of physical harm to myself from 
the environment or the sufferer for the duration of the study period.  
3.1(iv) Each visit represented a potential intrusion into the everyday secure 
environment of the ME sufferer and therefore needed to be one of respect and integrity 
where the researcher ‘listened’ to sufferers in a non-evaluative manner. 
Further areas of consideration were: anonymity, confidentiality, right to withdrawal 
and opportunity for debriefing. At no time were ME sufferers taking part identifiable 
by name or person. They were assured that all data relating to them would be reviewed 
by the researcher alone. This was important given the extent of audio/visual material 
by which they might be identified as well as idiosyncratic objects, environments, 
routines and the highly sensitive nature of ME. Video captures used in the written 
report avoided showing individuals but were selected to illustrate the idiosyncratic 
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nature of their objects, for which permission was obtained. Audio-visual data was 
encrypted and stored on an external hard drive kept in a locked cupboard in the 
researcher’s house, as were written notes and recordings. The ME sufferers taking part 
had access to the researcher’s contact details and those of the lead supervisor. They 
were aware that they could withdraw at any time from the research without 
justification. One sufferer did request withdrawal by phone after my second visit. Prior 
to the final research visit, sufferers were mailed a questionnaire to complete. This 
included all symptoms that might comprise their ME profile and space to reflect on the 
research [appendix 4]. It provided a tangible end for them, whilst ensuring that I had 
correctly understood and recorded their symptoms. The questionnaire was discussed 
with each ME sufferer. They were then read the standard debrief [appendix 5]. 
During debriefing, three sufferers informed me that they had benefitted greatly from 
participation. They welcomed the opportunity to talk at length and explore their 
experience of ME. They explained that they felt that the research process had 
somehow improved their symptoms and understanding of their ME.  
5.2.6   Data and collection methods 
I wanted the data to include anything that might comprise an individual’s ongoing 
everyday experience with ME and my participation in that experience. With 
ethnographic methods in mind I aimed to enter into the sufferer’s everyday life and 
what they would normally encounter. This enabled me to become an actant in the 
networks in which the ME sufferer was entangled and meant that I had to find ways of 
holding onto disparate strands of that experience, such as feeling, hearing, seeing, 
participating, talking and thinking.  
My involvement in the ME sufferers’ daily routines represents participant observation   
and allowed me to understand the experience of ME and its effects via an open 
dialogue that lead to a shared understanding (Huspek, 1994). However, I note that the 
term participant observation may connote that one can observe a setting from an 
objective viewpoint and that the setting exists as a bounded object. This would be 
desirable from a naturalistic perspective (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). However, 
the psychosocial framework to my approach is inherently reflexive. The implication is 
that whilst I attempted to maintain a realist position in that there clearly exist ME 
sufferers living lives that go un-researched, the moment I enter into those lives means 
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that my descriptions of ME are inevitably a product of my interpretive stance and 
personal history (Bourgois, 1996). This is clearly the case, given that a part of the 
process involved interpreting my affective response to participation and discussing it 
with the sufferers.  
I used methods that enabled me to record as much of the experience as possible. 
Below, I outline the data and my rationale, but it should be noted that data types 
clearly overlap. All of my visits, discussions and participation were recorded on a 
digital video camera, with a built in microphone providing an audio-visual record to 
refer to. My initial visit with sufferers was based around a partially structured 
interview which enabled a reflective understanding of experience. The decision to use 
an initial partially structured interview addresses some important issues. 
According to Lucey, Walkerdine and Melody (2001), interviewees accounts are neither 
value nor emotion free. Interviewees seldom conform to the model assumed by some 
sociological approaches where they are conceived as fully rational and in charge of 
their emotions. Instead, the interviewee/interviewer relationship is founded on 
unconscious, intrapsychic processes which necessitate both parties defending against 
unconscious anxiety and feelings that the interview arouses. Drawing on one’s own 
feelings and exploring them in relation to unconscious processes, both intra and 
interpsychic, and anxiety characterises a particular approach to psychosocial research, 
such as that developed by Walkerdine, Melody and Lucey and this intersects with 
other feminist orientated methods. Hunter’s (2005) feminist inspired psychosocial 
work, which highlights the complexity of exploring the voices of individuals in 
positions of power in relation to health and social care services and the social relations 
of gender and ethnicity, is useful in this light. It brings to attention how the ‘voice’ of 
participants in a research setting mediates between identity and experience in dynamic 
ways. At the heart of the research relationship are power differences such that 
assuming the interviewee to be a ‘good story teller’ and the interviewer a ‘good 
listener’ amounts to an oversimplification.  
What I take away from these works is that even a pragmatic choice, such as what form 
an interview takes, should be carefully considered. Attention should be paid to the 
intrapsychic and inter subjective play of emotion, power and the ethical field that these 
are situated in as part of the research process. For example, Hunter notes that on one 
hand, closed questioning and structured approaches provide participants with the 
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opportunity to label themselves and to explore the meanings of these labels. Questions 
can also be constructed to uncover or challenge silenced or unacknowledged gendered 
or racialised power, for example. I also imagine that structured approaches emplace a 
scaffold which mitigates some of the anxiety that might be mobilised in both parties. 
On the other hand, a less structured approach, perhaps with open questions, enables 
participants to respond in ways that reflects their particular unconscious defences. This 
can be useful because it foreshadows how the act of communicating is always 
negotiated, potentially conflicted and relational. This is where a psychoanalytically 
informed means of ‘listening’ and using one’s felt response to the interaction can itself 
be interpretative. However, it also implies the ethical requirement, on the part of the 
researcher at least, to acknowledge their own [potentially] ambivalent responses, 
resistances and silence to the unconscious plays of power in what amounts to a social 
process.  
Because I had to trace associations within and across data sets and look to the affective 
response of the researcher a conversational approach was adopted (Rubin & Rubin, 
1995).  This allowed for the pursuit of unexpected turns in the narrative and following 
up affectively informed ad-hoc and post-hoc interpretations.
14
 The rationale of 
adopting a conversational style was to engage the ME sufferer in their everyday world 
in an emic sense (Kottak, 2006). With ethnographic methods in mind, my approach 
reflects the idea that an interview is “a shared conversation through which new ways of 
knowing are produced” (Pink, 2011; p.271).  
Given my focus on the relation of ME to material objects and places, it was important 
to explore the full range of what I saw. Thus, how the sufferer gestured, shifted their 
body, how they interacted with material objects in the environment and how objects 
appeared to me all constituted visual data. Given my methodological rationale, visual 
data provided a means of tracing the associations between people and material 
things/places. Moreover, the use of visual material reflects the notion that: 
“Meanings are made in situ through the full spectrum of sensory phenomena 
with which actors engage [...] but also reverberate within webs of signifiers” 
(Hurdley & Dicks, 2011; p.278).  
                                                 
14
 My interview style was influenced by biographical narrative approaches and eliciting statements 
about experience; see for example Bury (1982; 2001), Williams (1984), Wengraf (2001).  
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According to Tilley (2006), creating and using objects is a function of the social 
persona and Elias (1987) notes that splitting subjects from objects is misleading 
because it suggests one can exist without the other. It was therefore important to 
experience the relationships between people and things.  
Visual media not only record what people say or do but also materially instantiates and 
connotes relationships that may not immediately be apparent, because they become 
part of the practice or process of the research itself. I therefore note the reflexive 
relationship between the ANT notion of how actants effect each other’s actions and 
identities and the media I used to record the research visits. This makes explicit that 
the modes and media I use are as implicated in the research process as I am. As Pink 
(2007; p. 243) puts it, walking and talking and recording the interaction with a video 
camera  
“Afforded me the opportunity to use my own sensory embodied experience as 
a basis from which to empathise with others.”  
Using a video camera allowed me to record conversation and the visual scene at all 
times. I became proficient in participating and chatting with sufferers whilst 
automatically being able to shift the camera to record and capture scenes as necessary. 
For instance, throughout visits where my participation was involved, such as cooking 
or going to the shops, I used the video camera hand-held to track the general scene as 
well as to record conversation. During the initial semi-structured interview, the camera 
was set on a tripod to record myself and the ME sufferer in conversation. In this way I 
could follow up shifts in position and non-verbal cues on both our parts and match 
these with the affective data from my Dictaphone or notes. 
In my participatory visits such as walking to the shops, conversation also took place 
and this reflects the blurring of the line between interviewing and participating 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). More significantly it reflects recent 
anthropologically orientated researchers who discusses how participation involves all 
the senses as well as the body and as such can be thought of as a phenomenology of 
perception and hence interpretation. This means that perception is an holistic state that 





Harris (2007; p.4) states that that: 
“Knowing is continuous and processual, it is situated and it is bound up with 
human engagement, participation and movement”.  
The implication is that there is something different about sitting and talking with 
someone and walking, talking and participating with them in different contexts. 
Without negating talking alone, participating by walking and talking provides an 
opportunity for a different type of affective engagement and hence different 
knowledge. This resonates with Ingold’s (2004) criticism that much academic work 
has prioritised the visual over the other senses and that embodied participation 
provides a different perception of surroundings and experience.  
A most important feature of my research and one that contributes to my psychosocial 
framework is the way in which I managed to participate in the everyday experiences of 
ME sufferers and the things they did to manage their ME and sense of self. According 
to Smith (2014), existing health research rarely goes beyond interviews and to actually 
get into someone’s home, routines and life on five occasions over an extended period 
is quite unusual. Constantly using my affective response to notice and engage in an 
authentic manner meant that I was able to go beyond focussing just on ME and this put 
me in a privileged position to understand the entanglements between ME and ‘not-
ME’.  
5.2.7   Affect and its importance as data 
A psychoanalytic notion of affect is central to my methodological rationale because I 
assert that interpretation and description of a state of affairs always entails an affective 
component. Affect is thus implicated as part of the communicative process.  
In line with Orange (1995) and in terms of intersubjectivity as outlined in chapter 
three, I denote affect as an undifferentiated somatic response that ordinarily develops 
by desomatization, articulation and differentiation. This speaks of the awareness of 
one’s own feeling state and also recognising that of the other. The interaction between 
two or more people involves the transference and sharing of feeling and emotion [the 
affective state] through the mutual generation of the intersubjective field created 
around and between them (Ermann, 2012). It is in this intersubjective affective space 
that emotion is organised and made meaningful.  
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Orange (1995) asserts that many methods used in research, such as questionnaires and 
interview schedules, provide a sense of security and a safe emotional distance from the 
participant and one’s own emotional response. Law (2004) echoes this sentiment. But 
the price paid is explanation at the expense of understanding and that no method or 
technique will yield understanding. Instead, affective engagement with the other 
allows empathic understanding to emerge in a reflexive sense. This stance informed all 
of my interactions with the ME sufferers I worked with. Central to each visit from the 
outset was to establish rapport with the ME sufferer and engender a relationship of 
trust. This comprises part of the affective aspects of the process. It was crucial to 
identify my own affective processes as well as those of the ME sufferers I worked 
with. These included tolerance of affects and making appropriate responses (Lech, 
Andersson and Holmqvist, 2008). It was also important to maintain active listening 
(Wengraf, 2001) because a failure of active listening may curtail the sufferers’ 
engagement and lead to attenuated talk.  
Participation involved an affective response to the ME sufferer, the places they took 
me and their objects. This mirrors the everyday setting of social interaction. One’s 
affective response is inherently embodied and sensorial (Pink, 2008; 2010). Pink 
alludes to the idea that sharing an experience and hence an affective state can lead to 
moments of insight about the other’s values and meanings. I used this notion to reflect 
my feelings and thoughts back to the participant in a conversational and relational 
manner. Reflexively, this can be understood in terms of how my understanding was 
fed back into analysis and whether it enabled new associations and inferences to be 
made. The process of feeding my affective responses and thoughts back to the sufferer 
took place at the start of each subsequent visit and thus informed following the actor in 
the ANT spirit.  
Because one’s affective response is emergent, pre-reflective and pre-verbal it cannot 
be predicted. Rather than disrupt participation by stopping to write field notes, if I felt 
an affective shift or if I believed that I noted an affective shift in the sufferer, I marked 
such moments on the camera by saying “oh I must remember that” or similar. 
Immediately after each visit I sat in my car and recorded my reflections on Dictaphone 
and wrote down key words or specific actants that I felt needed following in my field 




Whilst some forms of data such as actual audio-visual material and objects are more 
concrete than affective data, how one responds to what is seen or heard always 
involves an affective element. However, it is not always clear why one feels what one 
feels and hence what mobilises given affects. This is why psychoanalytic ideas and the 
notion of unconscious processes beyond what initially appears as rational are 
important.  
5.2.8   Schedule and structure of research encounters 
Each research visit entailed a specific focus with the aim of exploring various aspects 
of the ongoing experience of ME. The first and second visits occurred in the sufferers’ 
home. For visits three and four some ME sufferers took me to other sites [table 2 
below].  
Visit 1 involved meeting the ME sufferer, briefing them and obtaining written consent 
to fulfil ethical requirements. I then used a narrative interview, beginning with the 
question “Tell me about your life history” and later “Tell me about your experience of 
ME”; designed to elicit discussion of relationships, work, family, problems, education, 
medical and developmental history (Dayle-Jones, 2010). The question order aimed to 
avoid prioritising ME as defining the sufferer’s broad experience. The nature of the 
interview was such that answer categories were not pre-determined to avoid closure of 
topic area (Minichiello & Stynes, 1995) and was suitable as a natural extension of 
participant observation   (Patton, 1990) which was employed to enable me to respond 
affectively to the sufferer’s experience and to aid tracing associations between actants. 
Between each visit I transcribed my affective notes and audio-visual data and reflected 
on each ME sufferer. This allowed for my ongoing affective responses to form. In fact, 
during the research period I was able to focus on little else because the sufferers I 
worked with and their experiences with ME were constantly in my thoughts and 
feelings. 
Visit 2 began with follow-up questions from the previous visit concerning my affective 
response and observations. It enabled me to ‘follow the actor’ (Latour, 2005) and trace 
associations between emerging actants. I then proceeded with a focussed discussion of 
the sufferer’s home environment and self-selected significant objects. This allowed me 
to identify key material actants and environmental aspects and how the participant 
understood these in relation to their ME experience and their meaning for self. I often 
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asked the sufferer if I could handle or use material objects so that I experienced a 
direct response to them. During this visit I also took the opportunity to notice other 
artefacts that the sufferer might not have mentioned explicitly. In this way I developed 
a feel for each sufferer’s home and the things in it. 
Visit 3 proceeded as before with follow-up questions. I then employed participant 
observation of an activity in the daily routine of, and chosen by, the sufferer. This 
enabled a focus on the lived experience of ME in terms of how daily routines are 
structured into self experience, so that ME could be explored as instantiated through 
practice and activity. Activities were framed and explored as an actant as this enabled 
me to connect them to other actants and made following my notes and interpretations 
easier to manage. I never knew what to expect before these visits and I anticipated 
each one with a high degree of excitement.  
Visit 4 began with follow up questions. I then used participant observation of an 
activity chosen by the participant that was not necessarily in their daily routine. The 
rationale was that the specific choice of activity would enable the extension of 
associations with broader actants as well as associating with significant features of 
broader self experience and understanding. There was however an unavoidable 
demand characteristic in effect because I had asked each sufferer to choose to do 
something meaningful for them. They had to choose something. However, what 
sufferers chose not only surprised me but invariably mobilised a range of affective 
responses from empathy, excitement, boredom, trepidation and so on. Despite the risk 
of sufferers responding to the demand characteristics of my method, my analytical 
framework revealed that what each sufferer chose was meaningful for them and fitted 
with their general experience of ME. 
Visit 5 proceeded with follow up questions. A semi-structured interview then allowed 
me to elicit reflections of how ME had been experienced across the six month study 
period along with any changes to self experience and self-understanding the sufferer 
had experienced. I then used the tick list [appendix 4] as detailed above. The final visit 
concluded with the opportunity for the sufferer to ask me any final questions and 
reflect on the process and then a full debrief to fulfil ethical requirements [appendix 
5].  
The following table (2) outlines key aspects of what each ME sufferer selected as 
objects or visit focus. Only the most significant material actants are listed to give an 
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idea of the variation of what was selected. Visits ranged in time from 45 minutes to 
111 minutes with a mean duration of 64 minutes: 
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5.2.9   Reflexivity 
A question arising from qualitative work, especially IPA, concerns the interpretative 
role of the researcher which, according to Brocki and Wearden (2006), is often not 
made explicit. This issue intersects with the question of whether interpreting ME 
requires a specific theoretical framework. A lack of a specific theoretical position may 
result in ungrounded analyses. If a theoretical frame is too rigorously applied then 
there is a risk of decontextualising the data and losing sight of the whole case. To 
address these issues as a whole requires developing methods that makes explicit the 
interpretive role of the researcher but from a position of subjectivity where the 
experience of another person [with ME] can be felt and responded to without an 
inflexible theoretical framework. Rather than develop methods that establish á priori 
what, for instance, fatigue is likely to mean for the suffer, it would be beneficial to 
explore how such symptoms reflect particular associations between the body, 
discourse and materiality and are meaningful to particular sufferers. 
A psychosocial approach is ideally suited to developing a reflexive stance to research, 
given its psychoanalytic influences and concern with the researcher’s affective 
engagement and the potential for unconscious conflicted states (Clarke & Hoggett, 
2009). Part of this is to get beyond one’s biases and the lure of creating an objective 
account of the research. Reflexivity speaks of the need to defamiliarise the familiar and 
to resist accepted yet unwarranted understanding. Adopting an explicit awareness of 
the affective field around the researcher and participant is one way of approaching this. 
If the researcher acknowledges their subjective relation to the research process they are 
open to the possibility of multiple understandings that can only be resolved by 
avoiding foreclosure of the analysis. Iteratively checking and updating their 
understanding as new information and experiences occur allows ideas to form and fade 
and new ones to emerge organically as the data unfolds with the researcher. This may 
not occur if the researcher ignores their affective state and instead prioritises the 
intellect and actively seeks out answers and conclusions (Crociani-Windland, 2009).  
Acknowledgement of researcher subjectivity and the need for a reflexive stance have 
been central to qualitative research for some time and direct us to “...legitimize, 
validate, and question research practices and representations’ (Pillow 2003; p.175). 
However, there is a danger of rubber-stamping research as reflexive without 
considering its epistemological role. This necessitates consideration of the 
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methodological rationale in terms of its realist or naturalist stance, especially in terms 
of ethnographic research (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). For this reason, a further 
aspect of the methodology I developed was to account for my role as researcher and 
hence a reflexive stance as integral to the research process and the theoretical 
framework. ANT lent itself to this position because, as Latour (2007) states, I was 
obliged to resist the tendency to invest things with familiarity and to accept that the 
phenomena of research were resistant to an absolute representation. I had to 
acknowledge the transient nature of understanding and especially interpretation. This 
became even more acute in light of the affective aspects of the data and that I was 
enfranchised into the ME sufferer’s actor-networks. From that position each statement, 
affective state and emergent understanding always had the potential to effect further 
and different associations with new actants. The process was inherently reflexive.  
However, I also note that it is impossible to ever be fully cognizant of one’s affects, let 
alone those of others. The act of empathising, atunement and interpretation always 
occurs in a mediated manner. Thus, making affective sense of a person’s life history, 
how they experience ME and how these relate to particular objects and environments 
is a complex, psychosocial process. As noted by, Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 
(2001; p.84):  
“A researcher in the social sciences is not simply presented with objective 
data, she is also presented with a number of narratives. These narratives are 
often emotionally charged, and always meaningful to the subjects.”  
Thus, interpretation does not give “greater proximity to the truth”. (ibid.) and often 
reflects the researcher’s own history.  
To that end, I found that having regular supervision was crucial because it allowed me 
to reflect on my analyses and alternative interpretations. This meant that I had to work 
harder to substantiate my analyses and this made them more robust. 
5.3  Analytic strategy 
In this section I outline the approach to each research visit, how the visit was managed, 
what was done with the data and how the data was drawn together into descriptions of 
the experience of ME on self. Because of the method-theory status of ANT, I do not 
differentiate analysis as a separate procedure. To suggest that analysis can occur 
separately from the process of the research diminishes the reflexive stance of the 
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researcher who is in fact an actant in the network (Law, 1999). Analysis was 
considered as occurring from the outset. Similarly, because of the contingency of 
actor-networks, I offer not a definitive account of the experience of ME and its effect 
on self but some descriptive observations that reflect the way that actants associated in 
given places and times for particular ME sufferers. My aim with this statement is to 
emphasise the fluidity and particularity of each experience of ME and that 
understanding ME implicates one’s own subjectivity, including that of the reader of 
this thesis. In terms of reflexivity, this lead me to avoid thinking in advance that I 
knew what the actors were really saying and imposing my explanations of their terms 
on them (Latour, 2005). Formal analysis of each research encounter initially followed 
a thematic approach (Harper & Thompson, 2011). Iterative reviewing of each 
transcript and sequential transcripts in conjunction lead to broad overlapping themes 
which were left open and unrefined to avoid closure in relation to uncollected data. 
Core analysis involved tracing the displacements and associations between actants by 
identifying the metaphorical or metonymical equivalence between them and within and 
between different domains
15. For instance, from Les’s data set the metaphorical 
displacement of the actant ‘chest pain’ [physiological and psychological domain] was 
traced to a particular place and objects; cemetery and gravestones, [material domain]. 
Overall translation of actants and the gross character of how actants came together as a 
network were built up in this manner. 
5.3.1   Procedure for each encounter  
The procedure for each, visit beyond brief/debrief, was: 
 Establish rapport using vocal intonation, empathic listening, displayed interest, 
authentic conversation and body language. Hold in mind the purpose of the research 
and each specific visit.  
 Ensure the sufferer was clear on the purpose. 
 Ask relevant follow up questions [second visit onwards]. 
 Record all interactions using digital video camera [tripod/hand-held as necessary] 
 At the end of the visit, ensure the sufferer was not in a negative state; arrange the 
subsequent visit. 
                                                 
15
 See chapter 4 (4.3). 
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 Sit in my car and record immediate affective response on a Dictaphone, including 
things to follow up.   
 On returning home type up recorded response and add to it as necessary. This 
constitutes initial affective response [appendix 6 for exemplar]. 
 At the first opportunity, review the video material and write up affective responses 
that emerged. This constitutes affective response to video [appendix 7 for exemplar]. 
5.3.2   Transcription 
The next stage was to personally transcribe the video recording of every visit. This was 
necessary because establishing myself as an actant in the sufferer’s network entailed 
that my responses and actions at all stages were available to me. Given the 
psychoanalytic influences to the methodology, I attempted to capture the idiosyncratic 
aspects of the discussions in terms of pauses and laughter and to match these with 
shifts in body position and other non-verbal cues. To record these non-verbal 
responses I use parentheses with pause length in them and the Microsoft Word review 
facility to add running comments alongside each line of transcript as necessary. Each 
transcript thus comprised of talk annotated with non-verbal information and any 
affective response that emerged in-process [appendix 8 for exemplar transcript 
section]. 
5.3.3   Initial thematic analysis and coding 
In this section I outline the use of thematic analysis (TA) and why it was suitable for 
the initial organisation of my data.  
Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns 
(themes) within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Whitehead (2004) suggests that it is 
artificial to divide analysis into thematic analyses and categorisation. Cassell and 
Symon (1994) state there is no distinction between analysis and data collection. These 
points resonate with my use of ANT as discussed. The choice of TA for the initial 
stage of analysis was the way it correlated with the process of entering a network and 
noticing actants and their associations.  
However, an important question that frames TA is what constitutes a theme. Braun & 
Clarke (2006) state that a theme captures something important about the data in 
relation to the research question and represents a patterned response or meaning within 
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the data set. My approach is slightly different in that I bracketed off the research 
questions and entered the network with as few preconceptions about ME as possible. 
What emerged as a theme represented a pattern that didn't only rely on semantic 
continuity and similarity between statements. Instead, I began formal analysis with 
iterative reading and immersion in all my data for a given sufferer and allowed myself 
to notice instances that appeared to associate with each other and annotated copies of 
the transcript with thoughts, highlighting salient points and cross references between 
pages. I relied on using the ANT premise of translation to think about how two things 
might associate into a theme in a displaced form and also held in mind the potential for 
metaphoric and metonymic relations albeit in a loose sense. The notion of the actant 
had to remain in focus at all times.  
Coding began when I felt that the initial stage had exhausted itself. I then began to link 
key annotations under a category label. I moved slowly through each transcript 
annotating with coded labels; such as these codes from Les’ data set: HS (Head 
symptoms), IA (Issues with authority) and CI (Country as an ideal). I took codes 
forward to subsequent transcripts to interrogate for further instances. The iterative 
process of thematising and coding thus occurred within and across transcripts for each 
sufferer. Finally, after each transcript had been thematised, I went back over each other 
transcript to investigate whether instances of codes from later transcripts appeared in 
earlier ones. This allowed me to gather looser themes together into one place and to re-
label some themes in a more suitable manner [appendix 9 for exemplar]. During this 
process I also made notes that indicated possible interpretations and ideas. 
The issue of interpretation is salient regards my methodology. By maintaining the 
ANT spirit of letting actants describe themselves without recourse to inner complexity, 
what I was doing was noticing how things associated and what actions and identities 
resulted. However, some interpretation of the associations between actants was 
unavoidable, but this didn’t require looking inside each actant to find some latent 
causal complexity.
16
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5.3.4   From themes to actants 
Having discussed the initial familiarisation and organisation of the data in light of TA, 
in this section I describe the movement from theme to actant.  
To recap, an actant is an entity that in association with other entities defines and has 
defined its identities and actions (Ritzer, 2004). An actant’s agency is taken as 
‘relational and non-volitional’ (Pels, Hetherington and Vandenberghe, 2002). Within 
this definition is a tension represented by the notion of a discrete entity with no inner 
complexity or essence that is influenced by and acts only via its networked 
associations and the problem of how to notice such an entity, if it only exists in terms 
of its relations in the first place. Callon (1998) notes a danger in presupposing that 
something is an actant and that it is difficult to establish how a discrete entity exists in 
the first place, unless the criticism is invoked that nothing exists beyond the network. 
This is to say that ultimately, no object or concept exists except in relation to 
something else. 
Given that an aim of ANT is to restore materiality to analyses of society and 
technology, there exists a second tension in that some actants are material whereas 
others are social or psychological. However, the ANT emphasis on relations rather 
than entities per se represents a paradox because the types of actants just described 
transcend simple categorisation as well as not existing as a discrete entity in the first 
place.  
To overcome this paradox I suspended thinking about actants as members of 
psychological, social, material or conceptual categories. Instead I held in mind their 
relationality, how they effected each other’s identities and that the premise of my 
methodology was to overcome the dualistic thinking that categories presuppose. 
Further consideration of these issues is warranted but is beyond the remit of this thesis.  
To compare the notion of actant with that of theme was necessary.  Ely et al. (1997) 
suggest that a theme resides not in the data but in the researcher’s head and results 
from thinking about the data and creating links as they come to understand it. Themes 
and coding represent a somewhat arbitrary categorisation process that, whilst 
subjective, also reflects specific epistemologies. Some of these issues apply to the 
manner in which an ANT analysis would identify and associate actants. Overall I feel 
that whilst I have tried to develop a systematic methodology, the subjective element 
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and the ongoing presence of the researcher will always render some descriptive and 
analytical choices as idiosyncratic. This is also an area that requires further 
consideration.  
Beyond this, I ascribed some basic difference between themes and actants that enabled 
me to move from the former to the latter. Firstly, material actants represent entities that 
are more bounded than a theme. They exist beyond the researcher and already carry 
out a function prior to being noticed. As themes are developed early on in the data it 
should be apparent that some material objects are acting actantially. In other words 
they don't necessarily appear at one site only but instead can be traced in a displaced 
form or have other actants constellating around them. Establishing whether a material 
object acted in a mediating sense involved checking how many times it appeared, the 
intensity and quantity of its associations and the affective significance of it for the 
sufferer and myself.  
Establishing non-material actants was more difficult. The scale of what can be 
theorised as a non-material actant and the epistemological questions this raises is 
beyond the remit of this theses.
17
 I emphasise the manner in which any descriptor, such 
as ‘cosmopolitanism’ or ‘anxiety’, is itself actantial in that it can displace itself or 
appear at different sites in association with different actants. Therefore, non-material 
actants have a life of their own but always and only through their associations. To 
move towards describing an aspect of my data as a non-material actant was based on a 
concept that was initially a theme and: 
 Appeared at multiple sites in an explicit form. 
 Appeared at multiple sites in a displaced form that didn't rely on recoding it. 
 Appeared to act in a mediating sense in that other actants associated with it. 
 Appeared to possess a specific identity in association with the sufferer. 
An example of a non-material actant from Patsy’s data set would be rhythm. This 
appeared implicitly in early transcripts and explicitly in the third and fourth. Patsy 
explains that one can use rhythm as a ‘conscious contemplation thing’ or ‘just to be in 
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(Tryggestad & Georg, 2011), ‘learning identity’ (Aberton, 2012) and ‘climate change rhetoric’ (Besel, 
2012).  In these analyses, many material and other non-material actants are implicated and there is also 




the moment’. At times she explains that rhythm is ‘clashing and out of sequence’. 
Whilst she is out in ‘nature’, walking, Patsy was aware of the rise and fall of her 
breath, her bodily movement, pace and their relation to the ground. She felt ‘better 
walking in the fields’ and not roads because there was more literal contact with nature 
and also because the ‘vibrations’ that came up from the ground were naturally 
rhythmic. When Patsy knitted she also recognised the rhythm of the process and this 
was also the case with her fiddle-playing. Both knitting and the fiddle are actants. 
Crucially, rhythm associated with ME for Patsy because ME enforced a slower rhythm 
on things and this was ‘not something she would do naturally’. Conversely, Patsy used 
other actants to moderate and mediate her ME. She paced herself in terms of 
monitoring the rhythm of cycling, walking, fiddling and knitting. ME had intensified 
her need to feel and maintain rhythm but her awareness of her personal rhythm and its 
relation to being outside predated ME and interestingly rhythm also represented an 
‘almost private space’. Patsy also recognised the importance of seasonal rhythms in 
‘nature’. Overall, this example illustrates in a crude way how rhythm was an actant 
that informed Patsy’s ME experience and was also part of her ongoing self-
understanding. 
Having outlined how I established something as an actant, the following section 
outlines how I used ideas about metaphor and metonymy to think about the way in 
which actants associated with each other.  
5.3.5   Using metaphor and metonymy to trace displacement of actants 
Having identified actants, the next task was to trace their associations. This was not 
easy and to some inevitable extent relied on my subjective understanding of metaphor. 
To aid the process I initially attempted to visualise the nature of a network. I began 
mapping out actants on a large wall-mounted white board using different colours to 
distinguish the concepts I was holding in mind. I added quotes from the sufferer’s 
transcripts and instances of affective responses. The end result of this process provided 
a tangible way of holding and bringing to mind how salient actants were beginning to 
associate. An example of this method is given below in photograph 1 (visualisation of 




The problem inherent in visualising an actor-network
18
 is partly why I tried to rethink 
the network in terms of assemblages. Thus, visual representation on the white board 
provided a useful organising tool but consideration of the relationship between how 
this mode of visualisation influences how an actor network is conceptualised requires 
further work.  
After visualising emergent actant associations I began to think about metaphorical 
relationships. Mueller (2010) notes that analysis of creative metaphors relies on a 
subjective evaluation based on a poorly defined concept. Metaphor analysis requires a 
creative, synthesising approach that is dependent on personal factors (Schmitt, 2005). 
This exacerbates that metaphorisation reflects complex processes and cannot be 
assumed to reflect a simple mapping of an idea in one domain to that in another 
(Kimmel, 2010).  
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To approach the issues around metaphor and metonymy I reviewed ways of 
systematising metaphor analysis. Schmitt (2005; p.368) for instance states that: 
 “Systematic models of metaphor analysis attempt to reconstruct models of 
thought, language and action”.  
This did not reflect my methodological premise. However, Schmitt asserts that 
adherence to methodology is less important than aesthetic subjectivity. I read this as 
the need to appreciate the particular use of metaphor by an individual in conjunction 
with a reflexive appreciation on the part of the researcher. This led me to conclude that 
I might be able to develop a framework that acted in a reflexive, heuristic manner. The 
process evolved as the analysis proceeded and as I gained experience with it. This 
reflects a further element of reflexivity. Unlike Schmitt I did not set out by specifying 
a topic area or particular deployment of metaphor in the first place. Instead, I looked to 
embrace the particular and subjective nature of metaphor and assumed this would 
include the broad spectrum of the functional deployment of conventional and creative 
metaphor by ME sufferers to explain their experience of ME to me and to explain ME 
and understand it for themselves.  
To this end I took elements of Mueller’s (2005) systematic approach in conjunction 
with my psychosocial framework, adopting the following criteria for transcripts and 
written material: 
 After immersion in and thematisation of the data, the identification of actants and for 
anything appearing metaphorical, I considered the immediate textual context 
[transcript] as this may suggest a metaphoric or metonymic process, given that 
metaphors interact with other metaphors (Goatly, 1997; Heywood, Semino and Short, 
2002; Benczes, 2011).  
 Metaphors may appear salient because of their role in an overall text. I scrutinised the 
text for shifts in topic, temporality and tense.  
 Contextual information may suggest a metaphor, such as a conventional metaphor, 
triggered by a specific topic. I utilised this by paying attention to the appearance of 
conventional metaphors or specific topics arising from the ME literature such as 
‘delegitimation’, ‘diagnosis’, ‘symptom exacerbation’ and ‘before and after’ 
narratives (Arroll & Howard, 2013). For example, a metaphoric relation to 
‘diagnosis’ might be that the ME sufferer may refer to having to ‘fight’ for the 
condition to be recognised.  
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 In conceptual terms, creative metaphorisation may appear when ideas in one domain 
are being described in relation to a different domain. I scrutinised the data for 
instances of dualisms where the sufferer explicitly talked for instance about mind in 
conjunction with body or psychological versus social aspects of ME. 
 
These analytical tools do not describe an exact procedure of metaphor identification 
nor are they clearly differentiated from each other. They represent a way of noticing 
and grouping information, as information from all levels may be important to assess 
the creativity of a metaphor and what it is doing.  
Because I established myself as part of the actor-network of the ME sufferer I also had 
to pay attention to the metaphors and metonyms I used during our discussion and 
looked to my affective responses to think about how these were received and how they 
were structured into the interaction. This was particularly important in informing my 
response to objects and places and their potential for metaphoric and metonymic 
function. This can be illustrated with a brief example from John’s data set. It should be 
notes that whilst this provides a flavour of my analytical use of metaphor and 
displacement, chapters six to eight provides the substantial, in-depth analysis of data 
relating to three separate ME sufferers I worked with. 
John (JB) had explained across several visits that he had an affinity with a specific 
cinema in his home town, which he visited ‘two or three times a week’. As part of his 
daily routine, he took me on his route through the town centre and explained how he 
always chose a route to avoid ‘battling’ through crowds. This conventional metaphor is 
commensurate with his battle against ME and reflects issues with delegitimisation 
(Dumit, 2006; Travers & Lawler, 2008) and perhaps a sense of social alienation. 
Psychosocially, this metaphor can be thought of as conveying the unconscious hostility 
and sense of otherness involved in suffering ME and connotes the association between 
self and other. I noticed on this route that we passed the cinema and paused to reflect 
this to John, as illustrated in the following extract: 
1 JF:  I’ll just get a shot of it. (>3.0) Have you been here recently to see a film? 
2 JB: Yes. A couple of times last week. 
3 JF:  So what sense do you get then when you come down here? 
4 JB: There's a sense of kind of warmth and fondness and affection and I know the 
5 people. They say hi. And they're friendly. And again as I think I said before ( ) 
6 just that sense of being cocooned and and ( ) forgetting everything else. 
7 Definitely. That’s definitely something. 
120 
 
8 JF:  So this is a nice place for you then?  
9 JB: It is.  
10 JF: Reflecting on it now ( ) do you think your route is as much about coming past 
11 this ( ) as avoiding people? Or is it both? If this is your regular route? 
12 JB: I hadn’t thought about it but I think there's something in ( ) in a sense of ( ) 
13 walking somewhere and you're walking past places that mean something to you or 
14 that hold a ( ) special place for you. And I hadn’t thought about it before but I 
15 think ( ) it is interesting that we've come down this way.  
16 JF: And the way you described it is like containment you feel contained when you 
17 go in there.  
18 JB: Yeh.  
 
John loves film and explains elsewhere how he escapes into a film’s narrative, but the 
cinema is acting in a particular way to contain John affectively and physically. My 
affective notes reveal how I felt the space in terms of Bion’s (1962) notion of 
containment. Bion refers to containment as the ability of the mother to hold on to and 
process the infants’ unconscious anxiety and feelings. The term is also applied to 
describe holding on to one’s feelings and responding affectively to them in terms of 
what they communicate (Clarke & Hoggett, 2009). Line 4 indicates that the metaphor 
has been activated and is being felt by John as a positive affect that is then articulated. 
Line 5 represents a metonymic displacement of this affect to the people who work at 
the cinema. In reference to my analytical frame previously outlined, it is possible that 
the significance of what is activated in line 5 would be overlooked. But the use of 
‘cocooned’ in line 6 prompts scrutinisation of the textual context for active metaphors. 
Thus, cocooned reveals the saliency of line 5. The use of cocooned is a conventional 
metaphor that resonates with the notion of containment. Notice also in line 6 the 
boundary that is established whilst being cocooned in the cinema, in that ‘everything 
else’ is forgotten. This might be representative of a defensive splitting that brings to 
mind Klein’s notion of withdrawal into the womb and avoidance of reality (Klein, 
1930). This is a useful metaphor for thinking about how John’s self is experiencing 
stasis and is unable to grow in light of his ME. However, it can also be thought of from 
an alternative perspective. The cinema as a metonymic displacement of the maternal 
womb can be used to think about the security, safety and unitary experience that the 
womb provides. But it is also a symbolic place where physical and emotional growth 
and maturation occurs (de Cortiñas, 2013). This indicates the polysemous nature of 
metaphor but also the requirement of some form of systematic analysis. By focussing 
on the saliency of the metaphor and its particular context it is likely that the womb 
metaphor is deployed in its first sense outlined above.  
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Conceptually, I noticed the displacement between John’s ongoing affective state and a 
particular material environment. The cinema represents a psychosocial space where 
metaphoric processes are mapped onto a geographical space and suggests the 
entanglement between metaphoric and material space (Collinge, 2006); hence a space 
that incorporates John, real and imagined others, objects and a place connected by a 
route to other places.  
To return to the notion of containment, the cinema brings to mind Modell’s (2007) 
assertion that the body as container is a primary metaphor. In this sense the cinema 
embodies what John’s body in light of ME can't manage: self containment. This 
represents the manner in which ME, the body, self and the material environment are 
mutually implicated. The degree to which John is conscious of this is debatable and 
illustrates why a psychosocial frame, where thinking about affective, social and 
psychological processes in a non-dualistic way, is useful. Note that in line 5 John 
refers to people in the present tense. This reveals the reactivation of a particular 
affective state at that time and introduces a temporal element and highlights how text 
can be scrutinised for shifts in tense that may connect to metaphoric processes.  
Finally, during line 12, the video captures John shifting his body and facial expression. 
A moment of insight had occurred for him because my affective response had been 
articulated. I felt that his daily walking route was not only to do with avoiding crowds. 
I became part of that specific actor-network for John at that moment and the resultant 
effect was a moment of insight on his part. Moreover, it demonstrates the need for a 
psychosocial frame because it implies that whilst John rationalised his daily walking 
routine as avoiding crowds, there was also an unconscious response to the 
metaphorical space provided by the cinema and the route to it. 
Whilst this brief analysis exemplifies my approach, the observations and extract are 
contextualised within an entire data set. The importance of which is that once actants 
are noticed, in this case of containment and a particular place, the task would be to 
establish whether they appear elsewhere and what else they associate with, so that 
initial ideas can be substantiated. 
I considered specific methods from psychoanalytic practice to enhance how I noticed 
metaphorisation in interaction with the ME sufferer. Psychoanalytic methods that 
focus on the analysand’s use of language include noticing how ‘switch-words’ are used 
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(Litowitz, 2013; see chapter 4), changes in vocal tone or subject (Cartwright, 2004), 
momentary inhibitions and facilitation of particular topics during discussion 
(Horowitz, 2011), interpretation of how metaphors cluster and their differences 
(Montana Katz, 2011) and slips and omissions (Schafer, 1981).
19
 Appendix 10 outlines 
instances of such events appearing in transcripts and the significance of these events in 
metaphoric and metonymic terms. I reiterate the potential overlap between metaphoric 
and metonymic processes and this extends to my interpretation of instances from the 
data. Rather than hard and fast rules, I employed my techniques in a flexible way that 
allowed for my reflexive relation to the data.  
However, as noted by Cartwright (2004), the emphasis with psychoanalysis has been 
understanding and interpreting the unconscious processes that underpin the 
development of meaning. Whilst I have considered psychoanalytic and psychosocial 
literature to glean ideas concerning how to think about textual material and identify 
metaphorisation, I am not interpreting these in terms of unconscious processes per se. 
For this reason I have adopted and adapted Lisa Baraitser’s (2008) psychoanalytic 
sensibility, echoed by Hollway (2009).  
A psychoanalytic sensibility alludes to a: 
 “...way of working with human participants that instigates a constant re-
working of the knowledge bases that we come with.” (Baraitser, 2008; p.426).  
Given that psychosocial approaches are interested in how social and psychic processes 
infiltrate each other in ways that dissolve the inner/outer and social/psychological 
dichotomies, the psychoanalytic sensibility I seek to adopt entails not over 
emphasising the psychoanalytic aspect of psychosocial approaches. It is important to 
pay equal attention to the social processes that comprise the psychosocial and the 
manner in which the psychic and the social are already mutually implicated.  
5.3.6   Identifying ‘local’ and ‘global networks’  
In the previous section I outlined the framework that I developed and used to notice 
and think about metaphoric and metonymic relations between actants. In this section I 
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 All of these techniques for noticing metaphor are language based and designed for use in clinical 
settings by trained psychoanalysts. The applicability and use of psychoanalytic concepts as research 
tools is a contested issue not only in terms of the ability of social researchers to apply such tools but 
also with regards to whether they are at all applicable outside of the clinical setting (Frosh & Baraitser, 




describe how I moved from identifying a few actants that were apparently associated 
to being able to make broader associations across a given ME sufferers data. 
Latour (1997; p.4) states that ANT “dissolves the micro- macro- distinction that has 
plagued social theory from its inception” and that there are not big and small networks, 
only differences in the intensity of associations. I found this useful when thinking 
about ME. It implies that anything can be enfranchised into a network and that 
following the actor ad infinitum would result in myriad, varied associations with other 
actants that were far removed from the initial actant both spatially, metaphorically and 
structurally. It also implies the fluidity of a network as different actants move in and 
out of it. But the research process has to end at some point. However, adopting this 
perspective on scale allowed me to shift between the particularity of actants and the 
actions they were involved in and the overall experience of ME on self.  
For instance, I have described above with John a relation between actants that include 
a cinema, his daily routine of walking through town and an affective state. This can be 
described as a local network. I developed this term to describe a few actants and their 
initial associations as an early stage of the analytic process. A further local network for 
John involved paper. John hoards paper and this was beginning to physically fill his 
flat. Associated with paper was fatigue and anxiety. As I moved back and forth 
through the data and encountered different actants I was thus able to establish for each 
ME sufferer a number of local networks. 
Once a number of local networks had been established, I scrutinised each one for 
specific actants and how they might be metaphorically or metonymically displaced 
into other local networks. For example, with John, local networks were built up around 
the cinema, paper, books, his father and emotion. By carefully looking at these in 
conjunction I was able to bring them together in a way where their associations could 
be established in a coherent sense. This became what I refer to as a global network. I 
employ this term as a description of a stage in the research process where I could begin 
to understand how ME was experienced by a particular sufferer and statements about 
ME in relation to specific material and non-material actants could be made in a broad 
sense. 
To reiterate; I use the terms global and local network as organising principles as part of 
the analytic process. But in light of Latour’s assertion above, the terms also serve as a 
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tool to shift between the micro and macro aspects of ME. For instance between how a 
particular sufferer manages a symptom with a pill dispenser to how fatigue and anxiety 
might be defined as the contours between many disparate human and non-human 
actants and spaces that manifest as a specific self-understanding. In this way, 
consideration can be given to the broad social discourses that affect the subjective 
experience of the ME sufferer, such as delegitimisation. Thus, my use of the micro-
macro distinction is more usefully thought of as ends of a continuum that enabled me 
to move between the social and intra-psychological aspects of ME in a non-dualistic 
manner.  
Being able to think about ME sufferers in terms of global networks brought me 
towards the end of the analytical process. In the next section I discuss how I moved to 
understanding each particular experience of ME as an assemblage. 
5.3.7   ME as an ‘assemblage’ 
The term assemblage reflects notions of complexity, chaos, indeterminacy, multiplicity 
and emergence. ME and its effect on self experience is comprised of concepts, 
experiences, viruses, bodies, material objects and places as a shifting mass; as 
disparate actors intrinsically associated in multi-scale, dynamic and fluid ways and 
effecting each other’s identity and delimiting how they act. ME as an assemblage is an 
apt way of imagining this complex arrangement and to frame the particularity of ME 
experience for a given sufferer.  
Despite the usefulness of ANT in thinking about ME, it struck me that the term ‘actor-
network’ felt like it described a two-dimensional arrangement.20 This was despite the 
fact that ANT has had a large uptake in the discipline of geography, where it is utilised 
to rethink notions of space and scale.
21
 Assemblage on the other hand connotes a 
multi-dimensional arrangement. Focussing specifically on the indeterminacy of an 
assemblage, I read this as a statement about being unable to absolutely and ultimately 
characterise what the assemblage is comprised of because of its dynamic, non-causal 
and complex nature.  
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In terms of each of the ME sufferers I worked with, I view their experience with ME as 
an assemblage because this metaphorises how each experience is comprised of 
different things that themselves have and define certain spatial and temporal 
arrangements and involve associations that are stable or unstable to varying degrees. 
Each experience of ME is particular to the sufferer and yet each experience may 
include similar actants that associate to manifest similar actions or define similar 
identities. So ME as assemblage is also a useful way of staying with the commonalities 
as well as the particularities of ME experience. 
Thus, the end of the research process involved drawing an arbitrary line between the 
ongoing analyses for each ME sufferer. It involved  subjective acknowledgement that I 
had worked on the global network for each sufferer enough to be as sure as possible 
that my descriptions of how actants associated and what this meant for the experience 
of the suffer were justified by direct reference to the data. But it was also motivated by 
the need to complete the project as a whole.  
Whilst this thesis is the written output of my work, I am left with an assemblage of 
each ME sufferer I worked with; a reflexive, affective and descriptive understanding of 
how ME has affected their self experience and how I was involved in arriving at that 
description. Each assemblage has to be understood as an incomplete and ongoing 
process and as an event that is still taking place for the sufferers concerned.   
5.3.8   Presentation of analyses 
Given my focus on the particularity of ME experience and the effect on self, I 
experienced a dilemma concerning how to present findings. I analysed all the data 
from all the ME sufferers I worked with but had to make choices about to how to 
present these analyses, given the need for brevity. Three possibilities for disseminating 
the analyses presented themselves: three chapters addressing one research question 
each with extracts and instances from all ME sufferers, three chapters comprised of 
instances from all sufferers and various aspects of all research questions or three 
chapters, each representing one single ME sufferer.  
The benefits of the first two were that a wider range of data could be included with 
instances from all sufferers. This also meant that all sufferers would be represented; 
which felt ethically correct, given how generous they had been in taking part. The 
benefit of the first approach would also maintain the integrity of each research 
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question. My final decision as to which method to adopt was influenced by personal 
history and the methodological stance I was attempting to develop. 
During my studies in psychology, I have been drawn to in-depth psychoanalytic case 
studies of individuals because this resonated with Freud’s use of individuals to build 
and exemplify his emerging ideas, as well as understanding and helping the individuals 
concerned (McLeod, 2003). I have also found that individual cases bring the real 
person into focus. In-depth case studies provide richness of detail and provide a way of 
addressing questions about how contemporary phenomena, such as ME, are 
experienced in real contexts (Scholz & Tietje; 2002; Yin, 2009). From the ANT 
perspective, the emphasis is on maintaining the description of the network from its 
own perspective and that such a description of an network, if adequate, should not 
require any further framing (Latour, 2005). This implies the need to retain the 
descriptive integrity of the whole case. 
Finally, a central concern was to bring into focus the particularity of ME as a means of 
highlighting the subtle variability of each individual experience. Thus, I concluded that 
the best way to represent my methodology and the lived, particular experience of ME 
was to present one individual in each of three analytical chapters. However, choosing 
three separate cases meant that most of the data and sufferers I worked with do not 
appear in this thesis.  This invokes in me a feeling of having betrayed those not 
represented and speaks of the emotional work needed on the part of the researcher to 
engage in reflexive, qualitative research (Clarke & Hoggett, 2009). Also, it might be 
suggested that selecting whole cases rests on a subjective bias on the part of the 
researcher (Achen & Snidel, 1989; Geddes, 1990). This is not an issue for the present 
research because the methodology makes explicit my reflexive involvement in the 








5.4  Chapter summary 
In this chapter I have outlined how I selected and secured a group of ME sufferers to 
work with and how I translated my methodology into practical methods.  I have also 
described in a stepwise fashion the analytical procedure I developed. My initial group 
of eight ME sufferers were aged twenty five to sixty five and represented a broad 
demographic. I used longitudinal, ethnographically informed methods over a six month 
period to enter into the everyday experience of these sufferers and their ME. Methods 
included partially structured interview and naturalistic discussion. These overlapped 
with participant observation of the everyday routines of the sufferers I worked with so 
that I could explore the relationship of ME to the experience of self in the material 
environment of their home and other familiar spaces and places. The research period 
consisted of five visits across six months which enabled snapshots of how self was 
experienced chronologically. My aim was to enter into the everyday routines of ME 
sufferers with the premise that I would approach how they experienced ME by 
becoming an actant in their actor networks. Audio-visual equipment was used to 
record all aspects of my interaction with sufferers. A central focus was to develop an 
explicitly reflexive method of participation that utilised my affective response to the 
sufferer and their world.  
Data was comprised of verbatim transcripts of all discussions with participants, field 
notes and audio recordings of my affective responses, video recordings of interactions 
and writings provided by the participants themselves. The initial stage of analysis 
involved a thematic analytical approach so that I could begin to organise data and 
follow the actor. I reflexively acknowledged that I do not separate the data collection 
phase from analysis and this also reflects my ongoing reflexive response and evolving 
understanding. After the thematic analysis I moved to the core analysis, which 
involved tracing the displacements and associations between actants by identifying the 
metaphorical or metonymical equivalence between actants within and between 
domains. I outlined how I identified an actant and its associations in terms of 
displacement. To approach the issue of metaphor and metonymy I reviewed ways of 
systematising metaphor analysis and described how I identified metaphoric and 
metonymic relationships between actants. The notions of global and local networks 
were described as organising heuristics. Finally, I explained why I think about the end 
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result of the research, a description and personal understanding of each sufferer’s 
experience of ME and its effect on self, as an assemblage.  
In the next three chapters I present analyses of three ME sufferers as separate, whole 
cases. Besides the reasons described above, these cases have been chosen because they 
best exemplify a specific area of my research aims and as such I have selected material 
from each case that addresses a specific research question. It should be noted that I 
report on a limited number of actants and associations for each ME sufferer. Whilst 
these are adequate to exemplify my aims, many more actants and associations became 
known that provided further insights into the effect of ME on self. However, these 



















Bruce: Material actants, ANT and the mediation of 
self and ME 
 
6.1  Chapter overview 
The focus of this first analytical chapter is Bruce. The research question addressed is 
how can material actants be used to explore the relationship between self and others 
for people with ME? My focus comprises two main areas. The first area is concerned 
with how I adopted and adapted the ANT premise of translation as a frame to 
approach the data. To this end I utilise my notion of local networks; a tool for 
organising how I noticed, follow and begin to associate actants. I then discuss each 
aspect of translation in relation to Bruce. The second area explores further local 
networks built around specific material actants. Each of the networks described 
provide insight into different aspects of ME experience and its relation to self. These 
include how material actants become temporally displaced; providing a way of 
thinking about the associations between the people and emotional structures that Bruce 
encountered early in his life. I discuss how the ANT-informed perspective provides a 
non-causal way of understanding the relationship of ME to what might otherwise be 
deemed antecedent factors, such as anxiety. Finally, I explore how specific material 
actants associate as part of a complex process which results in what I term a productive 
self, enabling Bruce to address ME symptoms such as fatigue and offsetting the 
anxiety associated with appearing unproductive in the eyes of others and to himself. 
Throughout, I emphasise how specific material actants have become indispensible to 
Bruce’s ongoing sense of self, his experience and management of ME and his relations 
to others. Material actants allow Bruce to concretise his self-understanding. They 
anchor Bruce’s experience of ME, his relationships and how he narrates his self-
understanding across his life span. The type of self described in this chapter is 
psychosocial because it is not reduced to either an essential, internal quality nor to 
external social reality. I maintain a tension between the self and ongoing relations and 
experiences in a material world and hence self is approached as mediated by material 
and social demands and restrictions. The chapter opens with a pen portrait of Bruce 
and descriptions of actants that appeared salient for him. Words and phrases appearing 
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in single quotations marks are direct quotes from Bruce. Actants have been highlighted 
in the first instance.  
6.2  Bruce’s background and central actants  
Bruce is 57 and is head gardener for a country estate. He has two children with his 
wife, Jan; Rowena who is 17 and just completing her A’ levels and Leo who is 18 and 
going to college. Jan has a son from a previous marriage; Alex. Alex is 29 years old 
and not in employment.  At the time of this research Alex was in a secure psychiatric 
unit due to the bipolar-disorder he has suffered for 13 years. Alex’s disorder has had a 
huge impact on Bruce and the family. Bruce has known his wife for 35 years. The 
family live in a medium sized semi-detached house and the garden is well looked after. 
Bruce completed a degree in chemistry at age 21 and then worked in the petrochemical 
industry for 3 years but gave this up to live in a tepee for 3 years in an alternative 
community in a Welsh valley. He eventually left this community to live back in 
‘mainstream society’. Bruce has a developed ideology based around being in tune with 
nature and describes gardening with passion. He stressed that the family eat mostly his 
own produce. Gardening for Bruce is an activity that connects to his ideological 
perspective. This perspective involves being in tune with the natural world. Bruce 
gardens intuitively and respects the history and nature of the ground.  His belief is that 
gardening is always ‘in process’ and cannot be viewed in any final or absolute sense.  
In 2005, Bruce completed a course in cranial-sacral therapy and began private practise. 
He had been ‘working hard’ and the therapy course had ‘loosened emotional stuff but 
in a positive way.’ After a weekend exhibiting at a local September craft fair he 
developed ‘flu-like’ symptoms that ‘wiped [him] out’. He recovered but ‘never got 
[his] strength back’. He cites this period as the onset of his ME.  
A theme that runs in various ways through Bruce’s narrative is the unemotional nature 
of his Dad and how this manifests throughout Bruce’s relation to himself and others. 
Bruce also describes his Mum’s unintellectual nature, which at times ‘verged on 
impairment’. He attempts to distance himself from both these aspects in various ways, 
such as constructing himself as ‘intellectual’. Bruce is also at odds with his self-
perceived lower-working-class background in Birmingham and Birmingham itself, 
which symbolises a place he escaped from ‘where the sun never shines’. 
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I first met Bruce at a self-help group. He struck me as a large man with an imposing 
presence, very articulate, passionate and educated.  
The initial actants I describe for Bruce are cooking and taste. These pervade Bruce’s 
entire data set and are important because, post-ME, cooking enables Bruce to engage 
in a productive and useful activity that is visible for himself and others. Bruce focused 
on taste in conjunction with cooking as his chosen activity for the third session. During 
this activity Bruce made various juices and fruit mixes with me and extolled the virtues 
of blending his own fresh produce.  
Taste was his explicit focus for the fourth session, where it acted to enrol many other 
actants. He explains that his Mum’s cooking was always ‘bland’ and that he was 
unable to taste things until a couple of years after his ME began. Bruce describes taste 
as ‘multidimensional’ but that the significance of these dimensions had not been 
apparent for most of his life. Beyond Bruce’s life-long inability to taste, he also 
describes experiencing food sensitivities for ten years prior to ME. These have affected 
his ability to enjoy certain foods. 
The actant emotion appears in different forms. Bruce explicitly relates his own 
emotional development to that of his parents, with his Dad occupying the dominant 
position in the family and setting the emotional tone in various ways. These include 
presenting a negative model of emotionality to Bruce, who acknowledges that his Dad 
was reprising his own emotional upbringing. Bruce describes his Mum as ‘emotionally 
damaged’ and unwilling or unable to talk to Bruce about his emotional needs. Overall, 
Bruce believes his childhood emotional development sets the tone for later 
relationships and self-understanding. He felt some ‘need’ to ‘mimic’ emotional 
relating and this may have impeded developing an ‘authentic’ sense of self. The 
important thing to note about emotion as an actant is that it represents a range of 
heterogenous thoughts, feelings, behaviours, memories and material objects that have 
become displaced across time and place. In this sense, emotion is a way of describing 
the associations between these things and holding onto their connectedness and 
inseparability.   
Anxiety is a further actant. Bruce describes suffering anxiety at many times through 
life and anxiety associates with many other actants. This was especially the case with 
the onset of ME. As a child ‘most things made [him] anxious’. He roots this with his 
Mum. He tends to deal with ‘anxiety-inducing things by avoidance’. Bruce conflates 
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anxiety with his own emotional response, which he describes as a ‘bit buttoned down’. 
In terms of the relationship between ME and anxiety Bruce explains that sometimes 
‘you rationalise the experience of anxiety [associated with ME]. It’s almost like the 
anxiety comes first.’ This is important because it highlights that Bruce is not clear how 
ME and anxiety relate to each other. The implication is that not knowing what ME is 
has exacerbated anxiety for him as well as causing it. For instance, cognitive 
impairment caused anxiety because Bruce could not ‘judge which queue to go in’ in a 
supermarket. ME also resulted in anxiety due to an inability to tolerate noisy, busy, 
bright environments such as supermarkets. Bruce also explains that when ME occurred 
his emotional system was like ‘a time bomb going off’, with him experiencing extreme 
mood swings. He states that ‘with ME, everything makes you anxious’. This includes 
the physical symptoms as well as the effect of ME on his ability to socialise and relate 
to others.  
A further actant is alienation. Bruce references alienation from others whilst suffering 
hepatitis, around age 23, in that ‘nobody wanted to come near [him]’ and that he was 
‘a social pariah’. This was reprised with ME. Alienation is implicated when Bruce 
describes various societal groups as ‘dispossessed’ and ‘seeking refuge’ at the time 
when he lived in the Welsh tepee village. He states that ‘there was a tide of damaged 
people flowing all around the country’; ‘the inner city dispossessed’. Alienation relates 
to what Bruce understands as traditional classed structures. He identifies himself as 
working-class. In terms of his gardening he appears alienated not only from his 
employers but people in general who view gardening with ‘a rational outcome’. For 
Bruce, gardening is a process of ‘becoming’. This belies Bruce’s highly developed 
ideological system.  
However, alienation for Bruce is primarily from himself. Beyond emotional alienation 
associated with his father, Bruce was intellectually alienated from his mother. He 
describes her as simple, naïve and ‘intellectually limited’. This primary alienation 
connects to how he felt about living in Birmingham as a child. His greatest wish was to 
‘leave that place as soon as possible’, which he did aged eighteen. Bruce reprises the 
socially alienating effect of ME in that with its onset he was ‘rapidly abandoned by 
friends’. Finally, Bruce conveys the sense of alienation concerning ME sufferers. He 
sets himself apart from online forum users by categorising them as ‘chatty types’, 
positioning himself as intellectual and focussed on finding useful scientific knowledge. 
He feels that specialists unhelpfully ‘psychologise’ ME. This latter point associates 
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with Bruce feeling that recovery from ME is down to him and not the medical 
profession.  
Otherness is an actant. Bruce explicitly and implicitly describes various groups in 
opposition to one another. These include ‘purists’ contrasted with ‘middle-class’ in the 
tepee valley, upper class ‘super-rich’ and his family’s ‘working’ class, ‘damaged’ and 
undamaged, traditional members of society and non-traditional members, ‘ideologists’ 
and non-ideologists. Otherness appears explicitly and implicitly in his gardening work 
on a large, privately owned estate, with himself as a classed other, where he explicitly 
states that the ‘super rich are by and large unpleasant’. Bruce describes an ideology 
that emphasises harmony with the environment, respecting the ‘history’ of the land and 
approaching a garden not as a blank canvas but working as part of it. However, in 
terms of what his upper-class employers would make of this he states: 
‘The people I work for at the moment if I tried to talk to them like that you 
know it’d be (touches his forelock) ‘get back in your box.’ ‘Yes master.’ For 
fuck’s sake! You know. [...] the people who actually have control who own 
these bright and cultural artefacts are ignorant, arrogant, selfish (laughing) 
and lacking in any sort of () social responsibility.’ 
This extract demonstrates Bruce’s sense of otherness in different ways. Beyond the 
apparent division along lines of class, Bruce implies that the [upper] class represented 
by his employers are unable to appreciate his ideological position and this establishes 
Bruce as an intellectual and enlightened other to the ignorant upper class. Bruce’s 
intellectual capacity is a defining feature of his self-identity and appears in various 
ways throughout the data. 
Bruce implicitly establishes a general other who is unable to appreciate his ideology: 
‘You know most people you say you're a gardener they don’t really think 
about it in those terms. They think about it in very mundane terms. But 
although a lot of the work you do is mundane, part of the process is a lot more 
complicated and sophisticated.’ 
This extract suggests that Bruce is aware that gardening may be seen as a classed 
activity. He therefore deploys his ideology to offset this.  




‘... a bit of a mascot you know long hair and a lab coat. Fantastic! Wandering 
round. Me and me [sic.] boss in the research lab. People used to sort of like 
look askance! At the smells and whatever came out. But it was brilliant! We 
used to umm () break all the patents.’ 
The sense of otherness that this extract conveys is that Bruce is a rebel who resists 
social norms. A general sense of Bruce as a rebellious individual who resists the norms 
of society in various ways is apparent throughout the data.  
As an ME sufferer, Bruce explains how non-sufferers ‘do not understand’ and do not 
appear to ‘share the same language’ as sufferers, who inevitably ‘can understand each 
other without barely a word’. These extracts indicate that Bruce has identified himself 
as an ME sufferer and hence this group is other to non-sufferers.  
Whereas cooking, taste, alienation, emotion and anxiety might be described as non-
material actants, I now outline material actants.  
First are a work bench and two cupboards that Bruce has in his lounge.  
 
These appear rough, ready, battered and purely functional and more suited to a 
workshop than a lounge. Bruce retrieved ‘only’ these items from his father’s house 
when his father died and describes them as ‘unemotional’ in design. Bruce had an 
affinity for these cupboards even as a youngster and explains that he got to see what 
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went in and out of them when he used to watch his father in his workshop. Bruce 
suggests that the reason he retained them was because they symbolised a ‘sense of 
control’ and how his Dad ‘extended his control’ and asserts that the garage was ‘his 
Dad’s domain’. This connotes that as a child Bruce was attempting to connect with his 
father by entering into his father’s world, where Bruce knew his Dad was in control 
and where he was allowed to enter but only to observe. The manner in which Bruce 
talks about them intimates the type of divided experiential world that Bruce inhabits. 
Bruce also described a food blender and juicer.  
 
These were demonstrated to me during our third meeting. Both are expensive models. 
Bruce takes delight in their design and explained their function to me in technical 
detail whilst disassembling and reassembling them. He uses the juicer every day to 
juice his own produce and add supplements to combat ME. 
He described bread and butter pudding in the third session and made some for me to 




This actant associates with his Mum, who would make ‘tasteless’ bread and butter 
pudding when Bruce was young. Bread and butter pudding enables thinking about how 
an abstract category such as emotion can become displaced across time to reappear in 
the present. 
During the third visit Bruce showed to me a pill dispenser.  
 
This was a small device in its own Filofax-like cover, conveying functional efficiency 
and purpose. It was divided into seven compartments. Bruce explained how he would 
deliberate what vitamin supplements and pills to fill each compartment with on a 
weekly basis. The device served to augment his memory and was also important as a 
visual symbol of ME.  
Now that the central actants arising with Bruce’s data have been outlined, the next 
section exemplifies how local actor networks were established.  
6.3  Establishing local networks: the cupboards and the work bench  
I begin this section by reiterating my adaption of key ANT ideas before focussing on 
how material actants are crucial to establishing relations between aspects of self-
understanding and also represent a temporal and spatial displacement of other actants. 
Material actants are integral to thinking about aspects of Bruce’s broad experience.  
Local network is a term I developed and used to describe how I noticed actants and 
followed them to the other actants they associated with, so that a small area of actor-
network could be loosely described.
22
 Establishing a local network entailed adopting 
and adapting the ANT notion of translation to conceptualise how actants affect and 
effect each other, such that particular identities and actions resulted. The four moments 
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 See chapter 5 (5.3.4). 
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of translation, problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation, represent 
steps in the analytical process   
Problematisation 
Problematisation describes the manner in which an actor attempts to define a problem 
in its own terms, identifies other actors that the problem affects and how these actors 
can be redefined in the interests of a solution (Callon, 1986; Sarker, Sarker & 
Sidorova, 2006). I also use problematisation as a way of keeping in mind that there are 
competing descriptions of how a network becomes established and to avoid 
foreclosing the analytical process. Problematisation in my synthesis of ANT also 
describes how an event or question arises from the data and which appears to be 
pivotal concerning the ongoing experience with ME. This use is closely allied to 
Callon’s use of problematisation. 
With Bruce, the actant ‘emotion’ presented as a problem that required following early 
on in my first visit; becoming salient when Bruce made explicit that his Dad ‘was not a 
great fan of emotion.’ Bruce identified that as a child he was obliged to suppress his 
emotional needs. Since that time he has identified that his emotional side has not ‘been 
developed’. Consequently, Bruce has approached emotional problems, such as the 
emotional dynamic around his stepson, as a ‘problem to be solved’. In other words, 
Bruce intellectualises emotion.  
I decided to follow emotion as an actant due to its extensiveness throughout the data 
and because it associates with many aspects of Bruce’s general history and ME 
experience. Moreover, emotion is clearly problematic for Bruce because of the manner 
in which it is entangled with his struggle to relate to people. In this sense, emotion is 
associated with Bruce’s tendency to differentiate between various groups. However, I 
am not suggesting that emotion is causal to Bruce’s ME but that it represents an 
ongoing problematic state that can be explored as an actant and which may lead to 
understanding an aspect of Bruce’s ME experience.   
In terms of problematisation per se, emotion has defined and displaced itself through 
various material and non-material actants. For instance, the following extract 
exemplifies the dualistic nature of Bruce’s understanding of emotion. Bruce is 




‘And I got there [tepee village] after the influx from the inner city 
dispossessed. So it had changed ( ) big time. But you know it was still a very 
interesting place to be. Umm (3.0) yeeehh. So where did I go from there? ( ) I 
got into gardening! And you know. Philosophically and physically it seemed 
to be perfect and I loved it.  I always have I mean I really like ( ) gardening.  
J: So when you'd been in that place [tepee village] and you came out you 
decided actively not to return to chemistry and industry and that way of life? 
B: Wasn't interested at all. Which is sort of a shame in some ways as there's 
an intellectual side to me that’s not been developed () through that. But 
perhaps there was an emotional side to me that needed a different sort of 
environment () to be in. Yehh (3.0) and umm () so life after that was about () 
looking after children.’ 
This extract not only highlights that Bruce experiences a split between intellect and 
emotion but that he is connecting emotion to physical and extra-physical 
environments. Emotion as a problematic actor can be thought of as attempting to 
define itself through Bruce’s relationship to specific spaces and places.  
Thus, Bruce establishes emotion in a complex manner as part of a space that 
transcends geographical location. Intellect is connected to a different type of space. 
The intellectual space incorporates academic pathways and working in a scientific 
manner. In contrast, emotion associates with a space that is comprised of a physically 
different environment and perhaps where gardening acts in a metonymic way, such 
that gardening involves nurture, growth and care of the earth. As part of this space 
Bruce’s emotional needs could also be nurtured, cared for and grow. The three second 
pause suggests Bruce was reflecting on his statement but given the shift in narrative to 
his children, it could also suggest that he was trying to recall chronologically what he 
did next. This is an example of problematisation in the sense that alternative 
explanations have to be held in mind until the point where one interpretation becomes 
more salient. 
Interessement  
Once emotion became salient, I began to think about how it might associate with other 
actants and whether it could be thought about in terms of interessement. Interessement, 
from the ANT perspective, describes how an actant begins to establish itself by co-
opting other actants into association with it (González, 2013). Given the saliency of 
emotion, the task was to follow it to other actants to determine whether and how it 
organised other actants in its own interests. My opening questions in visit two involved 
following the actor [anxiety] from visit one. In the following extract, I have reflected 
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to Bruce that I had noticed a lot of anxiety talk during our first encounter and needed 
to follow it. Bruce replies: 
B: (1.0) Um () gosh. Phwwaaaaw! Well, in terms of absolutes () I suppose () 
yeh, there's been different time in my life when I've hit anxiety quite badly. 
And certainly the beginning when this [ME] started it was like an emotional 
bomb going off. Somehow () the whole emotional system became unbalanced 
and you got really extreme swings. Not a () probably a bit buttoned-down 
emotionally or I certainly was when I was younger. Umm and umm () it’s a 
tough one. I used ah () antidepressants to try and deal with that a bit. I used () 
beta blockers. Very effective! Um just when I had meetings with the boss 
because they were trying to sack me. So just at the time when I was least able 
to handle that sort of emotional (1.0) stuff [due to ME onset] it [anxiety] was 
hitting me the worst and it was a dreadful time. But since then I think if () 
almost if anything () emotionally I'm (1.0) I've not experienced emotions so 
much. Emotion-anxiety I'm not sure if they () fully equate. But () when you're 
really tired you don’t experience emotion.’ 
In this extract, ‘emotion’ can be thought of as co-opting ‘anxiety’ and establishing 
itself as mediating Bruce’s general experience, and later with ME, because even 
though he has been asked about anxiety, by the third sentence emotion has appeared. 
Prior to ME, emotion is established via the metaphor of an ‘emotional system’. Bruce 
then connotes that with ME, this ‘system’ violently transforms. However, in the next 
sentence Bruce has deviated from the emotion/ME narrative to explain that he was 
emotionally ‘buttoned down’ when younger and this implies that Bruce is trying to 
reconcile his emotionality in the past with how he understands it today. Bruce then 
rationalises his use of beta blockers to try to ‘deal’ with his unbalanced emotional 
system and this reflects his general tendency to rationalise and intellectualise events. 
Bruce then suggests that since the onset of ME he has not experienced emotion ‘so 
much’, but this conflicts with many other instances where he describes the ‘emotional 
roller-coaster’ of ME. In the last two sentences, Bruce appears to be trying to repair, in 
a discursive sense, the way that emotion co-opted anxiety and became salient. The 
moves involved are: anxiety becomes salient over emotion because the anxiety 
associated with ME was ‘hitting’ him, emotion has not been experienced ‘so much’, 
emotion is offered up as potentially equating with anxiety and finally anxiety is 
prioritised over emotion because the fatigue induced by ME precludes the latter.  
In terms of interessement, this extract reveals how emotion was not the conscious 
focus and yet it somehow revealed itself, requiring Bruce to work it into the narrative, 
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and has co-opted anxiety into a certain relationship with itself. Taking the previous two 
extracts together, emotion appears to be an object for Bruce that was not allowed to 
grow as a child, became connected to certain spaces where it can grow and has co-
opted anxiety and intellect by asserting itself as an organising principle.  
The following extract is from the fourth interview and again involves me following the 
actor; in this case the cupboards and bench.  
‘J: You described him [Dad] before [in a previous visit] as kind of 
unemotional. And I think you talked about the work bench. As kind of 
functional, utilitarian and pragmatic. But without much umm ( ) an emotional 
kind of flair I suppose I'm thinking because um when you look at this [I turn 
and gesture to the cupboards] it it does a job.  
B: Yeh. He would of hated that in here. Cos for him ( ) it was a functional 
bench in the garage and the reason the paint’s on it is cos he used to ( ) rub his 
brushes out on it. 
J: Ahh right!  
B: There’s more coats of paint. Umm.  And ahh (2.0) he had this thing about 
him. Emotionally ( ) he did not like emotion. He didn’t like showing it 
himself he didn’t like other people showing it. Which could get quite 
extreme. Which I don’t think is very healthy.  
J: Healthy for you ( ) to pick up...  
B: Or him.  
J: Or him [...] What made you think that I know you described these before 
but made you ( ) retain these? Perhaps there were other things? Is there 
anything now on reflection that drew you too them?  
B: I've had quite a bond with them from childhood. There’s something about 
them. I think it’s probably cos my father ( ) used to lock everything up. Um ( 
) he was very fond of keys and er ( ) you can see they all have locks. So it 
used to be like his treasure kingdom really. Boxes full of this that and the 
other ( ) all locked away. Um ( ) so...  
J: What did that feel like as a boy?  
B: Err (3.0) gosh...  
J: Because the other thing I'm thinking is: you want to find what's in there. 
Because my Dad had similar. Things that were locked and you'd 
automatically want to unlock them. Do you have a sense of that?  
B: Um (1.0) not so much because he would be in the garage when he was 
working and I would see stuff in and out. Um ( ) but maybe it was this sense 
of control. The way that he extended his control. To (3.0) I suppose it was his 
domain. The garage. You know he was quite a clever man. He did a few ( ) 
odds and ends I think people did more in those days they didn’t have much 




What are the moves in this passage? Firstly, Bruce acknowledges the utility of the 
cupboards and that his Dad would not appreciate them in the front room. There then 
appears to be a break in the flow of narrative; Bruce is describing what his Dad used to 
do with the bench but hesitates and pauses before switching to focus on his Dad’s 
emotional character, which implies that Bruce is experiencing a reactivated affective 
state associated with the cupboards and his Dad when Bruce was a boy.  Bruce then 
reprises that his Dad’s suppressed emotional nature was not beneficial to Bruce or his 
Dad. His next description of the cupboards can be understood in metaphorical terms. 
An interpretation is that Bruce related to the cupboards in a metaphorical manner. 
Whatever the cupboards held was translated into ‘treasure’. The connotation is of 
something desirable, hidden or waiting to be found.  
At this point in the discussion, Bruce and I are not sharing an intersubjective affective 
state because I am focussing on the significance of the locks and relating my own 
experience with my father’s cupboards. A previous affective state from my childhood 
has been activated. However, Bruce refutes my idea, explaining that he got to see what 
went in and out and suggests the reason he retained them was that they symbolised his 
Dad’s control. Stating that the garage was ‘his Dad’s domain’ connotes that as a child 
Bruce was metaphorically and literally attempting to connect with his father by 
entering into his world where Bruce knew his Dad was in control, where he was 
allowed to enter but only to observe. If this interpretation is viable then the fact that the 
cupboards and bench were the only things retained by Bruce is significant. Bruce was 
not physically excluded from this world but was emotionally excluded.  
The last sentence reveals that the affective substrate for Bruce is becoming unstable. 
There is a rupture where Dad is portrayed in a positive light [‘he was quite a clever 
man’], then a more ambiguous light followed by Bruce moving towards a 
rationalisation and defensive humour. At the end, Bruce cannot tolerate the affective 
movement. He breaks off the narrative by negating his affective state, the cupboards 
and their reactivation of his Dad by moving into the kitchen, ostensibly for this reason: 
‘B: Yeh. I'm just gonna get the [inaudible]... [Bruce gets up to get something 
from the kitchen] Have a little bit of roll-mop. (10.0) Here. [he returns and 
puts bottle of colourless clear liquid on table]’  
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Note the long delay before he returns. The kitchen was two steps behind him and the 
bottle had been on the worktop. This implies that he needed to break off from the 
affective space created around the cupboards and the bench. 
Focussing on the cupboards and work bench sheds light on the relationship between 
Bruce, his father and emotion. The cupboards represent a metonymical and 
metaphorical translation of unemotionality in that both his father and these objects 
are/were unemotional. In this sense they maintain Bruce’s relation with his Dad. The 
metonym can be pushed further by suggesting that they have become a displacement 
of his father and stand in for him. They represent Bruce attempting to make a 
connection to his father and perhaps embody Bruce’s stark unemotionality. 
It is also important that Bruce recognised the classed nature of these cupboards and 
bench. The cupboards’ classed nature was made explicit by Bruce when two 
neighbours came to visit. These neighbours didn't like the cupboards, feeling they were 
not in keeping with Bruce’s character. Bruce felt that the neighbours viewed them as 
‘middle-class’ in that they represented the middle-class ‘pre-occupation with salvaging 
antique objects’. Bruce suddenly recognised his alienation from these neighbours and 
he parted friendly company with them. The interesting thing to note is that these 
cupboards began life as pragmatic, working-class objects.  
However, these objects in a front lounge represent what might be called ‘shabby’ or 
‘poor chic’. Shabby chic furniture is interesting because it represents a movement 
since the 1990s where the middle-class mimic what the working-class of previous 
generations actually had to do, which was repair and revamp old furniture. Whilst fully 
unpacking what shabby chic represents is beyond the remit of this thesis, Halnon 
(2002) notes that one such line of thought is that shabby chic provides a way of 
highlighting and poking fun at the traditional practices, symbols and artefacts of the 
the working-class. However, she also notes that the practice of shabby chic does 
nothing to actually eradicate the differences that class entails. I read this from a 
psychoanalytic perspective such that shabby chic provides a way of displacing and 
maintaining contact with the unconscious anxiety that having to acknowledge the 
[classed] other provokes.  This is important in terms of Bruce’s’ cupboards. 
Firstly, the implication that the neighbours recognised the cupboards as being at odds 
with Bruce is that they identify him as working-class. Bruce became alienated from the 
neighbours but one interpretation is that he actually became alienated from their 
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identification of him as working-class and this implies that he is attempting to detach 
his classed background. If Bruce was actually working-class, these cupboards as 
shabby-chic objects would be unfitting. Thus, two possibilities as to why the 
cupboards are in Bruce’s lounge are that they embody his Dad or that they represent 
Bruce attempting to identify as middle-class and differentiate himself from his 
working-class background. In this case, Bruce has adopted them as shabby-chic items 
that allow him to perform middle-class and hence dissociate from his own working-
class background. This interpretation is plausible, given that in the extract above Bruce 
had stated in reference to the bench that his Dad ‘would of hated that in here’, yet 
Bruce had given them centre space in his lounge/diner. Bruce may be differentiating 
himself from his Dad by defiantly placing the cupboards and bench in the wrong 
setting and in doing so reprising what the middle-class do but he may also be 
attempting to maintain contact with his Dad.  
Overall, the cupboards and bench appear to be doing varied work. They are a 
displacement of Bruce’s Dad and hence his unemotionality. But they also provide 
Bruce with the opportunity to resist his Dad. This resistance could represent a rejection 
of Bruce’s classed origins but it is equally possible that they represent a rejection of his 
emotional origins. It is important that none of these options are rejected and instead the 
cupboards are imagined as a site of conflict where class and emotion have become 
conflated. Hence, when it comes to thinking about these cupboards in association with 
the actant of ‘otherness, the otherness implied is not easily understood in terms of clear 
delineations between classes.  
To return to the metaphor of treasure, the cupboards connote something waiting to be 
discovered. As a phantasised treasure object, the cupboards and bench provides the key 
to Bruce discovering and integrating his Dad as a whole object and hence himself as 
well as solving the conflated issue of his classed and emotional origins. This 
interpretation was evidenced when Bruce wrote to me unsolicited by e-mail [on three 
occasions]. On the second occasion, just after my second visit, he wrote: 
‘My Father died and I found parts of me that had been unavailable whilst he 
was alive.’ 
Whilst Bruce hasn't found the ‘whole’, those parts seem to be aspects of Bruce’s 
emotionality. It appears that the cupboards and workbench are involved in 
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interessement and have co-opted other actants that include Bruce’s emotion and his 
dead but metonymically present Dad.   
To reiterate, Bruce has experienced anxiety throughout his life. He conflates anxiety 
with emotion and with ME. He is not sure whether anxiety leads to ME or vice versa. 
There is a need for Bruce to diminish the anxiety around emotion that pre and post-
dates ME and to respond to the onset of ME and the way that it implies failure of his 
body and pre-ME self. 
 From Bruce’s perspective, the interessement, the co-opting by emotion of other 
actants into networked relations acts to maintain some sense of self, bodily integrity 
and to minimise anxiety, which is displaced into the cupboards and bench. Material 
actants such as the cupboards and bench can be thought of as proxies of bodily and 
psychological capacities. The ANT-informed approach brings into view a new world 
of material actants that are equally important to the ME sufferer yet are subtle in their 
effect. 
Enrolment  
Interessement does not automatically lead to successful alliances and overall 
translation requires further reinforcement by enrolment (Callon, 1986). Actants  have 
been co-opted at the interessement stage by a central actor and the defining of a 
problem, but the roles of these actants needs to be further defined by ‘negotiations, 
trials of strength and tricks’ (ibid. p,211) to ensure that they fulfil the needs of the 
central actor and the desired solution to the problem. Once I identified a central actant, 
such as emotion, and the manner in which it co-opted other actants into association 
with itself I subsequently moved through the data to discern the ways in which 
emotion defined other actants and also how emotion resisted the attempts of these 
other actants to impose an alternative identity upon themselves. I also used the term 
enrolment to think about the way that actants are associated in the emerging 
descriptions of local networks and whether early identification and linking of actants is 
validated by the later appearance of new actants and descriptions as I feed them back 
into subsequent visits. 
For instance, an early actant I noted with Bruce was a large soft sofa with which Bruce 
had replaced his previous sofa, so that he could ‘crash out’ after coming home. I felt 
this might be a significant actant but in subsequent visits it did not reappear in 
discussion and emotion, in an actantial sense, did not appear to be co-opting it any way 
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I could discern. Thus, the sofa made visible an aspect of Bruce’s ME experience but 
not to the same degree as the bench or cupboards and it did not threaten to assert itself 
in any problematic manner.  
I reiterate that actors, artefacts and practices do not pre-exist networks but are 
outcomes or effects of these relations and emerging from processes of ‘heterogeneous 
engineering’ (Law, 1999). The material actants Bruce enrols have potentialities that 
lend themselves to be enrolled in a certain way. In terms of the cupboards and 
workbench for example, when it came to thinking about enrolment, I questioned 
whether these objects held any potentialities that might threaten the manner in which 
emotion had co-opted them into a relationship. Thus, a different potentiality that the 
cupboards held was that they served a functional purpose because Bruce stores things 
in them and on them. The question was whether this potentiality threatened what I 
perceived as their association with emotion and whether their presence in the lounge 
was better understood in terms of their functionality. Approaching the cupboards and 
bench from the perspective of enrolment meant I had to further explore and interrogate 
their presence and in this sense enrolment becomes part of the heuristic of noticing and 
substantiating actants and their associations and identities. My conclusion concerning 
the cupboards and bench is that their interessement by emotion had been successful 
because of their metaphoric implication by Bruce in ‘finding parts of himself’. 
Mobilisation 
The final moment of translation, is the point at which actants become spokespersons 
representing the network (Callon, 1991) and that the central actor “accumulate[s] 
enough allies in one place to modify the belief and behaviour of all others” (Latour, 
1990; p.60).   
Each actant in each local network has to be identified in terms of the action it is 
involved with and the identities it has potentiated. One way of managing this is by 
following the actor and checking descriptions with the sufferer. For instance, at the 
start of my second encounter I reflected to Bruce my affective response concerning his 
anxiety around ME and his alienation from others that emerged in the first interview. 
He corroborated my interpretations and affective response to the data as correct. 
Having established a local network around Bruce’s cupboards and bench and emotion, 
successful mobilisation meant advancing the analysis and not finding that the central 
actant of emotion reappeared in another setting with a contradictory identity. If this did 
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occur it meant that the cupboards and bench and other actants that emotion had co-
opted were not exhaustively interrogated for potentialities or alternative associations. 
However, this is not to say that actants cannot act in contradictory ways (Latour, 
2005). But if they do they have to be accounted for. By this stage, it was apparent to 
me that emotion was playing a central role in Bruce’s experience of ME. It had 
displaced itself from his childhood and had reappeared in association with different 
material and non-material actants, such as the cupboards and bench, the space around 
gardening and the emotional disturbance caused by the onset of his ME. 
This section illustrated how I adopted and adapted the ANT premise of translation as a 
frame to approach the data and research process. Translation has occurred in that a 
number of actants came into association and effected each other’s identities in a 
dynamic relationship. The cupboards and bench can be thought of as spokespersons for 
the network in that they are materially stable and have been co-opted by emotion. 
Emotion, both as a presence and an absence and which is associated with Bruce’s Dad, 
appeared as a problematic that required exploring and which has temporally displaced 
itself in different ways to appear in the present. However, networks are precarious and 
there is always the possibility that any of the actants I have described could act in an 
unpredictable manner and hence radically alter the associations that Bruce is part of 
and thus how he experiences himself and ME.  
6.4  The pill dispenser and anxiety 
Anxiety is a common feature of ME
23
. In this section I illustrate how materiality and 
establishing local networks provide a means of exploring the relationship between 
cognition and anxiety. 
During my third visit Bruce showed me a range of dietary supplement pills and a day-
by-day pill dispenser. He explained that the pill dispenser relieved anxiety as it helped 
him organise his supplement regime. It acted as a functional adaptation to ME that 
associated as part of a local network around food and an ideology built around health 
equated with nature. Anxiety was identified from the first visit and reappeared at this 
time as I followed the actor. However, as noted in section 6.2, Bruce is ambiguous as 
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to what anxiety is, to the degree that he wonders whether it ‘equates to emotion’. 
Bruce has explained that symptoms of ME include impaired memory and attention.  
He states with reference to filling up the dispenser with various supplements:  
‘B: Each week I sit and think which ones will I use?’ 
J: Does this sort of thing make your life easier to organise do you think? Or 
can you dispense with it?  
B: Oh God yes otherwise I'd have like a dozen different pots I'd be taking out 
each day. Plus each time I do it even though I do it each week I've got to sit 
and think: which ones will I use? Sometimes I’ll just forget about something 
entirely.’ 
 
The dispenser validates and materially mediates an aspect of Bruce’s ME experience. 
The ritual of filling up the dispenser acts as a sign of ME to himself and others. It 
signifies that because ME has affected his cognitive skills he needs something to 
mitigate such effects. It enables Bruce to control an aspect of his ME in terms of what 
pills go in the dispenser. As such, the dispenser is granting Bruce an agential means to 
address his ME. It also substantiates his cognitive failures such as memory impairment 
and reduced attentional capacity and is therefore a tangible and visible sign of ME. As 
an alternative description, it may also act as a material artefact that helps maintain 
Bruce’s cognitive deficits associated with ME. This notion exemplifies that actants 
may act in different ways and that descriptions are contingent.  
The pill dispenser potentiates an aspect of Bruce’s ME identity and self-understanding 
and ameliorates some of the anxiety associated with it. However, the anxiety 
associated with Bruce’s ME is entangled with pre-existent anxiety that he identifies 
from early in his life and this highlights the manner in which ME symptoms do not 
stand alone but seep into ongoing arrangements. Anxiety can be built into a local 
network around the pill dispenser and cognitive effects of ME, such that anxiety can be 
thought about not as causally preceding ME but instead as co-extensive with it in 
forms which have been temporally and materially displaced. 
The pill dispenser provides a means of establishing how an aspect of anxiety is 
experienced and managed by Bruce but it is not a question of what anxiety is or does. 
Given the network premise of emergent identities and effects, anxiety is an instance 
where inputs and outcomes can be observed but the internal workings are hidden 
(Latour, 1987; Akrich & Latour, 1992). It is not the case that anxiety exists apart from 
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the network of things through which it emerges but instead can be understood as the 
associations between things rather than as a thing in itself; as a contour between 
actants. My ANT approach to anxiety is in terms of its performativity and as a process 
(Hartt, 2013) and a “consequence of the relations within which [it] is located” (Law, 
1997). This provides an alternative to deploying anxiety as a thing in itself that exerts a 
causal effect, as from the biomedical perspective.  
In terms of process, the ANT perspective is compatible with object relations 
conceptualisation of anxiety, where, rather than linked to a specific causation anxiety 
instead exists as a ubiquitous, unavoidable aspect of the human condition, arising 
initially from the infant’s overwhelming experience of helplessness.  
The comparison between psychoanalytic ideas and ANT are such that in both 
instances, anxiety does not exist as separate from the network of objects, sensations 
and experiences through which it is registered. For Bruce, anxiety does not stand 
behind experiences in a causal sense despite him having made sense of his experiences 
of growing up and ME by labelling some of these relations as anxiety. The difficulty is 
that if anxiety is an inherent part of being human and experienced as an interior and 
fundamental aspect of self then its representation will always fall short of how it is 
experienced. Thus, whilst Bruce’s pill-dispenser provides a symbolic means of 
understanding an aspect of his anxiety, there will remain an interiority of experience 
that cannot be symbolised. I have attempted to retain this sense of interiority by not 
attributing a cause to Bruce’s anxiety, by allowing anxiety to describe itself in the 
terms that Bruce uses and providing a picture of how extensive anxiety had been for 
Bruce across time and different experiences. In other words I have attempted to 
provide a sense of anxiety as an ongoing feature that weaves in and out of Bruce’s life.  
6.5  The food blender and juicer 
In my second visit, with a focus on material actants, Bruce talked about and 
demonstrated his food blender and juicer. He explained them as highly significant in 
allowing him to ‘experiment with flavours’ and prepare healthy food. The aim of his 
healthy food regime is to combat the symptoms of ME. As with the pill dispenser, the 
blender and juicer also allow Bruce to carry out a useful function that is visible for 




‘I got the blender because I couldn’t ( ) I'd didn't have the wrist strength to 
make pastry. And um I got that [liquidiser] for smoothy type stuff. And I got 
this one for doing ( ) fruit, vegetables and um ( ) wheatgrass. To try and ah ( ) 
well ( ) nutrition really to give me as much in the way of minerals and 
vitamins and stuff that I could.’  
Besides acting as a displacement of Bruce’s wrist weakness, the blender facilitated a 
discussion about Bruce’s food intolerances and how the content of vitamin pills is 
‘ludicrously low’.  
The potentialities of the blender and juicer became relevant at the moment of 
interessement; at the point where Bruce was suffering ME symptoms. Given his 
knowledge of health, gardening and his nature-orientated ideology, the blender and 
juicer co-opted themselves into a local network and defined their identities as 
indispensible to Bruce’s emerging health regime. What I am emphasising here is that 
the identity of these actants only emerged in light of the way that they associated with 
other actants in an emerging network. Thus, the identity of the blender and juicer is not 
a fixed attribute that pre-exists interessement. With a different individual, a blender 
may not become a sign of the self and of ME in the same manner.  Instead it may 
signify failure or resentment. This goes for any actant. Its identity is an aspect of the 
whole network and established through its associations with other actants. 
Bruce’s understanding of nutrition appears central to his ideology and how to treat 
ME. The value of the blender and juicer is that they offset the anxiety associated with 
an aspect of Bruce’s ME, namely that ME may be related to a nutritional deficit. 
However, there are further associations which are equally salient yet perhaps less 
apparent. There are two central threads of association here. Firstly, Bruce reprises the 
standard discourse that the medical profession do not care or at best are unhelpful. He 
states that: 
‘J: So your improvement ( ) is down to your hand? 
B: I think I've done it in spite of the medical profession. They’ve done 
nothing to help me. And got in the way. Either directly or indirectly. I had to 
send to the States to get ( ) half the supplements I use ha.’ 
This extract illustrates an association with the actant of ‘alienation’. But it points to 
alienation not only from the medical profession in an abstract sense but also in a 
geographical and spatial sense, given that he has looked to the USA for what he needs, 
which brings to mind my discussion of emotion and ‘space’ in section 6.3. This is 
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substantiated elsewhere in Bruce stating that ME sufferers get a ‘better deal’ in the 
USA and that USA online help forums are more useful. Alienation also associates with 
Bruce’s intellect and chemistry background in a way that points to alienation from 
others as well. In the following extract Bruce is explaining that after the onset of ME 
he began to look to his diet as a means of addressing symptoms: 
‘So I started moving more towards meat. But it tended not to be ( ) heavy 
duty meat. It tended not to be ( ) red meat or anything like that. Quite a light 
diet. But um ( ) sooo and then I ( ) ah yes! Salt. I used to use low salt high 
potassium low sodium. Um ( ) but one of my problems seemed to be low 
blood pressure. I got a blood pressure monitor and checked that through the 
day. And when I felt rough I very often had low ( ) blood pressure. So I 
started drinking more liquids and eating more salt. On my food. Umm and 
going back to a straight salt. And that helped. So that was quite good. So then 
I started looking at (1.0) um I think it was DHEA [supplement] and trying 
that. And that was extraordinary. I mean within a week I was feeling the 
difference. So I gradually upped the levels of that. And there's a thing called 
SAMI [supplement]. Which is very good and umm ( ) a supplement of B-12. 
Because quite a lot of doctors particularly in the States give injections of B-
12. But they never would here like they never do anything here! So umm I 
found this sublingual [?] because it doesn't go through the gut very well. It 
would take a lot to try to get it through the gut. Particularly this umm 
methylcobalamine which is umm (1.0) often they give you cyanocobalamine 
which umm and it seems to be the methylation which is really important in 
quite a lot of these issues especially around umm mitochondrial function.’   
Bruce is calling on his technical knowledge and intellect to substantiate the 
supplements he uses and is rationalising his experience of ME into a problem to be 
solved. He approaches symptoms in a quasi-medical manner. Overall, the blender and 
juicer becomes sites where Bruce can approach ME as a ‘scientist’ and this might 
suggest that these actants enable him to objectify, and distance himself from, ME. In 
this manner, the anxiety associated with his symptoms is managed.  
However, the blender and juicer are also a sign of Bruce’s alienation, intellect and 
ideology. They have become indispensible to Bruce. In ANT terms they are an 
obligatory passage point (Callon, 1986) crucial to Bruce’s self-understanding and its 
enactment. The implication is that the aspects of Bruce’s self experience with ME can 
only be resolved by ‘passaging’ through the blender (González, 2013).  The ongoing 
movement between actants in and out of a network encourages thinking about the 
ways in which Bruce’s self experience is fluid and phenomenologically different at 
different times and entangled with material artefacts.  
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6.6  Cooking and a productive self 
In chapter three I discussed qualitative work that has explored trajectories of the self in 
light of ME. In this section I explore a local network that constellated around 
‘cooking’ and how this associated with actants such as Bruce’s Mum and which gives 
light to the manner in which Bruce sought to establish a productive self in light of the 
effects of ME. The term productive self, which did not occur in my literature reviews 
of either ME or self captures Bruce’s attempts at restoring or creating a self-aspect that 
assuages the negative impact of ME in a way that is demonstrable. The term reflects 
the general notion of attempts to recreate or restore a more positive self that ME 
literature does reflect.
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 However, what I seek to emphasise in terms of ANT is that 
Bruce’s productive self arises as an effect from a network of actants that include social 
discourse about ME, doubt, real others, fatigue and specific material actants.  
In our third session, Bruce stated: 
‘Cooking has been the road back from the abyss.’ 
‘Cooking’ appeared to me to be an actant that needed following. In the second visit I 
had asked Bruce about the significance of food. In the past, cognitive impairment has 
been so bad that he: 
‘...could not hold and follow a recipe in his head.’ 
Concerning his partner, Bruce states: 
‘And then of course with ME ( ) I couldn’t even stand up. I couldn’t stand up 
long enough to cook anything. To even walk. Um (1.0) and so Jan (1.0) did 
Jan do the cooking I'm trying to think. Yeh. She’s a teacher so she works 
quite hard and comes back quite late. And um ( ) I think the pressure was on 
me to cook because it seemed like I wasn't doing a lot really apart from lying 
around all the time. So I’d take a chair in the kitchen ( ) and stand up enough 
to sort of get something on then I’d sit on the chair. And just do it like that. 
And quite often I’d come home from work, I'd fall asleep, for two three hours 
( ) I'd wake up come down cook tea ( ) and then go to bed! Because that was 
it. That was my life for ( ) at least 18 months. If I'd been living by myself I 
probably wouldn’t have eaten because I was so tired and I couldn’t be 
bothered. I really ( ) just ( ) I didn't do anything I didn't have to do. Down to 
the most minor thing I wouldn’t get up off the chair I wouldn’t pick up a cup. 
I wouldn’t do anything that I didn't have to do. I was so tired you couldn’t 
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 See Charmaz (1987); Clarke & James, (2003); Whitehead, (2006). 
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believe it. So probably (1.0) um I don't think she really believed me for (1.0) 
at least two years. Umm which is a bit difficult.  I sort of understand it and 
it’s just who she is. Um but ( ) it’s a bit tough. Um so yes I felt a degree of um 
pressure from her to do (1.0) at least the cooking.’ 
Bruce’s partner can be construed as an actant that appears in this network and is 
implicated in his sense of self before and after ‘cooking’. He explains that cooking 
became ‘a life line’ to him; something he could be productive through. The chair is 
significant as an actant because it is also a material instantiation of Bruce’s ME that 
signifies his compromised abilities. It acts as a sign of the self and for his wife. It 
substantiates fatigue because without the chair his fatigue precludes activity.   
Bruce had also explained how his Mum’s cooking was ‘not experimental’ and that she 
was ‘limited’ intellectually and by the ‘spirit of the age’:  
‘Um ( ) so ( ) in some ways it’s like I look back and I think about her cooking 
and how that worked and I think well why did it work? Because ( ) it could 
have been a lot better she wasn't experimental. She did things probably the 
way her mum had taught her to. Umm ( ) and umm (3.0) yehhh. (3.0) So it’s 
about limits. About ( ) how we are all limited. And exploring your limits.’ 
But Bruce had also described his mother in the first visit as: 
‘...naive, emotionally damaged.’ 
 And his emotionally neglected general development was: 
‘...to do with the emotional structure ( ) in the family.’ 
As a child, he: 
‘ ...wasn’t allowed to question or ask...’ 
And: 
‘You become accustomed to accepting one thing, even if your senses tell you 
another.’ 
There thus exists an association between cooking, his Mum and emotion. 
I also asked Bruce if he helped cook as a child: 
‘I wasn't involved in it all. My Mum did the cooking ( ) very traditional. My 
dad went to work. My dad expected his tea on the table um ( ) and my mum ( 
) cooked ( ) very simple food. We were very ( ) you know we were quite poor 
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so it was very simple.  She bottled things that we went out and collected. [...] 
She used a pressure cooker a lot. It meant that ( ) every vegetable pretty much 
tasted like every other vegetable. Um ha ha. Her cooking wasn't exactly 
cordon bleu.’  
And that: 
‘B: [...] My father was very much ah ( ) unadventurous. He wouldn't have any 
spices ( ) pepper, onion. Anything like that in food. In food. So I guess ( ) 
maybe I grew up on very bland food. I never really thought about it. [...] I 
think physiologically I was ok. But thinking about it cos it’s an odd thing ( ) I 
suspect it’s much more to do with childhood structures ( ) in perception. Um ( 
) I suspect ( ) a bit like seeing: you see what you expect to see most of the 
time. And if you're fairly strongly conditioned to seeing a particular thing ( ) 
then that is what you'll see. And I suspect tastes may be the same. 
J: So you're saying you grew up not with an active awareness but with an 
absence of taste? That you never noticed? Perhaps? 
B: Possibly. But I think it must be more than just the physical ( ) um ( ) you 
know ( ) taste of food. I think it’s got to be more of a ( ) probably emotional 
structure. Within the family. That around food there would have been ( ) 
some sort of emotional charge between my mother and ( ) I don't know I 
mean. She had to make do with very little. So ( ) getting the most out of food 
was ( ) I mean their relationship was very restricted and quite ( ) traditional.’ 
Bruce goes on to think about his emotional capacity in terms of ‘conditioning’, 
reprising discussion in the previous session about ‘being conditioned not to ask or see 
and to accept the ‘double-think of feeling one thing and being told another’. The 
‘charge’ around food is twofold: the emotional restriction from his Dad physically 
restricts Bruce’s ability to taste food. In other words Bruce’s emotional capacity is 
metonymically displaced into food as an absence.  
Secondly, the impoverishment of the period may have introduced an emotional 
dynamic between his Mum and Dad that Bruce engaged with unconsciously and 
associates with the alienation that Bruce feels. This and their material surroundings 
began to establish Bruce’s sense of class, which became conflated with burgeoning 
emotional alienation from self and parents. It is not that a working-class origin caused 
Bruce’s alienation from self and other. Instead, Bruce’s alienation, sense of self, 
otherness and class are potentiated in many non-material and material actants and is 
realised as an identity at the network level which can be explored by building a local 
network around cooking and taste.  
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So what is happening around the actant ‘cooking’? Firstly, cooking provides a space 
where Bruce can explore his limits and demonstrate a productive self. Because of his 
wife’s doubt about Bruce’s ME he had to find a way of demonstrating a productive 
self as well as being able to experience a productive self.  
Secondly, the space around cooking connects Bruce to his emotionality and his 
mother. Metaphorically, cooking can be thought of as reflecting a productive self 
infused with his mother, but it also represents a space where he can define himself as 
different from his mother whilst retaining emotional contact with her. Cooking may be 
the road back from the abyss for Bruce but this involves more than demonstrating and 
experiencing the capacity to be productive. From the ANT perspective, it demonstrates 
how this arises as part of a complex process involving different kinds of actant that are 
co-extensive. This is because the conditions of emergence of his cooking-orientated 
productive self antedate the appearance of ME.  
6.7  ME and the return of taste 
A second chain of association is the way in which ‘taste’ is implicated with ME in as 
much that before ME, Bruce ‘could not taste’ but with ME, taste returned in 
‘Technicolor’: 
‘J: Going back to the food thing then. You started to talk about food and that 
your taste (1.0) or your tastes ( ) had changed.  
B: Yeh. I was always used to having homeopathy so I thought: ok I’ll use 
homeopathy because the doctor’s no good. And umm (3.0) phwaaw I tried a 
couple of things. You know. Didn't lead to very much. And um ( ) I tried this 
other one and um (3.0) blow me! I just tasted ( ) like I’d never tasted. It’s like 
a black and white world turned Technicolor. It was unbelievable and I was 
[laughs] sitting there and I don’t know what it was. It was probably a carrot or 
something and it didn’t have to be anything much it could be anything...’ 
Bruce describes the rate of reappearance was ‘over a day’.25 Prior to ME Bruce 
suffered ten years of food sensitivity to many food-stuffs. With the reappearance of 
taste this disappeared and he states: 
‘And with this sense of taste came ( ) I started blending tastes. So I started 
understanding food in a way that I’d never understood it before.’ 
Subsequent to the third visit, Bruce sent me some writing via email:  
                                                 
25
 A positive experience which complements work that suggests ME can effect positive and negative 
changes; see for instance Clarke & James, (2003); Dickson, Knussen and Flowers, (2008).   
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‘I wrote “initiating factors” shortly after your last visit, I guess it stirred 
something up.... [   ]... I would like to focus the last session around ‘Taste’ as 
it has been my route back from the abyss. I’m sure it will be interesting and 
fun....’ 
This writing implies an affective movement in Bruce and that an insight into his ME 
has arisen through the research process. Bruce focused on taste, in conjunction with 
cooking, as his chosen activity for the fourth session. Taste associates with his Mum, 
cooking, his Dad and emotional structures. Bruce’s stilted emotional nature is 
instantiated through the material actants of taste and cooking and runs through Bruce’s 
practices and behaviour today and his experiences as a youngster.  
In the following extract, Bruce has been explaining how he wanted to cook things for 
my last visit but that he wasn’t sure how it was going to turn out: 
‘Cos although I'd thought about the dishes and how I was going to lay them 
out on the table ( ) I couldn’t actually think ( ) how it would work. It was 
almost like setting up a space ( ) and then ( ) whatever happened happened. I 
didn't know what it was going to be.’ 
What is the significance of taste for Bruce and why did he build the last session around 
it? To convey the scene, the following screen capture shows the food Bruce had 




The dining table was arranged with many food stuffs he had prepared for us to eat, 
most of which, and most significantly the bread and butter pudding, were sweet foods 
from his childhood that his Mum used to prepare. He explained that this session was a 
‘learning experience for him’. He had written three pages of notes and spent a week 
planning this activity. The degree of planning was ‘exhausting’ for him, although the 
notes helped him keep track and organise his thoughts and this he connects to the 
detrimental effects of ME on cognition; another material instantiation that was visible 
for Bruce and myself. ME was present in a way that may not immediately be apparent 
but became apparent when the focus was on the material world.   
Bruce started the session by giving me a cup of expensive macha tea. He invited me to 
the table to ‘play with taste!’ I jokingly asked if I had to eat everything: 
‘B: You don't have to eat it all. The idea is it’s tastes. That’s what ( ) and it’s 
a whole variety of tastes. In terms of () well I thought in terms of nurturing 
tastes. So there’s some things which ( ) my mum used to make. So bread and 
butter pudding, and (1.0) rice pudding. This is umm ( ) bananas made with 
mashed with condensed milk. Which was...’ 
Bread and butter pudding is an actant that effects a temporal displacement of emotion 
from Bruce’s childhood. Superficially it equates with his mother and nurturance. 
However, Bruce explained that his mum’s bread and butter pudding ‘was tasteless but 
his won’t be’. Using ANT to trace associations provides a means of thinking about 
how material actants such as the pudding translate directly from the past and into the 
present. More importantly, given Bruce’s comment previously in this paragraph and 
that his Mum’s cooking was ‘tasteless’ and ‘non-experimental’, bread and butter 
pudding became an actant through which Bruce can differentiate himself from his 
Mum in that his pudding was experimental, tastes better and is not impoverished.  
It is therefore useful to think about the pudding from a psychoanalytic perspective. 
Bruce’s suggestion that his pudding will be tastier than his Mum’s suggests that he is 
splitting off that part of his Mum that is bad and has become associated and 
symbolised in her inability to cook, tasteless food, emotional damage and inability to 
nurture Bruce. The latter observation is doubly important in that Bruce was not 
nourished literally or emotionally. In contrast, Bruce also states that his Mum did her 
best with what she had. In this sense, the pudding is a material displacement of Bruce’s 
childhood affective state and its evolution with his Mum and the environment.  
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I also note that in preparing the food table for me, Bruce was carrying out a nurturing 
role. He fed and nourished me. In this sense, the spread of food Bruce prepared felt as 
though he had tried to identify with his Mum by doing what she could not do. The 
pudding then becomes a site with which Bruce maintains contact with the good and 
bad parts of his Mum and through which he can carry out reparative work, in an 
unconscious sense, that mitigates the anxiety associated with feeling that his Mum had 
bad attributes.  
Therefore the significant aspect is the reappearance, if not the ongoing presence, of the 
real external object [BB pudding]. Material objects thus provide a means of bridging 
past states with present ones and hence provide a way of noticing and exploring issues 
of temporality. At the time, my affective notes reflected that the appearance of the 
pudding on that table struck me as overwhelmingly important. Through his Mum’s 
pudding and his Dad’s cupboards, Bruce’s parents and his affective relations with 
them are still present for him in a displaced material sense.  
It appears that taste as an actant can be described in association with cooking, his 
Mum, bread and butter pudding but also with the research process itself, which has 
‘stirred something up’. Given the association between Bruce’s fatigue, cooking and 
taste, ME can be understood as inseparable from Bruce’s emotional history and 
ongoing material environment. Moreover, because of the manner in which actants have 
been temporally displaced for Bruce his productive self reflects a response to ME as 
well as the ongoing arrangement of actants in effect from his early life. In this sense 
ME is entangled with Bruce’s whole life experience.  
Bread and butter pudding anchors what might be called self and implies how self 
experience in the present is comprised of material actants as well as past relationships. 
‘Taste’ and ‘cooking’ are non-material actants that mediate Bruce’s relationship to his 
past and simultaneously his changing experience with ME. However, the relationships 
between all these actants and others that potentially did not become known during my 
research are difficult to reconcile from a causal perspective.  
Considering ‘emotion’ as an actant associated with ‘taste’ provides a way of thinking 
about antecedent factors in relation to ME. From this perspective, ME does not stand 
apart from materially oriented practices nor from self experience. Instead, they are 
entangled in a non-causal manner. Material artefacts can be understood as part of the 
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self, without which self-understanding and experience could only exist in an abstract 
sense.  
Objects signify and objectify the self to our self (Rochberg-Halton, 1984). This notion 
can be used to think about self in different ways as it indicates how objects carry 
potentially opposed values, such as Bruce’s bench or his pudding, or enable the 
construction of dual meaning and acquire a specific history depending on the 
sociocultural relations they become involved in (Epp & Price, 2010). For instance, 
bread and butter pudding has a long history but is usually associated with the need to 
avoid wasting food, particularly stale bread. In this sense, the pudding is associated 
with impoverishment, those who cannot afford waste and hence is classed; especially 
true during the frugality of the post-war era. Thus, bread and butter pudding 
potentiates the negative aspects of Bruce’s early relationship with emotion and his 
perception of working-class and alienation. It also potentiates the positive aspect of 
regained taste and productivity of self via cooking.  
Conradson (2005) views self not as bounded but as emergent and relational within and 
through its encounters with others and events. This view comes to mind in as much 
that Bruce does not talk about ME in isolation but segues into fundamental aspect of 
other self experiences that involve displacement in many directions. In this sense, self 
is distributed across actants and the practises they are involved in. This is somewhat 
different to previous literature that investigates the effect of ME on a ‘self’ which 
appears to be less problematic because of the implication that self is innate, bounded 
and divorced from materiality. If self in ME is understood as relational, antecedent 
factors such as emotion have to be reconsidered in non-causal terms because they do 
not sit behind and cause ME but are instead co-extensive with it. Moreover, Bruce 
depends on the materiality of the blender and pill dispenser to maintain specific 
aspects of his self understanding and experience of ME. From the ANT perspective 
one can hypothesise that if the blender fails or the dispenser is lost, a momentary 
disruption would result and Bruce would experience self in a disequilibrated way until 
the items could be repaired or replaced and the networks built around the blender or 
dispenser re-stabilised. Alternatively, the loss of these actants might result in a new 
aspect of self, new ways of coping or the enrolment of other material actants and hence 




6.8 Chapter summary and conclusion 
The research question addressed by this chapter was how can material actants be used 
to explore the relationship between self and others for people with ME?  The aim was 
to describe the manner in which Bruce and his history associated with material actants 
when talking about post-ME changes to self. The actants allow Bruce to concretise his 
self-understanding and provide an anchor with which to experience and talk about 
changes to self and to maintain contact with and renegotiate aspects of self-
understanding across his lifespan.  
For instance, cooking appears to be important to Bruce post-ME. But when 
considering this productive activity in association with other actants it is clear that 
cooking is as much the end result of a series of long-standing displacements as it is 
new. One explanation for the types of self deployed in ME research is that they reflect 
specific methodologies and epistemologies as much as an actual state of affairs. 
Asking a sufferer to describe how ME has affected their life may result in a restricted 
narrative that focuses on ME symptoms or diagnosis but not what other aspects of 
ongoing experience may associate with these across the lifespan. This limits the ability 
to contextualise the particular experience of ME.  
I have tried to bring to attention a way of thinking about self and ME that challenges 
the notion of the ‘rational and autonomous human’ (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). For 
instance, from a rational perspective, Bruce keeping his Dad’s cupboards and work-
bench makes sense because they act as a reminder of his Dad and they have pragmatic 
value.  However, by exploring these as actants that embody Bruce’s Dad and 
unemotion, they take on a less transparent character. The cupboards and bench are 
saturated with various affects that make sense to Bruce in ways that have no objective 
relationship to the cupboards and bench themselves. My perspective contests rational 
notions of self, given that I described how interactions in the present contain 
symbolised interactions from the past, such that the past has been temporally 
displaced.  
A psychosocial perspective challenges the notion of Bruce as autonomous and in 
charge of a rational self that has engaged with ME as an object wholly in the external 
world. ME has become entangled with long-standing actants in Bruce’s life such as 
anxiety and emotion and has resulted in further anxiety and emotional issues. It is 
difficult to establish the boundaries between Bruce’s history and ME as actants blur 
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into each other. From the relational ontology of the ANT perspective, actants such as 
the cupboards, blender and dispenser have their own material reality and hold various 
potentialities. They have equal standing with Bruce in the networks where they appear. 
Pushing my perspective to the limit, they have imposed themselves on Bruce and 
effected aspects of his self as much as he has imposed himself on them.  
For instance, the cupboards when Bruce was a child acted as a phantasised bridge 
between Bruce and his Dad. Today, they embody the ongoing relationship between 
Bruce, his Dad, his emotional nature and so on in a manner where what affectively 
belongs to Bruce and what has been shaped by the cupboards is unclear. Similarly, the 
bread and butter pudding is part of the ongoing, dynamic relations between Bruce, his 
Mum and social class and in this sense the past really is present for Bruce today. From 
a psychosocial viewpoint, the associations between Bruce, the cupboards, bread and 
butter pudding and emotion transcend a simple inner/outer dichotomy and bring into 
question how past and present relate to each other.  
Illnesses such as ME render one’s body and one’s sense of self as other to the norm of 
the healthy self (Driver, 2005). The way ME transforms identity can be seen as 
positioning the ME self as lying outside and other to the normal pre-ME self (Asbring, 
2001). ME is therefore fundamentally alienating. It is also well documented that ME 
sufferers are socially marginalised by scepticism about the veracity of the condition 
(Charmaz, 1997) and this was particularly pertinent for Bruce. Also, disabling illnesses 
and sick bodies denote for the well and healthy the tenuous nature of human 
physicality. This can result in anxiety which is defended against by consigning it to the 
ill-as-other, resulting in further social alienation (de Wolfe, 2002) and perhaps 
connoting the psychic aspect of the psychosocial. 
Otherness implies power because group relations often involve power differentials, 
with perhaps the more powerful group having greater resources to define the identity 
of the less powerful group and to imply the latter as inferior and as other (Okolie, 
2003). This social aspect of otherness is also relevant to an analysis of Bruce’s 
experience with ME. His conscious awareness of the power differentials that working 
for the landed gentry entail is already infiltrated by the anxiety outlined above. In this 
sense, Bruce’s experience of otherness and its relation to self with regards to his ME 
can be usefully explored under a psychosocial light because it provides a perspective 
on the complex interplay of the psychic and social processes that otherness entails.   
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The type of self that I have alluded to in this chapter is psychosocial because I have not 
reduced it to either an essential, internal quality nor to external social reality. I have 
attempted to maintain a tension between the self and ongoing relations and experiences 
in a material world. In other words, I have approached self as embodied in the world 
and mediated by material and social demands and restrictions (Millward & Kelly, 
2003).  
Focussing on anxiety specifically, I described the ways in which anxiety can be 
thought of as “a consequence of the relations within which [it] is located”. This 
statement is necessarily tautologous because I want to think about anxiety as 
psychically and physiologically experienced but also as materially and socially 
mediated and produced at the same time as being experienced individually, by Bruce, 
in particular ways. Anxiety from this perspective resists objectification and this is 
different from biomedical approaches.  
In conclusion, an ANT oriented approach to ME enables a reconsideration of self in 
terms of its instantiation with materially oriented practices. By thinking about the 
material displacement of abstracted categories, such as emotion, the self and its 
relation to ME becomes less abstract and more particular. There is however not 
necessarily a one to one correlation between an actant and what is displaced with it; 
bread and butter pudding does not immediately lend itself to an understanding of 
Bruce’s emotion, childhood relations with real others or the effects of ME. ME from 
this view is continually constituted and reconstituted in the associations between 










Whimsy: Using metaphor and metonymy to trace 
associations between actants  
 
7.1  Chapter overview 
Chapter 6 described how ANT was used to trace the temporal and physical 
displacements of material actants. The present chapter takes up my adaptation of the 
notion of displacement with the emphasis on how ideas about metaphor and metonymy 
extend the ANT framework. The research question addressed by this chapter is how 
can metaphor and metonymy be used to explore relations between actants? Whimsy 
has been selected because the actants that became known through her data highlight 
how the physical environment, events and specific features of ME become entangled. 
Metaphor and metonymy enables a shift from certainty about causes of action to the 
non-causal uncertainty of describing who and what is acting and how (Latour, 2007). 
Metaphoric and metonymic relations involve describing, explaining or experiencing 
one thing in terms of another. In this sense, a key aspect of the way that metaphor and 
metonymy work is that they unite different actants in a non-causal manner and in 
doing so act as a bridge between past and present states. Using metaphor and 
metonymy to imaginatively explore the associations between actants provides a way of 
retaining the unique and subjective nature of ME as well as the confusing relation 
between body and self and the contradictory aspects of what people say, do and feel.  
I begin the chapter by presenting a pen portrait of Whimsy. I present descriptions of 
how Whimsy experiences ME in terms of her specific beliefs about energy, how she 
understands events that have happened to her in life and how these beliefs and ideas 
can be explored in terms of their metaphoric and metonymic relationships. One of the 
threads running through my analysis is the way in which ‘death’ has become 
associated with Whimsy’s neck via a series of metonymic equivalents. Whimsy’s neck 
is for her the focal point and embodiment of ME. I focus on the identity that Whimsy’s 
neck conveys on her in terms of a site of vulnerability that affects ‘romantic’ relations. 
My discussion of this association highlights the relation between ME and how it is 
associated with real social relationships and the manner in which real others become 
imagined. A further thread, also associated with Whimsy’s neck, concerns how she 
understands energy. Exploring the ways in which ME sufferers experience and 
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understand energy is highly salient, given that low energy is a common feature of 
sufferer’s experiences and psychiatric and biomedical concerns with characterising and 
managing ME (Carruthers et al. 2011; Heins et al. 2013). I describe how Whimsy 
deploys a particular understanding of energy that involves mechanical metaphors of 
the body and bodily processes. For Whimsy, ME equates in part to an energy flow that 
is blocked by her neck.  
Connected to the issue of energy is the the notion of debilitating space. This is a term 
that does not appear in the literature but which I adopted to frame an environment that 
associates with different actants such as emotion, energy, pain and the body and which 
results in a negative outcome for the ME sufferer concerned. Whilst much work has 
been done that explores how spaces and places act in restorative, enhancing ways
26
, 
Whimsy’s data suggested the opposite. For Whimsy her flat as a physical space is 
somewhere where she is trapped, feels isolated and fears dying alone. The notion of a 
debilitating space is a way of framing how metaphoric processes transcend and 
connect what would otherwise be binary understandings such as inner/outer, 
social/individual and material/immaterial. To conclude, I draw together my discussion 
of central actants and their metaphoric and metonymic relations to provide the reader 
with a sense of the assemblage of disparate and seemingly disconnected actants that 
Whimsy’s ME appears to be comprised of.  
7.2  Whimsy’s background and central actants  
Whimsy is 59 years old. She was ‘given away’ as a baby by her mother to, and raised 
by, her Grandmother. Whimsy experienced ‘difficulties’ as a school-child. She moved 
several times, attending various schools, and experiencing distress because she had no 
parents to ‘turn to for guidance’. Whimsy intimates that her education was lacking but 
resolved to make up for this by educating herself through art school because ‘that is 
what [she] could do’. She now has two degrees and ‘other qualifications’ and has 
worked as a lecturer in art and design at an ‘FE college teaching HE courses’. ME 
obliged Whimsy to give up work in 2002. She has been unemployed ever since and in 
receipt of benefits. Whimsy is vague on detail but claims to have been a dancer and 
singer, appearing on Top of the Pops and to have taught yoga and meditation. 
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Whimsy is divorced and has lived alone in a small, top-floor Georgian flat for around 
nine years. Whimsy feels ‘isolated and trapped’ in her flat and has worried about dying 
from an unspecified lung condition and ‘not being found’. Of significance is a fear of 
city pollution that has grown on her recently. However, she states that her isolation 
may be partly due to her own actions. Her flat is tidy and modern with artistic artefacts 
and pictures. Whimsy’s ex-husband was an ‘internationally renowned’ musician and 
recording artist but she left him to pursue a career in writing and stated that she was 
the one who provided the financial support for the early part of their relationship. She 
is convinced her husband had been ‘siphoning’ money into a secret account for many 
years. 
Whimsy describes being prone to illnesses and infections through and beyond early 
childhood. This is conflated with a generally ‘weak’ constitution, which she has 
‘fought’ to overcome. 
Having provided a pen-portrait of Whimsy, I now describe the central actants in her 
ongoing experience of ME. Although there are many other actants, the ones I have 
selected convey the disparate nature of what can be described as an actant, such as 
material objects, people, places and emotions.  
The first actant is Whimsy’s’ unreliable mother, who ‘tried to abort’ whimsy before 
she was born and gave her away at birth, perhaps because Whimsy was ‘ill’, her 
mother ‘couldn't cope’ or ‘was post-natally depressed’. Whimsy’s Mum subsequently 
had five other children who she kept but Whimsy was told they were ‘cousins’. By age 
11 she suspected the truth and felt alienated and an ‘outsider’. Whimsy states she can 
never be confident of the veracity of what her mother tells her, even of the illnesses 
that Whimsy suffered as a child. Yet she builds on these illnesses the notion of an 
inherent weakness that she has always strived to overcome and to ‘achieve things’. 
This is partly responsible for her ‘overly energetic’ approach to life which ultimately 
contributes to ME. Indeed, Whimsy explicitly identifies herself as having been a 
perfectionist but that she ‘wouldn’t have known [she] was a so called perfectionist. It 
was just the way I did things.’  It was other people that brought this to her attention.  
Whimsy’s perfectionist nature reflects research that suggests ME sufferers exhibit a 
disposition towards over-expenditure of energy related to achieving perfectionism.
27
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 See for example Courjaret et al. (2009): Deary & Chalder, (2010); Fukuda et al. (2010). 
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The second actant is Whimsy’s grandmother, who raised ten children of her own and 
had lost her eldest child, her husband and given birth to Whimsy’s mother in the space 
of three months, resulting in a ‘nervous breakdown’ and being ‘hospitalised for over a 
decade as a result’. Her grandmother was delusional and lead Whimsy to believe that 
Whimsy was the ‘rightful Queen of England’ and ‘would ascend to the throne’. 
Whimsy did not fully dismiss this notion until she was a teenager. 
The next two actants appear as absences. The first is Whimsy’s father. Whimsy did 
not mention her father at all in our first meeting. In the ANT spirit of ‘following the 
actor’, I fed this back to her in our second meeting, whereupon she was silent for ten 
seconds and then, in a choked voice, said ‘we will have to move away from that’. He is 
not mentioned at any other point throughout the data set but clearly has had, and 
continues to have, an effect on Whimsy. 
The second absence is explicitly a traumatic event that Whimsy suffered at an 
unspecified age as a child. Whimsy associates the traumatic event with her ‘first out of 
body experience’. She has ongoing out of body experiences, suggesting the childhood 
event is still present for Whimsy in a displaced form. She states that she cannot talk 
about it in her own home. Talking about it reactivates it and her practices of 
Buddhism, meditation and breathing are designed to help keep the traumatic event in 
the past. Whimsy states that ‘intellectually’ she knows the event is in the past but the 
negation of this is that affectively the event exists in the present.  
The collapse is an actant which Whimsy deems a ‘triggering event’ to ME. She 
describes the ‘collapse’ as an event which involved witnessing one of her students 
screaming and banging her head on a desk in a crowded class at the FE college where 
Whimsy taught art and design, causing Whimsy to ‘freeze’. This reactivated the 
experience of a neck injury she had sustained nine years previously as a result of a car 
crash. The triggering event is described in conjunction with Whimsy already suffering 
a viral infection and being in an overworked, stressful environment with unreasonable 
demands made of her. 
Whimsy’s neck is an actant. One night, 9 – 11 years before the ‘collapse’, Whimsy 
was taking out a 19 year old girl for the evening. This girl is described as ‘like a 
surrogate daughter’. Whilst Whimsy was barely moving, her vehicle was hit by 
another car, driven at around 75 mph by a ‘boy’. No one was killed but Whimsy 
injured her neck. She contextualises this crash by explaining how, six months before, 
166 
 
she suffered an ectopic pregnancy. At that time her doctor had told her not to drive. 
The significance that Whimsy points out is that when the crash occurred she had made 
a decision to drive when she should not have.   
Michel; Whimsy’s mentor on her Master’s writing programme. Whimsy embarked on 
a writing career in 2000/01. At this time she divorced her husband and took a 
sabbatical to attend a Masters programme in writing. According to Whimsy it was 
designed for Oxbridge graduates with ‘starred firsts’. Whimsy states that this was a 
‘fantastic achievement’ for someone with her ‘background’. On this programme, 
Whimsy had the ‘Poet Laureate’ as mentor. She establishes the credentials of Michel 
by stating that in France he was awarded the ‘equivalent of the Nobel Prize’ for 
literature and that he was a ‘great humanitarian’. People told Whimsy she ‘was trying 
to do the impossible’ but only Michel encouraged her to achieve what she had set out 
to do. Whimsy carried on corresponding with Michel for a year after the programme 
finished. He attended her birthday party in 2001. Of this she states that he was a 
‘virtual recluse’ but that they ‘managed to get him out of his shoe box’. In 2002, again 
on her birthday, he died in a car crash. Whimsy states: 
‘Sommmeeething (sic) was triggered. That coincidence the shock of that, the 
ending of something. The double death in a way.’ 
The implication of a second loss coincides with the onset of her ME and in the same 
year as her ‘collapse’. However, Whimsy does not expand on what the first death of 
the ‘double death’ applies to.  




On her writing course Whimsy submitted a story about a grandfather who used to 
whittle pegs in the autumn. The reference was to a Grimm’s fairy tale. Michel noticed 
this because ‘it resonated with him’ and that they ‘had imagined something similar’. 
He was an Austrian raised in Switzerland with a German father who would not talk to 
him about wartime persecution of Jews. As he grew older Michel realised that he ‘had 
to look into the story or reality of that’ to find out what his ‘heritage had left him’. As 
Whimsy puts it: 
‘Some kind of scar on his character because his forefathers had been involved 
in this and they're trying to cover it up.’ 
The implication is that Michel was also haunted by a past he was not in control of. In 
her story there was a row of wooden clothes pegs on a washing line. A child was 
noticing these hand-carved pegs and, as such, each one looked identical but they were 
in fact all different. Whimsy explains that their ‘conditionality’ is different. The pegs 
represent ‘the act of closure’ and ‘as a metaphor of something that connects, holds and 
separates’.  Michel noticed this. Thus, the real object that Whimsy showed me was a 
hand-carved wooden peg in a glass display case, with a handwritten inscription that 
reads:  
“Here’s a solitary peg. A batch more is being dispatched from Switzerland.” 
A further actant is the writing front cover. 
 
This is a piece of white A4 paper with a handwritten comment about Whimsy’s written 
work from Michel and a stuck on leaf. It is involved in the same work as the peg. The 
comment is encouragement from Michel and the paper itself is important because 
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‘[Michel’s] hand is there’. She states that if there was a fire, the peg and the paper are 
the only two things she would attempt to save.  
Prior to my visit Whimsy had put this case and the writing cover-sheet on a chair under 
her table and out of my view. She produced it when I enquired about objects and as she 
hands them to me she is laughing and giggling. But as soon as she handed them to me 
she covered her face with her hands and when she eventually removed them she had 
tears in her eyes.  
Breathing is an actant appearing explicitly throughout the data. Over the last few 
years Whimsy began to experience breathing difficulties. She had several 
investigations but is ambiguous as to what is wrong; an x-ray revealed ‘something 
tangible’ but that something is ‘not quite asthma and not quite bronchitis’. Whimsy 
uses meditation and yoga to help regulate her breathing. She connects the issue of 
breathing to city pollution and being in her flat.  
Whimsy’s flat is an actant. Whimsy purchased a top-floor Georgian flat after her 
writing course to ‘shut herself off and write’. However, she has increasingly felt 
trapped in this flat and unable to move, especially post-ME. The entry buzzer does not 
work and she feels isolated. The air in the city is polluted and she cannot get outside. 
She fears ‘dying alone in the flat and not being found’. Whimsy explains that many 
fellow residents complain about ‘pollution’ in the air. 
7.3  Using metaphor and metonymy to explore the associations between    
                     actants in triggering events  
In this section I explore Whimsy’s narration of triggering events by adopting the 
underlying premise that actants exist in association with each other and become 
displaced across time and place. Noticing and conceptualising these displacements was 
achieved by using the metaphoric and metonymic framework I described in chapter 
five. The key feature of metaphor and metonymy to bear in mind is that it cannot be 
presumed that a metaphor or metonym represents a simple one-to-one mapping of an 
idea in one domain to that in another (Kimmel, 2010).  
Thus, scrutinising the data for causal metaphorical and metonymical relations is 
inadequate. Instead, the task is the imaginative linking of concepts that might be 
metaphorical or metonymical and then searching the rest of the data for similar 
instances of the same metaphor/metonym, related conventional or novel metaphors or 
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figurative comparisons and determining whether the emerging associations are 
commensurate with the connections between actants in an ANT sense. The aim in a 
simplified sense is to be able to arrive at the notion of an assemblage where the actants 
involved can be observed in association directly in the data and also in terms of 
metaphorical or metonymical relations.  
In the following extract from Whimsy’s data she is describing what she considers to be 
the event which preceded her ME. I approach this event as an actant and refer to it as 
the ‘collapse’. Whimsy describes the event accordingly: 
‘And I couldn’t actually make any contact (0.25) with this girl who was 
screaming. I knew who it was and I was full of concern. But (0.75) um (1.0) 
the whole situation just got out of control. And I () apparently what happened 
was I ( ) what seems to have happened was I ( ) froze () in ( ) a state of trauma 
( ) and I triggered off a neck injury that I ( ) had from a car crash I had a near 
fatal car crash.’ 
She goes on to state: 
‘And then ( ) there I was driving a car with two young people. You know ( ) 
other people’s children and I nearly killed them.  Umm ( ) so () may I ( ) kind 
of think that there was um () a link between the girl in the studio who was 
also about that age and my ( ) concern for her.  Not being able to do anything 
about it. On top of my ha ha exhaustion and umm ( ) mostly ( ) pressure from 
umm ( ) management. To you know kind of ( ) perform miracles. You know ( 
) with no ( ) funding.’ 
In the account of the ‘collapse’, above, there is a literal and metaphorical inability to 
make contact with the girl. Beyond the affective content and intensity of these 
recollections for Whimsy, I noted a compounding of events. Whimsy has a tendency to 
amalgamate events in her narratives that do not immediately seem connected. There 
are several instances where this process is signified by her use of the term ‘on top of’, 
as in the extract above. I interpret the way that Whimsy compounds events as more 
than one metaphoric or metonymic relation becoming activated. This brings to mind 
Montana Katz’s (2011) assertion that several metaphoric processes can become 
complexed into one object or process. The manner in which metaphors complex with 
each other can be conflicted and contradictory and this might be reflected in the way 
that Whimsy’s narrative or experiences can often feel compounded and confused. It is 
for this reason that analysis cannot proceed with the notion that metaphorisation is a 
rational, discrete, causal and easily identified process.  
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 In the following extract, Whimsy has told me she was suffering a virus around the 
time of the ‘collapse’ and has had susceptibility since childhood: 
J: So you you've () been catching viruses since childhood? 
W: Not viruses. But things like umm () what am I saying? Scarlett fever on 
top of chicken pox on top of someth- I don't actually remember this but that’s 
what I'm told. That I was () kind of sickly. Umm (3.0) or rather weak. I was () 
weak. Ha ha. 
J: Yeh. 
W: A bit bit of a wimp ha ha. 
Beyond compounding illnesses, this extract is interesting because of the way that 
Whimsy uses the term ‘wimp’, which implies a character flaw on her part. There is an 
affective movement in the penultimate line where she shifts from being told she was 
weak to self-identification as weak.   
In this extract, Whimsy is explaining that she fears being found dead in her flat, 
apparently from breathing difficulties: 
‘And last winter when there was lots of viruses and things around I felt for the 
first and only time that I would die. In this flat umm. And for various reasons 
one of which was the entry phone () wasn’t working. I don’t know if it was 
when you came last. Which (1.0) if you live on the top floor can be sort of 
slightly concerning. And so that seems kind of a normal response to me. And 
part of me also wonders how much of it is in my mind and () you know 
whether it’s my mind () not sending the signals to my body to move and if it’s 
not, why is it not.  So it’s a kind of (2.0) it’s almost like a syndrome on 
(laughing) top of a syndrome.’ 
In this extract, Whimsy compounds viruses, with a broken answer phone, fearing 
dying [as a normalised response] and worrying whether her mind is implicated. I 
connect this fear that her mind is in question to my observation that Whimsy often 
requires others to validate her experiences.  
Events in the external world for Whimsy are often conflated with the implication of 
personal responsibility and, most importantly, an inability to remember with clarity 
what has happened or the reason it happened.  In this vein Whimsy’s data reveals 
many instances of a need to be validated by others. For instance, she describes 
validation of her ‘personality’ by an occupational therapist who establishes her 
collapse as PTSD. Friends and ‘other people’ tell her she is a perfectionist and her 
mentor, Michel, establishes her in terms of ability but also as a worthy person. It is 
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significant that the peg and cover page were shown to me because these embody 
Michel’s validation of Whimsy’s potential. My affective notes state that I felt Michel 
was a surrogate father-figure for Whimsy but also that that there was an ‘attraction’ to 
him from a romantic perspective. In contrast to those that validate her, Whimsy 
constructs a GP as ‘not knowing’ what is wrong with her and this mirrors and validates 
Whimsy’s own confusion about ME. My affective notes reveal that as the research 
progressed, I developed a feeling that Whimsy did not know who she was, reflected in 
a struggle to establish a coherent sense of self.  
In this final example, Whimsy has been explaining her perfectionist, ‘buzzy’, ‘speedy’ 
character to me: 
‘I was I was I hadn’t realised it myself but () from time to time people would 
say: and of course you're a perfectionist. Umm (1.0) and I have I think it’s 
probably relevant to say I didn't go to school very much. I was in distress an 
umm () didn't have my parents I would be sent to another school and another 
school so I went to veeery very many () different schools. And have got 
hardly any memory at all of being at school. But when I was old enough to () 
I decided that what I had to do was educate myself. So when I got into art 
school, which seemed to be not so difficult, it was kind of what I could do. 
Because I was curious about everything. Then I on top of that () started taking 
courses in sort of literature. And then went on as a mature student to do my () 
degrees () and I got starred firsts and then I went to do umm another degree 
and worked with the poet laureate so in some ways I achieved what I set out 
to do.’ 
The first line shifts narrative from perfectionism to not being at school and distress. 
This implies an affective movement has occurred for Whimsy. Whimsy then narrates 
how she took courses on top of other courses. Taking these courses appears to offset 
her experiences at school but the central feature is her lack of parental support. The 
implication is a metaphorical relationship between what she describes as perfectionism 
and lack of parental input which becomes displaced into a later desire to succeed 
academically.    
Overall, the manner in which Whimsy compounds events brings to mind Freud’s 
notion of condensation. This is a metaphoric process where the properties of objects or 
persons in one domain are conveyed as a single subject in a different domain that is not 
literally equivalent. Interestingly, condensation represents repressed, traumatic 
material; repression is a defence mechanism whereby traumatic events are 
unconsciously forgotten, so as to defend the ego from anxiety (Freud, 1900).  
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What I take from this is that analysing data such as Whimsy’s requires techniques that 
go beyond a rational interpretation because it is difficult to account for the shifts in 
narrative, especially as there exists a complex conflation of past and present. Using the 
notion of metaphor to scrutinise data provides a means of connecting the moves that 
Whimsy makes from disturbing events through her narrative to pressure at work and 
intimates the metaphoric equivalence between events that may frame understanding 
(Schmitt, 2005). What this means is that for Whimsy, events from her past which are 
clearly distressing have been transformed into events that are consciously more 
manageable. For instance, data not presented here suggests Whimsy identifies with the 
girl in the studio and represents a metonymic equivalence between their helpless 
situations. When the girl started screaming, an affective movement occurred in 
Whimsy which manifested metonymically as a neck injury and freezing. However, it 
appears that her neck injury is already a metaphorical translation of other actants. 
Thus, Whimsy has rationalised conflated events through the metaphor of her neck.  
Metaphor enables a way of understanding the relations between elements in a narrative 
that are difficult to reconcile or do not make obvious sense. In the case described there 
is no clear link between for instance freezing and the girl screaming. Neither is there a 
discernible link between Whimsy stating that she was a perfectionist and then shifting 
her narrative to describe how she did not go to school much.  
Focussing on further metaphoric and metonymic aspects of her collapse, the car crash 
described by Whimsy involved the potential for death. Death appears explicitly in 
Whimsy fearing dying in her flat and implicitly in fearing her neck will break. The 
crash also involved Whimsy feeling guilty of causing it and her inability to do 
anything about avoiding the crash. Her neck is implicated directly in the crash and 
indirectly in her ‘collapse’. 
Regarding her car crash, Whimsy states: 
‘And I was driving at around three miles an hour when the car was hit but it 
was (0.25) a near fatal crash.  
J:  So somebody else hit you but going… 
W: At seventy five miles an hour. Yeh. But they the two passengers my 
passenger and the umm (4.0) the driver (0.5) were both about nineteen years 
old. And what I know () I didn’t () quite know it then I intuited it but I know 
that um (0.75) it was something that (0.75) I couldn’t (0.5) I couldn’t come to 
terms with the fact that I’d lost a baby.’ 
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There is a conflict between feeling that she had nearly killed the youngsters in the car 
and the way she has already established herself as innocent because she was barely 
moving when ‘hit’, implying her passive role in the event and this brings to mind 
questions about her agency. Whimsy has made a conscious association between these 
events but via a series of metonymic equivalents, death has become associated with her 
neck. I note a further compounding of events, given the narrative disjuncture between 
the crash and her loss of a baby [ectopic pregnancy], which again she could not be 
consciously responsible for and which may suggest a metonymic translation is 
activated. An important illustration can be drawn from this.  An aim of ANT is to 
rethink the dichotomy of agency and structure. In chapter four I described agency in 
terms of: 
“...the collective capacity of heterogeneous networks, in which the activities 
of the non-human may count for as much, or more, as the activities of 
humans” (Ruming, 2009; p.456). 
Through the ANT lens, Whimsy’s self-conscious sense of agency that she ‘nearly 
killed them’ is not fully explained by the arrangement of actants that came together 
and which resulted in the crash and in her sense of agential responsibility. There 
remains something interior about that sense of agency that the ANT approach does not 
quite capture and yet which the psychoanalytic influence might help to retain. That is 
the manner in which sense has been made by Whimsy of the events and in how they 
appear to be metonymically related but in ways that are not immediately clear.  
For example, my interpretation of a metonymic displacement between feeling 
responsible for the crash and the loss of a baby appears to follow a logic that makes 
sense in terms of an unconscious process that is simultaneously internal and external. 
Whilst the externalised effects of this process are visible in the data, the associations 
between actants remain non-representable in a way that neither a rational framework 
nor recourse to ANT critique of social explanations, such as the notion of ‘black 
boxes’28, can easily account for.  
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Overall, there may be metonymic equivalence of ‘failure’ between these events and the 
inability to ‘perform miracles at work’. I envisage a network of metaphoric and 
metonymic displacements associating the ectopic pregnancy, car crash, her neck, 
freezing in the studio and hence her collapse. Associated with this is the post-viral 
fatigue that had been diagnosed before ME and factors such as overwork. Several 
situations where Whimsy is in a position of helplessness can be identified which 
represents a metonymic translation reprising her abandonment at birth and lack of 
[parental] support through school. When it comes to her ‘collapse’, Whimsy is unable 
to intervene and help the girl who is screaming. Neither could she intervene and help 
her baby nor the girl in her care in the car crash. Thus, even though Whimsy has no 
agency in these situations, she feels as if she does because they represent metonymic 
displacements of her own helplessness. 
Having said this, there remains a danger of reading Whimsy’s data from the 
perspective of existing discourses that might attribute her ME to an ostensibly interior 
cause, such as her ‘perfectionist’ personality; which has become a “persistent 
behavioural problem regardless of [Whimsy’s changeable] social environment” (Gadd 
& Jefferson, 2007). This is to imply that perfectionism is indeed a quality of the person 
that is independent of context. Alternatively, a social cause might be posited which 
represents the misattunement of her early maternal environment and subsequent 
difficulty at school. However, there is an issue about how to characterise what a 
perfectionist personality is without categorising it in terms of social norms in the first 
place. Metaphorically re-establishing the relationship between what are otherwise 
taken as psychological and social explanations is a way of exploring how the social 
and the psychological are mutually infused in the first place. 
Despite Whimsy establishing herself as striving to overcome her origins in an overly 
energetic and perfectionist manner
29
, the subjective experience of being perfectionist 
may differ from clinical measures of perfectionism and approaching perfectionism as 
an abstract category belies a complex arrangement of many subjective factors. 
Objectifying perfectionism implies a causal relationship with the individual concerned, 
which can be measured as an ongoing, stable effect. This decontextualises 
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perfectionism and overlooks its particular manifestation and results in the focus 
shifting away from the processual and dynamic associations between things. This 
results in an illusion of deterministic relations.  
In Whimsy’s case, there appears to be a strong association between her infant 
environments, lack of care as she understands it and failure at school. Her perfectionist 
personality is situated in a particular way which may differ from another sufferer’s 
perfectionism. For Whimsy, perfectionism is about ‘not having had guidance on how 
to act’, which resulted in her ‘not knowing where to draw the line’ or ‘where the 
boundaries were’ and that she felt she needed ‘stabilisers’ both physically and 
affectively. She describes this in a range of contexts, for instance: 
‘How do you know how to do anything at all? How do you know (0.25) um 
table manners? The things I kind of exhausted myself with learning. Ok. So I 
would like to have perfect table manners. So I now have perfect table 
manners. Anyone else eats their grub and they don't think about it.’  
The significance is that Whimsy understands her perfectionist personality through a set 
of specific experiences that were exhausting because she did not know when to stop. 
Rather than objectifying perfectionist personalities, using metaphor and metonymy as 
the basic currency of translation between various domains is what allows associations 
to be traced as a subjective process that involves disparate types of actants and 
resultant actions and identities.  
Concerning ME, establishing actants in terms of metaphoric and metonymic relations 
is vital. I moved away from understanding ME in terms of an inherently causal model 
where Whimsy was overworked, stressed and post-viral. Instead, I envisage Whimsy’s 
ME as an assemblage of disparate actants, including her early childhood experience. 
However, one problem is how to account for specific metaphoric and metonymic 
processes and why one metaphor becomes salient over another, given that metaphors 
often overlap and co-occur (Benczes, 2011). In Whimsy’s case why was the neck 
injury triggered in the studio and why did it invoke a translation for me that involved 
death? There are two issues here.  
One is how the researcher arrives at a particular metaphoric understanding and the 
other is how the ME sufferer arrives at an understanding. With this in mind Stern 
(2001) notes that metaphor is sensitive to context in a linguistic sense. Salient features 
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of the immediate linguistic environment influence metaphor choice and use and this 
will reflect in the way that metaphors and association became activated between 
Whimsy and myself during our discussion. Before I could arrive at ‘death’ being 
metaphorically present and using that to think about how actants were associating, I 
had to check that it could be substantiated in the data and that it fitted the context at the 
moment of translation around Whimsy freezing in the work studio. Secondly, my 
understanding needed to fit with Whimsy’s descriptions of her experiences, which it 
did. This is reinforced by her explicit references to death at various times.  
This section has outlined how I used metaphor and metonymy to explore the 
associations between actants that comprised an ME triggering event for Whimsy. In 
the subsequent section I use the notion of metaphor and metonymy to describe how 
‘energy’, a cardinal feature of ME, can be understood in terms of metaphorical 
translation of the way that actants associate. I describe the moves between energy, an 
already abstract construct, as a conflation of physiological, psychological and material 
actants such as Whimsy’s neck and real and imagined others.  
7.4  Energy in metaphorical terms and the problem of conflation 
The issue of energy and fatigue is important both in terms of sufferers’ experiences of 
ME and psychiatric and biomedical concerns with characterising and managing ME.
30
 
Biomedical research does not address the subjective use of the term ‘energy’ and the 
conflation of neither psychological and physiological aspects, nor what it’s 
idiosyncratic deployment as a term means. However, a subjective and conflated use of 
energy can be rethought in terms of metaphorical and metonymical equivalence. This 
enables the tracing of connections between apparently disparate actants to arrive at a 
psychosocial understanding of what energy is doing in Whimsy’s account. 
In these extracts Whimsy understands energy as: 
‘It’s about being able to wake up in the morning and not have a resistance in 
my neck to movement. So if you like it’s the freedom to wake up and get up 
and go. That seems to me. And then to have a consistent flow. That I get sort 
of blocks ( ) as though the energy must be there somewhere. Trapped.’ 
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This is a quantified, materially-orientated conceptualisation of energy. Whimsy goes 
on to state: 
‘Do you remember when you left last time ( ) sorry not when you left. The 
last question you asked me last time was about energy. You asked me what I 
meant by energy. And I didn't know how to answer that question. And partly 
it’s about I've tried to think about it in so many different ways and kind of 
wracked my brain until I ( ) was not kind of coming up with anything 
anymore. But the thing I remembered or the thing I could point at ( ) that 
there was evidence for ( ) is the ( ) um ( ) neck condition that I wake up with 
ha ha every morning. I then have to work my way around before anything 
starts happening in my lower body. Cos the problem’s there and all my kind 
of circuitry it feels like it’s not working until I start ( ) manually ( ) moving 
my head. [...] some days I would have to stay in bed. But that was a physical 
reason for not being able to get up. But if you like the x-rays are there to 
show if you like it’s a mechanical problem. That’s causing that. [...] But I was 
trying to answer your question ( ) struggling with how I could explain this 
thing about energy ( ) um ( ) when actually I could have said something like: 
okay ( ) I wake up in the morning and I feel like a dead weight. I feel like 
there's no energy flowing through me. And for energy to start flowing I 
somehow ( ) have to manoeuvre myself around ( ) and start.’ 
In reference to the first extract, the negation of ‘freedom’ is being ‘trapped’. Because 
the energy is trapped, Whimsy is trapped. ME equates with blocked energy flow and 
whilst she implicates both mental and physiological effort, Whimsy associates these 
with the issue of her neck. My affective notes with regard to this moment read:   
Perhaps the subsequent laughter after this statement again represents that she 
is unable to see the neck in metaphorical terms and instead it is identified 
metonymically.  
The second extract suggests that Whimsy is objectifying her body, in that she refers to 
‘circuitry’ that will not work, implying that a mechanical metaphor involving flows of 
energy is being called upon.  
Whimsy also states: 
‘W: Yeh. Well according to the um first consultant I saw ( ) that was then 
called post viral fatigue syndrome ( ) everything could be accounted for by 
the fact of this ( ) neck injury. Um ( ) that would deplete me of energy so 
much so that some days I would have to stay in bed. [...] But I had an 
experience of waking up and feeling that I literally couldn't lift my head from 
the bed. [...] but all I could think of was this must be some kind of mental 
178 
 
thing that was pulling me down. But if you like the x-rays are there to show if 
you like it’s a mechanical problem. That’s causing that.’ 
In this extract, Whimsy appears to mobilise her neck in two ways. Firstly, the manner 
in which it becomes the the thing that accounts for PVFS and secondly as evidence 
that she does not have a ‘mental’ issue which underlies ME. The X-rays validate for 
Whimsy that it is an objective, mechanical problem. In other words, the neck really is 
the problem. She consciously equates ME in terms of a block of something called 
energy by her debilitated neck. 
There is a relationship here to psychoanalytic ideas where unconscious anxiety that 
cannot be verbalised or expressed symbolically manifests as an apparently [to the 
sufferer] disconnected somatic symptom (Elisha, 2011). For instance in the 
contradiction between Whimsy’s fears that her neck will break and that she has been 
told by physicians it will not break. According to Montana Katz (2010) what is 
experienced as real reflects the metaphoric processes that give rise to experience. It is 
interesting to reconcile this with standard ME discourse because it is not easily 
accommodated, given that biomedical approaches adopt a rational framework and 
reduce psychological symptoms to biological causes and because ME is described as 
an heterogenous and contested condition (Karfakis, 2013).  
Because Whimsy spent periods of time in bed, due to her neck, her friends began to 
suspect depression as the cause. Whimsy also began to wonder whether this was the 
case but concluded it was not because she is ‘the opposite of depressed’. She also 
explains that once her neck started to move there was an ‘unblocking of energy’ and 
she was then able to function. She states that even her post-viral fatigue can be 
‘accounted for by her neck’. The translation of various actants including the collapse, 
the car accident and post-viral fatigue are mobilised metaphorically by Whimsy and 
translated as her neck. The neck is a visible and tangible sign of the conscious and 
unconscious anxiety that is associated with the other actants and enables Whimsy to 
make sense of her situation and experiences. The conflict inherent in this arrangement 
is that Whimsy cannot fully dismiss that her neck might actually break.  
In the previous section I noted the saliency of ‘death’ either implicitly or explicitly in 
Whimsy’s narrative. Metonymically, with phrases such as ‘I feel like a dead weight’ 
and ‘I feel like there’s no energy flowing through me’, Whimsy is establishing the 
relationship of ‘energy’ with herself as ‘dead’. The implication is that until she can 
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physically move her body, primarily her neck, there is no energy. For Whimsy to be 
alive she has to move and this failure to move, to live, is now embodied by her frozen 
neck.  
Rather than assuming energy is a mind or body phenomenon, Whimsy appears to 
relate to energy as a metaphor that enables her to articulate and experience the 
relationship between her neck, ME and actants such as the collapse.  Thinking about 
energy as a metaphor that enables the sufferer to understand their ME is a different 
perspective from one that establishes energy as something objective and which the 
sufferer can have a deficit of. Energy is therefore in itself metaphorical and this goes 
beyond the simple conflation of psychological and physiological aspects. It can also be 
seen as a flexible discursive resource which means different sufferers can deploy the 
concept in different ways; a notion in keeping with previous research. 
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Issues around energy were a feature of ME for all the sufferers I worked with. For 
instance, John made explicit the conflation between physical and psychological aspects 
of energy and yet for him energy was metaphorically translated into paper items such 
as letters, flyers, clippings and pamphlets which he collects. John’s rational reason for 
hoarding such items was so that he could have sufficient information to make 
decisions about things like internet providers. However, he was distressed by the build 
up of paper and not making decisions and he woke up in the mornings feeling 
overwhelmed and ‘depleted of energy’. His flat was beginning to overflow with paper 
and his recourse was to escape into town every day. Whimsy and John both suffer ME 
that implicate both energy and their flats albeit in different ways. 
In the next extract, Whimsy is talking about how yoga ‘heals’ and this represents 
another actantial association to energy and also to breathing, which she has identified 
in terms of her asthma-like symptoms and fear of pollution: 
‘If you're in pain ( ) and you feel like you haven't got much energy ( ) and you 
feel ( ) you identify with illness ( ) then what's going on is kind of in your 
head (1.0) and this ( ) this kind of syndrome it’s either coming or it’s there or 
it’s leaving. You know that's why it’s a syndrome isn’t? So ( ) a lot of your 
time ( ) because you don't feel very strong and you don't feel you can go out 
and do things and lead a normal life a lot of the time you’re kind of trapped in 
your head. You know I said I sometimes feel trapped in this flat? Well part of 
that is sometimes I feel if I go out I haven't got the energy to get back again. 
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180 
 
So all that is part of the syndrome. But when you do physical exercise you're 
focussing on the external aren't you? And of course it’s your body. But you're 
able to almost come out the back of your head into the front of your head to 
see what’s ( ) to focus on ( ) um ( ) one of the things is breathing. And that 
helps.’ 
Whimsy metaphorically locates depleted energy in her head. A metonymic translation 
becomes activated between being trapped in her head and being trapped in her flat and 
hence the relation to ‘energy’ and ME. Towards the end of the extract Whimsy appears 
to differentiate between her self and her body because the ‘external’ is ‘your body’ and 
she is almost able to ‘come out the back’ of her head. Elsewhere, Whimsy describes 
how meditation grounds her and ‘literally’ connects her to the earth. It appears that the 
equivalence between flat and body and being trapped is metonymical so that the 
relation between self and body is displaced into her flat.  This interpretation is 
reasonable, given that Whimsy proceeds with: 
‘W: But (1.0) well not but ( ) and ( ) energy produces energy. Doesn't it? It’s 
this thing of kind of being stuck. Inside a thing that is not working properly. 
That of course causes distress. Causes alienation. 
J: So do you feel stuck inside a body that's not working? 
W: I have yes yeh. So that’s what I was stuck with. So ( ) that’s had some 
effect. That's made me feel trapped.  And interestingly the term the consultant 
used on the letter was nerve entrapment.  
J: So that entrapment stuck with you? It had some significance? 
W: Yeh it felt like entrapment it feels like being locked into something.’ 
By stating that she is trapped inside a body implies that Whimsy identifies ‘self’ as 
something separate and yet internal to her body. She highlights the significance of the 
consultant’s statement about ‘entrapment’. The terms ‘trap/trapped/entrapment’ thus 
appear to hold together certain metaphorical associations for Whimsy. There is a 
metonymical relation here between a body that does not work and a flat that has 
trapped her due to an intercom that will not work. Perhaps the alienation Whimsy feels 
due to her compromised body is also reprised by feeling alienated from her flat. This 
interpretation is significant because it illustrates a translation between the domain of 
the material world and the inner world and how a place becomes entangled with ME, 
as I discuss below. 
However, Whimsy’s deployment of energy as a concept may not be entirely available 
to conscious reflection and is better understood as reflecting individual and social 
processes that are not easily articulated in either register. On the other hand, what 
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Whimsy says about energy reprises familiar themes from discursive and 
phenomenological work. The deployment of the term energy enables Whimsy to 
construct a legitimate version of ME and thereby helps in the struggle to make sense of 
her experience. Energy as a term informs a social discourse of ME because it is 
intelligible and can be deployed as a common cultural object (Froggett and Hollway, 
2010).  
In summary, the purpose of this section was to explore how energy and hence ME is 
understood by Whimsy in a way that contrasts with biomedical approaches. I used 
metaphor and metonymy to trace the associations between energy and how Whimsy 
deploys a particular understanding that involves mechanical metaphors of the body and 
bodily processes. Whimsy equates ME with an energy flow that is blocked by her 
neck. Her neck is associated with the trauma of a car crash and reappeared explicitly at 
the time of Whimsy’s collapse. Whimsy is alienated from her compromised body and 
this reflects her relation with her flat. In the next section I pick up the relationship 
between Whimsy and her flat and discuss the significance of the associations between 
people and material environments from a metaphorical/metonymical perspective. 
7.5  Debilitating spaces and the maintenance of ME 
Having described how I think about the relations between various actants in Whimsy’s 
experience of ME, this section focuses on environments as both a physical place and a 
psychosocial space that may play a part in maintaining ME. Besides Whimsy, I briefly 
discuss John and Hannah and their relations to specific spaces. 
In chapter three I outlined the relation between health and environments in terms of 
enabling and restorative functions. However, it is not clear which specific aspects of 
place should be regarded as enabling’. Some literature focuses on the material 
properties of place (Steinfeld and Danford, 1999) whilst other literature stresses its 
psychophysiological or social aspects (Korpela et al. 2008; Cattell et al. 2008). Despite 
some authors acknowledging the benefits of thinking relationally about things, people 
and places they tend to advance a notion of how health can be maintained or restored 
via the types of resource that become mobilised by or converge in a specific place. In 
contrast to the idea of enabling and restorative places, for Whimsy, John and Hannah, 
the immediate environment of their homes appeared to function in a debilitating way 
that was highly entangled with how they experienced and made sense of ME. To 
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capture the way that an environment can have a deleterious effect as part of ME I use 
the term debilitating space.  
The notion of a debilitating space provides a frame for exploring physical 
environments where different actants such as emotion, energy, pain and the body 
interact with specific material places in non-causal ways. This is in line with 
Cummins, Curtis, Diez-Rouxc and Macintyre, (2007); p.1825) who state that despite 
renewed interest in how space and place shape health: 
“Empirical research has relied on rather conventional conceptions of space 
and place and focused on isolating the ‘‘independent’’ contribution of place-
level and individual-level factors”.  
Cummins et al intimate the same, implicit focus on assumed causal structures that 
appear to characterise how ME is understood from biomedical perspectives.  
My argument is that a place can be explored as part of an assemblage of the experience 
of ME. Whimsy’s flat is a debilitating space that is fundamental to her experience of 
ME. However, it is not the flat in itself as a certain type of space that is the problem. 
Instead, the materiality of the flat is involved in the translation of highly conflicted and 
entangled actants such as the split between Whimsy’s body and self, energy and her 
neck and real others. From the ANT perspective, the flat held specific potentialities 
that have become displaced into specific identities and from there as part of Whimsy’s 
understanding of ME. For instance, the broken intercom, the fact that the flat is on the 
top floor, has poor air circulation and is in a city became potentiated in terms of the 
alienation that Whimsy feels to her body. 
Most significantly, the flat is a space from which the traumatic event is consciously 
barred. The degree of success of this disbarring is questionable. Whimsy has come to 
understand, via the displacements between these actants, that the flat is no longer a 
place where she can create and be happy. The flat is a prison that metonymically 
reprises her relationship with her body and with other, explicitly discussed, traumas. 
I have briefly outlined above how John’s flat associates with paper in a similar manner 
such that he has to literally escape his flat everyday, which like Whimsy’s is small, top 
floor and Georgian. John was an officer in the RAF with status but had to retire due to 
ME. John describes his flat as reflecting ‘a loss and lack of status’ and this means that 
he is uncomfortable inviting people into it, especially his eleven year old son who lives 
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in another town. The size of John’s flat was a potentiality that manifested as John’s 
failure and he does not want his son to see him as a failure. Because of what is in the 
flat [the piles of paper he hoards] and what this represents to John, he is constantly 
‘overwhelmed’. The flat is a constant reminder of ‘how he doesn't want to live’ and 
‘what needs to be done’. Overall, John’s flat is a space where he is worn down and 
fatigued. 
A further sufferer, Hannah, who is twenty five and lives with her mother also 
demonstrates an entanglement between place and ME. Hannah’s house metaphorically 
represents a safe haven where ME is kept in abeyance and therefore more in line with 
notions of enabling and restorative places. Hannah’s ME symptoms are entangled with 
agoraphobic symptoms and hence literally outside her house is anxiety, insecurity, 
alienation and otherness. Significantly, this represents a split where the environment 
outside the house is explicitly associated with Hannah’s ME and where her fatigue is 
‘worse’. 
Whimsy feels trapped in her flat and does not have the energy to escape it and fears 
dying alone there. In this sense, Whimsy, John and Hannah experience specific 
environments in a way that appears to be intrinsically entangled with their experience 
of ME. But this is not the same as saying the environments are causing or maintaining 
ME. Rather these specific environments are instead part of an assemblage which 
amounts to the ongoing experience of ME but from which ME is inseparable.  
In summary, Whimsy’s flat appears to be involved in the translation of entangled and 
conflicted actants such as the split between her body, sense of self and energy. As 
such, the flat as a physical space has become a defining feature of Whimsy’s ME 
experience, symbolising specific metaphoric associations such as being a ‘prison’ and 
‘trapping’ her. I have described her flat as a debilitating space; a term which attempts 
to capture how certain environments can become entangled with ME and hence 
impede recovery in ME sufferers.  
7.6  Social relations and imagined others  
Whimsy’s neck is a central actant in her experience of ME that appears to have made 
itself indispensible (Callon, 1986). In the present section I discuss how Whimsy’s neck 
mediates and in fact limits the potential for her to have successful romantic 
relationships with others. In doing so, I emphasise how real others become imagined 
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(Frosh, 2002) and become implicated in Whimsy’s experience of ME.  This section 
illustrates that the boundaries or effects of ME are insidious in that a compromised 
romantic relationship and what it entails would not immediately appear connected to 
ME. Identifying the idiosyncrasies of each sufferer’s ME experience is thus important.  
In the following extract Whimsy is explaining how her compromised neck has an 
effect on her ability to have a romantic relationship, ostensibly through fear that if 
someone hugs her neck might break.  
‘W: So it’s had an effect on a ( ) romantic life. If you like. Because I'm very 
anxious.  
J: Say some more. (1.0) How are you making the jump to ( ) limited 
movements to anxiety to ( ) romantic relationships?  
W: Well ( ) okay okay. Um (3.0) I feel very anxious if someone puts their 
arm around me. When friends come to- ( ) sorry ( ) not friends. When male 
friends come towards me to kiss me as a gesture of friendship. Or ( ) maybe 
not necessarily friendships. Maybe something more than that ( ) I have to 
withdraw. So all the time I'm guarding this (2.0)... 
J: Neck area. 
W: Yeh yeh. All the time. Um ( ) a friend came this afternoon and I've known 
him for twenty five years but I still have to back away ( ) because he is a big 
person who’s got a strong grip and wants to hug. Um ( ) you know a friend. 
And I can't bear that cos I feel like my necks gonna break. After all this time 
and I know it’s not gonna break. Um I've seen a scan ( ) if you like ( ) to 
prove ( ) that it’s not gonna break.  But it doesn't mean it doesn't feel like it. 
The doctors have sat me down and said ( ) it ( ) it looks like ( ) from where 
you are if you do that [moves her head side to side slightly] it feels like it will 
break but I can assure you it won’t because of this and that.’ 
Whimsy expresses conscious anxiety about ‘romantic life’. The three second pause 
suggests she is having difficulty accessing a domain that involves romantic relations 
and this represents a point at which metaphor and metonymy needs to be used to 
consider what such relations may involve, for instance love, caring, trust and so on, 
because doing so provides a further means of exploring the data. 
Whimsy is experiencing difficulties acknowledging affectively what romantic relations 
might involve, reflected in the way that she conflates platonic and romantic relations 
and then has to correct herself. The manner in which the neck is implicated is 
interesting because her reticence to name the neck is apparent. It is when I name it for 
her that the narrative moves forward. However, despite making explicit the romantic 
connection to the neck, Whimsy struggles to talk about her male friend in this light and 
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works hard to establish him as ‘you know a friend’. I also note that she adopts a 
passive stance towards this friend in that ‘he wants to hug’. My affective notes at this 
point reveal that I experienced Whimsy as helpless. The final three sentences imply 
that Whimsy fears her neck will break despite seeing evidence to the contrary and this 
suggests a failure to experience her neck injury as a discrete event that happened in the 
past, in other words a metonymical displacement from past to present has occurred; 
Whimsy’s neck has become the real problem for her.  
Borbely (2009) describes a past traumatic event that is unconsciously repeated but in 
an unrecognisable symbolic way in the present as negative metonymy. This term 
implies that whatever is symbolically appearing from the past feels like it is occurring 
in the present and this means that the individual is unable to re-structure past 
unconscious memories in light of present experiences. Thus, what is activated when 
Whimsy encounters a possible romantic liaison is symbolised in anxiety that her neck 
will break. Applying the ANT framework to such an arrangement is useful because it 
enables the tracing of associations between the neck and other actants that at first may 
appear unconnected. Moreover, this also highlights how actants become complexed 
together. Whimsy’s neck is thus only part of the picture.  
Exploring Whimsy’s narrative using metaphor and metonymy illustrates how 
antecedent incidents are translated into real social relations and from there structure 
real interactions because the anxiety that her neck represents is preventing Whimsy 
engaging with someone romantically. However, it is not immediately apparent what 
the association between specifically romantic relations and anxiety is, but it is apparent 
that her neck situates that anxiety. For instance, it is equally possible that Whimsy 
fears that a romantic interest will actually love her, as much as she fears being actively 
hurt or rejected. It is also possible that Whimsy fears she is unable to love another. 
However, rather than hypothesising about these alternatives, the focus is on what can 
be determined from her neck and what she says about it.  
To elaborate on the relation between Whimsy’s neck and romantic relations requires 
further scrutiny of the data, for instance to determine if there are consistent metaphoric 
relations between her neck and male relations in other contexts. Because Whimsy 
conflates ‘romantic’, with ‘friend’ and with ‘male’ and has to withdraw from anything 
more than friendship, it would be useful to go back to the data to determine what 
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actants associate around friendships, romance and relations to establish whether 
anything is mobilised in line with what I have described about energy.  
That ME affects social relations is a widely reported effect, usually understood for 
instance as a rational line of causality, for instance that ME involves unpredictable 
fatigue, fatigue inhibits activity, socialising requires activity therefore ME inhibits 
socialising (Dickson, 2004). In contrast, identifying actants such as Whimsy’s neck 
provides a means of following the translations between particular and subjective 
bodily aspects and other actants. A reformulation particular to Whimsy might entail 
these displacements: her ‘collapse’ metonymically translates a neck injury from a car 
crash, her neck blocks energy flow in her body, this restricts her activity, she fears her 
neck will break and avoids romance and this assemblage is ME. However, from the 
ANT perspective, networks do not exist as small, discrete entities and this necessitates 
following actants as far as possible to establish further associations. 
7.7  Expanding the network 
Following the actant of Whimsy’s neck leads to other actants such as a traumatic event 
from childhood which itself associates with out of body experiences (OBE), which 
Whimsy has experienced since a child. Whimsy does not talk about this event in her 
flat and, as such, it was present in her narrative as an absence. But perhaps this event is 
neither entirely available for Whimsy in a conscious sense.  
For example, Frank (1995) characterises traumatic experiences in terms of ‘chaos 
narratives’ which sit behind speech but are incommunicable because there are no 
words available to tell them, which points to the impossibility of representing or 
sharing such experiences with others.  From a Kleinian perspective Minsky (1998) 
claims that attempts to find words for traumatic experiences are split off and projected 
and are thus unavailable to description.  Thus, the significance of Whimsy’s traumatic 
event is that it appears to play an actantial role in how she manages aspects of her ME. 
Despite it appearing as an absence, its effects as part of a network can be detected in 
the identities and actions that result in the actants associated with it.  
OBE metaphorises the split between Whimsy’s body and self. She uses meditation and 
breathing practices to ground her in her body and keep the traumatic event in the past. 
These actantial practices also enable energy to flow and the neck is central to this. For 
instance, Whimsy explicitly states: 
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‘But the breathing is part of the yoga. And it seems to me ( ) in terms of 
things being connected ( ) um the flow ( ) that seems to be blocked ( ) in this 
condition ( ) that’s what ME is to me. An energy block. And whatever you do 
( ) whether it’s mental effort or physical movement ( ) you can't unblock it.’ 
The block is of course situated in her neck. When I mediated with Whimsy, she stated: 
‘W: I didn't have time to get where I would normally be but what was really 
interesting was that having just said ( ) having made a big thing about this out 
of body experience ( ) you know having a kind of direct line to it if you like. I 
actually had what I think of as the bog standard experience of feeling my 
body. Not weighted. Because that's very very unusual for me.  
J: So you felt the body ( ) lighter you mean? 
W: No I usually feel that I'm unaware that I'm supported by anything. So if 
you like I don't feel supported by the ground. [...] And I don't usually have 
those experiences but this time I actually was aware of it. 
J: That you were supported? 
W: Yeh! 
J: And how does that feel is that ( ) positive or negative? 
W: It’s positive in a kind of boring way. And so ( ) that’s normal experience! 
You know: there is a body ( ) you are in it ( ) and it’s on the ground. And 
that’s such an unusual experience. I spend a lot of time in the kitchen 
particularly. Practicing this thing of being aware that my feet are on the 
ground. And that there is a whole planet underneath supporting. 
J: Because normally ( ) you feel a little bit ( ) ungrounded do you mean? 
W: Most of the time.’ 
 
This extract illustrates how I appeared as an actant in Whimsy’s network that at that 
time had a clear mediating effect on her experience of ME. However, it is conceptually 
interesting because the implication is again that Whimsy usually feels disconnected 
from her body. Moreover, she does not feel supported or connected to the physical 
environment and this further enhances my argument that the relation to the 
environment is an important feature of ME. However, on this occasion Whimsy did 
feel what she describes as the mundane, normal connection between body and ground. 
I pondered my role in this as an actant as part of a network but came to no simple 
conclusion. 
Whimsy’s neck has mobilised around it actants of various types that become 
implicated in her social relations, or strictly speaking, romantic relations but following 
the chains of association and connecting up local networks leads to the broader 
understanding of Whimsy’s ME and its relation to the environment and practices.  
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It is impossible to know what Whimsy’s traumatic event involved. It thus has to be 
treated as an actant by its absence. In terms of the traumatic event and her father, 
because they appear in the data as absences, I did not make assumptions about their 
nature. Instead, I scrutinised what was said around these absences and studied the 
metaphorical context around them in her talk. If Whimsy’s relational difficulties are 
entangled with ME, there is a risk that a less than critical stance would attribute ME to 
what happened to Whimsy as an infant. Exploring through metaphor and metonymy 
the way that material and non-material actants associate and by assigning all actants as 
ontologically equal overcomes this risk because it avoids calling on abstract concepts 
as an explanation of ME, for instance by decontextualising ‘energy’ and using it in an 
objective way to describe ME.  
What Whimsy has said about the traumatic childhood event is that it connects OBE, is 
intellectually in her past but affectively felt in the present and that she uses meditation, 
breathing exercise and yoga to help keep it out of her house and affectively in the past. 
There is an association between the traumatic event and breathing and meditation as 
she uses it to restore the flow of energy through her body and to offset her neck 
problem.  
To draw the discussion together, Whimsy struggles to overcome and has adopted and 
developed a specific ideology and approach [Buddhist informed meditation] to combat 
her ME which crystallises around her neck and low energy. She is explicit that this 
approach also keeps the ‘traumatic event’ in the past. Her flat is metonymical of her 
body and her alienation from her flat reprises her alienation from herself. She fears 
dying in her flat alone and this is associated with her breathing and with city pollution, 
both metaphorical and connected to death.  
Whimsy uses meditation to connect herself to the ground and to feel grounded and this 
associates with ongoing out of body experiences which are metaphorical of escaping 
herself and hence the traumatic event. She fears breaking her neck if she becomes 
romantically inclined to someone. Her neck impedes energy flow. As a child she 
appears to have had an absence of a loving figure, she had an unreliable mother and 
Whimsy was not sure whether she was royalty or not. Her father remains an absence. 
Michel alone has validated Whimsy and unfortunately he died. Whimsy does not 
believe her ME is going to get better. This assemblage of actants, events, beliefs, 
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people real and imagined, body parts and so on is ME and transcends the boundaries of 
inner/outer, self/other and mind/body.  
7.8  Chapter summary and conclusion  
In this chapter I have focussed on the question how can metaphor and metonymy be 
used to explore relations between actants? I therefore used metaphor and metonymy to 
explore Whimsy’s experience and understanding of ME and began by describing what 
I termed the ‘collapse’ and which represents for Whimsy the immediate antecedent to 
her ME. The collapse comprised several associated actants such as her undisclosed 
childhood traumatic experience, a car crash and an ectopic pregnancy. ME revealed 
itself via these actants that appeared unconnected but which were interpreted as 
metaphorically and metonymically associated. Using the notion of metaphor to 
examine data provided a means of connecting the moves that Whimsy made through 
her narrative. Whilst Whimsy had made a conscious association between these events, 
I suggested that via a series of metonymic equivalents, death had become associated 
with her neck and that her neck had became the focal point and embodiment of her 
ME. Whimsy’s neck was also associated with how she talked about and experienced 
‘energy’.  The issue of energy in ME is important because it is a common feature of 
sufferer’s experiences and psychiatric and biomedical concerns with characterising and 
managing ME. I described how Whimsy deploys a particular understanding of energy 
that involves mechanical metaphors of the body and bodily processes. ME is equated 
with an energy flow that is blocked by her neck.  
All the sufferers I worked with discussed the impact of ME on their energy levels with 
energy deployed as purely physiological, psychological or a conflation of both.  
However, Whimsy’s idiosyncratic use of ‘energy’ means that attempting an objective, 
standardised measure of energy is unhelpful. This is significant given that a diagnostic 
feature for ME is fatigue of more than six months duration.  Thus, claims for objective 
measures of energy, such as Lerner, Safedin and Fitzgerald’s (2008) ‘energy index’ 
designed to measure the degree of disability in ME patients are non-sequitur because 
of the inherent subjectivity of the linguistic terms they use to build their scale around.  
I proposed the notion of debilitating space as a way of framing an environment that 
associates with different actants such as emotion, energy, pain and the body to effect a 
negative outcome. My focus was on the manner in which Whimsy associates her flat 
with feeling trapped, dying and the depleted energy that her neck appears to translate. 
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Hence, understanding Whimsy’s ME necessarily entails exploring the relationship 
between it and the environment of her flat. The notion of a debilitating space is a 
useful way of framing how metaphoric processes transcend and connect what would 
otherwise be understood as dualisms such as inner/outer, social/individual and 
material/immaterial. A debilitating space is thus representative of my psychosocial 
framework and is also useful because it contrasts work that has investigated the 
restorative, enabling functions of spaces and places. 
I described how Whimsy described her neck as a site of vulnerability for her in terms 
of ‘romantic’ relations. My discussion of this association highlighted the relation 
between Whimsy’s understanding of ME and how it affects her real social 
relationships. This section brought into focus the manner in which real others become 
imagined and provided an alternative way of following the links from ME to its social 
effects.   
Finally, I drew together my discussion of central actants and their metaphoric and 
metonymic relations so as to provide the reader with a sense of the assemblage of 
disparate and seemingly disconnected actants that Whimsy’s ME appears it be 
















Les: imagining the body in ME 
 
8.1  Chapter overview 
In chapter seven I exemplified how I used metaphor and metonymy in conjunction 
with the ANT framework to explore the associations between actants in Whimsy’s 
experience of ME. The present chapter builds on chapter 7 by addressing the research 
question can ANT and metaphor be used to rethink how the body is theorised in ME? 
My aim here is to explore the relationality of the body in ME, through a focus on Les, 
who was selected because of the unusual onset of his ME and the manner in which it 
implicated a specific body-part and event. Les illustrates the importance of drawing 
comparisons and contrasts between different ME sufferers in ways that point to the 
particular yet superficially similar aspects of the condition. For instance, a central 
discussion in the present chapter concerns how Les’s ME is entangled with his heart 
and visiting a specific place, namely a cemetery. My analysis details how this 
entanglement may work towards managing the anxiety associated with Les’s ME-onset 
and ongoing fear of relapse. This analysis not only highlights a further specific 
experience with ME but also paves the way for a discussion of how the body in ME 
can be re-imagined in terms of its relationality. But I also draw an important contrast in 
how death and fear are implicated in Les’s ME in ways that are qualitatively different 
from how death and fear appeared to be implicated for Whimsy.  The salient feature of 
the first section is that an event that implies the body can be explored in terms of how 
that event becomes translated into a feature of ME experience in a displaced manner 
and as part of a specific material space, a cemetery, which Les regularly visits for 
‘fresh air and exercise’. In conjunction with this I describe how Les conflates ME with 
the vagaries of aging and changing bodily capacities. The manner in which Les 
experiences ME appears associated with how he perceives his self as capable of 
achieving in the sporting arena and in this demonstrates how ME is highly entangled 
with an ongoing sense of self and the aging body. Following this discussion, I outline 
how ME research has had a tendency to present an ‘ME body’ as an homogenous 
body, which overlooks the variable ways that parts of the body are implicated in ME. I 
therefore use Les’s experience with his heart and onset of ME with chest pains to draw 
attention to how ME is often felt in or implicates various parts of the body in different 
192 
 
ways. The penultimate section of this chapter contextualises my analysis concerning 
the body by outlining the relationship between the body, materiality and discourse. I 
emphasise that a psychosocial approach can be used to explore the notion that 
unconscious processes imbue the relationships between the disparate actants that 
constitute ME. Most important is the notion that a psychosocial conceptualisation of 
space accounts for the ways in which biomedically and hence politically motivated 
discourse is engaged with and embodied in particular ways. Finally I explore a view of 
the body as a dynamic process that is brought into being, rather than as an incarnate 
entity that unfolds in the world. 
8.2  Les’s background and central actants 
Les is 65 years old. His father was an agricultural labourer and his mother was a home 
maker. The family lived in a small village and moved into town when Les was around 
15. When Les married he moved into a house in the next street and has been there with 
his wife ever since. At age 11 Les contracted meningitis, although he does not know if 
it was viral or bacterial. He was treated for this with what at the time was a ‘novel 
medicine’ and this seemed effective. Les does not link this event to ME. Les has 
‘always’ suffered with headaches and is unable to be in the sun. 
Les received little guidance from his parents regarding life choices and does not report 
any formal education beyond age 15, at which time he left school to work in a factory. 
He eventually gave up this work due to the noise and the headaches it caused. He then 
worked in a nursery and as a labourer for the local saw mill; remaining in the latter line 
of work until the onset of ME in 2007. Les is now officially retired and receives an 
‘adequate’ pension, stating that he and Dora, his wife, are financially secure.  
Les has an older sister [+ 6 years] and brother [+ 2 years]. He has always been close to 
his brother but less so his sister. Consequently Les does not see his sister that often but 
his brother visits him ‘most Wednesdays’. His brother still lives in the same street the 
family moved to when Les was 15.  
Les has been married to Dora since 1970. Dora was raised and lived in the street next 
to where they currently live. Les’s house is very well presented and feels quite modern. 
His garden at the time of first visit was in full bloom. Behind his house is a large 
cemetery and the general area is relatively quiet. Les has seen neighbours ‘come and 
193 
 
go’ but does not appear unduly bothered by this, nor by the general growth and 
redevelopment of the town. 
Les has a daughter and a son. His daughter lives in the same town as Les and regularly 
brings Les’s two young grand-daughters to see him. He is very close to these girls and 
babysits and collects them from school on Fridays. However, Les is somewhat 
estranged from his son, who lives in a nearby town. Les initially attributes this 
estrangement to the influence of his daughter in law and consequently regrets not 
seeing his 18 month old grandson that often. 
Les discusses the onset of ME as chest pains that occurred one Sunday night in 2007. 
These pains lasted six months before switching abruptly to headaches. Les does not 
reference viruses at that time beyond a ‘mild cold’ occurring a couple of weeks before 
the chest pains.  
I now describe central actants from Les’s data.  
The first actant is heart-stopping. One night in 1991, and for no apparent reason, 
Les’s heart stopped. He now has an on-demand pacemaker. Les does not establish 
causality between his heart-stopping and ME-onset but intimates that around the time 
of ME-onset he was feeling overworked with his job and unsupported by management. 
Fear of relapse is an actant that crops up explicitly several times across the data and is 
associated with Les’s day to day experience. It is an ongoing source of anxiety for Les, 
who worries about relapse ‘pretty much all the time’. Relapse characteristically occurs 
when Les is out; he comes over ‘faint and giddy’ when he ‘uses [his] strength’, 
although it is ‘not a lack of strength’. Les avoids some activities if he particularly feels 
a relapse may occur and is more likely to go out if Dora is with him. On one occasion 








The cemetery behind Les’s house is an actant. 
 
 
The cemetery is large, landscaped, has sweeping views of the town and holds 3000-
plus graves. Les house spends 20-30 minutes walking around it two or three times each 
week and does this for ‘exercise and fresh air’.  
Sport, which I describe as an actant, has always been important for Les in terms of 
participation and watching. He ‘love[s]’ sport but ME has had an effect on this in two 
ways. Low energy means he is less able to participate, although he has recently 
resumed putting and skittles on a weekly basis as his energy levels have improved. 
Secondly, fear of relapse prevents him committing to some activities such as attending 
his local football team’s matches. Sport has always been significant for Les in terms of 
self-understanding. His sense of self is tied up with his ability to perform sport and 
perform well and this means that ME has had a negative effect on his sense of self. 
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In the subsequent section I describe the onset of ME for Les and how this might 
associate with actants such as the cemetery and implicate the body. Of significance is 
the actant ‘fear of relapse’. My analysis focuses on the associations between this actant 
and events prior to Les’s ME. 
8.3  The body in ME 
In the following extract Les has responded to the question ‘tell me about your ME’ and 
begins in terms of ME-onset. Les states: 
‘L: What when I first had it? Umm. Sort of fe- felt a funny pain ( ) sort of 
ache or what was it in my side ( ) here. I thought ( ) oh ( ) and went to bed it 
woke me up feeling funny so my wife called the ambulance [inaudible] said it 
was chest pains ( ) and they whipped me off to hospital. They were looking at 
me and I thought ( ) well ( ) they give me some morphine eventually but that 
didn’t clear it. ( ) So they still didn’t know what to do with me. I got heart 
problems anyway so they thought it was down to heart. So ahh... 
J: When you say heart problems ( ) what... 
L: It stopped!  
J: It stopped? 
L: It stopped! (laughs) one Friday night in 1991 it stopped.’  
Onset of ME with acute chest pain as the only symptom is uncommon. Les begins the 
extract by describing chest pain before introducing his ‘heart problems’. The shift from 
ME-onset to ‘heart problems’ does not strike me as problematic because the latter 
logically follows as an explanation of how doctors responded to him at that time.  
However, the transcript reveals that our subsequent discussion is about his heart and 
not ME and it is some time before Les returns to ME, explaining that after six months 
the original chest pain abruptly switched to a headache:  
‘L: Yeh it’s all different now [inaudible] well mainly it’s headaches at the 
moment. Fuzziness ( ) I say last Saturday I had a ma- a little bit of a relapse. 
Came over bad in town. The first time I had that for about eighteen months. 
J: When you say relapse what what happened ( ) do you mean? 
L: I felt ( ) shaky and [slumps forward, mimics the physical symptom] could 
hardly hold myself up. So my wife got a taxi and we got home. [inaudible] 
eased off it didn't last. When it’s happened before it’s lasted quite a while and 
it’s a lot worse.’  
In this second extract the shift in narrative from headaches to fear of relapse is 
significant because the latter does not obviously follow and this suggests an affective 
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movement has occurred for Les. The next extract is the opening of our second meeting 
and illustrates me following-the-actor: 
‘J:  Yeh so ( ) let me see. Yeh I got ( ) three questions actually. The first one 
is how often do you find yourself worrying about a relapse?  
L: I would think ( ) pretty much all the time really. Cos I hope I'm not gonna 
have one when I go out. And when I had that little one that was the first time 
it happened ( ) when I went out.  
J: Had you been worrying about relapsing up to that point? 
L: Not really it’s just a general it’s sort of in the back of your mind all the 
time really I think. But I hadn’t had one for about eighteen months. That was 
the last of them. But it wasn't as big as the other ones. Cos the others ones 
she’s had to call the ambulance ( ) out. And it was the last time they didn't 
take me to hospital but normally they would take me to hospital. I said I don't 
want to go up there! It’ll be four or five hours mucking about and they'll just 
say go away at the end of it ha ha! 
J: Did you get any particular chest pains with relapse? 
L: No. Relapse is feeling really ( ) the whole body just goes into break down. 
I feel weak and wobbly and have to sit down. Or flop out and ( ) wait for it to 
go away’. 
My first observation is that it is the fear of relapse that affects Les’s ability to go out 
and not ME per se. Les’s last statement is particularly significant because relapse is 
expressed in terms of a definite state or a limited set of events. As noted above, fear of 
relapse associates a lot of anxiety for Les and can be thought of as an actant that has 
effected a problematic state, co-opting other actants into association with it.  
Of equal significance is the metaphor of the body entering breakdown. This is the only 
occasion across the data set where Les explicitly discusses the body apart from one 
other instance where he explains how the initial pain shifted from his body to 
headaches. Les objectifies his body by referring to it in the impersonal tense, reflecting 
how female ME sufferers talk about and objectify ‘the whole body’ (Hart and Grace, 
2000). Yet he [‘I’] feels weak and wobbly, implying that Les might experience his 
body as differentiated from his sense of self. His body ‘goes into breakdown’ is 
metaphorical of a mechanical object failing and Les’s heart failed him in 1991. There 
is thus a metonymic translation between this event and failure of the body in general in 
that the anxiety associated with Les’s heart-stopping appears to associate with the 
onset of ME. Chest pain in the latter is metonymically equivalent with the failure of his 
heart in 1991.  ME-onset can be thought about as a past traumatic event that has been 
temporally displaced. At least two things point in this direction.  
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Firstly, the nature of his heart-stopping and the ME-onset is similar, as is the manner in 
which Les narrates them. In both cases there is ambiguity in terms of what occurred. 
ME appeared as a ‘funny pain’. When his heart stopped he states he ‘was feeling ever 
so funny.’ The use of the word ‘funny’ may be coincidental. However, he uses the 
term ‘funny’ on three other occasions; once more during our first visit and twice in the 
third. On each occasion the word is used to describe how he was feeling during 
relapses. The term ‘funny’ is significant and has become metaphorically related to, and 
hence associates his heart-stopping, ME-onset and relapses. In chapter four I discussed 
‘switch’ words. Freud (1905; p.5) refers to these as a word or phrase which often 
appears in an individual’s narrative. The switch word serves as a nodal point on which 
various unconscious and conscious thoughts converge. The switch-word ‘reveals and 
conceals’ the meaning of a symptom (Litowitz, 2013; p.2). It is useful to think about 
Les’s use of funny in this light as it may suggest a metaphorical association between 
Les’s conscious understanding of events and unconscious anxiety. 
My interpretation that ME-onset associates with Les’s heart-stopping is that they both 
occurred in the body and were experienced in the body. In relation to what caused his 
heart-stopping he states: 
‘L: They don't know. ( ) They ( ) did all tests and all that they didn't know’. 
In relation to ME-onset he states: 
‘L: And they done all the tests. They still didn't say what’s was wrong with 
me so they sent me home again.’ 
Both occurrences are figuratively and metonymically similar.  Moreover, there may 
also be an association with Les feeling funny, in that the physicians’ inability to know 
what was wrong with Les metonymically reprises his own vagueness about what 
occurred at ME-onset. Thus, Les appears to understand both his heart-stopping and 
ME-onset in the same affective and cognitive modes. Fear of relapse is one factor that 
might be restricting Les’s behaviour, more significantly perhaps than the effect of low 
energy. But perhaps the latent anxiety concerns his heart.  
Finally, I note that when Les described what a relapse feels like in the extract above he 




‘L: I was feeling ever so funny. And then my wife said she’d get a cold 
compress for my face and I slipped down on the floor.’ 
My interpretation is a metonymic association between fear of relapse and his heart 
stopping in that they involve a similar affective state that became embodied in a 
similar manner.  
The salient feature of this section is how an event that implies the body directly might 
become translated into a feature of ME experience in a displaced manner. Moreover, 
my analysis illustrated how metaphor can be used to trace associations between 
different domains, such as the body and Les’s cognitive understanding of ME. In this 
regard the analysis illustrates the importance of identifying cross-domain translations 
as well as the need to scrutinise data for instances of metaphor that appear in different 
linguistic contexts, such as ‘funny’. However, in this section I have not addressed the 
significance of the body in terms of its heterogeneity. I have focussed on the heart but 
this was used to represent Les’s general bodily relation to ME. In contrast it is 
important to recognise that ME affects the body in terms of its parts as well as a whole 
and that sufferers’ narratives, such as Les’s will, reflect shifts between these two 
aspects. Whilst focussing on the whole body may provide an overview of how ME is 
experienced, focussing on specific, heterogenous body-parts provides a nuanced view 
of how ME is associated with and affects parts of the body in different ways.  
8.4  The cemetery: the translation of a bodily event 
In this section I describe how the relationship with the body may be translated into 
specific behaviours. I use metaphor and metonymy to suggest why the cemetery is 
significant for Les and how it connects to ME and Les’s body. 
As I went through the transcription process and initial thematic analysis I felt Les was 
trying to tell me something whilst we were in the cemetery that he could not articulate. 
I could not imagine what this was but added to my notes to stay with this feeling and 
see what emerged. During the tour of the cemetery [3
rd
 visit], the majority of what Les 
pointed out to discuss with me concerned grave stones and the state of the cemetery 
and was about damage, restoration and acknowledgement. ‘Tramps’ frequented the 
cemetery and had left a bag of clothes. Badgers had dug up the graves and scattered 





‘Vandals’ [‘kids’] used the cemetery to ‘do drugs’ and damage the gravestones. He 
also pointed out specific headstones. For example one of a soldier killed in the Second 




I did not appreciate its significance at the time but during my third visit Les says the 
following: 
‘L: That's why yesterday afternoon I felt (1.0) all sort of ( ) all ( ) don't know ( 
) I thought I’ll go for a little walk see if that does anything and it did ( ) it 
done the trick. (3.0) // Cos ah ( ) the cemetery is full actually.  
J: The cemetery is full? 
L: Behind us is full. So you can't have new ( ) um ( ) burials there. I looked in 
and it looked like a new grave was there. But that must have been a plot that 
was a family plot. 
J: Oh I see! 
L: So I went and had a look and it was August ( ) 26th he died.’ 
In first line of the extract, Les suddenly switches topic [indicated as //]. He had been 
talking about low energy and relapses. Sudden shifts in narrative are one way of 
noticing a metaphorical or metonymical translation becoming activated. 
Metaphorically, if the cemetery is full then no-one else, including Les, can be buried.  
Les visits the cemetery for a walk two or three times a week. So what are cemeteries 
about? Rationally, Les explains it as ‘exercise and fresh air’. Metaphorically, of 
significance is the manner in which Les brought to my attention that headstones [to 
remember the dead] become damaged [which means we cannot remember the dead] 
and thus something had to happen for the damage to be repaired and the dead 
remembered again. If these observations arose from one session I would be less 
inclined to think about them actantially and this speaks of the need to follow-the-actor 
and lines of association in an exhaustive manner, before making explicit associations. 
However, instances in this vein do appear in three separate sessions explicitly.  
In transcript one Les described a trip to America and how he visited Gracelands, where 
Elvis is buried: 
‘Well it’s strange really it’s like going back in a time warp. Cos everything 
stopped still to when he died [...] and he’s actually been moved ( ) he’s buried 
there now. With his brother ( ) mother ( ) and father and twin he had a twin 
who died at birth. So ah ( ) he’s got them and you got a little church thing as 
well. It’s it’s sort of ( ) well! Ha ha. Strange feeling!’ 
I am particularly intrigued by how he talks about Elvis in the present tense as having 
‘got them’, which may suggest a temporal translation where Elvis is somehow still 
present and perhaps this means that Les unconsciously experiences issues around death 
and being dead in a complex, atemporal manner. 
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Elsewhere, Les is explaining the construction of a cemetery in New Orleans: 
‘L: And if something’s gonna happen they all should get out and they shut the 
gates. Cos they used to have bodies floating about cos it’d flood. So they got 
all the concrete things they put em in.  
J: Oh crikey to keep em in place? 
L: Yeh. But that didn't work when that hurricane happened. Even that failed.’ 
In other words, damage could not be prevented. Further instances pertaining to damage 
and the cemetery are the badgers, which have undermined graves and thrown up 
human bones. Les stopped to show me a badger set and discussed their damage in 
these extracts: 
‘L: All this grass ( ) when the um (1.0) badgers were out ( ) they dug it all up! 
You'd think a (1.0)  
J: Bulldozer? 
L: Or thing that churns the ground up. 
J: Oh rotavator!’ 
And: 
‘It’s unbelievable when someone said the badgers had been doing it cos they 
actually found some bones lying about. They'd been underneath just digging 
up bones. So the crematorium had to come out and take em to the crem and 
burn them.’ 
 
Les appears incredulous that the badgers could intrude on the cemetery. Vandals and 
kids have also damaged the cemetery. One or two graves have been restored, but Les 
can't understand why: 
L: If we go up this way there's um ( ) a grave up here they restored. For some 
reason [...] I'm surprised it hasn't been damaged again. 
J: Was it damaged and they restored it? 
L: Yeh well it’s probably been damaged for a long long time. Why ( ) they 
picked up and done that I really don't know. That don't make a lot of sense to 
me. 
The damage that occurs in the cemetery and in New Orleans intrigues Les because it 
seems unreasonable to him and cannot be prevented. So the cemetery, primarily his 
cemetery, is a space that potentiates something beyond just walking and taking air.  
Exploring damage and the cemetery metaphorically and metonymically opens up 
possibilities for thinking about Les’s experience of ME. Firstly, at no time did Les 
mention death or dying to me explicitly, not even in terms of his heart-stopping. Does 
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this mean that the cemetery and talk of damage and restoration is a displacement of 
this?  
I thought about death in relation to Les as the ultimate destruction of the body. This 
associates with Les’s onset of ME and the feeling of a chest pain because I interpret 
them as a translation of the original heart-stopping incident some years before. For 
instance, Les visits the cemetery which is a sight of conflict between death and damage 
and restoration. The materiality of the cemetery is involved with the mediation of his 
affective response as part of ME and ME clearly implicates Les’s body.  
Thinking about this relation between embodiment, materiality and affect challenges 
the liberal notion of the self contained individual (Mulcahy, 2012) and I apply this 
challenge to Les and his ME because it implies less than transparent relations between 
people and things. The absence of explicit references to death and Les’s heart-stopping 
are perhaps metaphorically translated into the cemetery, where death is represented as 
an absence; the thing that Les cannot consciously tolerate. The ‘damage’ which 
appears to concern Les can be rethought as a metonymical translation of the damaged 
heart. The heart is itself associated with the original chest pains which as discussed 
mirror the onset of his ME. The fact that Les comes into the cemetery on a regular 
basis is important, as are his discussions about it, and brings to mind the return of the 
repressed (Freud, 1900). The return of the repressed is the process whereby elements 
that have been repressed or locked away in the unconscious reappear in consciousness 
or in behavior. However, this return occurs in a form that is not recognisable and is 
instead apparently disconnected. Freud (1933; p.74) states: 
"...impressions [...] which have been sunk into the id by repression are 
virtually immortal; after the passage of decades they behave as though they 
had just occurred.” 
This idea is important because it frames the temporally transcendent nature of events 
and brings to mind the manner in which Les returns to the cemetery. For Les, the terror 
that may be associated with the experience of his heart stopping and having a 
pacemaker may continue to exist in an ongoing yet displaced form. Les’s narration and 
use of the cemetery points in this direction. Every time Les enters the cemetery he 
unconsciously re-experiences his heart stopping and this is an alternative to the rational 
explanation that Les manages his ME by going there for air and exercise. But going to 
a place where the terror of death is re-experienced albeit unconsciously appears 
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counter intuitive. However, Les’s recourse to the cemetery reflects complex conscious 
and unconscious processes. 
Les’s relationship to the cemetery also brings to mind the notions of transitional 
objects and phenomena as discussed in chapter three. These terms describe a range of 
objects and experiences that are involved in the infant moving from “relating based in 
internal, subjective experience toward awareness and use of an external, objective 
world of objects” (Cancelmo, 2009). In this sense, the cemetery is involved in Les 
negotiating his affective world, which may be largely unconscious, and an attempt to 
translate it into something meaningful, embodied by/in the cemetery and which is 
materially tangible for him. However, this explanation is limited because it implies an 
affective experience that pre-exists the cemetery. In contrast, I want to emphasise the 
co-extensiveness of the cemetery and Les’s affective experience with ME as an 
ongoing arrangement. 
The cemetery can be thought of as a means of keeping in touch with the unconscious 
anxiety associated with his heart and ME and his repressed fear of death. But there is 
also a reciprocal relation between Les’s affective world and the materiality of the 
cemetery because the latter has an autonomy of its own that is beyond Les’s control 
(Pile, 1996). Les has not arrived at the cemetery and utilised it as a stable, extant 
symbol. In contrast, the cemetery has made itself indispensible to Les on its own terms 
because of certain potentialities it held, such as damage by badgers and restoration of 
graves. The cemetery is in a dynamic state of damage and repair and this ongoing 
movement provides an affect-laden space where Les can negotiate and renegotiate his 
relation to his heart-stopping and ME also as an ongoing, dynamic event.  
At this point it is important to draw a comparison with Whimsy. Whereas Les does not 
discuss death explicitly, Whimsy does. For Whimsy, certain actions such as being 
hugged and being in her flat have become associated with death and yet death for 
Whimsy appears to be structured around vastly different experiences. What I take 
away from this is that whilst there may be intuited, universal unconscious anxieties 
about death, the manner in which these anxieties manifest themselves and are managed 
are vastly different and are clearly mediated by specific places in specific ways.  
Hence, exploring ME as situated in specific places and affective spaces, especially 
ones such as cemeteries, which are already filled with affective intensity, provides a 
lens on the types of activities ME sufferers might engage in and why, as well as 
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highlighting the complex interplay between conscious and unconscious processes that 
may appear to result in counter-intuitive behaviour. In Les’s case, approaching his 
visits to the cemetery in this manner provides an alternative view that complements a 
rational understanding of activities designed to ameliorate ME such as paced exercise. 
Les’s relation to the cemetery is such that not only can it be explored in terms of 
rationalised exercise but also has a site that mobilises specific unconscious anxieties 
concerning death and his heart that are inextricably linked with how he experiences 
ME. 
8.5  Body parts 
It is important to highlight the manner in which parts of the body are implicated as 
well as the body as a whole, to draw attention to the heterogeneity of the experience of 
the body and hence ME. At times Les’s heart and chest are salient. At other times, as 
discussed, Les’s head is the centre of his ME experience with headaches. This is in 
contrast to what I suggest is the totalising tendency of research (i.e. Moss & Dyck, 
1999; Soderlund & Malterud, 2005) to represent an homogenous ‘ME body’. The ME 
sufferers I worked with moved between parts of their body and representation of it as a 
whole and this implies that the sufferer is experiencing their body at different times in 
different ways.  
By focussing on body parts rather than abstract whole bodies I got closer to 
understanding the particular experiences of ME. The ANT/metaphor framework 
highlights each body as itself an heterogenous assemblage of various actants that 
function in association with other parts and other actants beyond the body. For 
instance, Les’s heart is not understood in a rational, direct causal relation with his ME. 
Instead, the heart as a physical entity in the body is displaced from site to site as 
described.  
However, I have not considered the role that Les’s pacemaker plays and this provides a 
direct, material mediation of his heart. Suffice it to say the pacemaker as an actant can 
also be thought about in terms of the ‘failure’ and ‘breakdown’ metaphors that Les 
deploys and which associates with his anxiety in a different way. Thinking about the 
material displacement and mediation of the body could therefore involve tracing 
associations between, for instance, viruses and particular aspects of bodily function in 
a fine-grained manner and this further establishes the particularity of ME for each 
sufferer and helps avoid stereotyping ME sufferers.  
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In this section I have emphasised that research can present the ‘ME body’ as 
homogenous and this overlooks that ME experience is often felt in, or implicates, 
various parts of the body. Focussing on the associations between body parts and other 
other actants and understanding them as an assemblage results in a particular 
understanding of the heterogeneity of the body in relation to specific individuals and 
the specific spaces they engage with. 
8.6  Rethinking the body in ME 
Previous sections in this chapter have described how I explored the associations 
between Les’s ME experience, specific body parts and the potential anxiety associated 
with his heart stopping and fear of relapse. These actants may have become entangled 
with the cemetery in ways that enable Les to work through what amounts to complex 
conscious and unconscious processes.  
In the present section I draw these discussions together to outline how I have thought 
about the body and its connection to space and place in line with ideas about the need 
to re-envision the relationality of the body, materiality and discourse.  I conclude this 
section by referring to Latour to think about the body as a dynamic process that is 
brought into being, rather than as a being that unfolds in the world.   
From the perspective of ME, the body has been theorised and discussed in terms of 
discursive, material, political and social processes and how these are connected (Moss 
and Dyck, 1999). Moss and Dyck’s review and subsequent study note the general 
move to bring the body back in to research by building a spatial body politics that 
accounts for importance of embodiment and the inherent relationality of the body. The 
implication is that the body is not a site that functions under the autonomy of, or with, 
the self. Instead, the body and how it is experienced is mediated by social and political 
discourses which produce various types of identity, reflecting contested notions of 
normality and disability. Moss and Dyck also cite the work that is being done to 
“challenge the dichotomy of discourse and materiality” (ibid. p.373) by focussing on 
the relations between place and body, such that notions of space can be rethought as 
places where embodied social processes are contested. These processes result in 




My perspective is that the process of re-imagining the relationality of materiality, 
discourse and the body has been hindered by the ontological differences between them. 
Moss and Dyck focus on women’s experiences of ME to assist in building a radical 
body politics in terms of a corporeal space where the “discursive and material bodies 
are experienced simultaneously” (ibid. p.389). They draw on and critically evaluate 
work such as Probyn, (1993), Rose, (1993) and Grosz (1994), that has explored the 
relations between the body, materiality and discourse and conclude with the need for 
an approach that reconciles power, body, materiality, discourse and the non-Cartesian 
subject so that the fluidity and simultaneity of these elements can be maintained. I read 
Moss and Dyck’s work as implicitly rational in that discourses are described as having 
fairly predictable, causal effects on the female ME sufferers they worked with and 
Moss and Dyck do not report the idiosyncratic relations between specific individuals, 
ME and particular spaces. The diagrammatic and structural language used to describe 
corporeal space belies the difficulty in representing the relationality that Moss & Dyck 
attempt to convey and perhaps then the central issue concerning the relationality of 
body is the inadequacy of articulating how it is experienced. As Shilling (2003; p.10) 
puts it:  
“To begin to achieve an adequate analysis of the body we need to regard it as 
a material, physical and biological phenomenon which is irreducible to 
immediate social processes or classifications.” 
One of my concerns has been to emphasise the ways that ME experience is both 
particular and full of confusing and apparently unrelated or contradictory experiences 
and objects. Les visiting the cemetery for instance and the manner in which he 
emphasises damage and restoration does not necessarily reflect the biomedical 
approach to characterising ME. However, from a psychoanalytically-informed stance, 
the metaphoric translation between Les’s heart, the cemetery and fear of relapse is 
reasonable and indicates how medical discourse about how to engage with ME as a 
sufferer becomes personalised.  
ME sufferers, as has been the case with Les, are often counselled on exercise 
moderation and conditioning techniques, such as CBT, pacing and graded exercise 
therapy to avoid boom and bust energy expenditure and to maintain muscle condition. 
From the dominant cognitive and biomedical perspectives, the meanings that ME 
sufferers attach to symptoms and hence their body influence the sufferer’s illness 
behaviour. This premise provides the rationale for CBT. Thus, when sufferers engage 
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in techniques to aid their ME, they are engaging in activities that are politically and 
epistemologically motivated.  
From a biomedical perspective, Les is moderating his ME with exercise by visiting the 
cemetery regularly and in that sense is addressing his ME in a reasonable manner as a 
‘good ME sufferer’ [my emphasis]. This is a rational explanation because it reflects 
how politically motivated dominant biomedical discourse suggests Les should act. But 
from another perspective the cemetery is a place that only exists because of death, 
mortality and bodies. Of all the kinds of exercise and all the kinds of places he could 
visit, Les visits particularly the cemetery and this suggests aspects of behaviour that 
are imbued with unconscious processes. It suggests that whilst his experience of self is 
autonomous there are other factors through which that self experience results that are 
beyond conscious understanding. The cemetery is therefore a psychosocial space 
where the politically motivated nature of management-practices is embodied. It is also 
a space which is co-extensive with Les’s body and the trauma it has suffered and how 
he manages this trauma both consciously and unconsciously. The body and how it is 
experienced is thoroughly entangled with a particular material environment to form a 
psychosocial space specific to an aspect of how Les experiences ME. 
In my methods and in my analyses I approached ME indirectly to provide a sense of 
the way that it is entangled with the body and materiality in less than obvious ways. 
The relational ontology of ANT decentres the body and re-envisions it as one actant 
amongst many at the same ontological level. In this sense the body and body-parts take 
on specific identities reflecting associations with specific material and non-material 
actants. It is the specific arrangement of actants and associations that potentiate the 
various identities of the particular body or parts therein, in a particular context. 
Knowledge of the body, indeed of one’s body, is therefore also embedded in embodied 
practices that cannot necessarily be articulated (Pink, 2011).  
I take from Pink the notion of how space is itself unbounded; intimating the dynamic 
flow of relations that an emplaced body involves. As a body enters a space both 
physically and relationally, knowledge of and about that body undergoes a dynamic 
transfiguration and the body, or rather a specific body, comes into being (Pink, 2011; 
p.348). What this brought to mind was how Les’s body and hence his ME is 
transfigured as he enters and engages with the space of the cemetery. As he enters that 
space, a change occurs where the elements of the cemetery become entangled with 
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Les’s physical body in a specific way that gives rise to his experience of being there 
and his knowledge of ME at that time. I infer from this the irreducibility of knowing 
the body or indeed the self because these are always integrated as part of a specific 
space as an ongoing event or dynamic.  
However, as soon as one distinguishes between discourse, materiality and the body 
then the inevitable outcome is a structural explanation [of ME], such as ‘diagnosis 
confers legitimacy’. Les’s relationship with the cemetery is not without conflict and is 
certainly not transparent but it is the conflict and the irreducibility of his ongoing 
experience that makes it so meaningful for him due to the associations with death, 
damage, reparation and restoration, and which are non-representable in terms of 
standard discourses about the ME body. 
Les’s heart-stopping is an actant in the material domain that metonymically translates 
his real heart into the domains of affect and the environment. This is reflected by his 
avoidance, in narrative, of the damage and trauma associated with his heart and the 
consequent displacement of that trauma into the cemetery. These translations become 
understood as, or part of, his ME; which is metonymically translated into the 
materiality of graves and damaged gravestones by means of negotiating the affective 
relation to his compromised physical body. In turn, these translate metaphorically as 
loss of the body and recovery of the body, serving to hold in place the original 
translations. In other words, through the cemetery Les can maintain contact with his 
body, particularly his heart and his fear of it failing, whilst at the same time retaining 
albeit metaphorically the wish that it will be repaired and restored.  
All of the translations involving Les and his heart are coextensive in that they exist 
across time and place and the various domains that each of them represent. They are 
dynamic in the sense that there is constant movement between the actants involved and 
the space that the cemetery forms. Les’s body can be thought of as a thing in itself only 
because a boundary has been established, by convention, between his body and the rest 
of the world or between his body and for example a gravestone. But that is because of 
the way that Western culture tends to make sense of the world via certain categories 
and metaphors in the first place. Alternatively, my approach highlights how the body 
in ME is experienced in ways that incorporates the particular embodiment of non-
dualistic psychosocial processes. 
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The cemetery was always behind Les’s house, waiting, as it were, for specific 
potentialities which it held to become associated with Les. In 1991 Les’s heart stopped 
and his bodily perception was radically altered. To make sense of this and to negotiate 
the anxiety that Les experiences as a displacement into ME and relapse, the cemetery 
has made itself indispensible in an ANT sense. This is not to say that there was 
something that could be labelled as anxiety in an objective sense that appeared when 
Les’s heart stopped and which he then translated into ME. Instead, the anxiety is the 
way that his heart-stopping associated with other actants at that time. Anxiety in this 
sense is being registered as an effect of certain actants associating and not as a thing in 
itself.  
The cemetery is a space where Les can maintain contact with translated representations 
of his damaged body [as holes, damaged graves, bones and so on] as well as the 
phantasy of reparation and regeneration [repaired graves, acknowledgement via 
headstones, and a full cemetery where his dead body wouldn't fit]. From this 
perspective, the cemetery represents to Les his body and is a psychosocial space that 
transcends any of the material elements that it is comprised, one of which is Les’s 
body.  
When Les is in the cemetery, he perceives his body as compromised. But for others, 
such as his wife Dora, when Les is in the cemetery his body is represented as 
compromised because that is ostensibly why Les is in the cemetery in the first place. 
The cemetery is a site where Les’s body presents ME in a way that is visible to others; 
by demonstrating the activity of exercise. In this sense at least his ME is entangled 
with the politically motivated discourses of how to manage ME, thought it cannot be 
reduced to that reason alone. But Les also visits the cemetery because it is a space that 
has become affectively habituated as part of Les’s ME experience. In other words the 
notion that the affective, felt experience of ME is comprised of the dynamic yet 
patterned relationships between people, things and places.  
For Les, the cemetery is a space crucial to managing his ME. However, the 
relationships between Les and the cemetery and indeed between Whimsy and her flat 
[chapter 7] and John and his flat and the cinema [outlined in chapter 5] are subtly 
different and suggest that space and peoples’ ME-relationships with it are variable. 
This is why an analysis that accounts for particular relationships is crucial. Whilst John 
escapes his flat and the anxiety associated with it, Les actively seeks out the cemetery. 
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Whimsy cannot escape her flat and hence anxiety is ever-present. Leaving anxiety in 
the cemetery works as a metonym but a more suitable description is that Les regularly 
goes to the cemetery to work through and reconstruct anxiety as a dynamic process. 
This is a more suitable description because it connotes how anxiety for Les is 
established in terms of the associations between specific actants and places and which 
may involve dynamic changes. However, a different aspect of Les’s ME can be 
presented to the one described thus far and which highlights not only the variable 
manner in which ME is experienced in certain ways at certain times but also how the 
notion of thinking about the body as part of specific psychosocial spaces is useful. 
In the following extract Les describes how his ME ‘goes’ when he is putting [golf] 
with his friends: 
‘J: So you find that when you go out playing your awareness of ME 
disappears? 
L: It’s gone! 
J: It’s just gone completely? 
L: Concentrating on my playing.  
J: And do you find you ( ) in terms of managing behaviour ( ) you think: oh 
no! I've overdone it? 
L: No. There's one or two times I didn't play when I got up there.’ 
What this implies is that ME is not so overwhelming that it is a constant presence in 
Les’s ongoing experience and as an object it moves from foreground to background 
(Paterson, 2001). Les’s ME appears transient and related to activity, context and hence 
certain spaces. He reiterates this on another occasion, this time when playing skittles: 
‘L: Yeh. Missed a few games of the skittles cos I got there and I just didn't 
feel ( ) I could play. The last time I played after the first one I was all shaky.  
J: Oh right. Cos you were just tired or fatigued? 
L: Or I was excited cos I got a good score ha ha ha! 
J: Oh right.  
L: It wasn't that we were playing really awful! 
J: So it wasn't necessarily the energy? It could have been the adrenalin 
maybe? 
L: It could have been. Cos ah ( ) I been playing badly really badly since I 
gone back. First couple of games I played well and since then it’s just gone 
phwapp! Ha ha ha ha I was hoping to get back ( ) it’s a little bit better at the 
moment. I've played three times. Not that good scores but ( ) good enough.’ 
Les provides an alternative for his shakiness that does not imply ME and Les’s sense 
of self is very much tied up with his ability to perform and perform well at sport, 
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which means that in a conventional sense ME has had a deleterious effect on his self. 
Yet, in the preceding extracts Les sidelines the opportunity to establish ME with 
fatigue and hence as fatigue affecting his performance. Instead, he flags up an aspect 
of how he understands self as comprising his ability to perform at sport: 
J: Does it bother you if you don't get good scores particularly? 
L: Well I'm not happy about it cos I'm a winner. I hate losing. Ha ha ha I hate 
losing! I always have done. 
J: So when you say you're a winner then is it during the game itself that you 
kind of feel that?  
L: Well ( ) I'm ( ) come on I wanna win! [Les gesticulates with his fists] I 
wanna win I've always been competitive in all the years ( ) football and 
cricket and anything I play I got to win. 
It is clear that Les’s sense of self is related to sport and performing and that during 
such times as he is playing, a certain affective response is felt in his body that was 
reprised in our discussion. The implication is that particular activities associate with 
particular relationships with ME and the body for Les. When Les is playing skittles or 
golf, his body is able to perform well enough and this is associated with a positive 
view of self. Les’s knowledge of his ME at these times is likely different from when he 
is in the cemetery, where ME reflects different dynamic associations.  
It is therefore useful thinking about the spaces inscribed by golf and skittles from the 
metaphorical and metonymical perceptive. Whereas the cemetery is imbued with 
death, damage and so on, the putting green or skittle-alley appears not to be and 
anxiety is not present for Les. ME and the body are experienced in different ways that 
reflect how Les’s body and his understanding of it results from the transformation that 
occur as the body physically enters and becomes part of different psychosocial spaces 
comprised of different associations.  
A further aspect of Les’s ME that directly involves the body is how the aging body is 
understood.  
Les ties ME and its effect on self with what may or may not be normal aging. He is 
ambiguous concerning his declining energy and ability to perform and is unsure 
whether this is primarily ME or age related. For instance, he explains part of the reason 
for giving up football at age 32 as: 
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L: Well yeh and I was getting slower () in my thirties. I had to move back in 
defence cos it’s easier in defence than up front! Too slow () to score goals ha 
ha. 
In other words a clear, age related effect. This was before ME appeared. But in another 
visit, again discussing playing football, he utilises ME in a more standard way: 
J: Have you found you think you've slowed down as you age or is it mainly 
the ME? 
L: I would think it was mainly the ME. Cos I used to keep myself fit and go 
for runs. I got a treadmill upstairs .  
J: This is because of the ( ) to keep your heart fit? 
L: No just general fitness. I was playing football and all that and I thought 
well I'm gonna keep going cos when you get older you slow down really 
quick ( ) quicker. I was ( ) determined to keep myself fit. But I can't do that 
anymore.  
J: That’s just cos of the ME? 
L: Just cos of the ME yeh. 
Here, in his initial reply, Les establishes a position where ME is prioritised but he also 
mitigates against scepticism that age is involved. He then acknowledges that aging has 
an effect before firmly establishing ME as the cause. However, this extract does not fit 
with the explanation above.  
There is also a conflation of age and how Les responds to his ME. Les explained to me 
in the last meeting that he has accepted his ME won’t get any better. In the following 
extract he links this to age: 
L: Yeh cos if I was younger I just wouldn't accept it. But I don't think there's 
any use fighting it cos it’ll just make you worse. 
There is a clear implication that age has deleterious effects which means not only can 
he not perform but he is less capable of improving his ME. On the other hand, he is 
fully aware that people do recover from ME: 
L: And there’s quite a few people who said it just went like that. Well I find 
that hard to believe. Well Michael Crawford. You know Michael Crawford? 
J: Yeh. 
L: Well he had it apparently. And he’s back in the West End now 
One interpretation is that Les is validating the seriousness of ME by doubting it can be 
recovered from and by emphasising that he won’t recover. Overall, whether or not a 
sufferer utilises standard discourses to explain their ME, such as ‘it is a virus’ or ‘I 
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over did it’, depends on the saliency of the context of talk and activity being 
undertaken. In this case, Les’s sense of self and love of sport was most salient on some 
occasions whereas on others less so. Age appears to be conflated with ME in terms of 
the ability to recover from it. This highlights the benefit of thinking about the 
metaphorical and metonymic aspects of talk in terms of exploring the linguistic context 
for the ways that metaphors are complexed and how they are deployed to narrate 
specific topics or experiences. For instance, one aspect of metaphorical interpretation 
is that his age means he cannot put up a good fight against ME.  
But of course, the physical body does age and in Les’s case there is a translation 
between a young body and an older body that he has to account for. In this sense, the 
body’s ability to perform is entangled with discursive use of terms such as ME and 
overwork as well as specific physiological changes. His initial reason for quitting 
football ties in with his failing ability to perform and hence his sense of self being 
affected. Later, ME is prioritised and this is used to rationalise stopping football. 
However, using the ANT notion of translation frames an exploration of the 
unconscious labour that Les might have to carry out to reconcile his aging body with 
an impaired sense of self that needs to perform visibly through sport and the anxiety 
that this may cause.  
In this section I have focussed on how Les’s body can be explored in terms of a 
dynamic relation with space and place in line with ideas about the need to re-envision 
the relationality of the body, materiality and discourse.  This is important because 
bodies represent sites where social processes become embodied and contested. 
However, the body and its relations are irreducible to these social processes or 
linguistic classification. To try to capture this irreducibility and also the particularity of 
ME I described how Les’s body and his knowledge of his ME comes into being as he 
engages with the space of the cemetery. Various actants  such as graves and damage 
and his failed heart become entangled with Les’s body in a specific way that gives rise 
to his experience of being there and his knowledge of ME at that time. Thinking about 
the body in this way reveals the manner in which discourses about ME, such as the 
need to exercise, motivate Les’s behaviour in that whilst in the cemetery his body 
demonstrates or performs ME for others and for himself. I also outlined how ME and 
its relation to Les’s body is mediated in different ways in different spaces that reflect 
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not only Les’s experience of ME and self but also how ME is reconciled with his body 
as it ages.  
8.7  Final thoughts on the body 
Interrogating what a body is and how it relates to space and place is a useful way of 
exploring ME. Latour (2004) reframes the question of what a body is by rethinking the 
body not in terms of the residence of a super-ordinate entity such as a soul, nor in 
terms of the ‘matter’ of science that is made of primary qualities in a physical sense. 
He also points out that even a phenomenological subjectivity is a myth that is attained 
by ignoring or discounting all the extra-somatic material resources that are in fact used 
to register experience and through which the body learns what it is. Instead of asking 
what a body is Latour reframes the question in terms of what allows the body to be 
registered in the first place, arguing that the body is:  
“An interface that becomes more and more describable as it learns to be 
affected by more and more elements.” (ibid. p.206).  
In other words, the body is only part of a dynamic trajectory by which people learn to 
register and experience the material world and perhaps Latour’s sentiment is also 
useful in turning the gaze outwards from the body to its relations.  
When Les is aware of his chest pain and fear of relapse or when he had original chest 
pain in 1991 and his heart stopped, he was becoming aware of a relation between him 
and the world and his body. This view can be turned outwards such that when Les’s 
heart stopped in 1991 it brought into association things such as a pacemaker, doctors, 
procedures, a different self understanding, and an altered social persona. From this 
view, Les’s body can be explored in terms of the associations that constitute it and 
those it constitutes, rather than as a site where the effects of external events are 
registered.  
What I take from Latour’s argument is that the body, or rather a certain body or body-
part, has to be brought into being. Of course, Les’s heart existed as a material fact 
before 1991 but since that time it has become part of an actor network in a different 
sense. Les is aware of his heart as part of a dynamic arrangement of other actants, such 
as a pacemaker. Les’s heart, like all hearts, had a potentiality that it could stop at any 
time. In 1991 that potentiality become associated with other actants that remain[ed] 
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hidden from view and yet became realised. A new identity came into being. As Latour 
(2004; p.207) notes: 
 “Acquiring a body is thus a progressive enterprise that produces at once a 
sensory medium and a sensitive world.”  
The process of acquiring a body is the means of effecting the world and being effected 
by it.  
Against this backdrop, Les’s body as effected by his heart-stopping, and now by ME, 
necessarily involves actants such as his pacemaker and the cemetery because these are 
the extra-somatic actants with which the whole experience is registered for Les. The 
cemetery as part of Les’s ongoing experience of his body with ME is indispensible, as 
is his pacemaker. Of course, in the ANT spirit, it can be argued that the pacemaker has 
made itself more indispensible in its translation of other actants than the cemetery. But 
I would argue that this is the view from the type of perspective I am eschewing in the 
first place. With Les, his ME body, or parts of it, had to be produced. His heart-
stopping meant that a certain relationship to the body was acquired that then became 
structured as part of the material space of the cemetery and hence ME. 
8.8  Chapter summary and conclusion 
The central element of this chapter has been a reconsideration of the body in ME. I 
addressed the question can ANT and metaphor be used to rethink how the body is 
theorised in ME? To this end I discussed the onset of Les’s ME and the incident of his 
heart-stopping and outlined how I associate these with his habit of walking round his 
local cemetery.  Exploring damage and the cemetery metaphorically and 
metonymically opened up different ways of thinking about Les’s experience of ME. 
Associating actants in this way enabled me to think about how the body might become 
translated into features of ME experience that imply things and places that are not 
considered in standard approaches to ME. Conceptualising the relationality of the 
physical body in terms of other actants and displacements challenges the notion of a 
self-contained unitary experience of ME and the anxiety it entails.   
I drew attention to the heterogeneity of the body and contrasted this with existing 
tendencies to treat it as an homogenous whole. I discussed aspects of Les’s bodily 
experience, such as the heart, chest pains, fear of relapse, and his head and how these 
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constellate as part of his ME. Focussing on body parts rather than abstract whole 
bodies brought me closer to understanding the particular experiences of ME.  
Bringing material spaces into ME, especially ones such as cemeteries which are filled 
with affect, and exploring them through the psychoanalytically inclined lens of 
metaphor and metonymy provides alternative insights into the relationships between 
ME, the body and the types of activities ME sufferers might engage in. From one 
perspective Les is moderating his ME with exercise by visiting the cemetery regularly. 
From a different perspective, thinking about why Les visits the cemetery particularly 
opens up a way of exploring behaviour that appears imbued with unconscious 
processes and anxiety.  
I outlined how Les experiences his body and ME in a different way when he is playing 
golf or skittles and which contrast the anxiety associated with Les’s ME and the 
cemetery. I discussed this in terms of the places that these activities comprise and how 
Les’s body is transformed as it becomes part of different these different psychosocial 
spaces. Part of this was how Les understands ME in relation to his aging body and its 
changing capacities. 
Finally, I cited Latour (2004) to argue that the body, or rather a certain body or body 
part has to be brought into being, rather than representing a pre-existent whole, and 
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9.1  Chapter overview 
In this final chapter I summarise my research findings and the contribution they make 
to understanding the experience of suffering ME and its relation to self. The central 
premise of this research was to develop a non-reductive means of exploring ME and its 
effects on self in relation to the material environment and the objects in it. This 
premise was formalised as three research questions that I approached by developing a 
methodology built on a synthesis of Actor Network Theory and psychoanalytically 
inspired psychosocial ideas about metaphor and metonymy: 
 How can material actants be used to explore the relationship between self and others 
for people with ME? 
 How can metaphor and metonymy be used to explore relations between actants?  
 Can ANT and metaphor be used to rethink how the body is theorised in ME? 
A key concern was to find a way of identifying all the different types of things that ME 
might be comprised of, such as viruses, symptoms, discourses, life events and material 
places on an equal footing. The purpose of this was to avoid slipping into an implicit 
causality where one thing was assumed to be more important than another and hence 
determinate in how ME took shape. ANT became the means by which this was 
achieved because it adopts a relational ontology, which enabled me to approach each 
entity [actant] as equally significant. Through the ANT premise of translation this 
provided an heuristic to think about what each actant was doing in a sufferer’s 
experience of ME in terms of its associations with other actants. Using translation 
enabled me to build up an understanding of a given sufferer’s ME in terms of 
networks. I defined the term local and global networks to describe the analytical 
process of organising the associations and actants that became salient into overall 
descriptions of how ME was manifested.  
218 
 
A significant idea within the ANT notion of translation is that an actant becomes 
displaced from one site to another, across place and time and in terms of form. It was 
important to trace these displacements and to account for them so that the resultant 
descriptions of ME could be substantiated. To explore associations I drew on 
psychoanalytically inspired psychosocial approaches. Such approaches enable an 
equal-handed treatment of the social and psychological aspects of ME and promote 
creative ideas about the relationships between psychological and sociological 
processes and their mutual infusion. Most importantly, psychosocial approaches 
challenge the notion of the rational and autonomous human that characterises social 
understanding as well as collapsing dualistic notions of mind/body; which the ME 
debate largely hinges on. In contrast, a psychosocial focus is on process and 
relationships and exploring the unconscious ways in which the psychic infuses the 
social and vice versa. This lead to a thicker description of how ME is experienced.  
Exploring psychosocial ideas lead me to research on metaphor and metonymy. The 
appeal was that contemporary work such as that of Lakoff and Johnson and 
psychoanalytic work by Freud, Klein and Winnicott appeared to converge on the idea 
that metaphor was intimately related to the way that humans develop language and 
thought through processes that primarily involve somatic and physical experiences that 
are situated in the immediate environment. I thus looked to metaphor as a means not 
only of tracing associations between actants but also to think about the connections 
between the body and materiality. 
Finally, after building my ideas of how ME was related to the sufferer’s material 
objects and environments I used the term assemblage to convey the messy complexity 
and indeterminate nature of ME and its effects on self. Assemblage captures how ME 
is comprised of concepts, experiences, viruses, bodies, material objects and places as a 
shifting mass of disparate actors in dynamic association. From this perspective self and 
and identity become properties of the assemblage as a whole and not fixed, essential 
entities. Describing ME as an assemblage also captures the particularity of how ME is 
different for each sufferer; a further central imperative of my research.  
The ethnographically inclined methodology that I developed was innovative and 
reflexive and involved bringing together many strands of data such as talking and 
participating with ME sufferers in their everyday environments and routines across a 
six month period. The challenges in developing the methods through which my 
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methodology was realised were many and included being with people who were 
emotionally and physically affected by ME and reconciling this with the requirements 
of research, the logistics of visiting sufferers across relatively long distances and 
capturing and organising vast quantities of data. 
The analytical process was complicated and time consuming. The challenges included 
identifying whether instances in the data represented figurative, metaphoric or 
metonymic processes, substantiating my inferences and building up networks to the 
point where they were stable enough that I could begin to comment on how ME was 
entangled with self.  
The end product of my research, this thesis, represents only a fraction of the material 
that was gathered and the time and work that actually took place. As my analyses are 
organised around three ME sufferers, the voices of remaining sufferer’s are largely 
unrepresented. I feel this to be a significant issue requiring explicit acknowledgement. 
9.2  Summary of main findings and how they contribute to knowledge 
In this section I summarise the main findings of my research and how they contribute 
to an understanding of ME or as a psychosocial approach. The overall contribution is 
that my analyses reveal how ME is fundamentally entangled with material objects and 
environments and marked by unconscious processes and associations that might 
otherwise go overlooked. Also, exploring how the body can be theorised in terms of its 
parts and associations highlights the way that ME manifests in superficially similar 
ways that belie different and particular processes.  
9.2.1   Material actants and ME 
A key concern of this research was to explore the ways in which material actants were 
involved in the everyday experiences of ME sufferers. I was surprised by the range of 
things that ME sufferers showed me and this reflected the highly personal functions 
that these objects performed. In terms of method, focussing on objects not only 
facilitated and opened up the discussion with sufferers but quickly lead to an 
understanding of how their experience of ME was anchored in concrete reality.  This 
was exemplified clearly with Bruce and the manner in which his relationships and how 
he narrated his self-understanding across his life span incorporated objects such as his 
Dad’s cupboards and bench, his pill dispenser, his juicer and blender and bread and 
butter pudding. Exploring these objects as actants and tracing their associations 
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provided a means of connecting up experiences in Bruce’s childhood as well as their 
ongoing effects. It also connects ME directly to the material environment and this 
focus is a novel contribution to ME research.  
Considering material actants provides a means of tracing associations across time. 
They also reveal the type of varied and unconscious work that might be involved in 
managing ME in that the cupboards and bench provided a site on which Bruce could 
not only maintain contact with his Dad but also an opportunity to reject and resist his 
classed origins and emotional background. In this light, exploring material actants 
provides a means of thinking though how emotion and class have become conflated for 
Bruce. By connecting material actants with non-material actants and approaching them 
as a network enabled an understanding of how Bruce’s material surroundings became 
displaced into a sense of class, which became conflated with burgeoning emotional 
alienation from self and parents. Overall Bruce’s sense of otherness and emotional 
alienation from self and others became potentiated in many non-material and material 
actants and realised as an identity at the network level. The significance is the 
connection of this to Bruce’s ME, a major feature of which appears to be a conflation 
between ongoing anxiety and emotion.  
The significance of material actants to ME was illustrated by Bruce’s pill dispenser, 
which validates and materially mediates an aspect of Bruce’s ME experience. The 
effects of ME are thus associated with specific material actants. As such, the dispenser 
is granting Bruce an agential means to address his ME. This was also the case with the 
blender and juicer which became a site where Bruce can approach ME by utilising his 
scientific knowledge. The dispenser, juicer and blender enable Bruce to objectify ME 
and to distance himself from it. 
From the ANT perspective, aspects of ME appear to be resolved by passaging though 
specific material objects (González, 2013).  For instance, in this manner, some of the 
anxiety associated with Bruce’s symptoms is managed. Thus, anxiety can be thought 
about as the associations between things rather than as a thing in itself or as the 
contour between actants. This provides an alternative to deploying for instance anxiety 





9.2.2   The relationship between ME and spaces and places 
Using metaphor and metonymy to explore the relations between spaces, places and 
ME provides a radical understanding of the condition. In chapter seven I outlined the 
notion of debilitating space; a useful way of framing how a place can exacerbate or 
add to the negative effects of ME. This notion complements existing work on enabling 
and restorative spaces and associates with different actants such as emotion, energy, 
pain and the body. Whimsy’s flat represented a debilitating space where she felt 
trapped, isolated and fears dying alone. Exemplifying the synthesis between ANT and 
metaphor, I framed how Whimsy’s flat represented metaphoric processes that 
transcended and connected what would otherwise be binary understandings of 
inner/outer, social/individual and material/immaterial. By tracing chains of 
displacement I suggested that Whimsy’s flat had become a metonymical translation of 
how she felt trapped in a body that did not work, due to ME. The relationship with her 
flat reprised how she experienced self as separate and yet internal to her body. This is a 
crucial insight into how the connections between body, self and the environment can 
be understood in terms of conscious and unconscious processes.  
Whimsy’s flat as debilitating also connected to traumatic events in Whimsy’s 
childhood. Whimsy used meditation to ground her body and keep the traumatic event 
out of her flat. A debilitating space is therefore a space where past events and present 
practices converge. The notion extends and complements work on enabling spaces 
because it stresses the psychosocial relations between people, places and events rather 
than merely focussing on the material properties of place (Steinfeld and Danford, 
1999) or their psychophysiological or social aspects (Korpela et al. 2008; Cattell et al. 
2008).  
The notion of debilitating space also applied to John in that he felt obliged to escape 
mounds of paper and how his flat symbolised lack of status and failure. With Hannah, 
whilst her house was facilitatory, outside the house had become a debilitating space 
where she suffered anxiety associated with social interaction and the fear of such 
interaction being compromised by ME symptoms. Thus, three different experiences of 
debilitating spaces suggest that not only is the notion useful in exploring the relation 
between ME and place, but it also points to the particularity of ME experience.  The 
notion of a debilitating space provides a frame for exploring physical environments 
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where material and non-material actants interact with specific material places in non-
causal ways.  
The relationship between space and place and ME was also important for Les, but not 
in the sense of debilitation. I described the associations between Les’s onset of ME, his 
fear of relapse, how his heart had stopped and how he regularly visits the cemetery 
behind his house. His conscious use of the cemetery is for exercise and fresh air. 
However, Les’s relation to the cemetery can also be explored in terms of a site that 
involves specific unconscious anxieties concerning death and his heart that are 
inextricably linked with how he experiences ME. With John, I described how a 
specific cinema and his daily route past it could also be framed as a psychosocial 
space. I drew on Pink (2008) to think about a place not as a distinct, static area but as a 
process that implicates a mobile, sensing body, objects and others. This demonstrates 
not only the value of connecting ME to space and place but also the use of metaphor to 
trace such associations.  
Overall, exploring ME as situated in specific places and rethinking them in terms of 
psychosocial spaces provides a lens on the types of activities ME sufferers might 
engage in and why, as well as highlighting the interplay between conscious and 
unconscious processes that may appear to result in counter-intuitive behaviour. It 
provides an alternative view that complements a rational understanding of activities 
designed to ameliorate ME, such as exercise. 
9.2.3   Understanding the relationship between antecedent events 
    and ME  
Various behavioural, cognitive and biopsychosocial models of ME exist
32
. The 
commonality of these models is an implicit causality between antecedent factors such 
as biological triggers and behavioural and cognitive modes of maintenance. However, 
debate remains as to the weight that individual factors lend to how ME manifests or is 
maintained and thus what should be prioritised from a treatment perspective (Maes & 
Twisk, 2010). Models that seek to balance biological factors with the 
phenomenological experience of ME, such as Ulvestad (2008), where the problem is 
couched as a ‘developmental systems disorder’, are valuable in working to bridge the 
divide between biomedicine and qualitative social scientific accounts of ME. However, 
                                                 
32
 See for example Surawy et al. (1995); Ulvestad (2008); Harvey & Wessely (2009); Maes and Twisk 
(2010) Moss-Morris et al. (2011). 
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they call uncritically on eclectic ideas such as psychoneuronimmunology, genetics, and 
phenomenology and systems theory. The problem is that because neither a common 
language nor ground had been established between these areas. It is therefore still not 
possible to attribute aetiological roles and there exists epistemological incompatibility. 
The purpose of my research was to explore the relations between antecedent factors 
and the ongoing experience of ME from a non-causal, non-aetiological perspective. 
Thinking about antecedents metaphorically overcomes the problem of assuming causal 
relations between things or identifying the relative weight that might be attributed to 
factors. Because metaphors exist and cluster in complex ways it cannot be presumed 
that any metaphor or metonym represents a discrete, causal mapping between one 
thing and another (Kimmel, 2010). This in itself steers away from trying to establish 
linear relations between antecedent factors and towards thinking about factors as 
coincident or coextensive.  
For instance, I outlined how Les narrated the onset of ME by conflating two apparently 
disconnected events, namely his heart stopping in 1991 and the [unusual] onset of ME 
with chest pains. Rather than establish causality between these events I approached 
them by tracing how these were associated with other actants. That there are 
associations were evidenced by Les’s use of figurative language when describing the 
events. I used psychoanalytic ideas to consider why Les neither made a conscious 
connection between these events nor at any time mentioned death or dying explicitly. 
It was as though the anxiety associated with these events was displaced. I outlined the 
relationship to psychoanalytic ideas where unconscious anxiety that cannot be 
verbalised or expressed symbolically manifests as an apparently disconnected somatic 
symptom (Elisha, 2011). Perhaps this was why Les consciously acknowledged how he 
feared relapse; an event that appeared to metonymically reprise the issues with his 
heart and ME-onset. However, Les’s heart stopping and his peculiar ME-onset are not 
easily reconciled with standard ME discourse or biomedical approaches. This indicates 
the use of a psychosocial framework and how it avoids reducing psychological 
symptoms to biological antecedents.  
The complex nature of metaphor was also reflected in how Whimsy described 
antecedent events and brought to mind how metaphoric processes can become 
complexed into one object or process (Montana Katz, 2011). Moreover, the manner in 
which metaphors complex with each other can be conflicted and contradictory and this 
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was reflected in the way that Whimsy’s narrative often felt compounded and confused 
when she described her triggering event. By using the ANT/metaphoric methods to 
follow and trace actants and their associations I outlined how Whimsy’s understanding 
of the immediate triggering event appeared to be compounded with undisclosed 
childhood trauma, abandonment, a car crash and a lost baby amongst others. By using 
metaphor creatively and tying it into further elements of Whimsy’s narrative, ME 
revealed itself as the associations between actants. I suggested that via a series of 
metonymic equivalents, death had become associated with unconscious fears that 
manifested physically in her neck and that her neck had became the focal point and 
embodiment of her ME.  
Overall, exploring ME antecedents in terms of metaphor provides a way of 
incorporating things that might have otherwise been overlooked and leads to an 
appreciation of how temporally distant events remain important in the ongoing 
experience of ME and how they become conflated with specific physical entities and 
situated experiences.  
9.2.4    The particularity of ME and the heterogenous body 
The body is implicated in debates around ME in many ways, such as the contested 
mind-body aetiology, the debilitating nature of physical symptoms and politically 
motivated discourses about how to treat ME (Horton-Salway, 2001; 2002; Karfakis, 
2013). There is also a tension between an increasing acknowledgement of the 
heterogeneity of ME and the biomedical tenet that similar illness manifestations must 
have something in common (Ulvestad, 2008); a key principle in separating out illness 
categories.  
Ulvestad acknowledges, albeit from a systems viewpoint, that all people are different. 
The issue for Ulvestad is that individuals are diseased in their own way and that this 
defies essentialist approaches to management. I concur with this sentiment and 
Ulvestad’s general premise which resonate with my research aim of using ANT and 
metaphor to rethink how the body is theorised in ME.  
I have already described how I rethought the relationship between body and material 
places in terms of the displacement between Les’s heart stopping, fear of relapse and 
the cemetery. But it is also important to emphasise the heterogeneity of the body itself 
in that ME for Les involved chest pains and headaches. For Whimsy, her neck became 
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the site of her ME because it blocked energy flows and inhibited romantic relations 
due to Whimsy’s anxiety that it might break. Subjectively, Whimsy usually 
experienced her entire body as ungrounded and also undergoes what she describes as 
out of body experiences. John experienced headaches associated with waking up in his 
flat every day.  
These descriptions point to the particular ways in which ME is experienced and that 
rather than an homogenised whole body affected by ME, ME is registered in parts of 
the body in both a metaphoric and literal manner.  Adopting a relational ontological 
stance was crucial. The relational ontology of ANT decentred the body and allowed 
me to explore how it was affected by ME as a whole and in terms of its parts and at the 
same ontological level as other actants that became salient. In this manner the body 
and body-parts took on specific identities reflecting associations with specific actants. 
The specific arrangement of actantial associations potentiated the various identities of 
the particular body or parts therein and always in a particular context.  
My descriptions of how ME affected the body/parts of the ME sufferers I worked with 
were therefore embedded in embodied practices and material contexts that could not 
always be articulated by the sufferer (Pink, 2011). By not assuming that similar 
processes underpin the experience of ME, despite similar surface manifestations, and 
by approaching ME indirectly provided a sense of how the condition is entangled and 
inseparable from the body and its particular material and non-material associations. I 
approached the body as simultaneously biological, material and physical and 
irreducible to social classification (Shilling, 2003).   
The relational ontology of ANT contributes to decentring the body and re-envisioning 
it as one actant amongst many at the same ontological level. In this sense, the body 
becomes an effect at the network level or an “ambivalent form of materiality” Mulcahy 
(2012; p.82) yet one that acts and performs in particular ways depending on what it is 
assembled with. Thinking about the body as an heterogenous assemblage reflects 
Birke’s (1999) observation that the organic body is always in a state of flux, as cells 
and tissues are renewed and broken down. This actual heterogeneity coupled with 
metaphors of fluidity and translation contrasts the notion of the body as fixed. It is 




9.2.5   Exploring how ME sufferers deploy terms such as ‘energy’ 
Low energy and post-exertional malaise are common features of ME as well as 
psychiatric and biomedical concerns with characterising and managing the condition 
(Carruthers et al. 2011; Heins et al. 2013). Exploring the ways in which ME sufferers 
experience and understand energy is highly salient. Previous work reveals that ME 
sufferers characteristically deploy conventional metaphors about energy, for example: 
“‘It’s like someone has sucked all your energy out with a big syringe” 
(Brocki, 2008; p.250). 
Or as as an object: 
 “I think I've definitely got my base energy levels up.’ (ibid. p.260).  
Energy is reported in terms of a quantifiable amount that can be depleted (Dickson, 
2004; p.87). Besides energy being quantifiable and objectified, it can be given and 
taken in that: 
“I can get energy from people and when they go they take my energy.” (Hart 
& Grace, 2010; p. 193).  
And lack of energy affects sufferer’s ability to maintain social contact (Reynolds & 
Vivat, 2006).  
Hart and Grace (2010) note that a discourse around energy exists that is useful for 
analysing issues of fatigue. However, the manner in which this discourse is called 
upon appears to reflect the conventional, objectified use of energy mentioned 
previously. Moreover, the majority of qualitative social scientific literature that report 
ME narratives and the effects of fatigue and energy also call upon the same 
unproblematic discourse of energy as a quantifiable, objectified entity that can flow or 
be blocked. These conventional metaphors of energy were also reflected by sufferers 
in my research.  
However, tracing associations using the ANT and metaphoric approach revealed a 
complex and conflated use of energy with the body, material actants and the material 
environment. Whimsy does not assume that energy is a mind or body phenomenon and 
relates to energy as a metaphor that enables her to articulate and experience the 
relationship between her neck, ME and actants such as the collapse.  The blurring of 
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the literal and the figurative is revealed because her neck is a real part of the body but 
it blocks the flow of energy.  
Whimsy is unclear to herself what energy is and describes it in metonymical terms of 
something that needs to be moved but cannot because of a compromised neck, which 
she fears might break. Thus, her use of energy at one level reflects conventional 
metaphor. Yet at another it points to a different relationship between factors that 
cannot be articulated by Whimsy. This indicates that energy is more problematic in 
how it is deployed and what it reveals. For instance, Whimsy narrates that energy is 
trapped in her head, which mirrors her fear of being trapped in her flat. But both of 
these instances of being trapped associate metonymically with early childhood trauma.  
Approaching energy and ME for Whimsy through an accepted discourse of how 
energy is deployed may not reveal how her experience of ME is highly entangled with 
early experiences and the ongoing material environment of her flat. For John, the 
conflation of physical and psychological aspects of energy was explicit but energy was 
metaphorically translated into paper items which he ostensibly hoarded to inform him 
of the best decisions to make. However, John had become overwhelmed by the amount 
of paper which had translated itself into not making decisions. Consequently, he awoke 
each morning feeling overwhelmed and ‘lacking energy’ and his recourse was to 
escape his flat, which he did every day by taking the same route through town. For 
John, energy reflected associations between place and behaviour and hence ME. 
Overall, identifying the particular, non-conventional ways that energy is deployed and 
tracing its associations to material actants and environments enables new meanings 
about how ME is experienced and what it is comprised of to emerge. 
9.2.6   Exploring how self is affected by and associated with ME 
Whereas biomedical approaches to ME are concerned with aetiology, mechanisms and 
treatment, they are not concerned with what it is like to experience ME nor how it 
affects the self. Social scientific qualitative approaches to understanding what it feels 
like to suffer ME adopt various epistemological perspectives but tend to rely on 
standard discourses with which to describe its effects. They also tend to rely on the 
interview method as the mainstay of investigation. Because ME appears to transcend 
characterisation as psychological, social or physiological and because many aspects of 
ME are confusing and contradictory I envisaged ME in terms of a complex, dynamic 
arrangement of factors. I attempted to develop a perspective on ME and its effects on 
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self that rearticulated the mind-body schism and to account for the way that self 
experience might implicate the material world and environment by drawing on 
psychoanalytically informed ideas.  
It was also important to develop a reflexive stance that incorporated the role I played 
in making sense of sufferers’ narratives and my response to the research. A 
psychosocial approach appeared apposite. My analyses suggest ways of thinking about 
the entanglements of ME and self. For example, I described a particular arrangement 
between Bruce and specific actants that resulted in what I termed the productive self. 
This term captured how certain actants are mobilised so that Bruce can address ME 
symptoms such as fatigue and offset the anxiety associated with appearing 
unproductive in the eyes of others and to himself. Through cooking, Bruce has been 
able to explore his relation to ME by incorporating an ideology inclined to harmony 
with nature and natural things. He has utilised specific material actants such as a 
blender and a juicer that have become significant signs of the self (Rochberg-Halton, 
1984). The blender acts as a displacement of Bruce’s lack of strength and wrist 
weakness. Methodologically, the blender facilitated a discussion about Bruce’s food 
intolerances. This in itself indicates the importance of utilising material objects as a 
means of theorising the self and opening up dialogue about self experience. More 
importantly, my analysis attempted to illustrate how self can be thought about as 
emerging in light of the ways that specific actants associate.  
How Bruce experiences ME and how he understands it has affected his self reflects a 
particular arrangement of actants. This is in contrast to the generalising tendency of 
existing social scientific qualitative research to present alternative, sometimes 
contrasting and yet quite general trajectories of the relationship between self and ME. 
Focusing on the ongoing movement between actants in and out of networks 
encourages thinking about the ways in which Bruce’s self experience is anchored in 
materiality but is also phenomenologically different at different times, depending what 
is associated.  
This psychosocial perspective challenges the idea of an autonomous self that is 
affected by ME in an objective, unitary manner because the perspective implies the 
entanglements between many disparate factors that have existed across Bruce’s life 
and which Bruce is not consciously aware of.  
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My approach also sheds light on the relationship between ME, self and real and 
imagined others. With Whimsy, I described how her metonymic relation with her neck 
and fear that it might break affected her ability to embark on romantic relations. This 
aspect of self experience is a clear example of how ME affects social relations in a 
general sense, but that a psychosocial perspective reveals an arrangement of actants 
particular to Whimsy. Overall, the psychosocial framework I have developed has 
enabled an exploration of self and ME by incorporating factors that might otherwise 
have been overlooked. My analyses reveals that the relationship between self and ME 
is much more complex than existing research might suggest.  
9.3  Evaluation of the methodological premise  
Given that my research involved developing a methodology through synthesising 
existing ideas, it is important to evaluate the viability of some of the central 
methodological aspects. Whilst there are clearly many features that require evaluation, 
the scope of this thesis precludes it. Thus, I evaluate what I consider are key issues. 
These are the success or failure of adopting a relational ontology, whether ANT lent 
itself to being synthesised with ideas on metaphor and whether the methodology is 
capable of exploring issues of otherness in ME. The last issue is significant not only 
because of the ubiquity of the human experience of otherness but also because it 
characterises many aspects of ME.  
9.3.1   The issue of ontology 
Establishing a relational ontology was employed so that I could explore all actants as 
equally significant to the experience of ME and how ME sufferers constitute their 
reality, without restricting my focus to one type of actant or to adopting a specific 
epistemological stance.  
According to Wildman (2006), the basic contention with a relational ontology is that 
the relations between entities become more important than the entities themselves. 
Wildman also points to the need to think about the ontological prioritisation of 
substance over relation, given that situations exist where a relation will change but the 
substance will not. A further consideration is whether relations are ontologically real 
or merely attributions made by conscious entities. For instance, an idealist stance 
would attribute primary ontological status to conceptual relations and from an 
empirical perspective, causation provides an ontological basis for speaking of the 
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reality of relations, which means causal relations exist irrespective of whether people 
are conscious of them or not. Ontology is therefore important concerning ME if it 
entails, for example, relations involving a virus that are independent of people’s 
conscious engagement with it but which do have a casual effect. Therefore, a question 
is whether I have downplayed relations which might be better thought of as causal or 
which might conflict with the understanding that ME sufferers hold.  
By assuming ontological relationality between actants I could focus on the associations 
between things in an inclusive manner. In line with Gargiulo (2006) this fits with the 
notion that ME has no single centre of meaning or single causal entity. Instead, ME 
constantly circulates, is redefined and renegotiated. So there exists a tension between 
the poles of causality and coextensivity that perhaps reflects Latour’s (2005; p.147) 
claim that actors establish their own ontologies. In other words descriptions of how 
actors’ worlds become established take precedence over the explanations of [social] 
scientists. From this perspective, the relational ontology I adopted served as a useful 
means of retaining the importance of all actants but what is equally important is 
valuing how ME sufferers construct their experience on their own terms.  
A further justification for adopting a relational ontology is because the ontological 
problem is not directly addressed by biomedical ME research. Instead, the focus 
appears to be epistemological. But as Poli (2002) notes, it is unreasonable to address a 
scientific problem without at least considering its ontological boundaries and 
structures. Ontological neglect is a core issue with existing biomedical research into 
ME because of implicit assumptions about causal relations. The categories that 
biomedicine attributes items to, such as physiological, psychological and psychosocial, 
represent ontological domains that become entangled in complex ways and therefore 
difficult to tease apart and analyse in terms of the implicit causality of biomedical 
epistemology. Looking for root causes of ME results in ambiguity. Categorising ME 
also means anything that does not immediately fit into a category is in danger of being 
discarded in the analysis. For instance, John’s collection of paper is clearly entangled 
with his ME symptomology but it does not fit neatly into a biomedical categorisation 
of ME and is at odds with the formal diagnosis of ME which he has. It may however 
fit into a psychiatric category, but that exacerbates the problem. 
However, I do acknowledge two issues. Firstly, the criticism that a relational ontology, 
by equating inanimate objects with humans, relegates the latter’s agency and lived 
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uniqueness. Mutch (2002; p.487) states that a relational ontology fails to escape the 
level of process and “ignores the stratified nature of human society”. This implies that 
people are reduced to the effects of their associations. As Sutherland (2013) notes, 
concepts such as ‘process’, ‘flow’ and ‘flux’ are unable to account for the material 
substantiality and agency of objects and privileges ‘becoming’ over ‘being’. However, 
this type of criticism is tautological and implies the dichotomy of process and object 
that I sought to avoid.  
My position is that processes implicate objects and vice versa and are therefore 
inseparable. Concerning ME, a virus may be implicated but that implication is in the 
form of an embodied effect and a process that also entails other objects. The virus 
cannot be distinguished as separate from the mental constructs and methods used to 
make sense of it or how it is experienced (Pels, Hetherington and Vandenberghe, 
2002). Because a virus cannot be experienced in an unmediated and unrepresented 
form there is no recourse to a deeper ontological level of reality. In this way, I argue 
that human experience is a process always mediated by things but because of the 
subjective sense of self the ‘things’ become bracketed off as separate from us. My 
conclusion is that a relational ontology was warranted. But it does lead to the 
observation that despite the suggestion that things and people are equally significant, 
most people feel more important than, for example, a food mixer. Thus the lived 
experience and subjective understanding of ME is paramount and research should 
therefore seek to maintain the integrity of sufferers’ accounts by avoiding the 
imposition of a version of ME on them. 
In summary, the ontological stance I have adopted allowed me to extend an 
understanding of the experience of ME. It enabled me to follow disparate actants and 
explore the processes and relationships ME entails from the perspective of otherwise 
neglected entities and through which ME is experienced and made sense of. It 
provided a useful way of grounding my psychosocial framework. However, in the 
spirit of ANT I emphasise that the descriptions of the ME sufferers I worked with 
remain paramount on their own terms. 
9.3.2   The compatibility of metaphor with ANT 
In this section I evaluate my synthesis of ANT and metaphor, outlining where I think 
the synthesis was successful and raising points of concern. My rationale for this 
synthesis was that I wanted to retain a sense of the interiority of self without reducing 
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it to an exclusively inner process and to connect up the disparate aspects that 
constituted ME. Psychoanalytically informed psychosocial approaches provided a 
means of thinking about the relationship between mind and body from an already 
metaphorical perspective. ANT provided a non-reductionist framework from which the 
associations between different entities could be explored. 
The flexible nature of metaphor implicitly acknowledges the potential for multiple 
associations between actants and points to the contingency of these associations and 
away from positing essential connections or causal relations. In line with Latour 
(2005), using metaphor encourages resisting the familiar and being creative. Was this 
in keeping with the basic ANT premise?   
An initial concern was that metaphor represented a separate ontology, with the 
implication that metaphorical relations, even if hidden, are substantive. However, 
metaphor was being used to suggest and describe potential associations between 
actants and their identity in relation to the whole network.  It was not being used to 
describe essential qualities of actants. This means that the metaphors used to talk about 
associations were also potentialities of the actants themselves. However, there may 
remain some tension between the use of metaphor, which represents an idealist 
position, and the materially orientated relational ontology of ANT.  
If metaphor development and use is not intimately associated with somatic and 
physical extra-somatic experience then it operates in an ontologically different domain 
from the body and the material environment. If this is the case, then my recourse to a 
relational ontology that grounds the body, the material, the experiential and the 
conceptual is flawed in a way that negates the methodological premise. That is a strong 
version of the problem. The weaker version is that whilst I am uncertain about the 
degree to which thinking and experience are metaphorical and the degree to which 
metaphor develops as part of physiological development, it does provide a useful 
heuristic which enabled me to describe how actants associate and why certain actants 
constellate. But there remains an issue of not overstating the case or promoting 
metaphoric relations to a position of causality. For instance, Les’s heart stopping has a 
metaphoric relation and a literal one to being dead. But that does not mean that there 
existed some underlying metaphoric process that structured these relations, as implied 
by psychoanalytic writers such as Montana Katz (20011) and Borbely (2004, 2009). In 
other words, I am not establishing metaphor as a separate ontology. 
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A further issue is that I tended to assume that metaphor reflected functional relations 
with objects. For instance, I have looked at what Bruce does with his food blender and 
did not enquire about its metaphorical status directly. I assumed that objects possessed 
some literal properties and metaphorically others (Goodman, 1979; Shottenkirk, 2009) 
but tended towards the functional. Stern (2001; p.302) debates the metaphorical status 
of non-linguistic objects, he explains that the broader issue is about the mechanisms 
that are specifically responsible for metaphor as opposed to general mechanisms 
concerned with symbolisation in a broad sense. In other words, are metaphoric 
processes a special subset of symbolisation and is there a case for focussing on literal 
relations? These questions require further work. Beyond this there exists difficulty in 
assessing whether material is metaphorical or metonymical, or indeed overlaps, in the 
first place (Bartsch, 2002; Dirven et al. 2003).  
Using metaphor to think about temporal relations proved useful. Incorporating 
metaphor as the means of establishing associations provided a means of noticing and 
thinking about temporal associations. According to Cameron et al. (2009), metaphors 
leave traces behind them or trails of association. This implies the temporal and spatial 
aspects of metaphor and that metaphors connect many systems of thinking, language, 
discourse and various levels of social organisation. Cameron et al. (2009; p.64) sheds 
some light on this by thinking about metaphor as:  
“No longer a static, fixed mapping, but a temporary stability emerging from 
the activity of interconnecting systems of socially-situated language use and 
cognitive activity.”  
This is commensurate with an ANT perspective because it means that metaphor is not 
viewed as a separate ontological level that stands behind actants. This perspective also 
resonates with my psychosocial framework in that metaphoric structures transcend 
inner/outer divides and bring together otherwise disparate elements yet in a dynamic 
manner. 
But it is still the case that some metaphoric translations are more conventional and 
hence less opaque than others. Glucksberg and McGlone (1999) raise the question of 
how to decide which attributes of a metaphor’s source equate to attributes assumed 
from its target. For instance the metaphoric translation Whimsy’s wooden peg and a 
lack of father figure is initially opaque. Gildea & Glucksberg (1983) assert that whilst 
some metaphors are immediately understandable, others require an appropriate context 
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to trigger comprehension. Similarly, Stern (2001) argues that semantic context 
systematically affects how metaphoric interpretation occurs. So questions remain as to 
why certain metaphoric relations are established from the perspective of the ME 
sufferer and whether these reflect a further level of organisation.  
The breadth of what is considered as metaphor also needs to be addressed. To suggest 
linguistic similarities rest on a conceptual system where experiences in one domain can 
be understood metaphorically in terms of another domain rests on a definition of 
metaphor that is ‘so broad that it loses its original valency’ (Jackendoff and Aaron, 
1991). Perhaps this indicates not only a difficulty in separating out metaphorical, 
metonymical and literal material but the reflexive issue that ultimately any 
interpretation rests with the researcher.  
In summary, my basic premise that metaphor provides an heuristic means of tracing 
the associations between actants and provides a descriptive language to talk about 
association appears warranted and in keeping with ANT. However, questions remain 
about why certain metaphoric processes become salient and not others, which requires 
further exploration. There may also be a case for paying more attention to the literal, 
functional relations between ME sufferers and material actants and environments.  
9.4  Possible limitations of the research  
In this section I discuss the possible limitations of my research and thesis. These fall 
into two main areas. These are issues with generalisability of the method and issues of 
reflexivity. 
The first area hinges on my sample size and the premise of describing the particularity 
of ME. Firstly, it might be argued that eight ME sufferers are too few to provide an 
adequate basis to assess the generalisability of the method and as such it provides a 
limited view of the general experience of ME. However, given that my rationale 
involved the development of a new methodology, a small sample size was warranted. 
More importantly, the methodology rested on prioritising the experience of the ME 
sufferer and wanting to gain in-depth insight, over time, into their experiences, daily 
routines, sense of self and the particularity of ME.  
It was also necessary to employ a small sample because of the projected amount of 
data that would be generated and how this would limit the degree of analysis that could 
be achieved in the given period. Whether my analyses provide general descriptions of 
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how ME is related to self experience is less clear. Indeed, the sufferers I worked with 
narrated many similar and general experiences with ME that reflect accepted 
discourses on the condition.  
For example, ME had a social impact in every case. However, given my focus on the 
particularity of ME, sample size is irrelevant. But there remains a paradox. On one 
hand, my approach allowed me to explore ME from an experience-near perspective, 
which was novel in itself and lead to descriptions of how ME and its effects, whilst 
superficially similar, arose through very different processes. On the other hand, from 
this perspective it is difficult to draw comparisons between cases of ME. I conclude 
that the effectiveness of my premise and methods should be judged on the merits of 
my analyses in this thesis and their potential transferability and not on the 
generalisability of my findings concerning ME.  
Another aspect of generalisability which is more problematic is that the sample was 
comprised of ME sufferers who were mobile and well enough to participate and past 
an acute and extremely debilitating onset, where sometimes the sufferer is bed-ridden. 
The reasons why I worked with an able sample reflect sampling techniques and the 
nature of the sites from which I recruited as well as the ethical concern for their well-
being. Thus, the experience of sufferers at the time of research would be vastly 
different from their experience at acute ME onset. Sufferers at the acute stage would 
be less mobile and perhaps engaged with the material environment in a different or 
limited way. In cases of extreme fatigue and cognitive impairment this would affect 
the researcher’s ability to engage with the sufferer’s day to day experience and 
converse with them in. An issue which results from this state of affairs is that more 
consideration needs to be given to whether the methods could indeed be used with 
more debilitated sufferers. However, that is not to say the general premise of the 
methodology could not be applied.  
In terms of the trajectory of ME, a significant improvement could be achieved by 
extending the study period to a year or longer and with more data collection points. 
Whilst this would result in an even larger corpus of data to manage it would allow 
exploration of more of the illness trajectory and a shift in focus to how the self 
changed across the period for a given sufferer.  
The issue of reflexivity is a double edged sword. On the one hand, I explicitly situated 
myself as an actant in the sufferer’s network and became part of their lived experience 
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of ME. The analytical justification was that my subjective relation to research visits 
and the sufferer’s experience involved establishing myself as an actant in the sufferer’s 
experience of ME. From this position and by association with actants in the sufferer’s 
world, I could explicitly acknowledge my role in translation and interpretation. For 
instance through my affective response and how this informed ‘following the actor’ 
and feeding my responses back to the sufferer where applicable.  
On the other hand, it can be argued that if a different researcher established themselves 
as an actant in the research process and given that each sufferer is an individual with 
their own potentialities and history, then each analytical interpretation will be 
substantially different. I would argue that should not be the case as long as the 
conceptual and methodological spirit I developed was adhered to. For instance, it 
should be the case that any researcher working with Bruce would arrive at an 
observation of significant actants such as his blender and could connect this to being 
productive. So whilst the nuances of the interpretation might vary, the broad 
perspective should be similar.  
9.5  Personal reflections 
Personal reflection enables an assessment of the researcher’s self and identity in 
relation to the participant and research process as a whole (Hand, 2003). Jasper (2005) 
explains that researchers should also examine their biases and prejudices so that they 
can understand how they have influenced the research. Jasper also claims that by 
uncovering one’s own background, the trustworthiness of the research is enhanced 
because addressing one’s background amounts to acknowledging the centrality of the 
researcher in the research process. This reflexive position is commensurate with the 
ANT-informed stance I adopted. It was necessary to bear my own prejudices in mind, 
given that my personal experience with two consecutive partners who each had ME 
had lead me to focus on ME as a research topic. Thus, Pain and Francis (2003; p.46) 
note that participatory research: 
“...is not so much the methods and techniques employed, but the degree of 
engagement of participants within and beyond the research encounter.” 
The word ‘beyond’ resonates with me because my research became my life for several 
years. I would anecdotally reflect to people that it was the first thought on my mind 
when I wake up and the last thing I think of at night. This statement is quite accurate 
and reflects my degree of investment in the work.  
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As discussed in the opening chapter, at some point during the research process, what 
had been ‘participants’ became referred to throughout my thesis as “the ME sufferer” 
or “the ME sufferers I worked with”. This reflects how my subjective relationship with 
these real people changed as I moved deeper into the work and into their worlds. 
Indeed, my lead supervisor regularly pointed out the need to “keep the sufferer at the 
heart of the research”, but I only came to understand this after the fieldwork was 
complete.  
At the end of this research I am left with mixed feelings. Primarily, a sense of 
frustration at what I perceive as the complex task of engaging with subjectivity and 
understanding the life world of another and to express that understanding in a way that 
does it justice. This may indicate a deep level of anxiety that I cannot or do not want to 
engage with, which I return to below. Despite attempting to symmetrise the relation 
between human and non-human, or the phenomenological/feeling individual and the 
individual as assemblage, my analyses taken as a whole demonstrate a commitment to 
‘real people’. Not real in that they are self contained monads but real in terms of how 
my experience is infused with theirs. This perhaps belies the difficulty in avoiding an 
inherent and perhaps unconscious dichotomy of how people are experienced; how 
one’s self is experienced. It implies perhaps the impossible task of keeping oneself and 
the people one researches affectively and unconsciously unentangled.  
So the ANT/metaphor stance I developed and which allowed me to situate myself as 
an actant in the life world of the ME sufferers I worked with brings to mind Orange’s 
(1995) claim that much of what researchers do, methodologically, is designed to 
defend against unconscious anxiety and emotion. In this sense, becoming an actant 
enabled me to rationalise my emotional response but not to disengage with it. But in 
that light, and in ANT’s light, by becoming part of the network of the ME sufferers I 
worked with meant that they became part of my network. As outlined in the 
introductory chapter, my route into this research was via two personal relationships 
with ME sufferers. I have to ask myself the question: has my research altered how I 
feel about and understand the experiences I had with each of these people and their 
experience of ME? In light of psychosocial approaches such as that of Walkerdine, 
Melody and Lucey a is concern is how explicit I could and should have been about my 
own feelings during the analytic process also required consideration. My conclusion, 
having completed the work, is that my feelings and the implication of my own 
anxieties, responses and so on are present in the analysis as it stands. My methods 
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involved recording my affective responses immediately after each visit, annotating 
transcripts with my feelings and thoughts as part of the process and so on. The 
implication is that reflecting on my experiences with the research and with the 
sufferers was present as on ongoing part of the process. As to whether it is possible to 
‘stay’ with a feeling, enabling it to take a symbolic form such as a thought or a word, 
has to be viewed cautiously. This is because if one accepts any psychoanalytic premise 
then one has to accept that what we think is ultimately a distortion to one degree or 
another, effected by unconscious defences. The implication is that over reflection may 
in fact result in an even more distorted, rationalised or intellectualised version of what 
was felt.  I would instead emphasise that ‘being’ is to allow oneself to be changed; a 
dynamic process. 
As I reflect on this, I experience the impossibility of suspending the understanding I 
now have of ME and remembering and reimagining those relationships by going back 
to the understanding I did or did not have when I embarked on this research. This 
means I have been changed. But perhaps unsurprisingly, given that as Latour might 
note: to become an actant in a network is to allow oneself to be changed. What does 
this means for ME research in a broader sense?  
In section 5.3.8 I noted that in arriving at my choice of presentation of analyses, by 
selecting three individual cases, I had ‘betrayed’ those sufferers I had not represented 
in this thesis. The majority, 60 – 80% of ME sufferers are female. 5 out of 8 of the 
sufferers I worked with were female and yet two of the three cases presented in this 
thesis were male. The betrayal implied thus applies primarily to the female sufferers I 
worked with. My rational choice of cases was based on those which best illustrated 
analytical insights about ME but I have to consider how this relates to my position as a 
male researcher and how this might be implicated in my choices. It is also the case that 
the motivation for my PhD was based on my experience with two successive partners 
with ME. It is not appropriate to engage in second guessing the potential of latent, 
unconscious processes to have shaped my choices. But it is imperative to acknowledge 
that, whatever the motivations, how ME has been represented in this thesis inevitably 
does some disservice to the fact that ME is primarily reported in females and may, in a 
very critical reading, reinforce stereotypical views of ME and its relation to gender and 
discourses of power around it. This requires further exploration. 
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The ‘deep level of anxiety’ which I cited above I now recognise as displaced in two 
senses. Firstly, in my desire to follow up this thesis with research that develops a 
therapeutic application of my thesis which I can take back to the sufferers. In a 
phantasised sense, if I can help the sufferers I worked with then I can make reparations 
for the unconscious anxiety they perhaps evoked in me. Anxiety that may arise via the 
guilt I experienced in not being able to tell each and all of their stories. There is also 
something here about the inadequacy of the case study method I adopted in that no 
story can ever be fully told and this inevitably leads to a gap between how a life is 
experienced and how it can be represented. Secondly, I feel that what, nearly five 
years ago, appeared to me as pragmatic choices about how to choose a topic to build a 
PhD around [ME] and to ensure my proposal was accepted in fact had more to do with 
wanting to cure the people I had relationships with of their ME. This is also where I 
have changed.  
I feel very strongly about how my work, how the relationships I have had with ME 
sufferers in various senses and my future proposal [discussed below] to extend my 
work into a therapeutic direction are themselves thoroughly entangled and yet how I 
can hold on to this entanglement because of what I have learned. Without detracting 
from what might be fruitful future work, the ‘psychoanalytic sensibility’ I sought to 
develop means that I am comfortable acknowledging on one hand that I believe I can 
develop this work for the benefit of others and yet on the other hand recognise my 
subjective investment in that and with the anxieties that circulate both consciously and 
unconsciously. This speaks of the broad phantasy that research and even therapy can 
ever be anything other than thoroughly psychosocial in the sense that I have used that 
term.  
In a more transparent sense, perhaps my whole premise of associations, networks, 
assemblages and connections represent metaphorically an unconscious need on my 
part to be connected and to be part of something greater than myself. It may also 
represent an implicit resurrection narrative in that from my ANT/metaphor premise if 
nothing is really in the past then nothing really dies. This brings to mind Nitzgen’s 
(2004) claim that what brings people to their ideas is the way that personal experience 
and technology structures human relations. Nitzgen is referring to how for instance 
Bion served as a tank commander in World War One long before he theorised the 
paradigm of container/contained. Nitzgen brings the relation between our material 
environment and subjectivity to attention. I would make explicit that this also entails 
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an enduring affective relationship that involves the many other imagined actants that 
constitute one’s ongoing life history. 
9.6 Future directions 
Very little psychoanalytically or psychosocial informed work has been carried out on 
ME beyond one or two cases studies. This was personally reported to me by Professor 
P. D. White, Professor of Psychological Medicine, Barts and the London School of 
Medicine and Dentistry, at the beginning of my research. Where psychodynamically 
informed models of ME aetiology have been proposed, the explanation for disease 
susceptibility is located with a failure of early maternal attunement, leading to later 
psychological and physiological vulnerability (Taerk & Gnam, 1994). Positing such 
causality is incompatible with my conceptual premise.  
However, three sufferers explicitly stated that having someone to talk to in their home 
had been useful for them in terms of having their experience reflected back to them 
and through providing a space in which they could explain and explore their ME 
experience. As I have highlighted throughout this thesis and as Simpson et al. (1997) 
point out from a psychodynamic perspective, each case presents a ‘unique mix’ in 
terms of aetiology. Added to this is the uniqueness of each individual’s lived material 
environment.  
With this in mind, one direction this research could take is to inform a rationale for 
psychotherapeutic intervention in ME that takes the therapy to the sufferer, rather than 
as with all existing approaches which involve visiting a therapist. In line with this, the 
ANT/metaphor approach can be used to inform a protocol which enables the person to 
work through their relationship with people, places and things as contextualised in 
their home and everyday environments. 
For instance, Whimsy was trapped in her flat and this may have been for many reasons 
including financial ones or because the flat was an actant acting in association with 
others metaphorically as I described. It might be beneficial, having identified this, to 
explore with Whimsy what this means for her and whether it or any actants associating 
with it can be re-constellated in a more positive way. Similarly with John, having 
identified his relationship with paper and his flat and how these associate with his need 
to literally escape from his flat might provide a way to explore with him what this 
means metaphorically and what can be done to redress the situation. 
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To date, most psychotherapeutic work takes place in a room dedicated by the therapist. 
The rationale for this developed from the need to contain the feelings mobilised during 
the therapeutic encounter (Gabbard, 1995). It also provided a clear boundary which 
aimed to prevent transgression such as sexual intimacy between client and therapist 
(Gutheil & Gabbard, 1993). However, recent developments in psychotherapy have 
explored practice in non-standard settings such as the home of the client and in what 
might be termed ‘nature’ or the countryside (Jordan, 2009; Jordan & Marshall, 2010). 
A rationale for working therapeutically with people in their home, from the ANT 
perspective, is that the researcher or therapist enters that world as an actant and 
becomes part of the sufferer’s experience and ongoing arrangement. Commensurate 
with this is the ANT/metaphor approach does not utilise pre-existing tools that inform 
various psychotherapies such concepts of true and false selves, splitting, and maternal 
misattunement and so on.  
From a more theoretical perspective, it would be interesting to consider how the 
ANT/metaphor approach could be used to think about existing psychoanalytic 
concepts, given the focus on the relations between people and things. My rationale was 
to think about the confusing and conflicted aspects of ME and thus to consider 
unconscious processes without adopting an existing and specific psychoanalytic 
conceptualisation. Thus, further work can be carried to out to explore the veracity of 
thinking about unconscious processes from the perspective I have described.  
ANT has already proven to be applicable to a wide range of topics beyond its initial 
sociology of science, such as in medicine and care (Mol, 2002; 2008) and law (Latour, 
2009). The ANT/metaphor as an extension of ANT could also be assessed in terms of 
exploring many other conditions that entail chronic illness to provide a different 
perspective on the particular experience of a given condition. The value in bringing the 
ANT/metaphor approach to the study of other conditions lays in the way that it 
brackets off social conceptualisations and specific discourses about the condition. 
Across the duration of this research I have noticed a move in ME literature towards 
establishing ME as an heterogenous condition. The ANT/metaphor approach is useful 
in that it can account for the heterogeneity of actants that such a condition comprises 
and this is likely to be the case for other conditions. It provides a tool that can be 
combined with different ways of exploring associations besides the metaphorical.  
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The scope of this thesis prevents many aspects of my research from being reported and 
indeed, many avenues of exploration had to be discarded along the way. For example, 
I worked on ideas about approaching ME from the perspective of transdisciplinarity; 
an area that appealed because it involves the production of new methods, new theory 
and new languages and results in an epistemological shift (Austin, Park and Goble, 
2008) that reflects a growing concern with moving past dualisms. This avenue requires 
further consideration. I have not been able to report on what I envisaged as functional 
adaptations; a term I developed to describe how Les in particular had traded certain 
material devices for ones that helped him manage his ME without consciously 
realising it. Exploring this avenue would complement existing work on assistive 
devices
33
 and their role in how self is experienced in light of other illnesses. Finally, as 
my research progressed I became aware that the nature of how research is reported in 
peer reviewed journals appears to be intimately linked with how epistemological 
stances are developed and how knowledge of ME takes shape. This inspired me to 
think about the etymological nature of theory development in general and why some 
concepts maintain inertia whilst others evolve or disappear. This resulted in a notion 
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 Assistive devices are items, pieces of equipment or product systems that are used to increase or 
improve daily occupation and participation in everyday life. See for example (Häggblom-Kronlöf & 
Sonn, 2007). For discussions on the relations between assistive devices and self-image see (Moller, 
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Appendix 1: participant information sheet 
Bath University Psychology Department 
Participant Information Sheet: Ref. 11-916 
 
An Investigation of the Home Environment and how it relates to the experiences 
of People with ME 
 
My name is John Fellenor and I am a second year PhD student with the Department of 
Psychology at Bath University. My research is about developing ways of 
understanding how the everyday physical environment and the real objects in it might 
relate to the way that you experience ME/CFS and how this in turn affects your sense 
of identity and how you feel about yourself. 
 
This information sheet provides information about what is involved in taking part in 
this research. 
 
What is this research about? 
The background for this research is based on ideas about how people with ME/CFS 
understand and think about themselves in light of their experiences, beliefs and how 
the real world around us might play a part in that process. The main focus is on the 
role that might be played by everyday things found in the home. 
 
What will happen if I decide to take part? 
Because every day with ME/CFS can be different from the next, the research will last 
for six months and involves the researcher coming to your home for five separate 
visits. During each visit a different aspect of what it is like to live with ME/CFS will 
be looked at. 
 
What exactly will happen each time the researcher visits you? 
The first visit allows me to explain the research to you in more detail and for you to 
ask me any questions you may have about taking part. You will also be asked to sign a 
consent form which shows you agree to take part. After this, we will spend up to an 
hour or as long as you are comfortable with discussing your experience of ME/CFS 
and how this affects your day to day life. This will be recorded with a video camera. 
Subsequent visits are outlined below:   
 
Second visit: 
 Open-ended discussion of how your home environment and the objects in it are 
important to you.  
 An object can be absolutely anything you have in your home and have owned for a 
long or a short time. 
 Video recording will be used as before. 
 
  Third visit: 
 Involves you carrying out a short physical activity from your daily routine that you 
have previously thought about and chosen, which may include using an object or 
item like you would on any day. 
 Examples include: washing up, cleaning, gardening, watching TV, DIY etc.  
 You may like to choose an activity that I can also take part in.  
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 This session will be video recorded but the focus is the activity rather than discussion 
about it.  
 
  Fourth Visit: 
 The activity for this visit will be something important to you that you choose. 
 You may wish to do something similar to the previous encounter, discuss an issue 
that is significant for you or combinations of activity and discussion.  
 
Fifth visit: 
 Discussion of the overall process and completing some semi-structured questions 
about what if anything you feel has changed in your life-experience over the study 
duration; followed by a full debriefing.  
 
At no time will you be asked to talk about things you don't want to talk about, 
show me parts of your home or objects you don't want to or choose to do any 
strenuous activity that you wouldn’t normally do. 
 
Why is a video camera being used? 
It will be useful to video record our discussions and how you relate to your 
environment and activities because not only will it record our conversation but also 
what objects are like and how you use them.  
 
Can anyone take part in this research? 
Anyone can take part as long as they are eighteen years of age or older and have been 
clinically diagnosed with ME/CFS. You can take part, irrespective of your personal 
level of ME/CFS as long as you feel mentally and physically able to do so.  
 
What will happen with the video recording and the notes you make? 
No one apart from the researcher will have any access to video recordings or notes and 
these will be kept at all times in a securely locked cupboard. 
 
Will people be able to tell who I am at any point during the research or from the 
written report? 
No. At the start of the research period you will choose a pseudonym for yourself. You 
will be referred to by this name only in any writings or notes from that point onwards. 
No one will be able to link the written research to you at any point.  
 
I have decided to participate. How will the researcher organise the research? 
If you think you would like to take part then contact me by phone or e-mail [details 
below] and we can then arrange the first visit. 
 
What if I decide that I don’t want to take part or change my mind half way 
through? 
You have the right to withdraw from the research at any time during the whole six 
month period. All you have to do is contact me to let me know you don’t wish to carry 
on and you won’t need to explain why. 







What if I let you handle one of my objects or possessions and you break it? 
Bath University are insured for damages to objects up to £200. This means that if you 
allow me to handle or use an item in your home and I accidentally damage it, it should 
be replaceable and not expensive.  
  
The researcher is a PhD student at Bath University in the Psychology Department. 
 
The researcher can be contacted by e-mail at XXXXX@bath.ac.uk or by phone on 
075XXXXXXXX. 
 


























Appendix 2: Standard brief read to all participants before giving consent 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study which looks at how material objects 
and the physical environment might be part of the relationship between self and others 
in people with ME/CFS. During this study you will not be asked to undertake any 
physical activity or any other activity that you would not normally encounter in your 
everyday life; as such, it should pose you no unusual degree of physical harm or 
stress. Any activities in relation to the study that you decide on undertaking will be 
entirely at your discretion as detailed in the information sheet you have been given.  
Across the six month study period, comprising five visits from the researcher, you will 
be involved at various times in discussing your experience of ME/CFS, carrying out 
everyday tasks or routines with the researcher in observation or joining in at your 
discretion. The form of the discussions will be open ended and I will be asking 
questions about what aspects of the physical environment and the objects in it are 
important to you and why. In other words, we will be having everyday conversations 
where we can both ask and answer questions. I will not be asking you any questions or 
request any information of a personal or sensitive nature and you can decline to 
answer or discuss anything as you see fit.  
As outlined on the information sheet you have been provided with, I will be using a 
video recorder on a tripod to record our discussions and images of the environment 
and objects you discuss. This means that you will appear on the video recording. 
During our conversation you may wish to tell me specific things you want me to write 
down and that is okay. I will not be making any notes at the time of our meetings but 
when the session has finished and I return home I will be making notes about things I 
feel were important or things you ask me to record. I have to ask you two relevant 
questions. If you answer yes to either question then unfortunately I will not be able to 
include you in the study as it may bias the results. Firstly, have you taken part in 
research like this before? 
 
[wait for response and proceed accordingly].  
 
Secondly, having read the information sheet and consent form are you able and willing 
to take part in this study? 
 
[wait for response and proceed accordingly].  
 
Thank you.  
 
I must inform you that if during our research discussion and video-recording you 
disclose any information to me that leads me to believe you might be liable to engage 
in or have engaged in criminal activity or appear to be at risk of harming yourself or 
others then I will need to refer this information for advice to the relevant agencies and 
the university ethics committee.  
In a moment, I will read with you the consent form. I will then ask you to sign that 
form which gives me permission to use you and the data you provide in the report that 
will be written about this study. In the written report of this research, stills from video 
sequences may be included but will be chosen to maintain anonymity. No individual 
will be identifiable from the data they have provided because all personal names will 
be anonymised and references to any specific places or events you have taken part in 
will be made impersonal. As such, your identity in the report will be totally anonymous 
and no person reading the report will be able to identify you from it. In terms of the 
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video-recorded material: no other person shall see this material apart from the 
researcher. Also, the objects you choose and will talk about will not be revealed to any 
other person and will be written about in an impersonal way so that they will not lead 
anyone reading the report to you.  I must also tell you that you have the right to 
withdrawal now or at any time during the study, should you not wish to proceed.  
If this is the case then all you should do is tell me and this meeting will be halted; your 
data will not be included in the report. Do you have any questions that you would like 
to ask me about what you will be doing or about other aspects of the study? 
[wait for response and proceed accordingly].  
 
Ok. Here is the consent form to read and sign  
 








































Appendix 3: Participant consent form 
Bath University Psychology Department 
 
Full title of project: 
 
An Investigation of the Home Environment and how it relates to the experiences of 
People with ME (ref. 11-916) 
  
Name of principal investigator:  John Fellenor 
 
                                                                                                                             Please 
initial box: 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the subject information sheet dated ____ 
for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions which have been 
answered fully           
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving any reason, without my statutory rights being affected 
 
3. I understand that the research report will contain reference to and analysis of data 
collected about me but that at all times this will be anonymised such that my personal 
identity and information will not be discernible to others 
 
4. I am aware that all data relating to me will be anonymised at collection, stored 
securely and destroyed at the end of the research and writing-up process 
 
5. Compensation arrangements have been discussed with me 
 




Name of participant:__              ____ Signature:_____________ Date:_________ 
 
Participant’s date of birth:_________ 
 
 





Appendix 4: Summary questionnaire 
                               
Name:______________________ 
Onset and duration of ME symptoms 
1 To the best of your memory, from which year/month can you remember 
experiencing symptoms which you now associate as ME? 
    ____ years /____ months 
 
2 To the best of your memory, what was the year/month when you first approached a 
doctor or specialist about these symptoms? 
    ____ year /____ month 
3 To the best of your memory, in which year/month did you first receive a diagnosis of 
ME? 
    ____ year /____ month 
4 Have you ever followed an awareness or support course for ME from a specialist 
unit i.e. in a hospital?     
   ____yes/____no 
5 Do you attend or have you attended an ME self-help group? 
   ____yes/____no 




















Please can you tick the relevant box by each symptom that you have experienced?  
If you have experienced a symptom that is not on the list then please add it one of the 




            Symptom 
Frequency of symptom 
Frequently 





(i.e. once or  
twice per  
month) 
Rarely (i.e.  
only  




Impaired memory     
Blurred vision     
Physical fatigue after simple  
tasks that does not improve  
with rest 
    
Sore throat     
Headaches that feel ‘normal’     
Feeling of light-headedness  
when standing up 
    
Headaches of a different kind     
Nausea     
Problems with physical balance     
Bloating of the abdomen     
Sensitivity to artificial lights     
Intolerance of certain foods or 
drinks 
    
Painful or sore joints     
‘Cut glass’ sensation in the  
throat 
    
Chills      
Slowed down thinking     
‘Hangover’ like feeling in head 
and body 
    
Cough     
Chest pain     
Painful or sore muscles     
Anxiety about being on your  
own 
    
Allergies to foods or drinks     
Pins and needles in toes     
Painful eyes     
Irritable bowel     
Flu like symptoms     
Mental fatigue after simple  
tasks that does not improve  
with rest 





Sensitivity to high frequency 
sounds 
    
Night sweats     
Sensitivity to low frequency 
sounds 
    
Feelings of anxiety that last  
for more than a day 
    
Diarrhoea     
Feeling irritable      
Restless legs or feet     
Panic attacks     
Prickly, sore or itchy skin     
Irregular heart beat     
Dizziness when standing up     
Fainting     
Pins and needles in hands     
Sensitivity to busy or 
disorganised noise 
    
Depressed mood that lasts for 
more than one or two days 
    
Unrefreshing sleep     
Fever/high temperature     
Sensitivity to day light     
Breathlessness     
     
     
     
     
     
 
Impact of symptom on daily functioning 
Please can you tick the relevant box by each symptom to indicate its impact on your 




            Symptom 







I can carry out 
my routines or 
activities   
with a little 
difficulty 
Makes it  
difficult to  





routines or  
activities  
Blurred vision     
Physical fatigue after simple 
tasks that  
 Does not improve with rest 
    




Headaches that feel ‘normal’     
Feeling of light-headedness 
when getting  
up 
    
Headaches of a different kind     
Nausea     
Problems with physical  
balance 
    
Bloating of the abdomen     
Sensitivity to artificial lights     
Intolerance of certain foods or 
drinks 
    
Painful or sore joints     
‘cut glass’ sensation in the 
throat 
    
Chills      
Slowed down thinking     
‘hangover’ like feeling in  
head and body 
    
Cough     
Chest pain     
Painful or sore muscles     
Anxiety about being on your 
own 
    
Allergies to foods or drinks     
Pins and needles in toes     
Painful eyes     
Irritable bowel     
Flu like symptoms     
Mental fatigue after simple 
tasks that does not improve 
with rest 
    
Sensitivity to high frequency 
sounds 
    
Night sweats     
Sensitivity to low frequency 
sounds 
    
Feelings of anxiety that last  
for more than a day 
    
Diarrhoea     
Feeling irritable      
Restless legs or feet     
Panic attacks     
Prickly, sore or itchy skin     
Irregular heart beat     
Dizziness when standing up     
Fainting     




Sensitivity to busy or 
disorganised noise 
    
Depressed mood that lasts for 
more than 
 One or two days 
    
Unrefreshing sleep     
Fever/high temperature     
Sensitivity to day light     
Breathlessness     
     
     
 
How do you feel about your participation in this research?  
 
The final questions are about your experience of this research. Please can you tick the 
box that applies to the statement in each case. There is also a space for your own 
comments but you do not have to write anything in this box unless you want to: 
 
Statement Agree Neutral  Disagree Comment  
 
‘The nature of each  
visit was clearly  
explained to me at the 
start’ 
 
    
 
‘I have found taking  
part in this research to  
be an interesting 
experience.’ 
 
    
 
‘The researcher did not  
ask me anything that was 
inappropriate.’ 
 
    
 
‘The researcher did not 
behave in an  
inappropriate way.’ 
 
    
 
‘The research has not 
caused me to think or 
worry 
worry about myself in  
any undue manner.’ 
 





‘My general mood and 
sense of well-being have 
not been made worse by 
taking part in this 
research.’ 
 
    
 
‘At no time did I feel 
pressurised into any 
activity or discussion.’ 
 
    
 
‘I have found taking part 
in this research to be a 
useful experience.’ 
 
    
 
‘The researcher can 
contact me over the next 
year if there are follow  
up questions.’ 
 
    
 
‘I am aware that audio-
visual data that has been 
collected about me will 
be destroyed after the 
research period.’ 
 
    
 













Appendix 5: Standard debrief read to all participants at the conclusion of the 
study period: 
  
Thank you for taking part in this study and allowing me into your home over the last 
six months and sharing and discussing your experience of ME/CFS with me. 
I hope that you found it interesting and that you were comfortable with all aspects of 
the research encounters. 
Before I carry on, are there any immediate issues or concerns you wish to mention? 
 
[Allow participants time to respond and discuss any concerns they raise as appropriate] 
 
Okay. Thank you very much for that. 
The final thing I must make clear to you is that if at any time from now on you have 
concerns about what will be done with the information you provided or if at any point 
you wish to have you participation in the research cancelled then all you need do is to 
ring the number provided on the information sheet, of which you have a copy to keep, 
and this will be discussed with you. If for example you request that you wish to 
withdraw from the research and have your data and recording destroyed then this will 
be carried out. You are under no obligation to the contrary.  
Once again, are there any final things you would like to discuss? 
 
[Allow participants time to respond and discuss any concerns they raise as appropriate] 
 
Once again, thank you for taking part. I would now ask you to sign and date this 





















Appendix 6: exemplar extract of initial affective response 
 
 
Immediately after each visit I recorded my affective response on a Dictaphone in my 
car. The following extract was recorded after my first meeting with Patsy. 
 
‘Has an interesting relationship with her mother who she says late in the discussion 
may have been anorectic as a child. This ties in with Patsy’s relationship to food which 
is difficult in as much that she is extremely fussy about what she eats. Borderline 
eating disorder?  
Lots of illness in her family. I.e. her own illness related to her proven kidney problem, 
her mothers and now her son James who is 27 and may be developing or have ME. She 
has been married from 21(?? FOLLOW UP) met her husband at uni and together ever 
since but she does not talk about him much in the discussion (FOLLOW?).  
Patsy loves the outside and has only travelled in the UK; no foreign trips since 1987 
(FOLLOW). She attributes this to financial constraints. Feeling a connection of 
restriction now at least between diet and money; she doesn’t lavish herself or family 

















Appendix 7: exemplar of affective response to video [from Hannah’s second visit] 
 
This is an extract from my affective response to the first viewing of Hannah’s second 
visit. I recorded my thoughts as they came to me and any insights I had. The first two 
numbers relate to the time on the video and the last three digits are the transcript line 
numbers that match it. This enabled me to tie my affective response at each point with 
what was occurring or being said in the video.  
 
30:13 346 This may lead somewhere significant; about taking water but not liking 
drinking it. 
33:17 377 note her tone as she says that her brother had got her a present when it was 
her Dad was ill. This feels significant. 
34:00 383 This Lumpy is really important.            [Lumpy is a soft toy elephant] 
34:44 395 It is important for her that Lumpy has been ‘touched and held by all the 
precious people’ and is not replaceable. This is very important. 
34:57 398 Her description here of him as he will never be washed reminds me of the 
transitional object. 
35:40 407 Lumpy stands in for her family if she goes away without them. 
36:29 414 This is HUGE as it links ME with the rest of HER LIFE!!!! i.e. to her Dad 
and all that that implies!! 
36:50 418 She says she still would take him now ‘even though I don't need it’ What a 
contradiction!! 
48:07 535 May be a theme here about Hannah feeling the need to position herself in 










Appendix 8: exemplar transcript section 
The following extract is an example of transcript from John’s fourth visit. He has been 
discussing the paper with me. Pause length is given in parentheses. Affective responses 
and observed shifts in body are given as comments. Capital letters in comments relate 
to thematic codes. Numbers in comments relate to specific lines. This enabled me to 
copy and paste coded lines into a subsequent document.  
300 
 
Appendix 9: exemplar of initial gathering of codes 
 
This appendix illustrates how I gathered codes from across a set of transcripts into one 
place. The first tables indicate codes and hence themes for each visit. Codes were 
carried from one transcript to the next and back in an iterative process. Once the 
transcript had been fully annotated I was able to copy and paste each line that 
exemplified a code, as exemplified after the tables. The notes section at the bottom 
included anything that appeared salient that may not have been coded.  
 










Drive to be stronger 
The lack of a supportive frame 
Being told by a credible source what she is 
Becoming self-validating 
Conflation of thinking and psychosomatic processes 
 
 










Different from others 
Weakness from an early age 
Father 



















Out of body experience 
Having to help others  














Instances of codes 
Having to help others; 98(Well a very close friend who was trying to help me 
financially and in all sorts of ways. Was trying to help me with somewhere to live so I 
didn't have to come down these stairs)  




Meditation; 71(Well one of the things I've been doing that’s very helpful is yoga 
exercises um because I believe in yoga. Because I believe it can heal. Um some things 
ha ha), see 356/BR 
Notes 
95(J: So do you feel stuck inside a body that's not working? W: I have yes yeh.) at 101 
she goes on to say (So that’s what I was stuck with. So that’s had some effect. That's 
made me feel trapped), so this is a big metaphorical passage and makes me think 

























Appendix 10: exemplar of metaphoric and metonymic events in the narrative 
The following table illustrates how I utilised psychoanalytic ideas to notice aspects of 
discussion with ME sufferers that appeared significant in metaphoric or metonymic 
processes. Codings such as TS1 relate to the transcript number for that individual. 
Process Suggested significance Example from data sets with notes 
Omissions Barred access to a given 
domain 
TS1 Absolute absence of the literal father from 
transcript with Whimsy. 
Lengthy 
hesitations 
Resistance to  
communication between 
domains 
TS2. I ask Whimsy about the circumstances of her 
car crash. She replies “But they the two passengers 
my passenger and the umm (4.0) the driver (0.5)  
were both about nineteen years old.” 




substitution. These would 
explained in terms of  
Freud’s ‘parapaxes’. 
 John TS1 is explaining how his Mum and Dad had 
split up but some years later decide to get back 
together. John has had animosity for his Dad since 
childhood and states an allegiance to his Mum. 
However, he says “ ... which seemed great on the 
face of it. But (2.0) I was (0.25) in some respects it 
was great. But in other respects I was () I I don't like 
my father. I didn't like the thought of them getting 
back together again. Particularly as he is quite 
domineering and oppressive I didn't want to see my 
mum back in an environment where she might be 
happy.” ‘Happy’ substitutes for ‘unhappy’.  
Jokes, humour Metaphorisation,  
partitioning of metaphoric 
processes in general 
Bruce TS2 is explaining how gardens evolve over 
time “...So when you start looking at a garden in 
those terms in historical terms then they become 
really quite complex cultural artefacts. Now. The 
people I work for at the moment if I tried to talk to 
them like that you know it’d be (touches his  
forelock) ‘get back in your box.’ ‘Yes master.’ For 
fuck’s sake! You know. And it always appals me  
that the people who actually have control who own 
these bright and cultural artefacts are ignorant, 
arrogant, selfish (laughing) and lacking in any sort 




Barring between domains TS2 Whimsy is describing how her mother had tried 
to abort her and says “...Even though recently 
apparently she’d thrown herself down the stairs. So 
 it seems when I was born ha ha ha I was already 
kind of ( ) not umm not ( ) I was already kind of 
knowing I wasn’t wanted.” 
Denials, 
uncertainties 
Barring between domains TS4 We are discussing her divorce and whether it 
links to her ME. She states “And some friends at  
first thought probably I had a broken heart. That’s 
why I couldn't speak and that's why I had a ( ) um 










Sudden activation of 
specific domains in 
communication suggesting 
translation between past 
and present 
TS1 Whimsy has explained how she was driven to  
be stronger as a child. I ask her what was doing the 
driving. She explains she can't answer that but it 
involves ‘childhood trauma’. I sense an affective  
shift and switch to asking her if she had any brothers 
or sisters and then describe another participant’s 
experience. Whimsy exclaims “Phweeeew! Really!” 
but this is out of kilter with what I described. My 
affective notes record that this feels like an affective 
rebalance caused by the actual affective event which 
was me triggering her memory of trauma by my 
asking if she had siblings. Whimsy then proceeded  




between domains or new 
metaphorisation 
John TS2 I have been asking about the significance 
of the cinema. He states “...There's something (>3.0) 
there's something safe about it I guess in  
that respect and you're anonymous as well. Me I'm 
not important to the people around me what's 
important is what's going on on the screen. So  
there is something I think about the darkness and  
combine ( ) the safety of it. I hadn’t thought about 




Partitioning of certain 
metaphoric processes 









John TS2 John has discussed how he hoards paper(s) 
and I feed this back to him how I have felt it. He 
replies immediately and affirmatively “Absolutely!” 
My affective notes record that John might have felt 
understood at this point. 
Narrative 
shifts 
Metonymic substitution  
of content in one domain 
for content in another. 
Sudden jumps in topic to something apparently 
disconnected; Les TS2 ‘L: That's why yesterday 
afternoon I felt (1.0) all sort of ( ) all ( ) don't know  
( ) I thought I’ll go for a little walk see if that does 
anything and it did ( ) it done the trick. (3.0) // Cos 
ah ( ) the cemetery is full actually.’ 
Temporal 
confusion 
Translation and barring  
of past and present 
TS1 Across a short passage Whimsy has extreme 
difficultly establishing the chronology of her collapse 
at work, her car crash, her pregnancy. 
Inconsistent 
logic 
Metonymic substitution  
as above or access barring 
between domains 
For instance that Whimsy illogically fears her neck 
will break.  
Interpretation Bringing together 
metaphoric processes into  
a cluster 
Whimsy throughout interprets ME in terms of 
‘energy blocks’ and ‘energy’ is used metaphorically 






between domains i.e. 
somatic to cognitive 
TS3. We have meditated and she explains her 
experience has been different. I ask here where ME is 
and the video shows her suddenly rub her neck and 







Appendix 11: pen portraits for sufferers taking part 
Participant background    Patsy 
Age at time of data collection: 54  
Date of formal ME diagnosis: 2007 
Onset of ME/ME like symptoms and events implicated by participant: Patsy 
suffered reactive arthritis at age five and seems to have had an ME-like illness age 16. 
She has suffered life-long thyroid and adrenal problems and had a nephrectomy when 
she was 38. In 2005 Patsy began to suffer headaches; this is where she positions the 
start of her ME. In the year leading up to this she implicates two triggering events: 
firstly, having to negotiate looking after her 84 year old mother in law who lived some 
15 miles away and subsequent hospital visits whilst she was dying with bowel cancer. 
Secondly, having to look after her mother after a tonsillectomy. At this time she 
crashed in terms of energy. By 2011 her energy had flagged and interfered with her 
work. 
Domestic situation: Patsy married in 1977 to John. She had her daughter [Zoe] in 
1980 and her son [Joe] in 1984. Patsy and John met at university and have been 
together since. John originates from Somerset and they settled in the area when they 
married. They have owned one other house besides her present bungalow. Patsy’s 
family moved many times when she was a child; from Cheshire down to Berkshire. 
This was primarily due to her father’s ill health.  
Significant relationships: Several individuals are described in depth; most 
significantly Patsy’s mother who had ‘major digestive surgery’ before age 3 moths, 
fractured her skull in a fall at age 2 years, as a teenager she seems to have suffered 
anorexia and subsequently throughout her life had several psychiatric interventions and 
ECT. She also underwent several operations on her spine, bowel and bladder. 
Basically, her Mum spent her life suffering one illness or another. During the research 
period Patsy’s Mum underwent a further operation and died [age 82]. It appears the 
surgeon perforated her bowel and this went undetected; a coroner’s inquiry is being 
held, with the conclusion due just after the last time I met Patsy.  
Patsy’s father is described in less detail. Patsy felt loved by him though he was 
‘emotionally undemonstrative’. He had worked for the coal board but developed 
jaundice. Significantly, her father and his family were ‘country’ and inculcated in 
Patsy a love of the outdoors and nature. Her mother’s family was ‘city’ and Patsy 
seems to have been less close to them. Patsy’s parents split up ‘not long after [she] was 
married’. 
Patsy’s son Joe is 27 and began a computing degree at university but stopped half way 
through to [successfully] publish a computing manual. He subsequently lived in 
London and Reading but seems to have always suffered ‘ME like symptoms’. Now he 
lives back at home ostensibly for health reasons. Patsy believes there is a family 
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disposition to poor adrenal function that is at the root of this. I feel that Joe also shares 
the same slightly asocial personality as Patsy.  
Education and career: Patsy completed science A’ levels and then a psychology 
degree and then entered the teaching profession at secondary level. This choice based 
on what she could fit around a family. Her first post was in a community care school 
but this was too demanding; given she was pregnant at the time. She was made 
redundant from her most recent post, in March 2011. This resulted from a combination 
of low energy [ME] and increasing ethical concerns with teaching. She has remained 
unemployed since but did purchase the rights to a sowing-kit business which now 
hopes to run as a low-level concern. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Participant background    John  
Age at time of data collection: 49  
Date of formal ME diagnosis: 2005 
Onset of ME/ME like symptoms and events implicated by participant: John 
reports having experienced low energy levels and fatigue since early childhood. In 
later life as an adult he was found positive for hepatitis C and posits this as a possible 
foundation for subsequent ME.  The only event which he can link potential hepatitis 
infection to is when he had wisdom teeth out around the age of thirteen. John did not 
suffer an acute phase of ME; his symptomology is typical and the main feature is 
fatigue and low mental and physical energy. This is exacerbating albeit slowly over the 
last decade or so. 
Domestic situation: John lives alone in a single bedroom fourth floor Georgian flat. 
He has owned this flat for some time but did not plan to live there as long as he has. 
The flat may lack enough physical space for John and this is certainly the case in terms 
of his desire to find a larger home where his son can stay. 
Significant relationships: John has never been married. He lived for a short while 
with a girl in London after university in his early twenties and since then appears to 
have had several short term relationships. Around 2000 he met a Polish woman who 
was married and embarked on an affair with her. This resulted in them having a boy, 
James, who is now around twelve years old. James lives with his mother in the York 
and John visits him when he can. John is reticent about James staying in his flat due to 
lack of space and the general ‘environment’. 
John grew up with a mother and father and two sisters; Rachel who is eight years 
younger and Zoe who is eighteen months younger. John describes his relationship with 
Rachel as not close; she left home at age 15/16 to live with her boyfriend. John states 
that he would on occasion hit Zoe. Temperamentally, Zoe is like John’s Dad and this is 
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cited as one reason for their lack of closeness. John was closer to Rachel as she was 
less aggressive but since she moved to America they have become less close.  
John’s father is recurrent in the data and is described as hostile, domineering, 
aggressive, unable to communicate with John, intellectual and emotionally 
suppressing. He appears to have had a significant impact on John’s development. 
John’s mum is described as subservient, a homemaker and not intellectual. John has 
had a difficult relationship with his father and this is ongoing.  
Education and career: John completed A’ levels with some difficulty and embarked 
on a degree in geophysics but did not graduate. He then embarked on a career in the 
RAF as a navigator. After around eighteen months he was dropped from navigator 
training; John cites not being able to keep up with the increasing need for rapid 
thinking. He then joined the military police and remained in this branch for eighteen 
years. During this time John was an officer in charge of up to fifty individuals and was 
posted around the world roughly every two years. 
John left the RAF at age 43 as he felt he could no longer cope mentally or physically. 
He worked part time for pension credits [but eventually was made redundant] and in 
his local cinema a couple of evenings per week. He has now been unemployed for 
some years and works part-time voluntarily in his local Oxfam. He also volunteers at 
his local cinema during their annual film festival. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Participant background    Freya 
Age at time of data collection: 43  
Date of formal ME diagnosis: December 2010 
Onset of ME/ME like symptoms and events implicated by participant: Onset of 
ME like symptoms occurred in 2004 and was acute in that Freya was out walking in 
the countryside and was overcome with tiredness and a sore throat and had to go back 
to her car. The most significant ME symptoms have been peculiar headaches, spongy 
feeling developing into myalgia in the thighs and low energy levels. The symptoms 
have stabilised into clear-cut trimonthly cycles of relapse/remission. There are no clear 
triggers to exacerbations.  
Since childhood Freya has had several illnesses which she mentions but does not 
directly implicate in ME: grumbling appendix/appendicitis as as child and then 
intermittently [finally removed age 24], IBS diagnosis around age 6, glandular fever 
around the same age, acute becoming chronic back pain around age 35 [cured 
overnight with a copper bracelet], depressive episode in her early thirties. She 
describes herself as having depressive tendencies.   
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Domestic situation: For the last seven years, Freya has been in her first long term 
relationship; with Paul. Paul is a freelance music teacher. They live in an old house 
with no children but several small pets. Freya describe she house as generally dark and 
not conducive to light or being able to draw energy from it. Freya has lived in many 
places in England both before and with Paul. She estimates having moved nearly every 
year for fifteen years.  
Significant relationships: Freya has a Mum and Dad who divorced when she was 18. 
This has had a significant effect on her. Her Mum suffered post-natal depression with 
Freya and was in and out of hospital throughout Freya’s childhood. Freya has a sister, 
Julie, who is 5 years younger than Freya. Julie has suffered from eating disorders and 
ongoing OCD since mid/late teenage and has received psychiatric intervention. She is 
described as having an addictive personality and had not worked for the last ten years. 
Julie and Freya’s relationship seems to be marked by ambivalence. Freya is very close 
to her Dad and identifies strongly with him. She describes a ‘split’ in the family with 
Julie aligning with her Mum and Freya with her Dad. Freya also mentions a 
grandmother who she was very close to. One of her objects was a cupboard she 
obtained from her Gran when she died. Her Gran seems to have provided some sense 
of ongoing stability for Freya that was absent from her other relations. 
Education and career: Freya describes herself as fairly academic; growing up in 
Essex and attending a grammar school [Julie attended the local comp]. Freya passed A 
‘levels and then a degree in psychology and maths at Royal Holloway. She enjoyed her 
time in London and engaged in many enjoyable social activities. After graduation she 
joined an accountancy firm which she describes as a mistake, but passed her 
accountancy exams after three years and worked in that line for four years. She then 
moved into human resources for a couple of years and worked in New Zealand for a 
few months. On returning, she completed a master’s degree in Manchester and then 
worked in occupational psychology; which she has done for the last ten to twelve 
years. This work appears to be varied; which she has found interesting but demanding. 
She has worked in places such as Syria and Egypt and often travels around England 
from place to place; occasionally having to cover 800+ miles per week.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Participant background    Hannah  
Age at time of data collection: 25  
Date of formal ME diagnosis: March 2004 
Onset of ME/ME like symptoms and events implicated by participant: Hannah’s 
ME onset occurred when she was age 17, in 2003, and she has no recollection of 
preceding infection or acute triggering event. However, she states that whilst at college 
she did experience bad headaches for some time and ‘experienced a few strange 
things’ and ‘was in town once and just felt really sort of weak and like wobbly’. Her 
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ME was diagnosed at a specialist hospital approximately 2 years after onset. Hannah 
now considers herself to be over the worst phase of ME but suffers ongoing residual 
effects and is reticent to talk of a full recovery to health. At the time of onset Hannah 
had embarked on A’ levels at a local college. She was enjoying these courses but had 
to suspend them due to ME. Prior to ME, Hannah considers her life to have been 
‘normal’. Hannah experiences anxiety in various forms. She reports this explicitly. For 
example, she tends to avoid social situations that involve her having to eat in front of 
others. She avoids crowded places and large parties of people.  
Domestic situation: Hannah lives alone with her Mum in an old stone house in a 
small village. Her Mum does not work. Hannah feels safe and secure whilst in this 
house and yet the world beyond presents as a place where she experiences the anxieties 
outlined above. Hannah’s house has been her family home for some years before her 
birth.  
Significant relationships: Hannah describes her family as ‘close’. She is very close to 
her Mum, who is in her late fifties. Hannah talks of family members in a positive way 
and they have been supportive of her before and during ME. Besides her Mum, 
Hannah has two brothers; 8 and 5 years older than herself. She has been especially 
close to the oldest brother who, by her admission, took on the role of surrogate father 
when she was very young; ‘closer than probably what people would think normal’. 
The reason for this was that her father developed an extremely rare condition 
[Schnitzler’s syndrome] when she around three years old. This appears to be an 
heterogenous syndrome incorporating neurological and motor effects. The father was 
confined to a wheelchair at periods and his health needs affected the family in various 
ways. As such, the eldest brother took the role that the father would have had but 
despite this Hannah was very close to her father, citing the fact that as he was always 
at home she spent more time with him than her peers might have. Hannah views this as 
a positive thing. Her father died at home in 2005 at age 71. This may have been due in 
part to the syndrome but Hannah explains that besides that he may also have had 
cancer and he was of advanced years Her youngest brother lives in the local area but 
the older brother now lives near London and returns every couple of weeks. 
Education and career: Hannah is currently studying for a youth and childhood 
studies degree with the OU; she is in the fourth year of a six year course. This mode of 
study suits her but Hannah struggles with the idea of full-time employment and cites 
ongoing fatigue and fear of symptom reoccurrence by way of explanation. After a 
period of improvement from symptoms Hannah volunteered with a local charity; once 
a week at an after school club. These shorts bursts of activity allowed her plenty of 
time in the week to recover. Eventually she was well enough to work three or four 
sessions per week but recently the charity has lost funding and she is back to one 
session per week. Hannah wants a ‘quiet life’. She wants two children and to do 
‘normal things’. She does not consider herself adventurous and desires a family and a 
home and perhaps a job working with children. 
